Scylla and Charybdis? Some Historical Reflections on the Two
Basic Problems of Corporate Governance

(Draft of June 2, 2008)

Naomi R. Lamoreaux, UCLA and NBER

Contact information:  Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Department of Economics, 8283 Bunche Hall, 405 Hilgard Avenue, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477; 310-825-0225 (phone); 310-825-9528 (fax); Lamoreaux@econ.ucla.edu.
Acknowledgements:
I am grateful for the helpful comments of Steve Bank, Ruth Bloch, Wayne Carp, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Daniel Freudenberger, Walter Friedman, Carola Frydman, Timothy Guinnane, Ron Harris, Eric Hilt, Timur Kuran, Stewart Myers, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, John Wallis, R. Bin Wong, four anonymous referees, participants in the corporate governance discussion group at MIT-Sloan and the Monday Colloquium at the UCLA Law School, and members of the audience at the Dale E. Benson Lecture in Economic and Business History at Pacific Lutheran University. Portions of this article draw on research conducted in collaboration with Bloch and with Guinnane, Harris, and Rosenthal.

Abstract:
Shareholders in corporations face two very different types of governance problems: expropriation by controlling shareholders or managers; and expropriation by greedy rulers or, more generally, by the state. The problem is that the more successful investors are in protecting their capital from the grabbing hand of the state, the less they are able to call upon the state to protect it from the grabbing hand of corporate insiders. Conversely, the more investors are able to call upon the government to restrain insiders, the more they are vulnerable to expropriation by the state. This article examines how the terms of this tradeoff have evolved over time in modern democratic societies. It argues that large firms are still vulnerable to both types of corporate governance problems.
Scylla and Charybdis? Some Historical Reflections on the Two
Basic Problems of Corporate Governance

Enron failed in late 2001. One of the most hyped companies of the 1990s boom, it crashed in the largest bankruptcy to that point in U.S. history. Subsequent investigations revealed that Enron’s executives had deliberately obscured the company’s increasingly unsustainable mountain of debt by shifting liabilities off balance sheet to a series of special purpose partnerships. The corporate insiders who ran these partnerships profited greatly from the deals. Some even managed to cash out on the eve of the edifice’s collapse, selling off their stockholdings at high prices while other shareholders (including many Enron employees who had invested the bulk of their pension funds in the company) ended up with worthless securities.¹

More scandals quickly followed at WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia Communications, and a number of other major U.S. companies. In each case executives were charged with using a variety of accounting tricks to cover up policies from which they personally had benefited but which had endangered the solvency of their companies. While Congress rushed to hold hearings, observers bemoaned the poor state of corporate governance in the U.S. How could such problems persist nearly three quarters of a century after the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? Why was corporate governance so difficult to reform?²

Although problems of abuse of power by corporate insiders have been stubbornly persistent, another type of corporate governance problem has to a large extent disappeared, at least in the U.S. To underscore the point, it is useful to recall the Stuart kings’ efforts, more than three hundred years earlier, to control the governance of the City of London and other incorporated English boroughs and, failing that, to revoke the corporations’ charters. This earlier scandal might seem to be a very different phenomenon. London was a city not a business, and the Stuarts’ attack on it and the other boroughs was primarily political in motivation. (The Stuarts wanted to insure that the cities’ representatives in Parliament would be on their side.) However, the law did not yet sort corporations into categories such as public and private, and the case highlighted the ever present threat of external interference that all corporations faced during the early modern era.

I begin with these very different scandals because they illustrate vividly the two major perils of corporate governance. The first is an internal threat: expropriation by greedy (or power-hungry) managers. I call this the Type I problem of corporate governance. The second is an external threat: expropriation by greedy (or power-hungry) rulers, or more generally by the state. I call this the Type II problem of corporate governance. The basic dilemma I examine in this essay is that the more successful members of corporations are in solving Type II problems—that is, in protecting their organizations from interference by the ruler—the less they are able to call upon the ruler to protect them from corrupt managers. They therefore become more vulnerable to Type

---


I problems. Conversely, the more members of corporations are able to call upon the ruler to restrain the manager (and protect them from the Type I problems of corporate governance), the more vulnerable they are to the ruler’s grabbing hand.

Societies have attempted to steer a course between this Scylla and Charybdis of corporate governance in different ways, sometimes drifting too close to one monster and sometimes to the other. In the U.S. corporations obtained greater protection over time against expropriation by the government than they did against expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders. Although this outcome seems to have been conducive to rapid economic development, it also led to repeated cases of abuse of minority investors and a reluctance on the part of many small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to use the corporate form. Although these problems have been to a great extent mitigated by the formation of the SEC and by an expansion of the menu of organizational forms, they have not gone away. However, it may not be possible to go much further without approaching too close to the other monster.

**Protecting Pools of Capital in the Early Modern World**

Although there were (and are) many different types of corporations, in this essay I focus on those organized for business purposes. I consider the corporation at the most basic level to be a device to permit the accumulation of economic resources (capital). It was one of a number of different devices for this purpose that emerged in various parts of the world before modern times. Although the corporation has a long history, it was first
used as a business form in Europe during the late middle ages, when monarchs began to organize trading corporations to promote, and gain control of, trade with the East.

It might be thought that business people did not need any special device to accumulate capital—that all they had to do was discipline themselves not to consume all their profits. A little further consideration will suggest, however, that willpower alone is not sufficient if the business involves more than one person or if the saver wishes the pool of capital to survive his or her death. It is unlikely that accumulations will remain intact if any of the individuals who contribute to them can withdraw their capital if they wish. Nor can they remain intact if they must be divided to settle the estate of a deceased contributor. Business people need special, legally enforceable devices such as the corporation to guard against these contingencies. In a corporation, for example, investments are sunk. They cannot be withdrawn at the behest of an investor’s heirs or creditors or even by the original investor.

The legal enforcement that devices like the corporation require comes at a cost, often in the form of taxes. This cost is to be expected, and investors must balance it against the magnitude of the benefits they expect to derive from the ability to accumulate

---


capital. More problematic are other perils that arise once wealth begins to amass. On the one hand, hard pressed (or simply greedy) rulers may be tempted to confiscate some or all of it. On the other, those who manage the capital may be tempted to consume it in the form of perks or to use it to further their own interests. Both threats are potentially important impediments to economic development. Basic economic theory tells us that savers will not put their money in devices like the corporation if they fear that their returns (or even worse, their investments) will be expropriated, regardless of whether the expropriator is the ruler or the manager.

One possible solution is to call upon a third-party enforcer who can keep both the ruler and the manager in line. Religious authorities have performed this function under some circumstances. For example, in Islamic societies wealthy merchants could protect some of their assets from being divided among heirs by putting them in a trust (waqf) whose profits would be dedicated to performing some useful social purpose, such as building a road or a school or providing alms. Members of these societies believed that endowments in waqfs were sacred. Because rulers who developed a reputation for impiety lost legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects, clerics were able to protect these trusts from confiscation. However, to fend off rulers they also had to ensure that the endowments were used for their stated social purposes. According to Timur Kuran, one drawback to this solution was that clerical enforcement could be so inflexible that it prevented funds from being reallocated to productive uses when the original purpose of the trust was no longer viable. Another was that the clerics themselves could be corrupted and, in exchange for a share of the rents, induced to turn a blind eye to
managerial expropriation. Over time, Kuran shows, corruption undermined the legitimacy of the trust device and laid funds in *waqfs* open to confiscation.⁶

Where religious authority was less monolithic, savers could protect pools of wealth from rulers by dedicating them to a sacred purpose, but such designations offered little protection from the grabbing hand of managers. For example, Madeleine Zelin has shown that Chinese families were able to safeguard funds from external threats by depositing them in lineage trusts whose purpose was to insure that families had the resources to honor their ancestors properly. Because there was no external enforcement of this purpose, it is likely that a great deal of wealth was frittered away in consumption or investment in insiders’ businesses. Nonetheless, managers’ autonomy from the state enabled them to invest the funds in their charge in response to new business opportunities. Indeed, Zelin has argued that the viability of this means of safeguarding accumulations of capital helps to explain why the corporation had relatively little appeal when it was finally introduced in China in the late nineteenth century.⁷

Although there has been considerable debate over the origins of the corporation in Europe, the church’s need for an organizational form whose existence was independent of the people who made it up encouraged the development of the device during the Middle Ages. The corporation then proved useful for a variety of other entities, such as guilds, colleges, and cities or boroughs. In some cases the church directly protected these

---


entities from the state. In others the organizations’ claims of independence derived
substance from the application of principles directly analogous to those used to defend
church corporations. In the sixteenth century, however, two developments forced a
different solution to the problem of protecting corporations from the state. The first, the
Protestant Reformation, meant that in some countries, most notably England, the church
no longer exercised an independent check on the ruler because the ruler was the head of
the church. The second, monarchs’ use of the corporation for the secular purpose of
promoting trade with the East Indies and elsewhere, meant that the interests of the ruler
became increasingly intertwined with those of corporations.

The solution that emerged in England by the end of the seventeenth century was
to make Parliament the new third-party enforcer. In the turbulent era that followed the
English Civil War, the Stuart kings had begun to intervene more actively in the internal
affairs of corporations in order to raise funds and place their supporters in positions of power. Wherever their efforts met with serious resistance, as they did in London and a
number of other boroughs, they moved to have the charters revoked. Ultimately, of
course, the Stuarts were deposed in the Glorious Revolution, and Parliament restored the
revoked charters. In the aftermath of this struggle, moreover, the House of Lords, sitting
as an appeals court in a case involving a corporation, definitively established the legal

---

8 Harris, “Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade”; Wallis, Weingast, and North,
“Corporate Origins of Individual Rights.”
9 Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson, and James Taylor, Shareholder Democracies? Corporate
Governance in Britain Before 1850, unpublished book manuscript, Chapter 1A; Bruce G. Carruthers, City
Press, 1996); Levin, Charter Controversy in the City of London.
principle that the King could not alter or abolish a corporate charter or intervene in a
corporation’s internal affairs. Only Parliament had that power.10

Parliament thus protected corporations from expropriation by the King. But it
could, and did, expropriate itself. For example, Parliament periodically extracted loans
from the Bank of England as a condition for extending its charter, offering monopoly
privileges in exchange and thereby insuring that the Bank could continue to supply it with
funds. To get a big loan in 1697, it gave the Bank a new charter in which it promised not
to incorporate any competing banks. When Parliament needed funds again in 1708, it
went even further to protect the Bank’s monopoly and prohibited unincorporated joint-
stock companies with more than six partners from doing business as banks.11 Although
Parliament treated the East India Company and the other great trading companies in
much the same way, it seems to have been more restrained in its dealings with most
corporations, either respecting the rights “vested” in their charters or providing
compensation for any infringement on corporate privileges.12 It is likely that the potential
returns to intervention were simply too small for Parliament to risk the political

---

of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-1769), Book 1, Ch. 18, 471-73; Bruce A. Campbell,
“Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Formation of Constitutional Policy,” Kentucky Law
of Organizations: The Tangled Roots of the Family, the Corporation, and the Right to Privacy,”

11 J. Lawrence Broz and Richard S. Grossman have shown that Parliament offered the bank new
charters in exchange for loans whenever it was running a big budget deficit. See “Paying for Privilege:
The Political Economy of Bank of England Charters, 1694-1844,” Explorations in Economic History 41
(Jan. 2004): 48-72. See also Carruthers, City of Capital, Ch. 6.

12 Ron Harris, “The English East India Company and the History of Company Law,” in VOC
1602-2002: 400 Years of Company Law, eds. Ella Gepken-Jager, Gerard van Solinge, and Levinus
Timmerman (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Legal Publishers, 2005), 217-47; Freeman, Pearson, and
Taylor, Shareholder Democracies, Chapter 1B; Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business
Company after the Bubble Act, 1720-1800 (1938 edn; New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 118-27; and
Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting
opposition that tampering with corporations on such a broad scale would inevitably entail.

Members of Parliament did, however, extract rents from these smaller corporations during the chartering process, when they could obtain bribes (often in the form of shares) from companies applying for charters or from others seeking to prevent the incorporation of a competitor.\textsuperscript{13} Over time, however, as more and more businesses sought corporate privileges, political opposition to this type of corruption mounted until Parliament passed legislation in 1844 permitting business people to incorporate their enterprises simply by registering their articles of association and paying a uniform fee.\textsuperscript{14} Similar political pressures forced Parliament to level the economic playing field by stripping the great “monied” or trading corporations of their monopoly privileges. Although the Bank of England retained its exclusive right to issue currency, the advent of general incorporation in banking transformed it into something more like a modern central bank with a quasi-governmental responsibility for the smooth functioning of the financial system.\textsuperscript{15} These changes removed the element of quid pro quo that had fueled Parliament’s ongoing intervention, and the idea that Parliament should not interfere with corporations unless they violated the terms of their charters attained the status of a fundamental principle.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{14} Shareholders in corporations formed in this way bore unlimited liability, but in 1855-56 Parliament amended the law to permit them to obtain limited liability. On the advent of general incorporation, see Ron Harris, \textit{Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Taylor, \textit{Creating Capitalism}, Ch. 4; and Freeman, Pearson, and James Taylor, \textit{Shareholder Democracies}, Chapter 1B. See also North, Wallis, and Weingast, \textit{Conceptual Framework}, Ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{15} Harris, “English East India Company”; and Broz and Grossman, “Paying for Privilege.”

In the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution Parliament had assumed responsibility as well for protecting corporations from the internal dangers posed by greedy management. Minority shareholders who felt their interests had been trampled by the majority could and did petition Parliament for redress, and sometimes these pleas sparked the formation of an investigating committee. But here too Parliament’s interventions were for the most part limited to companies, like the East India Company or the Hudson’s Bay Company, where there were important national interests at stake, or to cases like that of the Charitable Corporation, where there were major public outcries against corporate fraud. As a general rule, redress of such grievances was left to the courts, which as the number of corporations increased, necessarily raised the bar for intervention. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the relevant court (chancery) was applying to corporations precedents it had developed to reduce the flow of lawsuits involving partnerships. In a key case, *Foss v. Harbottle* in 1843, it declared that minority shareholders could not bring suit against corporate officers for malfeasance if the shareholders meeting as a body could potentially take action. Corporations were supposed to govern their own affairs. “The majority of the proprietors … has power to bind the whole body,” and every shareholder knowingly subjected him or herself to this authority when he or she purchased stock. Only in the most egregious cases of fraud would the courts intervene. As Parliament increasingly refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of corporations, the dangers of Type II corporate governance problems

---

receded, but minority shareholders were left without little or no recourse against the Type I danger posed by controlling shareholders.

From Dartmouth College to the Securities and Exchange Commission

In the U.S., as in Britain, opposition to the corruption associated with grants of corporate charters led to the passage of general incorporation laws during the first half of the nineteenth century. As in Britain, moreover, reducing these Type II problems of corporate governance potentially worsened Type I problems. Once the state withdrew from active intervention in corporate affairs, minority shareholders in corporations were left with little recourse against expropriation by controlling shareholders. Not until the Great Depression of the 1930s was there any real effort to address this problem, but even then the legislation creating the SEC only protected investors in corporations whose securities traded publicly.

After the American Revolution responsibility for chartering corporations had devolved on the various state legislatures. These bodies initially assumed that they had powers akin to those of Parliament to alter or revoke charters, and they did not hesitate to meddle in corporate affairs. Perhaps it is not surprising that legislators felt free to revise charters granted by the government against which they had rebelled, but they did not hesitate to attack charters granted by post-Revolutionary republican legislatures either. Indeed, in the turbulence of the period the composition of the various state assemblies could change dramatically from one election to the next. Succeeding legislatures often sought to undo what their predecessors had done, and one legislature might grant a corporate charter only to see it altered or even repealed at a subsequent legislative
session. Such actions were especially likely where the special privileges granted to particular corporations touched off storms of protest. After the Virginia assembly chartered the Richmond James River Company in 1804, for example, a deluge of complaints led it to amend the charter the next year over the objections of the company and exempt small boats from having to pay tolls. In Pennsylvania charges that the 1781 charter of Bank of North America gave the bank too much power led the legislature to repeal it in 1785. Two years later a politically reconfigured assembly passed another, this time more restrictive, act of incorporation for the bank. Similar criticism of the Massachusetts Bank, which had been modeled after the Bank of North America, induced that state’s legislature to pass an “Addition” to the bank’s charter in 1792 that placed greater limits on its operations.

In 1819 the U.S. Supreme Court moved to put a stop to such interventions with its Dartmouth College decision. The college’s trustees had filed a lawsuit challenging an act of the New Hampshire legislature revising its governing board, and they had maneuvered successfully to get the case heard by the Supreme Court. Writing for the Court Chief Justice John Marshall declared that state legislatures did not inherit Parliament’s boundless powers over corporations but rather had to acknowledge the superior authority of the Constitution. Dartmouth College was a private corporation and, as such, was

---

19 See Bloch and Lamoreaux, “Private Rights of Organizations.”
protected by the contract clause of the Constitution. Because “no State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,” New Hampshire could not alter unilaterally the composition of the board or any other aspect of the college’s charter.\textsuperscript{23}

Although states could, and did, get around the \textit{Dartmouth} decision by inserting clauses into charters that reserved their right subsequently to alter the terms of the grant, the problem of state intervention in the internal affairs of corporations largely disappeared over the next several decades. The reasons were similar to those already discussed for the case of Britain. Initially corporations in the U.S., as in Britain, could only be chartered by special legislative act. Such acts gave those who were able to obtain them privileges that others did not possess. At the most basic level corporate charters conferred legal personhood and organizational permanence, but they often included other privileges that ranged from fairly common boons such as limited liability to rarer powers such as eminent domain or the right to issue currency.\textsuperscript{24}

Because the privileges embodied in corporate charters could be very valuable, they were an opportunity for expropriation—for Type II problems of corporate governance to arise—and, indeed, as in the case of Britain, they often led to some kind of quid pro quo relationship with the state. The extraction in which legislatures engaged


could be on a broad governmental scale, justified as in the interests of society as a whole. For example, states might require corporations to pay bonuses or special fees to get a charter, lend the government money, or invest some of their assets in public works projects like canals.\textsuperscript{25} Or the extraction could take the form of what was in effect demands for bribes by individual politicians.\textsuperscript{26}

Spurred by mounting political opposition to the idea that government-granted privileges were available to those who were politically well connected or wealthy enough to pay for them, most states passed general incorporation laws during the middle third of the nineteenth century that made the right to form a corporation available cheaply to all.\textsuperscript{27} Legislatures nonetheless continued to grant special charters of incorporation for many years thereafter.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, all of the banks formed in Massachusetts during the 1850s sought special charters rather than organizing under the state’s new general incorporation act because they did not like the costs the law imposed on them.\textsuperscript{29} Over the next several decades, however, voters in most states closed off this route to privilege by securing

\textsuperscript{25} See also Richard Sylla, John B. Legler, and John J. Wallis, “Banks and State Public Finance in the New Republic: The United States, 1790-1860,” Journal of Economic History 47 (June 1987): 391-403; and Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, 129-30, 174-5. Most of the New England states included provisions in early-nineteenth-century bank charters requiring the banks to lend the government money on demand. In 1836 Maine’s treasurer discovered that he could make some money for the state by borrowing from banks at the legally mandated rate of 5 percent and then investing the proceeds in bank stock, and the legislature voted him limited authority to borrow for this purpose. Lamoreaux, Insider Lending, 29.


amendments to their state constitutions mandating that all corporations be chartered under the general laws.  

As in Britain, an unintended consequence of this withdrawal of state governments from active intervention in corporate affairs was to weaken minority shareholders’ ability to protect their interests from greedy controlling shareholders (that is, to increase the potential for Type I problems of corporate governance). In theory, minority shareholders in the U.S. had somewhat greater access to the courts than their British counterparts. Whereas the precedent set by Foss v. Harbottle gave British shareholders little or no recourse against an oppressive majority, in the U.S. they could exercise a derivative right to sue if they could demonstrate that those who were abusing their positions effectively controlled the corporation. In practice, however, minority shareholders still faced substantial legal hurdles in obtaining redress of their grievances. They had to show that the corporation’s refusal to take action on their behalf was fraudulent—that directors (or the controlling shareholders behind them) were not simply pursuing policies at variance with those that minority shareholders thought should be adopted. If the refusal was simply a matter of business judgment, the courts would not be willing to intervene, even if the corporation had sustained heavy losses as a result of the

30 For a chronology of the relevant state constitutional provisions, see George Heberton Evans, Jr., Business Incorporations in the United States, 1800-1943 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1948), 11; and Hamill, “From Special Privilege to General Utility,” 177.
31 For evidence that exploitation of minority shareholders was a very real problem, see Eric Hilt, “When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History, forthcoming.
directors’ decisions. It was a well established principle that “Directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a mistake, … are not liable for the consequences.” The burden of proof, moreover, was on the shareholders bringing the suit. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court later explained, “it is always assumed until the contrary appears, that [corporate directors and officers] obey the law, and act in good faith towards all their members.”

What these principles meant for minority shareholders became clear in the aftermath of the scandal that blew up around Crédit Mobilier of America, the construction company that built the Union Pacific Railroad. Owned by a subset of the Union Pacific’s directors, Crédit Mobilier had managed through a series of subterfuges to secure the contract to build the railroad at a cost that, critics charged, earned its stockholders exorbitant profits. Media attention, however, focused less on this abuse of power by corporate insiders than on the shares in Crédit Mobilier that members of the “railroad ring” had distributed to influential Congressmen. Nineteenth-century Americans were much less concerned about Type I problems of corporate governance than about the corrupting influence of Type II problems. The scandal led the federal government to withdraw from the business of subsidizing railroads, but there was no

---

36 For a detailed account of the deals and the infighting among directors that resulted, see David Haward Bain, Empire Express: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad (New York: Viking, 1999).
37 Details of the Crédit Mobilier manipulation had been reported in the press since at least 1869, but they attracted little attention until the New York Sun, which opposed the reelection of President Ulysses S. Grant, broke the bribery story in September 1872. See Bain, Empire Express, 599-600, 602, 627-28, 676. For an intriguing contrary example, however, see Eric Hilt’s account of the New York State legislature’s response to a major corporate governance scandal in the 1820s, “Wall Street’s First Corporate Governance Crisis: The Conspiracy Trials of 1826,” unpublished paper (2008). The legislature’s Revised Statutes of 1827 for a time heightened protections for investors, especially in “moneyed corporations.”
Indeed, in the period after the Crédit Mobilier scandal the position of minority shareholders in corporations if anything became weaker. There was a longstanding legal rule that contracts tainted by conflict of interest (such as the Union Pacific’s contract with Crédit Mobilier) were voidable. This rule had always been an absolute one and included contracts that otherwise were completely reasonable, so that, in the words of a Michigan justice, it is “immaterial …whether there has been any fraud in fact, or any injury.”38 In 1881, however, the U.S. Supreme Court qualified the rule as it applied to corporations, making fraud a necessary condition for a lawsuit. Such contracts would henceforth be voided only “where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders” or where “such a fraudulent transaction …will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other shareholders.”39 In other words, the Court sanctioned applying what was in effect a reasonableness standard. Minority investors now faced the same high bar for cases involving conflict of interest that they did for other types of abuse by controlling shareholders.

The situation for minority shareholders became even worse with the passage of a wave of more “liberal” or “permissive” general incorporation laws in the aftermath of

---

39 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881). The shift away from an absolute prohibition against self-dealing by corporate officers was noted with puzzlement by Harold Marsh, Jr. (“Are Directors Trustees?” Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,” Business Lawyer 22 [Nov. 1966]: 35-76), who asserted, “One searches in vain in the decided cases for a reasoned defense of this change in legal philosophy, or for the slightest attempt to refute the powerful arguments which had been made in support of the previous rule” (p. 40). The mystery largely disappears, however, when the cases are viewed in terms of the broader legal history of minority shareholders’ rights. See Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Corporate Governance,” and Bloch and Lamoreaux, “Private Rights of Organizations.”
New Jersey’s path-breaking 1888 statute. These acts typically included provisions that reduced the ability of minority stockholders to block managerial decisions that fundamentally altered the business of their enterprise, placing the individual shareholder, as one writer later put it, “in the position of holding a ‘pig-in-a-poke’”—“more dependent with each new statute upon the desire of the management and the majority which often is only another name for management.” These statutes also provided the legal framework for the great merger wave of the turn of the century. The multi-firm consolidations formed during this period were the first industrials to market their securities widely, and they paved the way for an expansion in shareholding by ordinary investors.

As more and more small investors bought shares in corporations and thus found themselves in the position of minority shareholders, concerns about Type I problems of corporate governance emerged as a political issue in a sustained way for the first time. These concerns gained legitimacy as it became increasingly apparent that, in many of the nation’s largest corporations, control was in the hands of salaried managers rather than investors with large ownership stakes. Little was done, however, until accusations of securities fraud in the aftermath of 1929 stock market crash finally led Congress to take steps to protect outside investors by passing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These laws required companies that sold stock to the public or


42 The most famous expression of this concern was Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York: Macmillan, 1933). Kenneth Lipartito and Yumiko Morii have recently argued that Berle and Means were as worried about the abuse of power by those with controlling interests in large-scale businesses as they were with the separation of ownership and control, the issue that later interpreters of their work brought to the fore. See Kenneth Lipartito and Yumiko Morii, “Rethinking the Separation of Ownership from Management in American History,” unpublished paper (2007).
whose securities were publicly traded to file detailed annual financial reports. The 1934 Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce the law, to regulate the exchanges on which securities were traded, and to promulgate regulations for the protection of investors against corporate fraud and abuse.43

The outcome of a bargaining process mediated by the savvy New Dealer, James M. Landis, the SEC was consciously set up to be a third-party enforcer.44 Unlike other federal regulatory agencies, it did not set prices or control entry. Rather its job was simply to establish procedures to prevent corporate insiders from using their position of control to exploit minority shareholders. Much like the clerics of early modern Islam, the SEC’s function was to curb Type I problems of corporate governance without exposing businesses to Type II problems. Indeed, the trust vested in the appointed members of the commission was quasi-religious in character. Early-twentieth-century Americans had enormous faith in the ability of experts to solve the problems of the modern economy—to sort through the confusing welter of evidence, of claims and counter claims, and chart a fair course of action. They had already turned to independent agencies staffed by experts to regulate railroad rates and curb monopolistic practices by large-scale businesses, and they would create a number of other such commissions before the decade was out.45

Although some scholars have been skeptical that the SEC had any real effect, the more


44 McCraw, Prophets of Regulation.

The general view is that the agency improved corporate governance practices and increased protections for small investors. Certainly, Americans believed the SEC mattered.46

The SEC may have helped to assuage worries about Type I corporate governance problems for investors in companies with publicly traded securities, but it offered little comfort to investors in corporations whose shares were closely held—the vast majority. Indeed, fear of oppression by controlling shareholders seems to have induced many business people to eschew the corporate form altogether. Data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures reveal that as late as 1900—that is, more than half a century after most states passed general incorporation laws—partnerships still constituted more than 60 percent of firms taking multi-owner forms in the manufacturing sector. Although the proportion of manufacturing firms organized as partnerships fell during the early twentieth century as the scale of enterprise rose, dropping to about 40 percent by 1920, it did not fall much further until after World War II. According to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, as late as 1947 partnerships constituted fully 40 percent of manufacturing enterprises taking multi-owner forms, and their proportion of multi-owner enterprises in the economy as a whole still exceeded 60 percent.47

---


Modern Alternatives to the Corporation

On the European continent governments generally remained deeply involved in the affairs of corporations until late in the nineteenth century, restricting the availability of charters, using corporations to further the interests of the state or its rulers, and sometimes even deciding which corporate securities could be traded on the national exchanges. Restricted access to the corporate form did not generate as much political opposition on the continent as in Britain and the U.S., however, because there were other organizational forms that enabled business people to obtain some of the advantages of incorporation without exposing themselves to government intervention. In particular, they could form limited partnerships. Although at least one partner had to bear unlimited liability, the rest risked only their investments in the enterprise. Moreover, by making the shares of the limited partners tradable, businesses could use this form to raise capital from the public without securing a corporate charter from the state.48

Because the limited partnership with tradable shares was an inferior substitute for the corporation, however, pressure built slowly in the mid-nineteenth century to make the corporate form available to all. France finally passed a general incorporation law in 1867. Many of the German states followed over the next several years, and the Prussian version of the statute became Reich law in 1871.49 Although the availability of

alternative forms of organization kept the number of corporations in both France and Germany below their levels in Britain and the U.S., business people took out significant numbers of charters. Indeed, in Germany there was a big surge in incorporations in the 1870s, when the rapid payment of the indemnity imposed on France after the Franco-Prussian war produced a stock-market bubble. After the bubble collapsed, accounts of corporate misdeeds led the Reichstag to pass a reform act in 1884 that significantly increased the costs of forming a corporation. Among other things, the new law mandated the detailed disclosure of financial information, raised the minimum size of a share tenfold, and required that shareholders pay in at least 25 percent of the value of their shares before the charter could take effect. The number of new corporations plunged dramatically in response.50

By the late 1880s there were increasing calls to revise the 1884 reforms. Although some critics argued for reducing the regulatory burden on corporations so that more would be formed, the solution the government adopted was to create an entirely new form of organization, the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (company with limited liability, later usually abbreviated GmbH). Owners of GmbHs had to forego the ability to market their shares publicly, but they all obtained limited liability. They also obtained an extraordinary degree of contractual flexibility that gave minority owners the tools they needed to protect themselves against expropriation by controlling shareholders. Although the law specified a set of default rules, business people were free to write alternative provisions into their articles of association. For example, by insisting on

---


50 Guinnane, et al., “Putting the Corporation in its Place,” 697-98; and “Pouvoir et propriété dans l’entreprise.”
supermajority voting rules as a condition of investment, minority shareholders could
insure that they exercised veto power over important decisions. Thus in one case a
shareholder protected her husband from being fired as manager of a GmbH by securing a
provision in the firm’s articles of association that required the stockholders’ unanimous
consent to dismiss him. 51

Once Germany led the way, other countries passed similar enabling legislation for
private limited liabilities companies (PLLCs). In Britain the sequence of events that led
to the PLLC was remarkably similar to that in Germany. After a series of scandals
involving public issues of corporate securities, Parliament passed a new Companies Act
in 1900 that significantly increased the cost of forming a corporation by mandating the
disclosure of greater amounts of financial information and by holding directors
personally liable if they failed to conform to all the provisions of the law. As in Germany
after 1884, the number of new corporations plunged, and there were mounting demands
that the law be repealed. Also as in Germany, Parliament responded with a statute
permitting businesses to avoid the high costs of incorporation by organizing instead as
private liability companies whose securities could not be publicly traded. 52 French
entrepreneurs gained access to a GmbH-like device as a result of World War I. There
were a number of GmbHs operating in Alsace and Lorraine on the eve of the war, and
their owners did not wish to give up the advantages of the form when France regained

51 In exchange for this provision and others insuring that the majority investors could not force a
dissolution of the enterprise, she agreed that the majority would receive a greater than normal share of the
firm’s profits. See “Pouvoir et propriété dans l’entreprise.” Under German law there was considerable
contractual flexibility in the corporate form as well, but many provisions that one observes in GmbH
contracts were not compatible with tradable shares. Not only were GmbH shares not tradable, but
shareholders could insist on the right to vet all potential purchasers of shares. See also Guinnane, et al.,
“Putting the Corporation in its Place”.

52 Guinnane, et al., “Putting the Corporation in its Place”; and “Pouvoir et propriété dans
l’entreprise.”
control of these provinces. Although a bill that essentially translated the GmbH law into French failed in 1919, there was widespread support in the business community for some such statute, and the Assembly enacted an enabling statute for a French version of the form, the *société à responsabilité limitée* (SARL), in 1925.53

Although the PLLC had somewhat different features in each of these countries, its attraction everywhere was that it offered business people some of the advantages of the corporate form (particularly limited liability) while allowing them to structure their enterprises in ways that reduced the risk of Type I problems of corporate governance. Hence wherever and whenever the form became available, it quickly dwarfed the corporation in popularity. In Prussia more than half of new firms founded during the early 1930s organized as GmbHs and less than 5 percent organized as corporations. In France at the same time about 60-70 percent of new firms organized as SARLs, and only about 20 percent as corporations. In Britain by the early 1930s the ratio of private to public limited companies was more than ten to one.54

Business people choosing this new form of organization did not bear much risk of expropriation from the state. Indeed, the basic idea behind the enabling legislation was that entrepreneurs would give up their ability to raise shares from the general public in exchange for being let alone to organize their enterprises pretty much as they wished. So many PLLCs were formed in the aftermath of the enabling legislation, moreover, that it would have been politically dangerous for the state to renege on this understanding.

---

53 Guinnane, et al., “Putting the Corporation in its Place”; and “Pouvoir et propriété dans l’entreprise.”
54 Guinnane, et al., “Putting the Corporation in its Place”; and “Pouvoir et propriété dans l’entreprise.”
The Resurgence of Type II Problems of Corporate Governance

It might be thought that, in the countries where it was available, the PLLC would have resolved the tradeoff between Type I and Type II problems of corporate governance once and for all. Most businesses could choose a form that allowed them to accumulate capital without fear of expropriation by the state. Moreover, the contractual flexibility that characterized PLLCs allowed minority investors to protect themselves against oppression by controlling shareholders. Nonetheless, the coming of the PLLC does not seem to have been the end of the story. To the contrary, in countries where the form was readily available, the PLLC’s popularity may have exposed corporations to greater risk of Type II problems for the simple reason that so few of them were formed that only a small proportion of business people cared about protecting their interests. This exposure, moreover, was likely worsened by the tendency of owners of small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) to see large-scale corporations as adversaries whose size gave them unfair competitive advantages.

Certainly, the mid-twentieth century witnessed a resurgence of state involvement in the affairs of large corporations in all of these countries. The rise of dirigisme was a complicated phenomenon that cannot, of course, be explained without reference to the economic turbulence of the Great Depression, World War II, and the post-war reconstruction, but it stands to reason that the abandonment of the corporate form by most SMEs eliminated an important element of resistance to government intervention in the corporate sector.55 Sometimes this intervention sometimes took the extreme form of

nationalization. Beginning in the interwar period and accelerating in the aftermath of World War II, for example, the British government nationalized the coal, steel, electricity, railroad, aviation, and other industries, and also the Bank of England.\textsuperscript{56} In France nationalization came a bit earlier but affected many of the same industries, as well as large segments of the chemical, automobile, aviation equipment, petroleum refining, banking, and insurance industries.\textsuperscript{57} In other countries, however, \textit{dirigisme} had more of a corporatist bent in which stockholders in large firms shared monopoly rents with interests the state regarded as important for its stabilization (mainly labor) in exchange for tariffs or some form of protection against competition. In West Germany, for example, the government allowed large firms to impose cartel-like restrictions on competition but required them to share the resulting monopoly returns with labor, which obtained representation on their supervisory boards.\textsuperscript{58}

In the U.S., where the PLLC was for all practical purposes not available until later in the twentieth century, there was no similar move toward state capitalism after World War II. The government played an active role in managing the economy during the war, but then for the most part eschewed microeconomic intervention in businesses’ affairs, adopting instead, particularly under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a

\begin{flushright}


\textsuperscript{58} See Peter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn, \textit{Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). In Germany the government defined the firms subject to these “codetermination” rules by number of employees. Although technically large GmbHs had to create supervisory boards with the required proportion of labor representatives, it was easy for stockholders in GmbHs to reduce the board to largely symbolic significance. See Herbert Wiedemann, “Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises,” \textit{American Journal of Comparative Law} 28 (Winter 1980): 79-92.
\end{flushright}
conservative form of Keynesian macroeconomic stabilization policy. The government’s most dramatic step in a *dirigist* direction, President Harry Truman’s attempt to seize control of the steel industry to prevent a strike in 1952, proved highly unpopular. Excoriated in the media as the first salvo in a general attack on property rights, it was quickly struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The increased intervention in corporate affairs that occurred in Europe during the post-World War II period was the work of democratically elected governments. Undertaken ostensibly to further the social good, it certainly facilitated recovery from the devastation of the war, and for a time these economies experienced impressive rates of economic growth. Nonetheless, within a couple of decades the *dirigist* economic engine had stalled. Part of the problem was the inefficiency of the nationalized companies. But part was the protection from competition that large-scale enterprises obtained under the corporatist quid pro quo. As resentment of the cozy relationship between government officials and big-business managers mounted, there was a general movement toward more laissez-faire policies. With the decline of *dirigisme*, however,

---


came the resurgence of Type I problems of corporate governance. By the early twenty-first century scandals at Vivendi, Parmalat, Hollinger, and other European companies competed for media attention with those at WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia.⁶³

**Scylla and Charybdis**

The European experience suggests that both Type I and Type II problems of corporate governance are still very much present in modern democratic societies. The passage of enabling legislation for the PLLC gave firms that did not intend to raise equity from the public (the vast majority) a form more suited to their needs than the corporation. As business people switched to the PLLC in droves, however, they left large corporations politically exposed, facilitating the mid-twentieth century shift toward *dirigisme*. Later, as governments retreated from this kind of micro involvement in the economy, corporate insiders took advantage of the change to pursue their own ambitions, sometimes feathering their own nests in the process.

In the U.S. the menu of organizational forms available to business people has become increasingly like that of Europe over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. When high personal income tax rates induced more and more firms to organize as corporations in the aftermath of World War II, states began to modify their general incorporation laws so as to give closely held corporations greater contractual flexibility, enabling them in effect to mimic the PLLC form. Then, beginning in the late 1980s, in the wake of tax reforms that made the corporate form relatively less attractive,
states passed laws enabling firms to organize as various types of PLLCs: limited liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and other more exotic forms.64

Businesses in the U.S. seem eagerly to have taken up the new forms, just as they did earlier in Europe. Although there is no information on the number that took advantage of the increased contractual flexibility that the states’ revised general incorporation laws made possible, the proportion of firms taking multi-owner forms that organized as corporations increased from 40 percent in 1949 to 66 percent in 1979 to 70 percent in 2002. Of course, tax considerations were a big part of the story, but the advent of the LLC thus far has had comparatively little effect on the stock of corporations, suggesting that the new statutes did in fact remedy many of the disadvantages of corporate form. The proportion of multi-owner firms that were LLCs increased from 1 percent in 1993 (the first year for which figures are available) to 12 percent in 2002, whereas the proportion that were corporations fell only slightly from 73 to 70 percent. Most of the increase in LLCs came at the expense of ordinary partnerships. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the LLC will eventually surpass the corporation as the form of choice for SMEs. In 2006, for example, states registered more than 50 percent more LLCs than corporations.65

---


As a result of the states’ late-twentieth-century legislative initiatives, therefore, investors in SMEs in the U.S. now have the same ability as their counterparts in Europe to adopt alternative organizational forms that allow them to minimize Type I problems of corporate governance. Whether another consequence of this change will be to expose large corporations to more direct government intervention and hence to Type II problems of corporate governance remains to be seen, but the recent popularity of the 2003 documentary film, “The Corporation,” in which a psychologist administers a test for personality disorders and determines that the corporation is a psychopath, suggests that the corporation itself, rather than specific large-scale businesses, is increasingly viewed as the problem. Moreover, there have been new intellectual efforts to justify the federal government’s intervention in internal corporate affairs, using, for example, the corporate income tax as a regulatory tool.

In the aftermath of the Enron scandal Congress took steps to beef up the SEC by passing what is known as the Sarbanes-Oxley bill in 2002. Among other things, the law stiffened financial reporting and disclosure requirements. Corporations’ accounts now must be regularly scrutinized by professional auditors selected from a list approved by a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and the auditors must be hired by committees composed entirely of external directors. The bill also requires the chief


executive and financial officers personally to sign their company’s financial statements, and it imposes severe criminal penalties for willfully misreporting financial data and for other kinds of corporate misconduct. Scholarly opinion about Sarbanes-Oxley runs the gambit from complaints that the act did not go far enough to the prediction that it will actually make corporate governance problems worse. There is general agreement, however, that the bill increases the costs that securities regulation imposes on public companies, that the additional costs are particularly burdensome for small public companies, and that the numbers of small companies going private are rising as a consequence. In other words, the U.S. may be repeating earlier experiences in Germany and Britain where the passage of similarly tough statutes led to sharp drops in the number of new corporations. One consequence of Sarbanes-Oxley therefore may well be to accelerate the emergence of a bifurcated European-style economy with relatively small numbers of public corporations (most of them very large) and relatively large numbers of private companies that run the gambit from the very small to the very large.

Whether that is a bad thing or not depends on how one weighs the relative risks and costs of Type I and Type II problems of corporate governance. Although basic economic theory suggests that both should inhibit investment and hence economic

---


growth, the record for the second half of the twentieth century suggests that Type II problems have more serious negative effects in modern democratic societies. Organizers of corporations can adopt governance rules that to some extent at least overcome the concerns that inhibit external investors from buying equities.71 Political leaders can reassure investors as well, but the main way in which they can credibly commit not to expropriate is to take ownership stakes (either for themselves or on behalf of the government) in the enterprises concerned and thus align their own economic interests with those of private investors. The problem, however, is that this alignment of interests induces politicians take steps to protect the firms from competition and thus typically inflicts considerable damage on the economy over the long run.72

The main additional costs of Type I problems are the ruined fortunes and lives of its victims and the corrosive cynicism to which scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Vivendi, and Parmalat give rise. But Type II problems also have victims. They are not so visible perhaps because they are dispersed throughout society, but they are very real nonetheless. Moreover, Type II problems produce a cynicism which, because it extends to government officials as well as business leaders, can be even more socially corrosive, undermining faith in democratic political institutions at the same time as it inhibits economic growth.


The middle way is to attempt to navigate a course between the two corporate governance monsters by relying upon a third-party enforcer such as the SEC. European countries have moved in this direction in recent years, and all of the members of the European Union now have SEC-type regulatory agencies. As with the Islamic clerics of early modern times, there is always the danger of laxness and corruption (capture), on the one hand, or rigidity and excessive regulation, on the other. The scandals of the early twenty-first century are perhaps an indication that the SEC became too lax and drifted toward the monster Scylla. Congress stepped in to correct the course, and only time will tell whether the new settings will steer the economy too close to the other monster.

73 See Prentice, “Inevitability of a Strong SEC.”