Grounds for opposing lying:
St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Bacon, Montaigne
ÒSuppose man imagined that there was no obligation to veracity, and acted accordingly; speaking as often against their own opinion, as according to it; would not all pleasure of conversation be destroyed, and all confidence in narration?Ó Francis Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy.
Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a
promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between
the two significations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or
whether it is right, to make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly of be
the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a
present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered
whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience
than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning,
the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be
much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present,
it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein
according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing except
with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim
will still only be based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly
different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of
injurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action
already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about
elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect
myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked;
but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to
me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however,
and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying
promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Should I be content
that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should
hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I be
able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he
finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate
himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I
can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law
there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my
intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this
allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin.
Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily
destroy itself.
I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everythingÓ
Shapin, A Social History of Truth: ÒIf truth is not supposed to change over time Ð to have a history Ð neither is it supposed to have a sociology. Whatever bears the marks of collective production cannot be truth and honored as suchÓ
ÒSince the acts of knowledge-making and knowledge protecting capture so much of communal life, communities may be effectively described through their economies of truthÓ.
Pragmatist philosophers: truth ÒhappensÓ to an ideaÑÒTruth consists of the actions taken by practical communities to make the idea true, to make it agree with realityÓ.
William James: ÒTruth lives Òon a credit systemÓ Ð Òthoughts and beliefs pass so long as nobody challenges themÓ.
Collective nature of knowledge-production: Òin order for knowledge to be effectively accessible to an individual É. There needs to be some kind of moral bond between the individual and the other members of the communityÓ.
Moral bond = trust
Senses of trust: we usually distinguish between
1. amoral: fulfillment of inductively generated expectations about events in the world Ð e.g. we trust that many people will catch colds in Edinburgh Winters.
2. Morally consequential Ð to trust a person, or to Òtrust that you will fulfill your promiseÓ.
Shapin argues that all 1. is really a disguised form of 2.
ÒtrustÓ derived from ÒtrystÓ Ð an appointed meeting (sounds a little fishy?)
Trust-dependency of social order. How could coordinated activity of any kind be possible if people could not rely upon othersÕ undertakings?
Montaigne: Lying is an accursed vice. We are men, and hold together, only by our word É Since mutual undersdtanding is brought about solely by way of words, he who breaks his word betrays human society. It is the only instrument by means of which our wills and thoughts communicate, it is the interpreter of our soul. If it fails us, we have no more hold on each other, no more knowledge of each other. If it deceives us, it breaks up all our relations and dissolves all the bonds of our societyÓ.
Lodowich Bryskett (1606): untruthfulness destroys: Òsocietie and civill conversation of men, since no man can trust É a lyerÓ. Ð liar lost Òthe title of a manÓ.
Proverb: ÒHe that hath lost his credit is dead to the worldÓ (from Ray, Collection of English Proverbs (1670)
George Mackenzie: untruthfulness Òstrikes at the root of all human societyÓ
Trust in truth telling was cement of society Ð distrust was Òa potent social solventÓ.
Social order of hell Ð Samuel Johnson
Problem for social order created by untruthfulness was the unpredictable reliability of the liarÕs relations (MontaigneÕs problem).
Adam Smith: ÒTo tell a man that he lies, is of all affronts the most mortal. But whoever seriously and willfully deceives is necessarily conscious to himself that he merits this affront, that he does not deserve to be believed, and that he forfeits all title to that sort of credit from which alone he can derive any sort of ease, comfort or satisfaction in the society of his equals. The man who had the misfortune to imagine that nobody believed a single word he said, would feel himself the outcast of human society, would dread the very thought of going into it, or of presenting himself before it, and could scarce fail, I think, to die of despairÓ.
Verbially mediated learning would be impossible in the
absence of trust Ð Barry Barnes
Sissela Bok: ÒTrust is a social good É When it is damaged the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and collapseÓ.
Erving Goffman (work on small scale social interaction): The dealings of individuals in the immediate presence of others have a Òpromissory characterÓ (exactly what is played on by conmen).
Òthe willingness of an individual to credit anotherÕs unconditional and conditional avowals is an entirely necessary thing for the maintenance of collaborative social activity and, as such, a central and constant feature of social lifeÓ (Goffman, Strategic interaction, 104.
Familiarity with individuals, local -> dependence on impersonal systems
Anthony Giddens: set of Òdisembedding mechanismsÓ Ð we rely more and more on physically absent others. Money as a Òdisembedding mechanismÓ.
Face-to-Face contact replaced by trust in systems and abstract capacities (e.g. credit report being required when you want to rent an apartment, and in fact even given the possibility of face to face interaction, the abstract system is preferred and trusted above individual character assessment)
Nullius in verbo Ð royal society motto Ð Òtake nobodyÕs word for itÓ.
Legitimage science seems to be based on rejection of trust. Saying something purely on the basis of trust does not resemble genuine knowledge.
16th century: Montaigne: no harm in the fact that Òalmost all the opinions we have are taken on authority and creditÓ.
17th century: Gilbert, Bacon, Descartes and Boyle made a big thing of taking nothing on trust/authority.
Natural knowledge founded in evidence in nature Ð individual reason. Not in authority of tradition. Real knowledge not based on trust but on direct experience.
Reliance on the views of others produces errors. The best
scientist is thus incapable of functioning as a member of society.
ÒDNA contains cytosineÓ. Test relies on common background assumptions. Scepticism is always a possible move Ð its possibility derives from a system in which we take other relevant knowledge on trust.
Distrust is something which takes place on the margins of trusting systems.
What would be involved in distrusting a piece of well-established scientific knowledge Ð building counterlaboratories etc.
ÒRadical skepicism cannot survive the short trip from the solitude of the study to the streetÓ.
ÒDoubting has an endÓ Ð Wittgenstein, PI, II.v
Ineradicable role of trust, even in skeptical search for individual/independent grounding of knowledge.
Wittgenstein: ÒThe child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after beliefÓ.
Modernism is based on the rejection of trust Ð trust/authority is bad, direct (e.g. Òclear and distinctÓ) perception of truth is the best model. Metaphysics, morals, geometry, logic.
Division of linguistic labour (Putnam) Ð members of English-speaking community can reliably use work ÒgoldÓ without being able on their own to distinguish the genuine from the fake metal.
Rorty: replace Òobjective truthÓ with Òunforced agreementÓ. ÒrationalityÓ is a mode of civility/
The only sense in which science is exemplary is that it is a model of human solidarity (Rorty).
Barry Barnes: Geometrical knowledge and trust
ÒIf an individual knows EuclidÕs geometry up to the twentieth theorem, we can straightforwardly say that he is in a position to prove the twenty-first theorem: he knows all it is necessary to know. But imagine that this knowledge is spread over the members of a society, some known by some individuals, some by others. We cannot say of this society that it knows enough to prove the twenty-first theoremÉ. The technical knowledge would have been present in the society, but not the necessary internal ordering Ð the necessary social relationships --- for the proof to be executed. Individuals would have known enough mathematics but not enough about themselvesÓ.
Bacon
Class questions: