THE DILEMMA OF CONTACT:
Archaeology’s Ethics-Epistemology Crisis and the Recovery of the Pragmatic Sensibility

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ABSTRACT
A consideration of ‘cultures of contact’ for contemporary archaeological practice necessarily involves engagements with non-archaeologists or local stakeholders. These discussions in the literature tend to revolve around ethics. That is, the ethical responsibility on the part of archaeologists to increasingly involve a public that has strong associations with sites that archaeologists study and work at. This paper assays the burgeoning literature devoted to the topic, and makes the claim that ethics is not the right trench to be digging in. This is because the fundamental issues which fuel the debate over whether to involve local stakeholders are at core epistemological dilemmas. Operating according to the deeply ingrained epistemological tradition of correspondence theory, archaeology faces a crisis of ‘doing the right thing’ ethically and incorporating ‘subjective’ values into archaeological representations or retaining objective representations and circumscribing non-archaeological participation. The paper fills out this assessment by examining two archaeological projects from two different contexts: a Traditional Cultural Property in the United States; and the UNESCO World Heritage site of Teotihuacán, Mexico. Pragmatic principles of knowledge justification, a ‘third-party’ philosophical tradition eschewing correspondence theories of objectivity, are discussed as a neither/nor solution to the current ethics-epistemology crisis. Implementing a ‘mediating archaeology’, based upon pragmatic justification of archaeological knowledge, is discussed in relation to an ongoing project at Teotihuacán.
IS THERE A DILEMMA OF CONTACT?

As way of introduction, I think it first important to explain what this ‘dilemma’ is all about. Such a ‘full-stop’ word does wonders in academia by underscoring the importance of inconsistencies in reasoning which were overlooked; or, more likely, felt to be satisfactorily dealt with as to not warrant such a red-light signifier. And the very reaction of audiences to dropping ‘dilemma’ in a title quickly breaks down the range of reactions to a full spectrum. Yet, as we might expect, the spectrum refracts between two poles: those immediately put off by such words in a mature archaeology where intractable problems have long been mused over (and solved?); and those curious as to what the ‘dilemma’ could represent for archaeology—for me to explain myself.

With currency of talk in the human sciences leaning away from binaries, unification or such ‘poles of reaction’, why might I still insist upon the divisiveness of a two-horned dilemma? Though my approach is aware of the entire spectrum of sentiments, I am going to argue from the premise that unless the concerns of the two extremes are addressed, the middling reactions tend to ignore inconsistencies and go about business as usual. Analogous to a bi-partisan political system, there simply rests the reassurance that pulls in two directions inexorably compromise for the ‘middle’. With statistics, a mode, medium or mean of data are incalculable without defined limit values on either side of a distribution. And like the predictable reactions to the term ‘dilemma’, I will argue that there are two limit-defining reactions in current archaeological discussions of ‘stakeholder groups’, or ‘non-archaeological interest groups’, that a social or anthropological archaeology engaged with ‘cultures of contact’ ought to consider more closely. (At the outset, I must disclaim that I am going to assume the necessity of such discussions themselves, particularly in countries such as Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, as such informing predilection was the inspiration for the current volume).

In this paper, I want to suggest a third party, and outline the tenements of a third movement which, though wider than and gaining momentum outside of archaeology, has yet to be seriously discussed in the discipline. While such a sensibility or ‘third party approach’, what I am tagging ‘mediating archaeology’, must be discussed later, at the outset I want to identify its legacy of crossing well-worn, extra-disciplinarian divides between analytic-continental philosophy, science-humanities, objectivism-subjectivism, fact-value and so forth. Such pragmatic thought has derived from a curious imbroglio of post-positivist philosophy and ethnography and has been applied in the trenches of the science wars with science and technology studies (STS). Acknowledging my influence at the beginning will aid in anticipating the movement I
am wanting to push for, highlight my intellectual debts and, critically, mobilize historical case studies for why I feel such recent thinking not only is appropriate for archaeology and its most divisive issue, but why archaeological practice is form-fit to contribute to such thinking as well. Indeed, archaeology has historically and continues to sit atop a humanities-natural science split and, as a consequence, has developed a unique sensibility of practice that cannot be properly located in either camp or in a hybrid of the two. As I will draw out, this archaeological sensibility is a pragmatic sensibility. As the discipline has little discussed pragmatic thought, the time is right for an identification of this unique sensibility against the backdrop of a contrastive problem.

My conclusion that there exists an ethics-epistemology crisis fracturing archaeology along reactive lines is based upon the burgeoning literature addressed to such anxiety (Bender 1998; Bray 2001; Carmichael 1994; Hodder 2004; Lynott and Wylie 1995; Meskell 1998; Kehoe Nelson 1990; Nicholas and Andrews 1997; Patterson Schmidt 1995; Swidler et al. 1997; Vitelli 1996; Zimmerman et al. 2003. The more acrimonious exchanges tend to constitute ‘manifestos’ for or against such inclusion and are lime-lighted in the flurry of scholarly journal articles: Anyon and Ferguson 1995; Fotiadis 1993; Goldstein and Kintigh 1991; Green et al. 2003; Hale 2002; Hemming 2000; Hodder 2002; Marshall 2002; Mason 2000; McGuire 1992; Meighan 1992; Meskell 2002; Mulvaney, 1991; Oyuela-Caycedo et al. 1997; Politis 2001; Powell et al. 1993; Shepherd 2003). I will briefly discuss my own work with governmental archaeology in the United States, as well as my on-going project at Teotihuacán, Mexico. For academics what better diagnostic is there than literary output? Such output has revolved centripetally around topics of ‘archaeological ethics’ and ‘indigenous’ or ‘non-archaeological stakeholders’. This is the archaeological-scape of post-NAGPRA familiar to many of us, encompassing the horizon of even those archaeologists not directly working in compliance with mandatory statutes or in highly politicized contexts. Why might this be so? Why is recent discussion of ethics so visible in professional society debates, at conference proceedings and in the literature? Is this evidence of the dilemma of which I am trying to convince you?

I want to put forward that it is not ethics per se that grabs our attention and preoccupies us. Ethical conduct certainly is an admirable compass point for orienting professional paths. Yet what the discussions of ethics rarely directly address, but which drives the more public debates, is epistemology, or questions over a theory of knowledge for archaeological reasoning (although notable exceptions include Mason 2000; Watkins 2000; Watkins 2001; Wylie 2002; Zimmerman 2001). Epistemology is as troubling as it sounds. A mention of the word conjures stuffy, abstract reasoning and
worse, rules of logic. None of which would square very well with the idea of archaeology as a hands-on (and dirty) activity ‘out there’ in some remote location. What would archaeology have to do with this hallowed specialization of philosophy, with the study of the nature of knowledge and justification? However, archaeology, more than most other disciplines in either the sciences or humanities, has many hurdles to jump in getting from the down and dirty of field work to accepted knowledge claims of just what happened ‘out there’ in the past. There are all sorts of epistemological warnings which flash when archaeological reasoning goes about bridging past and present, from objects in ruin in the present to subjects in the past. All of this complicated further by the fact that archaeology, unlike the experimental sciences or textual humanities, ‘destroys’—or at least transforms—the tenuous remnants of evidence it does have in its pursuit of explaining this tattered evidence. So while many archaeologists, even those who have contributed to epistemological debates in the discipline, feel its time to get-on with the doing of archaeology (Cowgill 1993, Flannery 1973, 1982), or at the least to merge the rampant theorizing with the dirt and field of practice (e.g. Hodder 1991, 8, 1999; Watson 1991, 272-3), the deflection to ethics will, I argue, only deepen divides amongst archaeologists as core inclinations formed by epistemological leanings only get buried. Particularly when the discipline is involved not only in internal, ‘theoretical’ wranglings, but, as it increasingly operates in a post-colonial or postmodern setting, is mandated from external interests to incorporate equally imbedded, non-western or local ideas about what counts as knowledge.

While there were early, pre-NAGPRA cooperative projects that placed priority on consultation and inclusion of non-archaeologists, it was the binding legislation of 1990 which sparked such a controversy. And some of those involved in the legislation, such as Echo-Hawk and Trope (2000) as well as early commentators (Mason 2000), pin-pointed the divisive issue at the root: NAGPRA, particularly section 7, paragraph a (25 U.S.C.A.§7(a)4) mandates the consideration of folklore, kinship and ‘oral history’ in establishing ‘cultural affinity’ for claims to repatriate cultural material and/or human remains. Additionally, the following section 8 (ibid:§8(b)a-c) prescribes punitive damages to insure compliance. Now, NAGPRA’s full statutes have already been discussed somewhat, and I leave full exegesis to those more qualified (see esp. Echo-Hawk and Trope 2000; Mihesuah 2000). My point in citing this particular section of the binding legislation is to underscore that, yes, NAGPRA demands consultation with archaeological stakeholders—Watkins’ ‘legiethics’—but, fundamentally, it sets up as an outcome for such consultation the altering of standards of evidence in archaeological reasoning. I believe this is what
Wylie (2002, 243-4) presciently (and optimistically) acknowledges when she sees ‘non-scientific goals’ requiring ‘productive transformation’ of the discipline; and Zimmerman (2000, 2001) when he sees the development of a ‘new and different archaeology’. A few other scholars on both sides of the spectrum I mentioned earlier also anticipate the epistemological challenges and adjustments for the discipline (Mason 2000; Echo-Hawk 2000; Zimmerman 2001, 170).

It is not the consultation process with the public interested in archaeology which is the source of anxiety (though some may abjure even from this). I believe most archaeologist have an inherent interest in communicating to the public about their research. And some, stemming from familiarity of the debate in archaeology concerning ethnographic analogy and ethno-archaeology, would probably agree that consultation with stakeholders, at a minimum, may in fact helpfully expand the range of models and potential hypotheses for testing (more of this later). So while there is ‘more work’, particularly of a bureaucratic kind, there may be pay-offs for archaeological reasoning as conceived in deductive or inferential modes. Additionally, with ethical codes of professional societies (such as Society of Professional Archaeologists (SOPA) or Society of American Archaeology (SAA)) setting the expectation for consultation as professionally respectable, there really seems little point in debating the need for ethics in archaeology. What still may be usefully debated, with respect to ethics of inclusion, is the degree or scope of involvement based upon underlying ethical models utilized (Intuitionism, Formalism, Contractarianism, Teleological, etc) and this, contrary to how it is framed, rests on issues of epistemology. So, to convince you of this, I want to turn attention to the ‘epistemology-engine’ (cf. Ihde and Selinger 2005) driving the discipline and why it has broken down. Reparations are in order, but not in first order to ‘the Other’ of archaeology. Following the sage maxim “put your own house in order before attending to your neighbor’s”, fixing the engine will drive the ethical change necessary down the road.

DRIVING THE GREAT DIVIDE: REPRESENTATION AND ITS TWO-LANE HIGHWAY

Now, to demonstrate I am not just a ‘post-ism anthro-apologist’ hooking onto a bit of legislation to wield deconstruction of traditional standards of practice, let us get specific. An exploration of the dominant reactions to non-archaeological inclusion will prompt an appeal to the alternate-party approach I stated above. An anticipation of the change to the discipline may take two tracks depending upon the received-view that is dominant in particular archaeological camps.
The controversy over the status and admissibility of ‘oral history’ within alternate patterns of argument in archaeology is a good place to begin. In a series of exchanges in Antiquity, Roger Echo-Hawk (2000) and Mason (2000) debated the evidential status of such history, and how/if it should be incorporated into archeological models of past mechanisms and processes. Mason argued vehemently that oral history and other established lines of archaeological evidence were simply ‘irreconcilable’ due to oral history lacking several key, shared characteristics: ‘rational’, ‘open to verification’, ‘search for order via reductionism’ (Mason 2000, 240). The scientism in Mason’s dismissal is apparent if unsurprising. The crux for Mason is that oral history cannot be demonstrably related to physical, real processes. Thus it is relegated to ‘entertainment’ (Mason 2000, 263). Though he does not explicitly state his position on analogical reasoning, his argument indicates that oral history would fall short in either the additional capacities of building potential hypotheses (use in abduction) or as a converging form of evidence for more robust, causal claims. For Mason, therefore, we can say that he launches an epistemological argument against the mandated inclusion of oral testimony that authors such as Echo-Hawk are proposing.

Echo-Hawk disputes the discrediting of oral history as particularistic, subjective and lacking causal relation to identifiable physical processes. He cites the Arikara testimony as long-term history of North America (2000, 267-70). In the paper, he does two things which are of immediate interest. One, he assumes the veridical nature of the oral account and re-designates it ‘oral record’; and two, as a record, he advocates its complementary usage with the archaeological record for reconstruction of the past. It is less for analogical reasoning than as a ready-made parallel account useful for bolstering other lines of evidence in explanation by convergence. Roger Echo-Hawk (2000, 270-2) suggests a similar realist stance to oral history as a ‘complimentary’ source of evidence.

The debate over how to integrate stakeholder participation, in this case the status of oral history, revolves around not ethics, but around the informing epistemological positions and their mutual compatibility. Such discussions that attend to the details of how to incorporate non-archaeological stakeholders turn not on what is ethically right, but on what is right. Additionally, the oral history debate refracts a general prism for viewing one of the lanes (of the two I alluded to earlier) the discipline

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1 Others have contributed assessments concerning the status of oral history and its place in archaeological explanation, particularly Anyon et al 1996; Anyon et al 1997; Ferguson et al 1997. Two commentators draw explicit and reasoned accounts for and against the incorporation of oral history in archaeological explanation (see Mason 2000; Echo-Hawk 2000).
is taking over the dilemma. I will call it realist-circumscription. Debated in epistemological terms, those tending towards a realism hold that, irrespective of the specific (and usually multiple) tactics of argument employed—whether nomothetic-deductive, inferential model building, statistical modeling, analogical reasoning, etc.—the goal of archaeological inquiry will be to approximate the actual, preferably causal, conditions which obtained in the past. It is a reconstructive effort to mirror in arguments the selected-for conditions responsible for the archaeological record. Obviously there will be a range of diversity with respect to both scale and scope of these causal factors, depending upon the informing position. So they may range from large syntheses aiming high for general and widespread covering-laws, or they may start inductively, building from more local and ephemeral details, to posit less subsuming factors.

For involvement of non-archaeological audiences, a sweep of the literature establishes a coherent pattern of involvement of stakeholders via induction to normative archaeological methodology and theory based upon this overall stance to reconstruction. Thus participation, even if untoward such as the proposal of an alternate (oral) history, is incorporated into a realist framework for sharpening the archaeological image of the past. Such a response to stakeholder participation makes historical sense as the discipline already has an extant body of theoretical literature going back to the early 20th century discussing methods for enriching the ‘source-side’ of models for testing. A common thread to such positions, whether aligned specifically with deductive and inductive positions, is the ability for non-archaeological record ‘sources’ to add robustness to the interpretation of the record. Among such positions, ethnoarchaeology, ethnographic analogy, and standpoint theory may be identified as practices oriented towards enriching ‘source side’ parameters for subsequent testing against the ‘subject side’ of the record (Wylie 1989, 1992). Some may even propose radically unexpected ‘models’ for testing. The overall goal is a better, more objective representation of past.

This seems common-sensically sound, but such a realist-circumscription approach begins to break down when apparently incommensurable conceptual schemes for determining ‘desired knowledge’ and evaluative principles are warranted, as with Traditional Cultural Properties (TCP’s) and sacredness as a ‘causal’ explanation for and criterion of ‘significance’ (King 2003; developing from Bulleting 38 of the National Park Service, see Parker and King 1990). Such post-NAGPRA amendments to the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)\(^2\) problematize such an incorporative approach where stakeholder participation is limited to an application of, and education in, this normative archaeological framework—a ‘confined’ participation as trained-archaeologist. As Parker and King (1990) outline for identification and evaluation of TCPs in the States under new National Park Service (NPS) guidelines, a site may be ‘a-archaeological’ under normative definitions lacking even—as with the case of Mount Shasta for instance—substantive archaeological material. Nevertheless, Bulletin 38 stipulates the consideration of TCPs as significant and amenable to National Register protection, despite the acknowledgement that the criteria for establishing significance does not necessarily entail the presence of artefacts. Instead, the criteria discuss the local valorization and usage of locales that hold significance for cultural practices.

A case in point is a site documented by myself for the US Forest Service on the Comanche National Grasslands (Webmoor 2003). The paucity of diagnostic surface material and lack of sub-soil deposits all, under standard NHPA section 106 criteria, lead to a determination of the site as ‘unlikely to contribute significantly to an understanding of prehistory’ and thus ‘insignificant’ and not eligible for inclusion on National Register for protection (FIGURE 1). However, when told by representatives from the Comanche Tribal Council of Oklahoma that the ephemeral site was a vision-questing locale, ‘significance’ could be conferred based upon local attribution of ‘sacredness’. Additionally, subsequent documentation proved contentious as even the disclosure (GPS coordinates) of the ‘site’ on State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) forms was contested. In the literature, such incongruous valorizations of ‘the past’ may border on outright acrimony, with charges of ‘scientific imperialism’ (White Deer 1997) or further ‘co-optation of alterity’ by ‘western discourse’ (Gnecco 1999), not to mention the more mainstream media commentary by Vine Deloria Jr. (1997). As counter-productive as such outright declarative characterizations seem to most archaeologists, there is legal leverage (particularly in the United States under NAGPRA and NHPA amendments) for demanding determination and control of archaeological sites.\(^3\) Again, as with issues of oral history, the controversy revolves not around ethical

\(^2\) The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966 (Public Law 89-665) established the framework for conducting archaeology in the United States on public land or with public funds which is still utilized in its rudiments today. Expansion of the National Register of Historic Places, establishment of an Advisory Council to adjudicate compliance, and detailing the Section 106 process for insuring compliance—regulated through 36CFR 60 and 36CFR 800—were all ushered in under the sweeping legislation.

\(^3\) Kennewick Man provides the complementary example to archaeological sites, where vituperative exchanges vocalize the gravity of the stakes for scientific-sovereignty negotiation, see Watkins 2001; Watkins 2003.
issues of whether to consult with local tribal councils or not (as it is mandated for section 106 compliance), but the epistemological wrangling of how to correlate or mitigate the at times intractable frameworks for knowing a site such as a TCP.

Dissimilarly, however, to the conglomerate of responses within an archaeological framework to an issue such as oral history which I have adumbrated, another course-of-action taken by some archaeologists, where such ‘ethno-philosophies’ abut, tacks an alternate but well established response. These move along the spectrum of types of understanding coined by Wilhelm Dilthey away from erklärung towards verstehen. From a cultural and social perspective, such moves away from compatibility of frameworks, far from threatening epistemic soundness, provide the subjective and personally mediated, and so all the more humanistic, insight into the human experience. Subtle existential details are precisely what tend to be glossed in realist-circumscripive programs. So the other direction on the two-lane road I am using as a metaphor tends toward an anthropologizing of archaeology, placing interpretive goals on a more nuanced, personal and socio-political context.⁴

A PRAGMATIC NOTION OF HUMAN INQUIRY AND MEDIATING ARCHAEOLOGY

While the majority of negotiations lie along the spectrum between these general poles I have identified, such as descriptive accompaniment to more quantitative data on causal factors, the impasse in operating assumptions and goals for archaeological knowledge is apparent—particularly for those here at Stanford. As I assay the contemporary situation, we inherit the following consequence: our neo-liberal values of the academy urge us to be inclusive (and of course ethical) while retaining our inherited adherence to epistemological safeguarding. Such a personal and intellectual inconsistency places us in a compromising position. Let me again summarize the resulting maneuvers along the circumscribed spectrum: 1) archaeologists outright confine rational inquiry to epistemological standards to ensure objectivity and so exclude stakeholder opinion; 2) more middling-way and less conflict producing is to ‘include’ stakeholders in rational inquiry albeit circumscribed by adherence to standards of archaeological practice developed according to the correspondence (objectivity) goal in mind; or 3) (less common in discipline) move to anthropological inclusion where descriptive inclusion on the part of stakeholders is included alongside more traditional archaeological

⁴ Hacking 1999 draws the keen insight that there may be more similar ontological maneuvering than expected, with ‘social constructivism’ replacing ‘external reality’ with ‘society’ as the bedrock of causal determinism. For a parallel questioning of the premises of ‘social archaeology’, see Witmore and Webmoor 2007.
accounts of archaeological material. I would argue that all three adjustments are negative in the sense that they want to minimize the hybridization of results which would, under the belief in correspondence, relegate such archaeological inquiry to ‘biased’, ‘politically motivated’ or value-laden.

So while not black and white—with a range of re-formulations of practice based upon external mandates and ethical recognition—along the spectrum, all three approaches falter upon the still dominant worry to produce ‘Representationalist’ account of ‘the Past’. Why is this not productive? My thesis is this: the apparent conflict between ethics and epistemology is only driven by a correspondence theory of truth—old Platonic distinctions between knowledge and rhetoric/opinion, reality and appearance, and fact and value. Such defining conditions regarding what constitutes beneficial knowledge lingers from the vestiges of an epistemological tradition most forcefully convened by logical-positivists with the ‘cognitive significance’ demarcation criterion. These dichotomies must be re-threaded in order to operate with a more common endeavor in archaeology without the fracturing tension pulling in two centrifugal directions.

The shift that I am arguing for—with influences of pragmatism, in the American tradition—is not entirely new to the discipline (e.g. Gaffney 1987); but it requires an abeyance of inherited notions of correspondence as being the definition of ‘truth’ in human inquiry, and the re-framing of what we believe is the desired end result. What difference does the notion of ‘right representation’ do? Thinkers such as James (1907) and Peirce (1955) suggest that a representationalist account just does not go very far:

Grant an idea or belief to be true [but] what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? . . . What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms? (James 1907, 114).

As James continues,

…the fact that the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action…and that our duty to gain truth, so far from being a blank command from out of the blue…can account for itself by excellent practical reasons. . . [truth] passes from cold-storage to do work in the world, and our belief in it grows active (Ibid., 115).

Truths do work in the world; they pay. Analogous to health, strength, happiness and other processes connected with getting-on in life, ‘truth’ from the pragmatist account is simply a collective name for processes that are made in an on-going negotiation with
experience. We can think of it as something possessed or inherent, but this abstracts the phenomena under inquiry and cuts the life-ties to in-action that gives truth its recognizable functions. Rather than static or essentialist, justification is a process that helps us deal, both practically and intellectually, with our articulations in the world. And because of this active-quality, ‘truth’ is a ‘leading-to’, or a becoming, which integrates us better and more fully with experience. It is a tool for fulfilling functional purposes, however diverse these purposes are defined.5

Rethought in Dewey’s (1957) and Rorty’s (1979) metaphor as adaptive tool, ‘truth’ makes no claim to the accurate mirroring of ‘nature’ or ‘external reality’. Building upon the failure of positivist-led analytic philosophy to tag particularistic bits of reality with bits of language as direct correlation—such as Russell’s atomistic program—thereby laying a correspondence foundation for more complex (synthetic) statements about reality, the pragmatists emphasize that truths do work. This move obviates the skeptical gap (long historically established) that opens between words, representational media, knowledge claims and ‘external reality’. Instead of ‘fit’ to reality as representation, the question is (pragmatically) reformulated. If a knowledge claims is ‘good’, it is kept as an operating principle not because of axiomatic reasoning or non-falsification by hypothetico-deductive testing, but because it aids our various endeavors in negotiating experience.

As the methodological touchstone of archaeology, let us consider mapping as a case in point. There have been debilitating critiques, particularly from post-colonial quarters, of the inherent bias of western cartography and its representational ‘scopic regime’ (Harley 1992 for the most strident critique). Yet would any archaeologist step into the field without a map? Even a phenomenologist wandering the moors of England and looking for non-textually inscribable relationships between material remains and landscape carries a map. I daresay otherwise s/he would get lost. So why universally utilize the map despite being a relative (i.e. ‘western’) medium which cannot irrefutably establish its correspondence to ‘out there’. Because our experience with maps is that, more than any other navigating or organizing tool, they work. The map works like a cognitive and sensory prosthesis in the hands of a map-user (Webmoor 2005 on ‘mapwork’). Without it, the archaeologist cannot perform the same work as

5 Pragmatism is not a ‘relativism’ as there is no skeptical questioning of the causal relations to world, Putnam 1995. If anything, pragmatism assumes from the outset—as it considers the legacy of Descartes’ methodological doubt to be a mistaken precedent—direct, casual enmeshment with the world, cf. ‘retrodiction’ in Rescher 2005. It is Davidson himself who offers a ‘triangulation’ notion of language and understanding directed at undercutting the relativism of conceptual schemes and paradigms of scientific research, Davidson 1985.
with it. And a map (of course) does not work as a navigating and orienting tool except when associated with a located map-reader. Having a map will enable not only certain decisions (such as where to survey, where to excavate, where to predict subsoil deposits), but will likely ‘suggest’ these possibilities. The map is a pragmatic tool par excellence. Like a Heideggerian ‘tool-to-hand’, when thought about in a course-of-action, the map confounds any traditional epistemological discussions of representational accuracy. It is a cyborg-like mixture of people/things which in action cannot be purified out (for mixtures in archaeology, see Webmoor and Witmore 2007).

So, far from relativism, pragmatists divest themselves of the realist’s positing of a skeptical ‘gap’ between words and things, and discard the realist-idealist distinction in epistemology that was misguided from the outset. Instead, the ‘cash value’ is placed upon practical efficacy in obtaining specific goals. If such a characterization smacks of common-sense, it should. When we stand back from our theoretical positionings there is therapeutic recognition of how archaeologists routinely operate in the field, in the planning of projects, or in the laboratory. If it was once said that archaeological interpretation is ‘data-led’ (cf. Hodder 1999), it seems more appropriate to say that archaeological practice is in fact goal-led. We can say there is an irreducible theory-data relationship, but to say so is only meaningful in the context of archaeological work; and in-action, all pursuit is practical pursuit geared towards immediate and long-term goals. We hold our practical goals much more intimately than our theoretical ‘biases’. While simplistic (though not a simplistic instrumentalism), there is much to be gained from acknowledging our pragmatic sensibility.

Updating Dewey and James, Rorty (2000) and Putnam (1995, 2002) push the image of truth as tool, not as ‘mirror of nature’. In doing so, their emphasis links-up with a host of students of science such as Hacking (1983, 1999) who, involved in experimentation, acknowledges that truth of things is assumed (not questioned from the outset) if they are instrumentally useful (the veracity of his sprayed sub-atomic particles). Ideas are not judged on terms of their supposed picturing capacity—in fact, Hacking would disavow (along with his positivist predecessors) such theoretical realism. Truths are kept if they fulfill goals and practical tasks. And much the same movement has taken shape in Science and Technology Studies (particularly Actor-Network-Theorists and notables such as Latour) where the epistemological gap raised by skepticism is closed as a result of not being useful in characterizing the increasingly inter-connected networks of people-things (such as the archaeological map) (e.g. Callon 1997; Latour 1999; Law and Hassard 1999). Instead of these representational goals for knowledge, pragmatic thinkers emphasize identifying multiple, practical goals.
and setting to work to see, through the causal constraints of reality, which will function best in meeting these values. Thus, there is a Darwinian/naturalized characterization to knowledge which intersects with the idea of stakeholder participation: the more courses-of-action undertaken with various practical goals in mind, the more democratic the inquiry process, the more likely that broadly useful truths serving the practical needs of society will emerge (cf. Dewey 1925, 1957 and his democratic inquiry).

As a case in point in global heritage, there are over 69,000 denizens of the Valley of Teotihuacán, Mexico, with several thousand more each year emigrating from Mexico City 45 km to the southwest. Situated at the border (at the boundary of federal property) of five growing pueblos is the UNESCO World Heritage site of Teotihuacán itself (FIGURE 2). The recent construction of a Wal-Mart within the site’s peripheral zone garnered much national and international media attention and mobilized local residents, valley merchants, and spiritual leaders (FIGURE 3), as well as Mexico City intellectuals, around the debate pitting transnational, economic interests versus values of national and symbolic ‘origins’ and prehispanic pride. What was to be the middle-American mogul’s impact upon cultural heritage and Teotihuacán’s role as a spiritual center (FIGURE 4); especially with the Wal-Mart visible (just 1.4 km from the main gate) from the summit of the pyramid of the sun?

Interviews with these local leaders and activists conveyed the impression that Wal-Mart’s economic impact upon traditional markets, as well as the blatant abutment of ‘pre-modern’ with ‘high-modern’ symbols, formed the focus of the valley’s angst. But what, in total, were the values held for Teotihuacán, and what were the goals for its future? Five over-riding goals were identified through statistical sampling and an ethnographic survey of 471 locals and Mexican national visitors to the site: Heritage, Archaeological Science, Economic Interest, Diversion/Entertainment and Spirituality/Religion (Webmoor 2007). While interest in further archaeological production of ‘scientific knowledge’ contributed to valorizations of the zone, the study identified at least four other desired goals, not normally considered by archaeologists for future endeavors at the site. Indeed, even the row over the Wal-Mart had not brought to light some of the values held by locals and visitors. In particular, the strong statistical correlations between scale scores compiled for each of these goals suggest that non-archaeological goals for research cannot be separated out from economic and heritage related goals (FIGURE 5). ‘Inheritage’, combining the mutually involved associations of these three broad goals for Teotihuacán as an archaeological site, better conveys the integration of activities all carried out through the nexus of a single site. These may or may not overlap with those parameters of research identified as goals for archaeological investigations, but the question from the outset must be: what is to be gained from
archaeological understanding?; and is there the basis in local contexts for such goals as well? If not, in conjunction with archaeological research, there may now be formulated alternate goals of research at Teotihuacán that are rooted in the practical goals of the surrounding population. From a pragmatic perspective, the more diverse the goals identified in planning and implementing multiple courses-of-action, the more likely that beneficial knowledge on a complete societal level will emerge. Such diversification of research at Teotihuacán would be undertaken to meet a democratic range of purposes. As the survey identified, these would specifically involve economic benefits to the local and national economy, contribution to national identity, and a continuance of archaeological research which enervates and feeds-into these primary goals. Spiritual and diversionary values, though held by a minority of the respondents, nonetheless associated very strongly with Teotihuacán and must be considered as well. In all, Teotihuacán envelops a loose set of interacting, ‘associative niches’ which span the range of archaeological and non-archaeological goals and values.

Now the next question arises: why should we do this? There is not enough space to do justice to the supporting arguments, but they should be familiar from extra-disciplinarian literatures: 1) history and philosophy of science; 2) lesson (failure) of analytic philosophy and positivism—now post-analytic movements in philosophy; 3) ‘external mandate’—‘legiethics’ that the discipline cannot ignore; 4) trajectory in archaeological theory and practice. In this paper I have attempted to sketch the latter two as they are intertwined with the moral: we are no longer insular in the global heritage context. In response, I feel the lead is to consult these two promptings—external and internal to academia—and usefully combine them.

Where are we and where do we want to go? What is our goal: stakeholder participation in global heritage? What is our goal: to be ethical. A pragmatic frame-of-mind then asks how to attain such a goal, what will make a difference? A pragmatic approach to inquiry is ethical from the ground-up, and so does not present the awkward band-aid maneuvers to include non-archaeological participation in an attempt to still dawn the legitimizing results of ‘objective’ correspondence. Giving up on the discredited notion of representation will aid in this goal to include alternate interests in global heritage, as without representationalism there is no longer the fact-value distinction, and the goals of stakeholders are incorporated from outset to define distinct courses-of-action for a mediating archaeology.

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6 I have addressed the consequences of recent thinking in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and its departure from Philosophy and History of Science as just such a movement to bypass the stalemate in the latter with respect to Representationalism/Epistemology, see Webmoor 2007.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks go to the environment of the Stanford Archaeology Center where thinking-around splits is a necessity. Also to Ian Hodder, Christopher Witmore and Alison Wylie for discussing these ideas and commenting upon this paper. The final paper reflects my own shortcomings rather than their perspicacity. Finally, my appreciation goes to the organizers of the conference for their hard work ‘behind the scenes’ to make the conference’s course-of-action happen, especially Sebastian de Vivo for his encouragement and good spirit. Portions of this paper were aired at the Theoretical Archaeology Group (TAG) in Sheffield and at the Society for American Archaeology (SAAs) in Puerto Rico.

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ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Traditional Culture Property (TCP) documented by the author for the U.S. Forest Service on the Commanche National Grasslands.
Figure 2. Satellite image of the central, 'ceremonial' precinct of Teotihuacán, Mexico. The surrounding towns may be seen, particularly San Martín on the northeast edge and San Juan de Teotihuacán to the southwest.

Figure 3. Traditional leader of the Teotihuacán Valley, and organizer of the Civic Front for the Defense of the Valley of Teotihuacán, conducting a springtime ritual for rain just outside the site's fenced perimeter.
Figure 4. Gathering of 'Aztec bailadores' or dancers in the plaza of the pyramid of the sun to commemorate Teotihuacán as the place where the gods sacrificed themselves to bring the world into existence in Nahua belief.

Figure 5. Box-plot of the frequency distributions of scale scores summarizing the relative (standardized 1-10) strength of Teotihuacán's principal associations.