Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics

Summer 2013 Workshop

 

 

Segment 4: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets

July 29, 30 and 31, 2013

Organized by Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University; Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles; Andrzej Skrzypacz, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Alexander Wolitzky, Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer, all Department of Economics, Stanford University.

 
 

This Segment of SITE is partially sponsored by The Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.

The session will meet in Conference Room A in Landau Economics Building.

Here is the map to the building.

 

 

Monday, July 29, 2013

8.30 - 9.00 Breakfast

*Part 1: Agency with Frequent Actions

9.00 - 9.45 Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University: Moral Hazard and Long-Run Incentives

9.45 - 10.15 Coffee

10.15 - 11.00 Tomasz Sadzik, University of California, Los Angeles and Ennio Stacchetti, New York University: Agency Models with Frequent Actions

11.00 - 11.30 Coffee

11.30 - 12.15 George Georgiadis, California Institute of Technology and Boston University: Projects and Team Dynamics

12.15 - 2.00 Lunchtime discussion

*Part 2: Dynamic Agency

2.00 - 2.45 Guy Arie, Rochester University: Dynamic Costs and Moral Hazard

2.45 - 3.15 Coffee

3.15 - 4.00 Marina Halac, Navin Kartik andQingmin Liu, all Columbia University: Optimal Contracts for Experimentation

4.00 - 4.30 Coffee

4.30 - 5.15 Mikhail Golosov, Princeton University and Luigi Ioviono, Toulouse School of Economics: Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment

 

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

8.30 - 9.00 Breakfast

*Part 3: Dynamic Mechanism Design

9.00 - 9.45 Daniel Garrett, Toulouse School of Economics and Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern University: Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-Based Schemes

9.45 - 10.15 Coffee

10.15 - 11.00 Andrzej Skrzypacz, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Juuso Toikka, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Mechanisms for Repeated Bargaining

11.00 - 11.30 Coffee

11.30 - 12.15 Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University, Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica, both University of Chicago, Booth School of Business: Suspense and Surprise

12.15 - 2.00 Lunchtime discussion

*Part 4: Repeated Games

2.00 - 2.45 Axel Anderson, Georgetown University and Lones Smith, University of Wisconsin, Madison: Dynamic Deception

2.45 - 3.15 Coffee

3.15 - 4.00 Takuo Sugaya, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University: Efficiency in Markov Games with Incomplete and Private Information

4.00 - 4.30 Coffee

4.30 - 5.15 David Rahman, University of Minnesota: Frequent Actions with Infrequent Coordination

6.30 Continued discussion and dissemination of technical knowledge during dinner

 

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

8.30 - 9.00 Breakfast

*Part 5: Search/Experimentation/Information Aggregation in Markets

9.00 - 9.45 Yoon Koo Che, Colombia University and Johannes Horner, Yale University: Optimal Design for Social Learning

9.45 - 10.15 Coffee

10.15 - 11.00 Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan and Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University: Search with Adverse Selection

11.00 - 11.30 Coffee

11.30 - 12.15 Semyon Malamud, EPF Lausanne and Marzena Rostek, University of Wisconsin, Madison: Decentralized Exchange

12.15 - 2.00 Lunchtime discussion

*Part 6: Reputation and Sequential Screening

2.00 - 2.45 Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University: Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture

2.45 - 3.15 Coffee

3.15 - 4.00 Dilip Abreu, Princeton University, and David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, both New York University: One-Sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining

4.00 - 4.30 Coffee

4.30 - 5.15 Juan Pablo Xandri, Princeton University: Credible Reforms: A Robust Implementation Approach

 

 

SITE is funded by grants from the National Science Foundation and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR). SITE receives additional financial support from the Department of Economics at Stanford University, which also houses its offices.