Belief Reports and the Structure of Believing weaves together concerns from three different literatures in philosophy: the logical analysis of propositional attitude reports (Quine), the semantics and metaphysics of cognition (Fodor, Putnam, Burge), and issues of causation and externalism in epistemology (Gettier, Goldman, Lehrer). The topics these literatures deal with fit naturally together, but the literatures do not. Often ideas are developed in one in isolation from the others; sometimes authors in one area see the relevance of the others, but do not have the patience to get things straight.
This work is based on the version of Philip R. Henry's dissertation that was left behind after his untimely death in 1987. Professor Julius Moravcsik, Henry's adviser, and Professor John Perry, a member of Henry's committee, felt it worthwhile to make the ideas of this serious and talented philosopher available to the philosophy community. They omitted some incomplete sections and references to them in order to produce the finished work, which even ten years after the author's death, contains current and thought-provoking arguments and distinctions.
was a graduate student at Stanford University. His interests included philosophy of language and mind. He died in 1987.
- Part I
- Psychology, Cognition, and the Individual
- Part II
- Epistemic Values and Epistemic Stratification
- Name Index