The intuitive concept of consequence, the notion that one sentence follows logically from another, has driven the study of logic for more than two thousand years. But logic has moved forward dramatically in the past century—largely as a result of bringing mathematics to bear on the field. The infusion of mathematically precise definitions and techniques has turned a field dominated by homely admonitions into one characterized by illuminating theorems. The aim of this book is to correct a common misunderstanding of one of the most widely used techniques of mathematical logic. In recent years, work in the philosophy of logic has been dominated by the investigation and advocacy of so-called alternative logics. Much of this work has challenged orthodoxy by questioning classical principles—the law of excluded middle, for example, or the principle that everything follows from a contradiction. In this book, Etchemendy challenges orthodoxy on entirely different grounds: he questions not classical logic but rather the received view of the conceptual underpinnings of modern logic.

Central to the received view is Tarski's model-theoretic analysis of logical consequence, which Etchemendy argues is fundamentally mistaken. Save indirectly, by those who question classical principles, this standard analysis has gone unchallenged for half a century, with the result that it has come to seem a piece of common knowledge. Etchemendy's critique will shatter the complacency.

John Etchemendy is a professor of philosophy and symbolic systems at Stanford University.

**Translated into Czech.**

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Representational Semantics
- 3 Tarski on Logical Truth
- 4 Interpretational Semantics
- 5 Interpreting Quantifiers
- 6 Modality and Consequences
- 7 The Reduction Principle
- 8 Substantive Generalizations
- 9 The Myth of the Logical Constant
- 10 Logic from the Metatheory
- 11 Completeness and Soundness
- 12 Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index

3/15/99