and G. is aware of many questions that it raises. One of these is, "exemplary for whom?" and G.'s answer is an intriguing one. The audience for this gesture is Socrates' interlocutors, and also ourselves (pp. 311–13). G. does not pursue the questions this raises about Plato's use of dialogue form.

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted largely to Aristotle, with some discussion of Plato and of Hellenistic philosophy, and additional reflections on G.'s own methodology and purpose. They focus on the tension between self and other, and the process of becoming fully human, respectively. In chapter 5 G. develops further his use of the distinction between first- and second-order reasoning in psychology, ethics, and education. This approach works particularly well for Aristotle, whom G. discusses at length, with a reading of the Ethics that runs closely parallel to his treatment of the Republic. The last chapter ends with some intriguing threads that might be pursued. For example, we may grant with G. that the Greek texts "do not standardly claim human beings are responsible, as individuals, for their success and failure in reaching the normatively human state by responding, or failing to respond, to... therapeutic discourse" (p. 450). Yet in the myth of Er, the man who is virtuous "from habit without philosophy" because he lives in a well-governed city, is reincarnated as a tyrant (619C). This point could be interestingly linked to the way in which literary figures like Oedipus, who are not "guilty" of their terrible deeds, are yet in some sense "responsible."

G.'s final question is, why now? Why was the time ripe for this particular paradigm shift? He answers in terms of the fading of certain aspects of Christianity and its influence (pp. 467–68). G., whose "arbitrary" use of he/she pronouns declares him a feminist, might also have mentioned the influence of feminist and feminist theory, along with subsequent developments in identity politics. For most of this century feminism has challenged the "humanist" conception of human nature and personal identity as something that transcends the circumstances of individual human lives, and focused attention on the concrete experience of lived lives in the specificity of gender, class, race, education, physical characteristics, and so on. This influence has formed part of a significant shift not just in the ivory tower, but in popular culture as well. This makes it an appropriate analogue for G.'s picture of a Greek world pervaded at literacy as well as philosophical levels by "objective-participant" values.

This is a weighty volume, reined in at times from becoming even longer. The claim on the jacket that it is "non-technical" should be treated as strictly relative. There is only a handful of typos in its five hundred-plus pages. G.'s writing is dry, but clear and careful and very thorough. To keep the reader on track, there are numerous summaries and cross-references, though the usefulness of the latter is vitiated by the maddening practice of referring to passages in the book not by page numbers but by "text to notes" or by chapter and section. The index could be more thorough, but the bibliography is impressive. G. is primarily a philosopher, yet he is much better read in both literary and philosophical criticism than many who try to bridge this particular divide. For such readers, and for anyone interested either in concepts of the person or in the ethics and psychology of Greek literary culture, this is an important book, which deserves the careful attention that it demands.

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In this intelligent and erudite study of the often-maligned (and all too commonly ignored) rhetorician, Yun Lee Too argues that Isocrates' corpus should be read as a unified and coherent whole, and that his speeches were intellectually ambitious and politically serious. T.s Isocrates—a figure radically and variously opposed to the cosmopolitan culture-hero, the drab educator, inferior philosopher, and vacuous sophist of earlier twentieth-century Isocrates scholarship—consistently represents himself as a writer of πολιτικός λόγος in a distinctly wryly "small voice." Isocrates, in T.s account, appropriates Athenian democratic ideals, but his political stance is ultimately that of the quietist and oligarch; he seeks to replace the real (democratic) polis and its noisy will to power with a cultural hegemony exerted and expressed only through the written texts of the individual, superior, teacher-citizen: namely, Isocrates himself.

The key to T.s understanding of Isocratean politics is, reasonably enough, Isocratean education. She firmly rejects the notion that Isocrates ever expounded a specific rhetorical doctrine either in a (lost) στυλογις or through an esoteric oral tradition passed on from student to teacher. Rather, Isocrates' μαθήματα are front and center, contained in his own textual self-description, notably in the letters, Antidosis, and Against the Sophists. T. argues that this last text, key to any analysis of Isocrates-as-educator, is not a fragment; its apparently "incomplete" state is a deliberate strategy, intended to avoid an undesirable mimetic assimilation of the pupil to the identity of the master himself. Ultimately, Isocratean rhetorical education is not about the transmission of knowledge, but about the formation of civic identity; thus, in common with Plato (of the Republic) and Aristotle (of the Politics), Isocratean education is deeply political, and so his μαθήματα are part and parcel of his πολιτικός λόγος.

T. argues this complex thesis forcefully, generally quite clearly (frequent summaries and chapter introductions help the reader remain situated in the argument), and often very persuasively. She is admirably concerned with relating her investigation of Isocrates to modern (and post-modern) debates over education and cultural canons—in the last chapter she takes on E. D. Hirsch (Cultural Literacy) and A. Bloom (The Closing of the American Mind), who are depicted as false Isocrateans. They borrow from the Isocratean rhetorical tradition yet are untrue to Isocrates' refusal to predicate the student's identity upon mastery of doctrine or the personality of the master: "they... differ from the Athenian rhetorician in making authority derive from making others like, rather than distinct from, oneself" (p. 232). T. is also very well read in the large and often tedious scholarship on Isocrates and classical rhetoric; while she clearly delineates her own questions from those asked by the tradition, she also draws freely from and engages in debates with earlier scholars. She confronts some old controversies head on: Appendix I, on "Isocrates and Gorgias," casts grave doubt on the common assertion that Isocrates was Gorgias' student.

T. is, to my mind, least convincing when she seeks to make Isocrates conform to the canons of postmodern literary theory. The conflict between oral expression and...
written text was a real one in late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens (as demonstrated, e.g., by Alcidamas' essay *On the Sophists*). But dragging in Derrida's now-shopworn arguments about the ontological priority of writing over oral speech does more to confuse than to elucidate the cultural context in which Isocrates worked. Derridean essentialism at one point leads T. to criticize scholars who "continue to work with a concept of rhetoric which implies that it is to some degree an orally performed language. . . . The assumption that rhetoric involves an oral element is ultimately permitted to prejudice assessments of Isocrates even as a writer" (p. 82, original emphasis). T. indulges in a wholly unnecessary speculation that R. C. Jebb "grants such prominence to oral performance in rhetoric" because he had studied dramatic performance (p. 84). All of this seems quite silly. As T. knows, Isocrates presented a number of his texts as pseudo-dicanic or pseudo-symbouleutic speeches. The fiction (whether sustained, as in *Plataeaus and Peace*, or explicitly transparent, as in *Antidosis*) entails a pose of an oral address to a listening audience. And therefore, ontology aside, rhetoric in the fourth century—even Isocratean rhetoric—is "to some degree an orally performed language" and surely it "involves an oral element." Isocrates was no doubt concerned to demonstrate that the written speech could be as good as oral speech and its worthy yokemate; but there is no warrant in our surviving texts for supposing that he thought that writing was superior to, prior to, or capable of replacing the authority of oral performance.

Much of the fascination of Isocrates' texts—which comes out clearly in T.'s excellent discussion of Isocratean *xρασια* as public liturgy—is the tension he maintains between the written text in the hands of the reader and the implied context of the oral, public, explicitly political performance that informs and (to some degree) justifies the text. The *Antidosis* (especially the Timotheus *κύρος*) reveals an Isocrates who was as proud of being a teacher of public men as he was proud of his own capacity to achieve personal eminence without addressing the public. I am very much in favor of theoretically informed readings of classical texts. T.'s book would surely be less rich and challenging if she had not read deeply in literary theory. But there is no warrant in our surviving texts for supposing that he thought that writing was superior to, prior to, or capable of replacing the authority of oral performance.

T.'s most challenging claim is that Isocratean rhetoric is about civic identity. She demonstrates clearly that establishing a specific political-cultural identity for the citizen is a central concern of both the classical polis and philosophical writers on education, especially Plato and Aristotle. She offers a detailed and provocative reading of the *Panegyricus* (chap. 4), suggesting that in the "Panellenic" oration of Isocrates assimilates Greek culture to Athenian culture, and Athenian culture to his own *ρασια*. This argument anticipates the final move (chap. 6): Isocratean *ρασια* is what offers the pupil/reader a civic identity that is at once hegemonically Greek, Athenian, and Isocratean—and yet irreducibly individualistic and anti-canonical in light of Isocrates' doctrinal silence. Much of this is convincing—the claim for a cultural development spiralling inwards from Greece to Athens to Isocrates seems to me very much in line with Isocrates' aspirations. And T. has done much to demonstrate just how expansive those aspirations really were. But I worry that she moves over-quickly in assimilating Isocrates to the educational ambitions common to the classical polis, Plato's polis (whether Callipolis or Magnesia), and Aristotle's best possible polis (in *Politics* Books 7 and 8). Each of these societies (real and utopian) was concerned, in quite different ways, with the civic education of the child, as well as with policing the behavior of adults. Each of these societies assumes that the primary inculcation of a civic identity has been accomplished before an individual is accepted as a full and participating citizen, even while recognizing that continuing education of adults (by emulation, or formal instruction) will also be necessary to ensure social reproduction.

The education offered by Isocrates, by contrast, seems to be uniquely for adults. He therefore assumes the prior establishment of a "civic identity" in his reader/pupil, an identity that will vary considerably depending on whether the reader is Philip, Nicocles, or Timotheus. Isocrates also assumes that his reader comes to him with a high level of "cultural literacy": a primary education that includes a mastery of much Greek literature and history, as well as a basic "philosophical" vocabulary. Isocrates is clearly concerned with reorienting and widening the reader/pupil's existing views on the relationship between culture and politics, especially by integrating Panellenic and Athenian perspectives—whether or not we accept that the Athenian perspective is necessarily meant to be hegemonic (which may seem dubious in light of *Antidosis* 80–81: "Intelligent persons should concern themselves for both [polis and Hellas], but among these they ought to give preference to the greater and worship cause"). And the student is surely meant to learn that Isocratean *φιλολογία* (rather than its several contemporary rivals) is a uniquely appropriate instrument of cultural integration. The prior civic identity is to be integrated with the wider Panellenic/Athenian perspective. Thus, Timotheus remains a loyal Athenian statesman, Nicocles a Cyprian monarch, Philip a Macedonian king, but each will (ideally) come to share with Isocrates and other Isocrateans an understanding of how that persistent local identity fits into a broader cultural frame. I am in full agreement with T. that this is an overtly political (and non-democratic) agenda, but it is somewhat different from the creation of civic identity of *de novo* that Athens, or Plato, or Aristotle intended for the youth of their several societies. Moreover, I suspect that T.'s appropriation of Isocrates against the sort of education reform advocated by Hirsch will not really hold up. T.'s readers may or may not agree with Hirsch's notion that a multi-ethnic nation must seek to inculcate in its youth a common body of cultural "facts," and that these facts should be mastered before the individual becomes a fully participatory member of civic society. But it seems hard to imagine that Isocrates—who

“Of all ancient poets,” R. O. A. M. Lyne remarks in the introduction to this study, “Horace is the one who most invites us to look through his poems to his life” (p. viii). In twelve chapters and assorted appendices, L. responds to this invitation with energy and imagination, reading the poetry against the life in an attempt to discover what Horace was up to in his poetry and, more broadly, who Horace really was. L.’s quotation marks around “life” register the difficulty of this enterprise. Who, after all, lies behind Horace’s poetry: Horace himself, or Horace’s persona? In their famous essay on the “intentional fallacy,” W. K. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley asserted that “we ought to imagine the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference” (The Verbal Icon, [Lexington, Ky., 1954], 5). Although the New Criticism is out of fashion, this caveat has maintained its authority across the decades, and many readers will be disconcerted by the intentionalist and biographical emphasis of L.’s study.

But the limits set by the New Critics do not deserve our automatic respect. To be sure, the speaker of Horace’s poems is not identical with the poet who wrote them. But when he addresses living contemporaries such as Maecenas and Augustus, that speaker performs, in or under Horace’s name, acts that may have consequences for Horace himself, both for his material circumstances and for his present and future reputation. Indeed, insofar as all of Horace’s published poetry is ipso facto public—open to the view of his patrons and of a wider reading public—all of his poems are potentially consequential in this way. Horace’s poetry is not just “about” his life, it is an important part of his life.

As its subtitle indicates, L. restricts himself to Horace’s “public poetry” (which for L. means Horace’s poems to public figures or on public themes) and focuses on the political and public dimensions of Horace’s career. Having fought on the losing side against the forces of Octavian (later Augustus) at Philippi in 42, the impoverished Horace found himself, L. suggests, in a doubly awkward position. Not only was Horace dependent on patronage (an “irksome” situation in itself, p. 13), but the patron he landed was Maecenas, a key associate of his quondam enemy. L. argues persuasively that the poetry of the 30s should be read as a form of “image-management” (p. 14): Horace counters the negative image of the debased client-poet by representing “patronage in the circle of Maecenas” as “an honourable, high-minded, and friendly business” (p. 20), and he deflects the charge of being a turncoat by representing himself as quite uninterested in political matters—the defensive message being that he has not switched sides but abandoned politics altogether (chap. 2). L. further attributes Horace’s “non-political” stance prior to the battle of Actium to a policy of prudence (p. 25): Having already switched allegiance once, Horace was wary of the “danger . . . of being caught on the wrong side again” (p. 28; original emphasis), and so delayed publicly committing himself to Octavian until after his victory over Antony (chap. 3).

Once he could safely do so, Horace took up the “moral and public role” that he had previously endorsed but not practiced (p. 22). In his most successful poems of this type, L. holds, Horace uses an “indirect method” (p. 57)—for example in Odes 3.4, where “myth substitutes for a direct encomiastic account of the battle of Actium” (p. 54)—in order to satisfy both himself and his patrons by producing at once “good literature” and “good politics” (p. 56; chap. 4). These values were no longer reconcilable, however, once the less comprehending and more demanding Augustus took over from Maecenas the patronage of poets, and Horace accordingly abdicated the public role after 23 (chap. 10). But this abdication (embodied by Epistles 1) was only temporary, and the pressure of Horace’s imperial patron eventually elicited the encomiastic poems of Odes 4, “court poetry” (p. 202) that L. views as lacking the saving indirection of the earlier public poems (chap. 11).

In counterpoint to this career(ist) narrative, L. explores various ways in which Horace vents his resistance to his public role and to the “grandees” he honors in his verse (p. 69). In his odes and hexameters to Maecenas, according to L., Horace self-assertively ribs his patron on his literary style, his superstitions, and especially his wealth (chaps. 7–8). Not only the content but the arrangement of poems within a collection can express “cheek” (a favored word of L.’s) as well as deference. The order of poems at the start of Odes 1.2 may have been premature (p. 86). Again, at the start of Odes 2.4, Pollio, “no favourite of Augustus,” pulls rank on the emperor’s “treasured advisers” (p. 89), who are relegated to second position, while the vivid evocation of civil war in the Pollio ode suggests, L.’s view (which I share), that the iam satis of Odes 1.2 may have been premature (pp. 92–93; chap. 6).

According to L., Horace indulges throughout the Odes in similar gestures of “political independence, which in the discreetest possible way may convey a kind of benign subversion” (p. 158). For example, the “lover Pirithous” at the end of Odes 3.4 constitutes a “humane allusion to Antonius” (p. 168), while the “wittily cynical” Odes 3.7 forms an irreverent coda to the harshly moralizing Roman ode...