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Essays in Honor of
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It is human nature always to rule over those who yield, but also to guard against those who are about to attack.

(Thucydides 4.61.5: speech of Hermocrates)

Take care, Pericles, you are ruling free men, you are ruling Greeks, citizens of Athens.

(Plutarch Moralia 813D-E: Pericles to himself)

Thucydides' account of Pericles' grand strategy in the Peloponnesian War has long fascinated historians, who have often tried to explain how Athens could have won the war given the essentially defensive strategy Thucydides ascribed to Pericles. I shall not attempt here to solve that vexing problem, but rather pose another, related question: what part did the defense of the Athenian countryside play in Pericles' overall strategy? Few modern historians have bothered with this question, since Thucydides seems to give a simple answer; namely, that the defense of Attica was never an issue because the rural citizens were withdrawn to the city, where they were safe behind the circuit walls. Upon closer scrutiny, however, this apparently straightforward solution appears inadequate, as Thucydides' own narrative demonstrates that Pericles in fact took serious measures to protect rural property. An investigation of Pericles' local defense preparations should reveal some of the underpinnings of his strategy; it may also shed some light on two other important issues. How did the Athenian democracy function during the time of Pericles' prostateia and what is the relationship between narrative and analysis in Thucydides' History?

Thucydides' summary of Pericles' strategy (2.66.7) is unambiguous. Pericles told the Athenians they would win the war if they (1) remained on the defensive (ἁυτών), (2) maintained their fleet, (3) resisted the temptation to expand their empire during the war,

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and (4) did not endanger the city. What Pericles meant by "remain on the defensive" is made clear in two of his speeches to the demos. In 431, at an Assembly called to consider a final Spartan peace proposal, Pericles argued against compromise and laid out his plan for dealing with the Peloponnesian invasion. The Peloponnesian land force, being superior in numbers, would ultimately defeat the Athenian army in battle. Therefore, the Athenians must not fight the Peloponnesians on land. If the Athenians were islanders they would be perfectly secure, therefore they should act as if their city were an island and abandon their land and homes in the countryside. Pericles considered land and country homes liabilities, since their threatened loss might tempt the citizens to meet the Peloponnesians in battle. Indeed he wished he could persuade the Athenians to sack their own lands to show the Peloponnesians how little they cared for such trivialities (1.143.5). The Athenians were convinced by this speech and refused the Spartan peace proposal (1.145). After the Spartans had mustered their army and were marching toward Attica another Assembly was called at which Pericles gave the same advice as before; the Athenians were to agree; they brought their families and moveable property into the city from the rural districts, refuse battle on land, guard the city, equip the fleet, and keep a firm hand on the allies (2.13.2). The Athenians agreed; they brought their families and moveable property within the city walls, disassembled the wooden frameworks of their country houses, and sent their livestock to Euboea and the other islands (2.14.1). Even in 430, after the ravages of the plague, Pericles stuck by his conviction (γιαθησθαι) that the Athenians must not meet the invaders in the field (2.55.1-2) and he reiterated his position in the Assembly. Athens' strength, he said, lay in her powerful fleet (2.62.2) and the Athenians must not be compared to country houses and land which are no more important than gardens or fancy ornaments and which only seem significant now because of their unavailability (2.62.3).

Pericles' strategy, as described by Thucydides, was highly original and completely logical. He knew that Athens had insufficient manpower to both man a fleet large enough to maintain the empire and fight the Peloponnesians on land. The Peloponnesians' strength lay in their land army and Pericles knew they would attempt to provoke battle by invading Attica. If the Athenians fought the Peloponnesians they would eventually lose too many men to be able to man a fleet. The Athenians were not constrained to fight in defense of their land, however, because the state had sufficient disposable wealth, generated from imperial revenues, to feed the population and maintain the war for several years. If the Athenians did not lose men in battle, they would retain enough manpower to maintain their navy and hence the empire from which the revenues accrued. The Peloponnesians could not match the Athenian navy at sea. Therefore, if the Athenians did not fight in defense of Attica (and avoided wasting their strength on imperial expansion) they could not lose the war. Q.E.D. Thucydides appreciated the logic and states that in his opinion Pericles' strategy would have proved successful had it been followed to the letter (2.65.13).

Pericles, however, not only had to devise a rational war plan, but also had to persuade a sometimes irrational democratic Assembly to agree to it; in this case there were good reasons for him to expect opposition. The strategy of abandoning the state chora and refusing to meet another Greek army in battle was not only original, it was revolutionary and contravened the unwritten rules of agonal combat. It was one matter for the Athenians to abandon Attica in face of the barbarian Persian invaders in 480, quite another for hoplites to refuse the formal challenge to battle by fellow hoplites, to stand quietly on the city wall watching homes burned and field ravaged, all the while imagining the taunts of insolent invaders. The Peloponnesians, on their part, certainly expected the Athenian army to meet their invasion force in the field. Thucydides (5.14.3) says that at the beginning of the war the Spartans believed they would destroy Athens' dynamis by ravaging Athenian land. The ravaging would, they assumed, bring the Athenian army out to fight. Archidamus, in addressing his army before the invasion of 431 suggested that there was "every reason to expect them [the Athenians] to risk a battle ... when they see us in their territory laying it waste and destroying their property" (2.11.6). Until the capture of the contingent on Sphacteria in 425, many Spartans continued to believe that eventually the Athenian hoplites would come out from behind the walls to fight in defense of their land, as brave men should. How could Pericles persuade the Athenian soldiery to hold back?

And what of the interests of the rural citizens? Thucydides clearly states that at the outbreak of the war the majority (Οἵ πασχόν, 2.16.1) of Athenians lived in the countryside and were therefore directly affected by Pericles' defense strategy. Thucydides' description of Pericles' plan implies that rural residents stood to
lose everything left in the countryside and they could hardly expect their lives in the city to be pleasant. The rural majority could have voted for an open battle strategy in hopes of protecting their farms. Furthermore, it was not property alone that was at stake. Each household had its sacred hearth and private shrines to think of. In the public sphere there were the olive trees sacred to Athena, as well as various rural festivals and fertility cults. The Athenians would be giving up a great deal when they abandoned their land.

Thucydides was well aware of the sacrifice the rural citizens made in choosing to come into the city and he describes their plight in detail. It was difficult for the Athenians to move, since they were used to living in the country (2.14.2); indeed autonomous village life was even more characteristic of the Athenians than of other Greeks (2.15.1). The Athenians had only just finished rebuilding farms which had been sacked in the Persian Wars (2.16.1) and were deserted and aggrieved (ἐξεμόνυμνον δὲ χαλεπὰς ἀσαφοῦς) at the prospect of leaving homes (ὁμιλαμένοι) and the ancestral sacred things (τρόποι). In sum, says Thucydides, the move to the city was for each rural citizen the equivalent of abandoning his own polis (2.16.2).

Thucydides' vivid description of the rural citizens' despair at leaving their lands leads his reader to expect an explanation of why they were ultimately willing to do so. Thucydides never offers an explicit answer, but his implicit explanation is clear: Pericles was first man of Athens, the most persuasive in speech and most powerful in action and he controlled the demos (1.39.4, 1.127.2-3, 2.65.7-10). Hence, when Pericles suggested that the Athenians do something, they might grumble, but they did it. But was it really quite so simple? Recent scholarship has shown that Pericles had more in common with his demagogic successors than Thucydides believed: like them, Pericles had to manipulate and cajole the demos to accomplish his political and strategic ends. If we cannot wholly accept Thucydides' assessment of Pericles' ability to force his will upon his fellow citizens we must ask what sort of argument and inducements he might have offered to persuade them to agree to give up their homes, temples, and sense of agonal honor.

First, Pericles might have played on Athenian hopes that the Peloponnesians would not actually penetrate central Attica. In 446/5 a Peloponnesian invasion of Attica had been aborted before the invaders had advanced farther than the Thriasian plain (1.104.2). Thucydides states (2.21.1) that in 431 the Athenians remembered this event and hoped that the current invasion would also be halted before crossing Mount Aigaleos. But the mass evacuation of 431 would have been unnecessary if the Athenians could be sure the Peloponnesians would stay west of Aigaleos. Clearly those Athenians living east of the Thriasian plain who had evacuated recognized the possibility that the Peloponnesians might advance. But even if the invaders did advance, one might argue, the Athenians need not have expected them to do a great deal of damage. After all, agonal warfare did not require an efficient destruction of enemy property, since the defending hoplites tended to show up for battle before much ravaging had occurred. The fact that the Peloponnesians would not be experienced ravagers may have been some comfort to the Athenians, but on the other hand the devastation of Attica during the Persian Wars was still in living memory. The Athenians had more reason than most other mainland Greeks to associate enemy occupation of unguarded land with economic ruin.

An explanation might be sought in the composition of the Athenian Assembly. Undoubtedly a relatively higher percentage of city dwellers than of rural citizens attended the Assembly regularly (Aeschines: on a question so germane to their interests. The possibility that Pericles may have packed the Assembly with urban voters is not sufficient explanation in the face of Thucydides' clear statement that the majority of citizens lived in the countryside.

Propaganda provides another possible clue. It seems likely that Pericles' great building program had the effect of fostering the identification of the asty with the polis as a whole. The very building of the Long Walls to Piraeus may have helped condition the Athenians to the idea that they might have to man them, and manning the walls implied abandoning the countryside. Not all citizens might make that connection, but for those who did Pericles prepared a convenient mythology in the iconography of the shield of the great statue of Athena.
Parthenos in the Parthenon. E. Harrison has recently demonstrated that the background of the Amazonomachy depicted on the shield was a city wall; the anonymous heroes of the Cleisthenic tribes are shown fighting on the wall against the besiegers. If the ancestral heroes could face invaders at the wall rather than in the field, their descendants would not shame themselves by doing the same.

Along with propaganda to persuade the Athenians that city defense was noble and brave, Pericles also played on the darker side of his audience's emotions by appealing to their passion for revenge. From 431 on the Athenians sent their large fleets to ravage Peloponnesian territory and the land army marched against Megara twice each year. In his first speech Pericles specifically links the expected Peloponnesian invasions and the planned Athenian raids: "If they march by land against our chora, we will sail against theirs" (1.143.4). Pericles (loc. cit.) goes on to say that Athenian raids will hurt the Peloponnesians more than the loss of all Attica will hurt the Athenians. Perhaps he believed that; Thucydides suggested that if the Athenians thought they could stop the infuriating Athenian raids by attacking the land of Athens' allies (4.80.1); mutatis mutandis Pericles might have had similar hopes in 431. Whether or not the raids would be effective in winning the war, they would keep the Athenians from feeling themselves helpless victims, unable to strike back at their tormentors.

At least some of these factors no doubt helped to pave the way for Athenian acceptance of Pericles' strategy; even collectively, however, they do not provide a sufficient condition for Athenian willingness to withdraw from the countryside. The rural citizens were being asked to give up a great deal; they must have been given some assurance that the state would make an effort to minimize the extent of their losses. But how could rural property be protected if the countryside were abandoned?

A solution may be sought by examining the defensive response of a similar Greek state faced with an analogous situation. Thucydides makes a point of comparing Sicilian Syracuse with Athens. Syracuse, like Athens, was a wealthy, populous, democratic state whose citizens, when faced with large-scale invasion in 415, chose initially to withdraw behind city walls. Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian expedition includes a detailed description of Syracuse's local defense strategy. The Syracusans, as it turns out, guarded their territory with cavalry and rural garrisons. Despite initial losses in battle suffered by the hoplite force, the Syracusan cavalry and garrisons effectively protected rural assets. The enemy hoplites were forced by cavalry raids to move about in large units in tight formation; any hoplite who left the formation was cut down by mounted skirmishers. The camp followers of the invaders were slaughtered when they attempted to collect water and firewood and could not spread out to scour the countryside for provisions. Since the enemy could never disperse his forces to ravage, damage to rural resources was kept to a minimum. The role of the Syracusan garrisons is less clear, but they seem to have served as bases for the cavalry and as centers of local resistance.

The cavalry/garrison defense strategy employed by Syracuse was a major factor in the failure of Athens' Sicilian expedition, but, according to Thucydides, it should have been anticipated that Syracusan cavalry they would be unable to venture out of their camp due to the cavalry (6.37.2). Nor, apparently, were the Athenians blind to the defensive potential of the cavalry. Nicias, in his second speech against the expedition in 415, stated that the main advantage the Sicilians would have over the Athenians was their numerous cavalry (τυπως... πολλος 6.20.4) and he feared that the Athenians might be shut off from the land by the horsemen (6.21.1, 6.22, 6.23.3). Perhaps Nicias was guessing, or perhaps Thucydides inserted the passage in the speech so this man who "had lived his whole life in accordance with virtue" (7.86.5) would accurately predict the future. There is, however, good reason to suppose that Nicias and his fellow Athenians well understood the defensive use of cavalry and garrisons because, as we shall see, Athenian cavalry and garrisons had been on active duty in Attica since the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

Could Pericles have believed, or at least have persuaded the Athenians to believe, that Athenian cavalry and garrisons would be able to defend Attic property? Certainly the Athenian cavalry was sufficiently numerous, with an equal (1,200 regular and mounted archers in 431, 2.13.8) to the "not less than 1,200 horsemen" the Syracusans fielded in 415 (6.67.2). Indeed, one of the similarities between Athens and Syracuse noted by
Thucydides was that both states possessed large navies and large cavalry forces (7.55.2). Like the Syracusans the Athenians enjoyed the support of allied cavalry contingents (unknown numbers of Thessalians and Peleponnesians attempted to capture Oinoe and Oropos (2.18-19.1). He then proceeded southeast to the Thriasian plain. After ravaging the plain his army apparently attempted to cross the Daphni pass to the Athenian plain; as they approached the entrance to the pass they were met (at "the Rheiti") by Athenian cavalry; although the Athenians were driven off, Archidamus decided to avoid the narrow pass and took the longer route north of Aigaleos to the deme of Acharnai (2.19.1-2).

After the Peloponnesians had established their camp at Acharnai, Pericles constantly sent out the cavalry (Κυνάχδες ... εξεστησεν τιει) to prevent the Peloponnesians from sending "outsiders from their main force" (προδρόμους ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς) or ravaging the fields near the city (Ἀφροῦς τοῦς εγγύς τῆς πόλεως κακουργῆτει. 2.22.2). At a place called Phrygiou (exact location unknown) the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry engaged in a Boeotian cavalry group, but were driven off with light casualties when Peloponnesian hoplites came up in support (loc. cit.). The Athenian tactics were similar to those later used by the Syracusan cavalry against the Athenian hoplite army, and seem to have been effective. The Peloponnesian Army left Attica through one of the northeastern passes (2.23) without ever having entered the main part of the Athenian plain, much less the Mesogeia or other areas of southern Attica.18 Despite the shock of the invasion and the near crisis when the numerous Acharnians realized their territory had been selected for the Spartan camp (2.21.2-3, cf. Plutarch, Pericles 33.5-7), Pericles had reason to be proud of his preparations; the no-battle strategy was working according to plan and the Athenians expressed their approval of his leadership by electing him to deliver the eulogy over the war dead (2.24.6-8).

The next year the Peloponnesian army returned and this time was able to ravage the Athenian plain and the Mesogeia during the nearly forty days they stayed in Attica (2.47.2, 2.55, 2.57.2). The property-protection scheme had apparently broken down completely. The failure was due in part to the disrupting influence of the plague (which had killed 300 cavalrymen by 427; 3.67.3), but also because of the (unexplained) absence of the Thessalian cavalry, and because Pericles took 300 cavalry with him on a naval raid (2.56.1). Cavalry available for local defense in the summer of 430 must

Could the Athenian cavalry have guarded rural property against Peloponnesian hoplites? Xenophon, who had a great deal of experience as a cavalry commander, thought so. In discussing Athenian options in the face of a potential Boeotian invasion in the 360s, he points out that the Boeotian cavalry was about equal in number to Athens' (Cavalry Commander 7.1). Xenophon hopes the Athenian hoplites will meet the invaders in the field, but if the city falls back on the navy and is content to keep her walls intact, as in the days when the Lacedaemonians invaded... and if she expects her cavalry alone to protect all that lies outside the walls... then we need first the vigorous support of the gods and second, a skillful commander" (emphasis added, 7.4). Xenophon states that, although it will not be easy for Athens' cavalry to contain the invading forces, containment is quite possible, and he presents a good deal of practical advice on the conduct of hit and run raids and the use of strongholds against the invaders (7.5ff).

If Xenophon, with the experience of the Peloponnesian War to reflect upon, considered cavalry defense against large invading forces feasible, it is reasonable to suppose that before the war the Athenians may have believed that their cavalry, supported by rural garrisons, would be able to limit the damage the Peloponnesians could inflict upon Attica. A brief review of the activities of the cavalry and garrisons during the Peloponnesian War shows that they were in fact expected to fulfill an important role in the defense of Athenian rural property.

At the outbreak of the war Athens had 1,200 cavalry of her own, an unknown number of allied Thessalian cavalry, and garrisons in strongholds at Eleusis, Oinoe, Panakton, Oropos, and perhaps elsewhere.17 Upon crossing into the northwestern Athenian borderland in 431 Athens was able to capture Oinoe and Oropos (2.22.2) and had hopes of getting more (from Thrace, 2.29.5). Unlike the Syracusans, however, the Athenians could expect substantial numbers of horsemen to accompany the enemy invasion force. The Boeotians had about 1,000 available (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 16.3-4), but some of these might be tied down at Plataea or kept behind on home-guard duty. The number of other cavalry available for duty in Attica is unknown, but is unlikely to have been very large.15 On the whole, the Athenians might reasonably hope to field cavalry at least equal in number to that of the invaders and the Athenian cavalry would have the support of the garrison posts.16

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have been less than half that available in 431; the difference in numbers was a key factor in Spartan ability to ravage at will in central and southern Attica.

The Athenian demos was shocked. A peace mission was hastily dispatched to Sparta (2.59), but the Spartans now saw no reason to make peace on terms favorable to Athens. Despair set in and with it anger at the originator of the defense plan which had failed. "The demos had lost what little they had, while the upper classes had lost their lovely country estates, both buildings and expensive furnishings ..." (2.65.2). Although the devastation of their armed forces by the plague (3.87.3) left them little choice but to stick with Pericles' strategy, the Athenians expressed their displeasure with their prostates by temporarily deposing him from the generalship and by fining him (2.65.3).19

After Pericles' death in 429 his no-battle strategy was maintained, but so was the attempt to limit the damage caused by the annual invasions. In 428 the Athenian cavalry rode out "as usual" (δωτερ εκδεσσαν) against the invaders and succeeded in keeping the light-armed retainers of the Spartans from leaving the protection of the hoplites or plundering near the city (3.1.1). Again Athenian cavalry tactics are paralleled by the later successful attempt by the Syracusan horsemen to imitate foraging by Athenian camp followers. After the capture of the Spartan force on Sphacteria in 425 the invasions ceased, but when the Peloponnesian garrison was established at Decelea in 413 the Athenian cavalry returned to action on a daily basis (ουσιμεμος). Their mission was much the same as before: to harass the garrison (μος την δεκελειαν κατεωρους πουβουμενων) and to guard Athenian lands (και κατην γοφαν φυλακοσσωνων). The cavalrymen saw such constant duty that their horses frequently went lame (7.27.5).20

Happily, the cavalry could look to the surviving garrison posts for help. In 411/10 an Athenian raiding force from the Oinoe fort successfully attacked a Corinthian contingent on its way home from Decelea (8.98). In the same year the Decelea garrison, along with reinforcements from the Peloponnesse, approached the walls of Athens, hoping to precipitate the surrender of the city. Instead, the Athenians, supported by some hoplites and light-armed men, rode out and drove the enemy away from the walls. The Peloponnesians retreated in disarray and the reinforcements were sent home (8.71.1-3).

The picture that emerges from Thucydides' narrative is clear and consistent. At the outbreak of the war the Athenians expected their cavalry and outpost garrisons to limit the damage done by the invaders to rural property. The defensive forces succeeded in restricting enemy movements during the first invasion, but failed in the second year, prompting Pericles' dismissal. Afterwards, the Athenians continued to use cavalry and garrisons to protect as much of their land as possible.21

Whether or not the rural Athenians' faith in the cavalry and garrisons was the primary reason they were willing to abandon their farms, the rural protection scheme must have been a necessary condition of their agreement. Perhaps Pericles really felt it would be a good thing for the Athenians to ravage their own lands, but of course he could not possibly have convinced them to do so. On the contrary, Pericles, like other Athenian politicians, had to present the majority of voting citizens with an attractive "legislative package" if he hoped to retain his influence and hence his ability to implement long-term policy. So he secured the demos' agreement to his no-battle strategy with a promise (which he may or may not have believed he could keep) that their lands would be guarded after they had come into the city.

Thucydides himself mentions the cavalry and garrisons frequently enough to allow the preceding reconstruction, but in his analytic passages and speeches he completely ignores local defense.22 Perhaps he considered the rural defense plan unimportant, but, assuming my thesis is correct, Pericles could not have implemented his no-battle strategy without it. Thucydides' narrative shows that the cavalry was constantly fighting the invaders and that the war would not be left in the borderlands for the duration of the war; one might reasonably expect him to explain what they were supposed to accomplish. Why does he not?

Thucydides was convinced that Athens' real strength lay in her empire. The Mytileneans informed the Peloponnesians in a speech that the war will not be waged in Attica as some may think, but over the places from which Attica derives wealth -- the allied states (3.13.5-6, cf. 1.122.1). The empire was held by sea
power, against which the Spartan land army was helpless no matter how often it might invade Attica, as Alcibiades pointed out in his speech of 415 (6.17.8). Besides the fleet, only city walls were necessary to defend the state. Theoretically, therefore, Athens needed only to protect the walls and navy to guarantee the security of the empire and win (or at least avoid losing) the war. Unlike Pericles, Thucydides could choose to concentrate on theoretically achievable ends and to ignore the means of internal politics if the latter seemed unworthy. Several passages in Thucydidean speeches suggest that the desire to defend one's land was indeed an unworthy, even slavish, impulse. An Athenian envoy at Camarina told his audience that Athens' allies had been justly subdued since, in the Persian Wars they had not the courage (έφασαν to leave their homes (τά οίκηα), but chose slavery (δουλεύω) instead (6.82.4). Athenian ambassadors in Sparta in 432 noted that if Athens had medized "in order to save their chora" all of Greece would have been lost (1.74.4; cf. Pericles' similar comments at 1.144.4). Archidamus warned the Peloponnesians in 432 that they must not expect the Athenians to be "slaves to their land" (τῇ γῇ δουλεύοις; 1.81.6).

Pericles presumably conceded the strategic insignificance of local resources (which go unmentioned in his list of Athenian assets, 2.13.3-5), but knew that in order to implement his policies he had to make political compromises. To Thucydides, however, compromise with the demos was demagoguery -- and the historian was determined to draw the distinction between Pericles and the demagogues as sharply as possible. Pericles made decisions according to his own opinion and controlled the demos; the demagogues, on the other hand, attempted to please the mob in all things and so were controlled by it (2.65.8-11). Thucydides' Pericles could not be depicted as making a deal with the rural citizens over a concern so negligible in the greater scheme of things as rural property. Rather, Pericles must be portrayed as having demonstrated to them the unavoidable logic of his long-range strategy, which was based on sea power and empire. If this was not the way Periclean Athens really did work, it was the way it should have worked.

The Thucydides I have described here is not the impartial and objective observer he claimed to be (1.22.2-4), but this does not mean he was a dishonest historian. In a recent essay on Thucydides, Chester Starr meditated upon the problem of historical objectivity and concluded, "All that a true historian must keep steadily in mind is an effort to counter his known prejudices and to take into account all the known evidence; his unconscious attitudes will be detected by others as they judge his work." Thucydides, like all historians, had his biases and idees fixes, which come through clearly in the analytic passages and speeches of his history. Yet in his descriptive narrative of events he presents enough discrete pieces of evidence (in this case at least) so that later historians may reassemble the jigsaw puzzle for themselves and speculate as to why the picture they see looks different from Thucydides' own.

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3. D.W. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca and London 1959), 340, and The Archidamian War (Ithaca and London 1974), 37-40, suggests that for financial reasons Pericles planned for the war to last for no longer than three years. Knight, "Thucydides and the War Strategy of Pericles," 153 n. 1, cites 1.141.5 (Pericles states that the financial strain of an "un­expectedly" long war will wear down the Peloponnesians) against the contention that Pericles planned for a short war.

4. On the forms of agonal warfare, see Ober, Fortress Attica, 32-35. Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgment," 70, notes correctly that the abandonment of Attica was a "radical" step, but I cannot agree with him that the rest of Pericles' strategy was conventional.

5. The Peloponnesians invaded Attica annually (2.47.2, 3.1.1, 3.26.1-3, 4.2.1) except in 429 (when they concentrated on attacking Platea instead, 2.71.1) and 426 (when the planned invasion was aborted due to an earthquake, 3.89.1). Even if some Spartans had doubts about traditional methods (Archidamus expressed such doubts in two speeches: 1.81.6 2.11.3-5) we must assume, therefore, that there was a good deal of support for the invasion strategy. On Archidamus and the Archidamian speeches see J. de Romilly, "Les intentions d'Archidamos et le livre II de Thucydide," Revue des Études Anciennes 64 (1962), 287-97; E.F. Bloedow, "The Speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaiadas at Sparta," Historia 30 (1981), 129-43. On Spartan strategy in the Archidamian war see P.A. Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War," Phoenix 19 (1963), 255-80; Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgment," 53-70; I. Moxon, "Thucydides' Account of Spartan Strategy and Foreign Policy in the Archidamian War," Rivista Storica dell'Antichita 8 (1978), 7-26; T. Kelly, "Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War," American Historical Review 87 (1982), 25-54.

6. Thucydides emphasizes the squalid conditions in which the evacuees lived: 2.17, 2.52.1-2.

7. The sacred nature of the central hearth: L.R. Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (Oxford 1896­1909), vol. 5, 358-65. Many farms had other sacred places; on three cult-related rupestral inscriptions found at a single farm in the Laurion district, see M. Langdon and V. Watrous in Hesperia 46 (1977), 162-77; J. Wickens in Hesperia 52 (1983), 96-99. On the sacred olive trees (which were located on private farms) see Lysias Oration 7. J.K. Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (New York 1981), 75-76, postulates that Thucydides' stress on the rural way of life and cults shows that Athenians had a "comparative detachment" from and a "curious lack of emotional involvement" in their real estates, which I think over­states the case.

8. Thucydides' assessment of Pericles' position is accepted by, among others, A. Delbruck, History of the Art of War (English ed.: Westport, Conn. 1975), vol. 1, 137-38, who praises "the power of the mind of Pericles, who was able to persuade the sovereign Athenian Citizenry to adopt a strategy that was so hard to grasp," and Kagan, who speaks of Pericles' "political magic" (Origins, 193-94) and suggests that Pericles'
"power" to persuade the Athenians to leave their farms was due to his "auctoritas" (Archidamian War, 54-56).

9. See the seminal article by M.I. Finley, "Athenian Demagogues," Past and Present 21 (1962), 3-24, esp. 14-16. There were, of course, differences between Pericles and his successors (see W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens [Princeton 1971]) and his personal prestige no doubt helped Pericles persuade the Athenians to vote his way on many issues, but there were limits to what the Athenians would agree to on the basis of prestige alone.

10. It is generally assumed, e.g. by M.H. Hansen, "The Duration of a Meeting of the Athenian Ecclesia," Classical Philology 74 (1979), 48, that the preponderance of voters at normal meetings of the Assembly were townsmen.

12. G.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of His Age (Oxford 1948), 331, suggested that the raids might have been intended to improve Athenian morale. Westlake, "Seaborne Raids," 79, found this "not quite convincing," but Kagan, Archidamian War, 29 n. 49, feels that it is a possible explanation.

13. Comparison of Athens and Syracuse: 7.55.2, 8.96.5. According to Nicias (6.20.4) Syracuse depended upon grain grown in its home territory, but Lamachus' (6.49.3) suggestion that a quick attack on Syracuse in 415 would catch the Syracusans in the countryside while still engaged in bringing their property into the city seems to indicate that at least a temporary evacuation was effected.


14. Syracusan cavalry tactics: 6.52.2, 6.70.3, 6.71.2, 6.98.3, 7.4.6, 7.10.4, 7.13.2, 7.42.6, 7.44.8, 7.78.3-7; rural garrisons: 6.45, 6.94.2.

15. The invaders' cavalry came from the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians (2.9.3, 2.12.4), but clearly the Boeotian contingent was the most important. Before the battle of Delium in 424 the general Hippocrates suggested that an Athenian victory would ensure the safety of Attica, since without the support of Boeotian cavalry the Peloponnesians would not invade (4.95.1-2). Knight, "Thucydides and the War Strategy of Pericles," 153, states that the Peloponnesians had a "great advantage" in "hoplite, cavalry [my italics] and light-armed forces ..." but cites no evidence for this contention.

16. Hippocrates left behind 300 Athenian cavalry to guard the fort at Delium during the battle (4.93.1), demonstrating that cavalry could be used in close support of fortified outposts.

17. Oinoe: 2.18-19.1, 8.98; Panakton: 5.3.5, 5.18.7, 5.33.5, 5.36.2, 5.40.1-2, 5.42.1-2, 5.44.3; Eleusis: Plutarch, Alcibiades 34.3-5; Oropos: 8.60.1. I discussed the physical remains and function of these and other sites (for which there are no testimonia) in Fortress Attica, 130-80.

18. G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeroneia (Gotha 1904), vol. 3.2, 930, suggested that the Athenian cavalry limited Peloponnesian movements in 431. His theory was noted, but rejected, by Kagan, Archidamian War, 51, 57 n. 48, on the grounds that "there is no evidence that the cavalry presented a serious problem to the Peloponnesians." Cf. also below, note 21.

19. 2.65.3; Plutarch, Pericles 35.4. For a review of modern studies of Pericles' impeachment and the view that it was the outcome of political faction-fighting, see J.T. Roberts, Accountability in Athenian Government (Madison, Wisc. 1982), 21. 30-34, 59-62.

20. The defendant in Lysias 20.28 mentions that his brother was a cavalryman who killed an enemy soldier based at Decelea. In Lysias 14.20 the defendant notes that Athenian cavalrymen had done much damage to Athen's enemies during the war.

21. Brunt, "Spartan Policy," 266, mentions in passing that Athenian forts and cavalry must have limited the damage done to Attica in the Archidamian War. V.D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece: Biblioteca di Studi Antichi 40 (Pisa 1983), 77-78, 105-5, notes the role of garrisons and cavalry in Athens' defense and argues, 109-43, that damage to Athenian agriculture was fairly limited even during the Decelean War.
22. Pericles suggests (1.142.4) that the Peloponnesians will find it difficult to establish a fort in Attica since ἐξωτικοὶ ήμων ὄρεα, which could be construed as a reference to Athens' borderland fortresses, but more probably refers to the city itself. For this interpretation and an analysis of the grammatical difficulties involved in the passage, see A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1945), vol. 1, 458-59.


24. Thucydides was convinced that city walls were necessary for civilized life: 1.2.2, 1.5.1, 1.7, 1.8.3; and showed a good deal of interest in the history of Athens' walls: 1.90-93, 1.107.1, 1.108.3.

25. C.G. Starr, The Flawed Mirror (Lawrence, Kans. 1983), 32. A good deal of the debate over both Periclean and Spartan strategy is ultimately based on decisions about the reliability of Thucydides' analysis. Cawkwell, "Thucydides Judgment," 69, who believes that "it is unthinkable that Thucydides sought to mislead," and Holladay, "Athenian Strategy," 404, who is unable to countenance the idea that Thucydides could give a slanted interpretation, both argue that Pericles' strategy was purely defensive, just as Thucydides tells us it was. On the other hand Wick, "Megara, Athens, and the West," 2, who suggests that Thucydides deemphasized Athenian strategic interest in Megara "almost to the point of being devious," and Kelly, "Thucydides and Spartan Strategy," 54, who notes that generalizations in Thucydides "cannot be taken as literally true and universally applicable," are both able to use Thucydides' narrative statements in arguing against Thucydides' own strategic analysis.