“In different guises, several of the main ideas about plausibility logics in this chapter also occur in the area of dynamic semantics, an update-based account of meaning in natural language. A classical source for this earlier line of work is F. Veltman, 1996, ‘Defaults in Update Semantics’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25, 221-261.”
“Comment. The combination of logic and probability employed in the syntax of this chapter may result in several cumbersome formulations. A perhaps more perspicuous alternative would be a two-component design as advocated in Appendix B, letting the epistemic logic work together with calculations in standard probabilistic notation.”
“Intentions are central in an influential model of agency called the ‘BDI framework’ (‘belief, desire, intention’) not covered in this book. Three major sources are M. Bratman, 1987, “Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, Ph. Cohen and H. Levesque, 1990, ‘Intention is Choice with Commitment’, Artificial Intelligence, 42, 213–261, and for ‘BDI Logic’, A. Rao and M. Georgeff, ‘Modeling Rational Agents within a BDI-Architecture’, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, KR’91, 473–484, ACM Digital Library.”