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Views of Sea Power in the Fourth-Century Attic Orators

The development and maintenance of sea power was of primary importance to the Athenian state in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., yet contemporary Athenian writers' views of sea power have seldom been studied. A. Momigliano's short article, intended to point the way for future research, has not, to my knowledge, been followed up by more detailed studies. It will be the purpose of this paper to determine the attitudes of the fourth-century Attic orators on the uses and limits of sea power and on its relationship to empire and democracy.

The speeches of the Attic orators are notoriously difficult to use for historical purposes. The various orators held different political views, and the views expressed by an individual orator often changed with time, politics, and the occasion. Many of the extant speeches are certainly or possibly spurious and many more are undatable or only tentatively dated. Furthermore, it is often difficult to determine whose opinion is represented in a private oration written by an orator for another speaker. These factors complicate the problem of determining any given orator's views and the development of those views. The orators can, however, be treated successfully as a body. Their speeches were intended to influence public opinion and could not, therefore, deviate too radically from views acceptable to the demos. Speeches by different orators in the same period often show a remarkable degree of agreement on the subject of sea power. Even orators who disagreed on other matters often agreed on the uses of sea power. This unanimity of opinion can, of course, be overstated and must be checked wherever possible. The discernible differences of opinion seem, however, to be more in emphasis than in substance. Within these limits, then, it should be possible to determine the views of the Attic orators on the subject of sea power from the end of the Peloponnesian War down to the death of Alexander.

A state may use sea power in a number of ways. These may be conveniently distributed under the headings of economy, military employment, and national prestige. The navy may further a state's economic ends by collecting tribute, protecting supply lines, policing the seas so as to encourage trade, or by interfering with an enemy state's supply or trade. Military uses are the destruction of enemy ships in offensive maneuvers, blockade of enemy ports and shipping, or defense of the state from attack by sea. Naval strength may enhance a state's prestige and can be an important factor in diplomacy and in the respect granted to the state by other powers.

The most obvious way that sea power can be used to a state's economic benefit is by extorting tribute from subject states, but there is little evidence that the

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1 This paper comprises part of a dissertation in progress at the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan, on the subject "Views of Military Power in the Fourth Century B.C." I am indebted to Professors C.G. Starr and J. W. Eadie of the University of Michigan who read various drafts of the text and suggested numerous improvements. I remain, of course, solely responsible for the opinions expressed and any errors that may remain.


3 Demosthenes (51.17) complained that orators' private forensic speeches often contradicted the opinions expressed in their public speeches.

4 It may be argued that Isocrates is an exception since his orations were not delivered to the Assembly or before law courts, at least in their present form. Isocrates was in some ways more of a pamphleteer than an orator, but I do not believe this negates his importance as an orator or the political views held by the state. Whether or not Isocrates attempted to influence public opinion is a long standing and hard fought one. For a survey of earlier work on this question see C.W. Adams, "Recent Views on the Political Influence of Isocrates," CP 7 (1912) 343-350. In a recent study of P. Harding, "The Purpose of Isocrates' Archidamos and On the Peace," CSCA 6 (1973) 137-149, contends that Isocrates' orations had no political purposes at all. G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 205, 175, 197f, claims that Isocrates' speeches were only secondarily intended to influence public opinion. The debate over whether or not Isocrates attempted to influence public opinion is a long standing and hard fought one. For a survey of earlier work on this question see C.W. Adams, "Recent Views on the Political Influence of Isocrates," CP 7 (1912) 343-350. In a recent study of P. Harding, "The Purpose of Isocrates' Archidamos and On the Peace," CSCA 6 (1973) 137-149, contends that Isocrates' orations had no political purposes at all.
fourth-century orators considered the ἀρχή τῆς ἱεράτης of their own day to have been a paying proposition. This is not really surprising. The control of the sea, or rather the empire held by that control, had been an important source of income in the fifth century, but the second Athenian confederacy did not serve to enrich the Athenian state. The references we do have in the fourth-century orators who link sea power and income from the empire are vague and for the most part refer to the situation in the fifth century. In 391 Andocides suggested in his speech On the Peace with Sparta (3.37) that the building of the walls and ships in the fifth century was “the source of good things” (τὴν ἀρχήν... τῶν ἱεράτων) for Athens. It is, however, difficult to see in this statement a link between sea power and the fruits of empire, since he later claims (3.40) that should Athens accept the peace with Sparta, which entailed giving up imperial ambitions, Athens would have this same ἀρχή τῶν ἱεράτων. Isocrates, in his defense of Athens delivered in 339, the Panathenaicus (5.67ff.), states that Athens took in tribute in the old days of the ἀρχή of the sea. He admits, however, that the levying of tribute was very unpopular and attempts to justify it by the contention that the allies received services for their tribute, not by claiming that Athens was enriched thereby. In his Antidosis (15.121ff) Isocrates describes Timotheus’ collection of overdue tribute but never suggests that this was a source of financial gain to Athens. In On the Chersonese (8.45) Demostenes mentions triremes in a list of state assets, but since this speech was delivered after Athens had lost her empire and earlier in the speech (42) he had called the Athenians unsuited by nature to hold an empire, Demostenes can hardly have meant to link triremes and imperial revenues. The probably spurious Fourth Philippic ([Demosth.] 10.37) claims that “not long ago” the state had an income of no more than 130 talents when “the triremes sailed and there was money.” The fact that the speaker is emphasizing the smallness of these past revenues in comparison to present income militates against a theory that he intended to show that Athens reaped a large profit from her former empire.

Although the fourth century orators did not see the ἀρχή of the sea as a source of revenue, Isocrates, at least did recognize that the ἀρχή was very expensive to maintain. In 373-371 Isocrates (14.40) marvelled at how the Spartans, although at first possessing insufficient resources (μικρὰς... ἄροις) to fight a war at sea, were able to shatter Athenian naval power. He realized, of course, the great financial resources needed to build and maintain a fleet. Isocrates later (7.54) complained that the Athenians were willing to support at their own expense any of the allies who would deign to be rowers in Athens’ navy. Isocrates made his most definite statement on the high cost of sea power in his indictment of Athenian imperial ambitions, On the Peace of 355. Here (8.200) he states that, if the Athenians are willing to give up their ἀρχή of the sea, they will be freed from the burdens of war taxes and trierarchies, will be able to sail the seas without fear; and will actually double their revenues. All of this suggests that the ἀρχή held by the navy was not considered an economic asset, and indeed could be viewed as a liability.

The use of the navy to protect one’s own trade and lines of supply and conversely to interfere with the trade and lines of supply of hostile or rival states is the other method by which sea power can be used to a state’s economic advantage. Since a distinction is often made by modern authors between the Athenian grain trade and all other types of trade; it will be easier to consider these two aspects of the problem separately. The “non-grain” trade will be considered first.

Although the fourth-century orators did recognize a connection between sea power and the safety of maritime trade, there is little to indicate that they considered the protection of trade to be one of the major roles of the navy. There are several casual references in the orators indicating trade was less safe when Athens did not rule the sea. Isocrates, in a private oration of ca. 393 (17.36), claimed that when the Spartans controlled the sea it was dangerous for an Athenian merchant to sail with his money from the Pontus. In 399 Andocides (1.137) mentioned the conditions of the late Peloponnesian War when the sea was full of triremes and pirates and dangerous to travel upon, especially for merchants.

The orators do occasionally refer to Athenian attempts to suppress piracy. In 352 Demostenes (23.166ff) mentioned that an Athenian fleet operating

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5 See S. Accame, La Lega Attonese del Secolo IV a.C. (Rome 1941) 134ff; F.H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy (Cambridge 1905) 38ff; Jones AD 5. The amount contributed by the allies, at least after 355, probably did not exceed sixty talents. Mossé FDA 405, suggests that profit was not the main impetus for empire, but believes that the pay of the rowers was one of the main forces behind the Athenian drive for naval supremacy. But see below.

6 δὲ ὁ λαὸς καὶ τρισκέλει ἐν τῶν καὶ κρατήρι ἡ γένος. J.H. Vince’s translation (Loeb) “the war-galleys sailed out, and the money came in” is rather misleading.

7 Cf. the very similar contemporary view in Xenophon, Revenues 3.8, 5.11ff.

8 Aristotle, Politics 7.13.11, claimed that most men desire empire because they believe it leads to prosperity, but it is notable that he was speaking of Sparta, not Athens, at the time and he goes on to refute the contention.

9 The distinction was most clearly drawn by Hasebroek TPAG Chapter 3, 44-182. This distinction was attacked by A.W. Gomme, “Traders and Manufacturers,” Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford 1937) 42-66, but see M.J. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973) 132ff.
around the Chersonese attempted to clean out a nest of pirates and robbers, but he does not indicate the reason for this raid. In the speech On Halonnesus, Hesegisppus spoke against a plan proposed by Philip for a joint Athenian-Macedonian naval expedition to rid the Aegean of pirates. He believed that Athenian prestige would be damaged by accepting the plan, since it would show that Athenian naval strength was insufficient to clean out the pirates. He therefore placed the prestige of Athens ahead of the safety of maritime traders. Demosthenes, however, in a private oration delivered in 341 or 340 (58.53ff), mentions a decree passed by Athens and her allies to “cleanse the sea” in order to make the sea safe for those sailing upon it. This statement is probably the most definite link between trade and sea power in the orators, but significantly it comes up in a private oration and is brought forward simply to point out the discrepancy between protecting traders on the seas and allowing them to fall into the hands of sycophants in port.

On the other hand Athens could interfere with the traders of other states when she did control the sea. In an undated speech (59.36) Demosthenes describes a prostitute in Megara who had a hard time getting customers due to the scarcity of foreigners there during the 370’s “on account of the war and because the Megarians favored the Lacedaemonian side, while you (Athenians) were in control of the sea.” In 341 he claimed (8.25) that the allied cities paid off Athenian admirals in order to avoid interference with their shipping. In 351 Demosthenes (4.34) suggested sending a fleet against Philip and claimed that this plan would impoverish Philip, on the very dubious grounds that Philip derived his main income from raiding Athenian shipping. In the speech On the Crown (18.145f), Demosthenes mentions that before Chaeronea Philip was much distressed by the war with Athens and by pirates and could not export from Macedonia or import the things he needed. This was, we are told, before he had the mastery of the seas.

With the possible exception of Hegesippus’ comment in On Halonnesus, all the examples mentioned above are casual references made in the course of a speech to make some point on a larger issue. These incidental references are proof that the navy did serve to protect trade, but the orators were not particularly interested in this aspect of sea power. Nowhere in the extant speeches do we get a clear statement to the effect that sea power is desirable because it encourages trade. Hasebroek’s contention that the polis was concerned with protecting vital supply routes as opposed to encouraging trade in general might appear to be supported by the disinterest of the orators in this aspect of sea power. As we shall see, however, the orators were not much more interested in the grain trade than they were in trade in general.

The maintenance of vital lines of supply is historically one of the most important functions of sea power. Much has been written on Athens’ dependence on imported grain; A.H.M. Jones’ comment is typical: “The Athenians...were greatly exercised by the danger of insufficient imports, particularly of corn.” This being the case, we would expect the Attic orators to emphasize the connection between sea power and the grain supply. There are, however, few references in the orators to this link.

The first clear reference to sea power and grain comes in a forensic speech by Isocrates (18.61), tentatively dated to 402. The plaintiff states that when Lysander was blockading Athens by sea (the plaintiff) and his brother, who were then trierarchs, managed to intercept grain being shipped to Sparta and to bring it to Athens. This is not, however, an indication that Athenian sea power preserved the supply, but that Athenian naval skill was sometimes able to carry out raids despite Spartan sea power. The clearest association of sea power with the grain supply comes in a speech by Apollodorus in the Demosthenic corpus dated to 359 or 358. After describing the conduct of his trierarchy, including a description of various sorts of convoy duty, Apollodorus claims that he convoyed the grain so that there would be war; but significantly the Assembly apparently did not think the situation warranted state interference. For a full list of examples of forceable re-routing of merchant ships see G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, N.Y. 1972) 314.

1. [Demosth.] 7.14. The attribution of this speech to Hegesippus is now generally accepted by scholars; see Kennedy (above, note 4) 257.

11. On the date of this speech see the Budé edition of Demosthenes' private orations edited by L. Gernet, Plaidoyers Civils (Paris 1960) 4.40. Perhaps this decree was passed as a counter to Philip's proposal, to prove that Athens did in fact have the naval strength to patrol the seas without Macedonian help.

12. Cf. also Aeschines 2.71; Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 18, mentions that the Rhodians recalled their merchant vessels after Chaeronea. This move was possibly motivated by fear for the safety of these ships should Athens' navy have been destroyed. See also Isaeus 11.48, on a private Athenian citizen who, probably in the 380's, bought and outfitted a trireme and used it to raid Spartan shipping. Isaeus tells us that this made the Assembly uneasy, since Sparta might consider this an act of
no lack in the Athenian market. In the same speech (50.6) Apollodorus tells us that the Assembly voted to launch the triremes because the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Cyzicenes were forcing Athenian grain ships to sail to their ports. After this unequivocal reference to the importance of keeping the supply route open, it is somewhat surprising that Demosthenes, speaking in 346 for the Peace of Philocrates (5.25), claimed that the Athenians allowed the Byzantines to detain Athenian ships because the Athenians did not consider this situation to be sufficient pretext for war. This attitude appears again in 341 when Demosthenes (8.28) urged the Athenians not to send a fleet against the rebel admiral Diopithes who was detaining Athenian cargo ships at the Hellespont. In 335 an unknown orator, whose speech has been preserved with those of Demosthenes ([Demosth.] 17.190), complained that Alexander had forced Athenian grain ships from Pontus to put in at Tenedos and desisted from this practice only when Athens passed a decree to mandate the launching of 100 triremes. This clearly indicates a relationship between the navy and the grain supply, but the orator's indignation is aroused by the fact that this incident was a breach of the treaty of 336, not by the possibility that Athens might starve. Again in 330 Demosthenes (18.241) claimed that through his actions Philip was prevented from seizing control of the Hellespont and thereby the grain supply, but he does not mention that it was the navy that prevented Philip from doing so.

Besides protecting Athenian supplies, the fleet could be used to interfere with the vital supplies of enemies of Athens. In 343 Demosthenes (19.123) suggested that Athens could have forced Philip to retreat from Thermopylae by cutting off his grain supply since "the conveyance of corn was impossible so long as your fleet was there and commanded the sea." This use of the navy to cut off Philip's supplies should perhaps be considered more military than specifically economic, as Demosthenes was interested in destroying Philip, not in improving the Athenian economy.

In sum, there is not a great deal of evidence to suggest that the orators considered the relationship between sea power and economics to be particularly important. The orators do mention economic aspects of the navy in passing, but they do not emphasize them. The lack of interest in the profits of empire can be explained by the fact that the fourth-century naval empire was not profitable. In the case of general trade, Hasebroek's arguments on the lack of state interest in encouraging trade might serve to explain the situation. It does, however, seem peculiar that the orators were not more interested in the protection of the grain route. Epigraphic, historiographic, and indeed the casual references in the orators militate against any theory that the Athenians did not actually use the fleet to convoy grain ships. It would also seem absurd to suggest that the orators did not realize the connection. It is certainly possible that economic aspects of sea power were slighted at least in part because economic factors did not make for exciting orations, but it is significant that the orators felt that their audiences would not be particularly interested in the economic side of sea power. Thus, it seems probable that the orators did not consider economic functions of the fleet to be of primary importance. While recognizing that the fleet did serve economic functions, the orators apparently considered other functions to be more important.

The Athenian navy was probably the most important branch of Athens' armed forces throughout much of the fifth and fourth centuries; it is the specifically military aspect of the navy that the orators stress most heavily. The defense of the city itself was the primary military mission of the fleet, and we have several statements to this effect in the orators. In his Areopagiticus of 357, when writing against the empire, Isocrates found it necessary to explain to his audience that he was speaking of public safety, even though Athens had more than 200 triremes and control of the sea. The implication was, of course, that the Athenians would find it hard to believe that Athens could be in any serious danger while in possession of a powerful fleet. Later, in his Panathenaeus (12.114) of 339, Isocrates claimed that the fifth-century Athenians needed control of the sea to fend off the plots of the Spartans and the power of the Peloponnesians. Perhaps the most unequivocal statement on Athenian sea power comes in Demosthenes'
speech Against Androtion of 355. Here (22.12) Demosthenes states that "I suppose that no one would deny that all that has happened to our city, in the past or the present, whether good or otherwise—I avoid an unpleasant term—has resulted in the one case from the possession, and in the other from the want, of war-ships." Trophies, spoils, naval victories, and the ability to aid allies are gained by the possession of a fleet (13f); disaster attends its loss (15). The navy gave Athens her powerful position and allowed her to maintain that position (16). Finally he proclaimed that the safety of the state was dependent on the triremes (16). Demosthenes reiterated this position in 353 (24.91) when he stated that the city owed its safety to the armed forces, both the navy (mentioned first) and the army. The orators realized that the city was dependent on the navy for her physical safety and thus tended to associate the destruction of the ships (especially at Aegospotami) with the fall of the city. Again Demosthenes, Against Androtion (22.15), makes the clearest statement to this effect: "...though many serious disasters befell our city, she did not succumb till her fleet was destroyed." Lysias, Isocrates, Andocides, and Ps-Demades express similar sentiments.21

The navy was not only defensive, but was also Athens' primary weapon for offensive warfare. In 351 Demosthenes delivered the First Philippic in which he laid out a plan for a full-scale offensive naval war against Philip (4.16ff). In a number of other speeches, orators suggest offensive naval strikes or discuss the various offensive battles of the past.22 Athenian naval victories could sometimes be considered victories for Hellas as a whole. Lysias, in the Funeral Oration (2.33), could claim that the Athenians embarked at Salamis to save all the Greeks from slavery. Demosthenes in Against Androtion (22.13) and later in On the Crown (18.100) mirrored the same sentiment.23 Isocrates twice (5.63f; 9.55) went so far as to claim that the battle of Cnidus was a victory for all Hellas. Here again the specifically military use of the navy is considered paramount.

No list of factors contributing to the military strength of a state was complete without a reference to the navy; indeed triremes often topped the list. In 354 Demonsthenes (14.9) spoke against a war with Persia on the grounds that the first requisites for any war were triremes (mentioned first), money, and strong positions. He claimed that the Great King had more of all these than had the Athenians. In 342 Demosthenes (9.40) stated that the Greeks of his time surpassed their ancestors in all things by which the power of cities is measured; triremes (again mentioned first), number of men, and material. Similar statements and lists are found in other speeches of Demosthenes, Aeschines Andocides, Lysias, Lycurgus, and Dinarchus.24 Manning the ships could be used as a virtual metaphor for going to war. Demosthenes (8.74) claims that Timotheus urged the Athenians to war with Thebes with the words, "Will you not cover the sea with your war-galleys, men of Athens? Will you not rise up at once and march down to the Piraeus and drag them down the slips?"27

Although most of the Athenian orators were no primarily military men, several of them had a fair understanding of the strategic and tactical uses of sea power. Most of these references are concerned with the battle of Salamis and the sentiments expressed were probably not original to the orators, but they do show an interest in how a navy could be used militarily. Isocrates in his Panegyricus (4.94), claimed that Xenexes knew that he could defeat the Peloponnesians if he could get the Athenian fleet on his side. This view is mirrored by Lysias in his Funeral Oration (2.45). Here the Athenians tell the Spartans that should the Peloponnesian fleet leave the straits the Athenians will join the King. Lysias claim that the only protection for the Spartans at that point would be to build a wall around the whole of the Peloponnes, because the King would have the unhampered control of the sea. Isocrates (4.98; 12.50) considered the battle of Salamis to have determined the issue of the whole war. Demosthenes shows an interest in naval strategy, though his grasp of the subject was no formidable. He states, correctly, that because Philip did not have control of the seas he had to move inland through Thessaly and Boeotia (19.153; 18.145f). One might, however, quarrel with his statement (6.36) that, if the Athenians had held Thermopylae, Philip could never.

21 D.M. Lewis, "Notes on Attic Inscriptions," BSA 49 (1954) 17-50 at pages 39-49, attempted to redate this oration to 357, but R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates," REG 68 (1955) 77-120 at pages 89ff, has successfully defended the traditional date.

22 Cf. the very similar statement put into the mouth of Procles of Phlius by Xenophon, Hellenica 7.1.6; [Demosth.] 17.25, where the speaker claims that as long as Athens holds the sea the city will be safe.

23 Lysias 2.59; 26.23; 13.46; Isoc. 12.99; 18.59; Andocides 1.73; 3.21; [Demades]. On the Twelve Years F 45 (Loeb), goes so far as to say that the naval disaster at the Hellespont shattered the land army as well. Cf. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 34.2; Theopompos FGrH 115 F 5 = Anon. Vit. Thuc. 5.

24 See Andocides 3.31; Demosth. 1.18; 20.69; 49.11; 50.4f; Aeschines 3.243.


26 Demosth. 4.46; 10.19; 20.162; 24.216; 18.311; 19.266; Aeschines 3.136, 163; Andocides 1.74; Lysias 31.26; Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 150; Dinarchus 3.9f; cf. Theopompos FGrH 115 F 166 = Didymus, In Demosth. 8.58; Xenophon, Hellenica 2.2.10.

27 Cf. Demosth. 19.291; Xenophon, Hellenica 5.4.34.
attack Athens or gain control of the sea.

These three orators had a certain appreciation for the military limitations and special requirements of a navy of triremes. Lysias (2.32) understood the great numbers of men necessary to man a fleet of triremes. He contends that the Athenians realized after Artemisium that, if they were to march out to defend the city, the King would simply take the city with his navy, since the Athenians had too few men to fight by both land and sea. Isocrates voiced a similar opinion in the *Panegyricus* (4.96). Demosthenes (4.31; 8.15, 18) realized that triremes could not sail easily in the winter and warned the Athenians against waiting too long to send a naval expedition against Philip. He also understood that triremes had to have local harbors if they were to remain in a given vicinity for any length of time. Demosthenes (4.22) also suggested that the fleet sent against Philip include several especially rapid triremes to serve as scouts against Philip's navy. Apollodorus was a navy man. He describes ([Demosth.] 50.22) the problems encountered by an Athenian fleet forced into battle after towing grain ships all day and subsequently unable to land for the night. Apollodorus (50.11, 23) also points out one of the greatest limitations of the fourth-century Athenian fleet: lack of funds with which to pay the rowers. The ultimate limit to the effective use of the navy was, however, the degree of will and determination shown by the Athenian people. Demosthenes (*Exordium* 21.2, Loeb) pointed this out clearly when he stated that the Athenians were all too likely to launch the triremes when they heard of an emergency and then recall them in a few days if some new contradictory report should reach the city.

The specifically military uses of the fleet clearly occupied the thoughts of the orators to a far greater degree than did the economic aspects of sea power. The primary function of the fleet was to serve as an offensive and defensive branch of the armed forces; in short, to fight the fleets of other powers. Modern military theory is far more sophisticated, utilizing any number of economic factors never considered by ancient theorists. The orators never forgot, as modern historians occasionally do, that the triremes were built to engage enemy triremes and that any other uses of the fleet were secondary.

Another aspect of sea power closely related to military strength was the relationship between the strength of the navy and national prestige. The respect accorded to Athens by the other powers was clearly and directly related to Athenian sea power. The orators realized this and often returned to this theme in their speeches.

The Persian Wars signalled the beginning of Athenian sea power and the orators stressed the role of the Athenian navy in defeating the Persians. Isocrates (4.97ff; 12.44, 50) proudly relates that the victory at Salamis was due to Athens and that Athens provided the greatest number of ships for the battle. This sentiment is also expressed by Demosthenes, *On the Crown* (18.238). Aeschines (2.172) states that Athens' reputation stood high (*eúdoξe*) after the battle of Salamis. This concern with naval prestige was not associated only with "ancient history." Lysias (13.46) connected the lack of a fleet directly with a drop in Athenian prestige in claiming that, when Athens was deprived of her fleet and walls in 404, the whole strength of the city was crippled and Athens sunk to the level of the smallest city. By the mid-fourth century the battle of Cnidus had become an Athenian rather than a Persian victory in the eyes of the orators. Both Isocrates (9.56) and Demosthenes (20.69) considered that this engagement added to Athens' reputation and that it forced the Spartans to grant the city proper respect. Hegesippus was particularly concerned that Athens maintain her reputation as a great sea power. In 342 ([Demosth.] 7.7f, 14) he argued against a joint Macedonian-Athenian expedition to rid the seas of pirates on the grounds that a joint effort would be tantamount to an open admission that Athens was unable to do the job alone and that this would be damaging to Athens' reputation. Aeschines (2.71f) argued in 343 that Athens was no longer considered worthy of the hegemony because of her practice of seizing ships, and he decried the gains Philip was able to make because of Athens' loss of standing. In a similar statement of 323 Dinarchus (1.75) claimed that Athens *used* to be great and renowned in Greece. As evidence of this past glory he cites four Athenian victories of the earlier fourth century—three of them naval battles.

Perhaps this concern with Athens' naval reputation was in part due to the fact that the strength of the Athenian fleet was a valuable diplomatic counter. In 355 Demosthenes (22.15) stated that the fleet was necessary for the military limitations and special requirements of a navy of triremes. Lysias (2.32) understood the great numbers of men necessary to man a fleet of triremes. He contends that the Athenians realized after Artemisium that, if they were to march out to defend the city, the King would simply take the city with his navy, since the Athenians had too few men to fight by both land and sea. Isocrates voiced a similar opinion in the *Panegyricus* (4.96). Demosthenes (4.31; 8.15, 18) realized that triremes could not sail easily in the winter and warned the Athenians against waiting too long to send a naval expedition against Philip. He also understood that triremes had to have local harbors if they were to remain in a given vicinity for any length of time. Demosthenes (4.22) also suggested that the fleet sent against Philip include several especially rapid triremes to serve as scouts against Philip's navy. Apollodorus was a navy man. He describes ([Demosth.] 50.22) the problems encountered by an Athenian fleet forced into battle after towing grain ships all day and subsequently unable to land for the night. Apollodorus (50.11, 23) also points out one of the greatest limitations of the fourth-century Athenian fleet: lack of funds with which to pay the rowers. The ultimate limit to the effective use of the navy was, however, the degree of will and determination shown by the Athenian people. Demosthenes (*Exordium* 21.2, Loeb) pointed this out clearly when he stated that the Athenians were all too likely to launch the triremes when they heard of an emergency and then recall them in a few days if some new contradictory report should reach the city.

The specifically military uses of the fleet clearly occupied the thoughts of the orators to a far greater degree than did the economic aspects of sea power. The primary function of the fleet was to serve as an offensive and defensive branch of the armed forces; in short, to fight the fleets of other powers. Modern military theory is far more sophisticated, utilizing any number of economic factors never considered by ancient theorists. The orators never forgot, as modern historians occasionally do, that the triremes were built to engage enemy triremes and that any other uses of the fleet were secondary.

Another aspect of sea power closely related to military

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28 Phillip was in fact a past master at timing his strikes when the Etesian winds would limit Athenian interference; see J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 64.

29 Demosth. 4.44. See A.W. Gomme, "A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy," *Essays* 190-203.

30 Cf. Demosth. 4.36f; 47.20 (on the lack of equipment).

31 On the rudimentary nature of ancient economic theory see Finley (above, note 9) Chapter 1, 17-34. Cf. also de Romilly *RFS* 25; W.S. Ferguson, "Economic Causes of International Rivalries and Wars in Ancient Greece," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1915) 111-121.

32 Aristotle's views on the correct uses of a navy are instructive. He believed that a polis needed a fleet to protect itself by sea and to conduct offensive strikes (*Política* 7.5.4). The navy should also be used to help allied states (7.5.6). It is vital to the state desiring hegemony (7.5.6).

33 Cf. Plato *Menexenus* 241 A-C; *Laws* 4.707 B-C.

34 See also 29.14 where Lysias complains that a certain Ergocles sailed out to make himself rich and did not gain honor for Athens.
SEA POWER

instrumental in negotiating the peace with Sparta in 371. A year later he claimed (14.29) that the King of Persia was not likely to attack Athens because he respected the strength of her fleet.38

The only note of contention on this point comes in Isocrates’ anti-imperialistic speech On the Peace. Here (8.36) Isocrates decries the popular leaders who claim that, if Athens lost the mastery of the seas, the city would become an object of laughter to the rest of the Greeks.37 This is an apparent condemnation of those who would link control of the sea with Athenian prestige.38 This speech was delivered in 355, after the crushing naval setbacks of the Social War. It is likely that the idea of empire fell into temporary disfavor at Athens as a result of the war, but the events of 354 suggest that Isocrates misjudged his audience when he chose to attack the link between the navy and national prestige. In this year Isocrates lost an antidosis suit and was surprised at his lack of popularity with the demos (15.40). It was all very well to attack the now-defunct empire, but to besmirch the prestige of the fleet was going too far.39

Thus, the orators generally believed that Athenian prestige was intimately associated with her naval strength. Most of the orators would probably have agreed with Rear Admiral William A. Moffett’s statement:

Thus it is that statesmen generally have come to realize that any maritime nation which does not maintain a sea power commensurate with its importance in the council of nations soon finds itself outside the council, from which condition it is but a step to total impotence.40

One of the most significant products of Athenian naval power was what modern authors call the empire and the orators called the ἄρχη, ἡμιονία, or δόναμις.41 The control of other states which ἄρχη implied was only possible through use of the navy; the ideas of sea power and empire are so intimately and inextricably connected that it is impossible to understand the orators’ opinions on sea power without considering their views on its relationship to empire, past and present.

The orators certainly realized that Athenian ἄρχη depended directly on sea power. Andocides stated this succinctly in his speech On the Peace with Sparta (3.38f) in which he described how Athens won and lost her fifth-century empire. He tells us that the Athenians cleverly persuaded the allies to assemble the fleet in Athens' harbor and that the Athenians gladly supplied the ships for the allies who were unwilling to build their own. The fleet, the building of the walls, and the crushing of Athens’ enemies are considered the building blocks of Athenian dynamis. When Athens was finally defeated the Spartans took away the Athenian fleet and pulled down the walls “so that we should not have them as a base for preparing a new dynamis.”42 Isocrates, in his Panathenaicus (12.53) of 339, also connected sea power with empire when he claimed that the ἄρχη of the sea was a power such that whichever state holds it holds most of the polesis in subjection.43

At first glance the orators seem to have approved of the ἄρχη. Again Andocides’ On the Peace with Sparta (3.37) is our clearest reference. He claims that some people do not see the good of getting back the walls and the fleet. There was, he goes on, a time when Athens had no walls and no fleet, but when Athens got them they were the source of all good things for the Athenians. “Should you now desire these same good things then work to acquire those (walls and ships). Having this as a basis our forefathers acquired a dynamis such as no

38 Cf. Demosth., 21.169 for praise of the great men of the past who won naval battles and captured cities for Athens and his disparagement of Charidemus in 23.214, because he did not.
39 On the general question of the relationship between military power and diplomacy see F.E. Adcock and D.J. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London and N.Y. 1975) 13, 121f, 134ff. 227.
40 Cf. the similar statement in Xenophon Revenues 5.11f, 5.
41 So, correctly Mathieu (above, note 4) 120.
42 Isocrates’ unpopularity was not, of course, due entirely to his statements about the prestige of the fleet. T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene (Oxford 1965) 93, believes that his unpopularity was due more to the “oligarchic” opinions expressed in the Areopagitica than to his views on foreign policy. W. Jaeger, Paedieia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. G. Hight (3 Vols. N.Y. 1939-1944) 3.132 attributes Isocrates’ unpopularity to his attacks on the “demagogues.” It is interesting to note, however, that Isocrates reiterates his anti-imperialistic stance in the Antidosis (15.63ff), but also praises the naval exploits of Timotheus (10ff, 121ff). Cf. H. Rohde, De Atheniensiun Imperio quid Quinto Quartove a. Chr. n. Saeculo Sit Iudicatum (Diss. Göttingen 1913) 73f; Laistner (above, note 4) 130.
43 In his Foreword to A.M. Shepard, Sea Power in Ancient History (Boston 1924) ix. P. Cloché, Démarchènes et la Fin de la Démocratie Athénienne (Paris 1937) 44, suggested the connection between sea power and Athenian prestige, but he did not elaborate on this theme.
44 A full consideration of these terms is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to note that ἄρχη ἷ Ἡμιονία generally refers to the military control of the sea and often implies empire, the usual term for which is simply ἄρχη ἷ ἡμιονία. It seems to be a more neutral term and can be used of the sort of leadership which does not imply empire; δόναμις is the term used by Andocides for the empire. For the use of the terms ἄρχη and ἡμιονία in Isocrates see E. Buchner, Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates: Ein historischphilologische Untersuchung: Historia Einzelschrift (Wiesbaden 1958) 6ff; H.J. Newiger, review of Buchner’s Panegyrikos in Gnomon 33 (1961) 761-768; Jaeger (above, note 39) 3.134 and his note 26; cf. the somewhat different view of Baynes (above, note 4) 145 ff.
45 My trans.
46 Xenophon, Hellenica 3.5.15, expressed similar sentiments. Ephorus FGrH 70 F 119 = Strabo 9.2.2, believed that Boeotia was particularly well suited for hegemony by virtue of her harbors and access to three seas. Aristotle, Politics 7.5.6, stated that naval power was a prerequisite for hegemony. Cf. de Romilly RFS 258f for the Greek idea that sea power was by definition unlimited power.
other polis has ever possessed." 44 Other orators are not so explicit in their praise of Athenian arche, but their incidental references to the fifth-century empire often seem to suggest that they thought favorably of it. It could be claimed that on the whole Athens had obtained her empire fairly, and the orators occasionally went so far as to state that the empire was governed justly. Isocrates first voiced this opinion in ca. 396 (16.27) when he claimed that the arche of the sea was given voluntarily by the Greeks to the Athenians because of the Athenian reputation for justice. 45 Isocrates repeated these sentiments in his Panegyricus (4.72) and added (4.21) that the Athenians deserved the hegemony over the Greeks because no state was so superior by land as was Athens in sea battles. Lysias, in his Funeral Oration (2.56), claimed that the Athenians had improved the allies' strength along with their own. In 349 Demosthenes (3.24) went so far as to say that in the good old days of the arche the allies had willingly obeyed Athens. 46 Lycurgus (Against Leocrates 72) claimed that the Athenians had been hegemones of the Greeks because of their good views on loyalty and patriotism. Plato was perhaps reflecting current opinion when he stated in his mock funeral oration, the Menexenus (244C), that at the end of the Peloponnesian War the Greeks took away the ships and pulled down the walls that had been their own salvation.

There were, however, dissenting views. The most vigorous indictment of empire in the orators comes in Isocrates' On the Peace of 355. Here Isocrates runs through all the evils brought upon the Greeks by the desire for arche in general and the arche of the sea in particular. He berates the Athenians of the fifth century who manned their triremes with the scum of Hellas and made themselves odious (8.79). Even worse, however, is the present generation of Athenians who themselves serve as rowers rather than hiring slaves (48). The rule of the sea was expensive (690) and corrupted the Athenian way of life (75ff). The Athenians were not the only ones affected; the Spartans were corrupted as soon as they took control of the sea (101ff).

At first glance this attack on the arche looks like a bolt from the blue. It has occasioned much debate among scholars, especially among admirers of Isocrates, who have had a hard time reconciling this speech with his pro-empire statements in the Panegyricus. Worse yet is the fact that Isocrates went back to justifying the empire and sea power, albeit in somewhat grudging terms, in his Panathenaiicus of 339. Some scholars have attempted to explain the apparent contradiction by claiming that Isocrates never really changed his views at all and that he was actually damning the empire when seeming to praise it or vice versa. 47 This is, however, a counsel of despair and the true answer must lie elsewhere. Other scholars explain Isocrates' shifting position by the assumption that the political situation was changing and argue that Isocrates revised his views to fit new conditions. 48 This is surely closer to the truth. The ruinous Social War of the early 350's, culminating in the naval disaster at Embata in 356/5 is likely to have turned Isocrates against the idea of arche. 49

Other Athenians appear to have been influenced by this dismal state of affairs as well. 50 W. Jaeger has argued cogently that Demosthenes' three public trial speeches of 355-353 were directed against a small pro-imperialist faction. 51 There is, however, the problem of the very
pro-sea power and pro-arche statements made by both orators before, after, and in the years 355-353. The explanation for this situation appears to be that the orators, and perhaps the Athenians in general, had a very ambivalent feeling toward the arche and the role of sea power in holding it. In order to demonstrate this it will be necessary to backtrack and consider some of the explicit and implicit attacks on the arche in the speeches of the orators.

The speech On the Peace was not the first or the last time Isocrates suggested that sea power could be a corrupting force. His other comments, however, concerned only the Spartans. In ca. 370 he claimed (9.54ff) that the Spartans had become too greedy when they held the arche of both land and sea after the Peloponnesian War and ended up losing their supremacy because of this. He expressed similar views in 357 (7.7). In the Philippus (5.60ff) of 346 he was even more explicit, claiming that Alcibiades had led the Spartans to desire the control of the sea and that as a result they lost even their hegemony on land. Thus, Isocrates probably always believed that the arche of the sea could lead to disaster, but only in 355 did he associate the evil effects of sea power with the Athenians.

Discontent with the arche may be manifested in complaints about the management of the empire. The orators often denounced mistreatment of the allies by Athenian admirals. These attacks were sometimes made against a specific general, as when Demosthenes in his speech Against Meidias (21.173) claimed that Meidias plundered the people of Cyzicus and by making chaos of the treaties alienated the Cyzicenes from Athens. It was sometimes claimed that it was a common practice for generals to extort money from the allies and that this practice had evil effects for Athens. Another frequent complaint was that generals and trierarchs were interested only in personal gain when dispatched on naval expeditions. While none of these statements is specifically anti-imperialistic or anti-sea power, they do show that the orators sometimes disapproved of imperial mismanagement and they provide an interesting counterpoint to the relatively optimistic statements alluded to above.

In several instances an orator appears to express opposite views on the subject of the arche in the same year or even in the same speech. The bulk of Lysias’ Against Agoratus, delivered in ca. 399, appears to be pro-sea power and pro-arche (13.5 and especially 46). In the middle of the speech (15f), however, Lysias makes a peculiar statement in defense of several generals who had attempted to keep the walls and ships from being given over to the Spartans. He tells us that:

...their motive was not pity, men of Athens, for the walls that were to come down, or regret for the fleet that was to be surrendered to the Lacedaemonians—for they had no closer concern in these than each one of you...

He goes on to say that their motive was to save the democracy. Lysias apparently felt that he had to justify a desire to keep the fleet and walls which were, of course, the bulwarks of the empire. This suggests that he thought his audience might not consider the ships and walls desirable in and of themselves. Another example of this ambivalence is Andocides’ On the Peace with Sparta. This speech contains one of the clearest pro-imperial statements to be found in the orators (see above, page 125f, column II), and yet the purpose of the speech was to persuade the Athenians to accept a peace that would have stripped Athens of most of the islands taken in the 390’s. This same ambivalence is evident in speeches after the 350’s. In his Panathenaicus Isocrates tries to justify the arche of the sea on the grounds that it was necessary to Athenian security (12.114, 117f), while admitting that it was harsh and repressive (53, 63f, 70). Aeschines, in On the Embassy of 343, at first appears to condemn imperialism roundly. He decries the extortions of Athenian generals which have caused Athens “to stink

Demosthenes’ views as it seems unlikely that Demosthenes would have aided a politician whose views he opposed in principle. Sealey “AASW,” has argued that there was no pro-imperialism group at Athens at this time and that Demosthenes could not, therefore, have been attacking imperialists in these speeches. But Sealey ignores Demosth. 14.8, where Demosthenes attacks the “rash advisers” (τοίς...δαυμωμένοις) who were urging war with Persia in 354 (cf. similar references in Isocrates 8.36ff and Xenophon Revenues 5.1f, 5). It could be argued that Isocrates and Xenophon were indulging in a rhetorical commonplace in referring to hypothetical imperialists, but Demosthenes’ whole speech is senseless if there was no faction urging war. Although Demosthenes does not identify these men, it is logical to associate them with the presumably imperialistic Aristophon group. Cf. also G. Bockish, “Der Niedergang des zweiten attischen Seebundes im Urteil des Demosthenes,” Helikon 11-12 (1971-2) 241-252 at page 241; S. Perlman, “The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B.C.,” Athenaeum 42 (1963) 327-355 at page 338; C. Mosse, Athens in Decline 404-86 B.C. trans. J. Stewart (London and Boston 1973)54ff. P. Harding, “Androtion’s Political Career,” Historia 25 (1976) 186-200 at page 199, doubts that Androtion was part of the Aristophon group, but admits that some of his actions, especially in respect to imperialism, were in accord with that group’s.

Cf. Aeschines 2.70ff; 3.159.

Demosth. 51.14; 8.25; Isoc. 5.14f. Cephisodotus F 3 (Sauppe=Aristotle Rhetoric, 3.10.7) called the triremes “parti-colored mills” (ἵππωμα ποξάξιοι), presumably because they “ground down” the allies; see E.M. Cope and I.E. Sandys, The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary (3 Vols. Cambridge 1877) 3. ad loc.

Lysias 28.2; 29.4; Demosth. 51.15; 21.167; 47.44.
like Myonnesus and pirates" (2.70ff). He then goes on to warn the Athenians against orators who speak about the great naval battles of the past and reminds the Athenians of the evils brought by the imperialistic Sicilian expedition (74ff). These statements seem to be clearly anti-imperialistic. It is therefore interesting to find Aeschines later in the speech speaking of the great ages of Athens' past, culminating with the period after the Peace of Nicias when the Athenians had 7000 talents in the treasury, 300 triremes, and moreover "a yearly tribute of more than 1200 talents came in to us; we held the Chersonese, Naxos and Euboea, and in those years we sent out a host of colonies" (175).

We may now return to the crucial period of the mid-350's and Isocrates' and Demosthenes' positions on archē and sea power at that time. As was mentioned above, Demosthenes' three public trial speeches of 355-353 appear to have been aimed at a pro-imperialist faction. In one of these speeches (22.12), however, Demosthenes explicitly states that good comes to Athens when she has a fleet and evil when she does not. It may, of course, be argued that Demosthenes was pro-sea power and yet anti-empire. This cannot, however, be said of a statement he made in another speech of 355, Against Leptines. Here (20.77, cf. 79) he praised the general Chabrias "who captured (ἀλε) many of the nearby islands and gave them over to you and made them friends when previously they were your enemies."55 This praise of the imperialistic conquests of Chabrias does not appear to jibe well with a stern anti-imperialistic attitude.

Isocrates' On the Peace is, as stated above, the most explicit condemnation of sea power and the archē in the orators. It is particularly interesting, therefore, to find Isocrates in his Antidosis of 354/3 praising Timotheus, one of the most imperialistic Athenian generals of the fourth century. Moreover, Isocrates begins his encomium of Timotheus with the statement (15.107) that Timotheus took more cities by force than any other Greek and that some of those cities were so important that their capture caused all the territory around to submit to Athens.56 It is not possible to contend that Isocrates changed his views in the year since writing On the Peace, since earlier in the Antidosis (15.63ff) he mentions that he had condemned the archē in the earlier speech and states that this was a praise-worth contention. Thus, in the same speech Isocrates condemned the archē of the sea and praised one of its principal founders for his great success in taking cities for Athens.

All of this very strongly suggests a feeling of ambivalence on the part of the orators, and probably the Athenian people as a whole, on the subject of the empire and the archē of the sea.57 There are perfectly good reasons for the Athenians to feel ambivalent about the archē. First, the control of the seas was a great financial burden to Athens in the fourth century. As suggested above, (pages 119-120, Column II), the orators did not consider the archē to be a paying proposition, and at least Isocrates tended to stress the high cost of maintaining naval supremacy. The orators were probably particularly sensitive to the cost of sea power, as they were wealthy enough to be liable for trierarchies.58 Furthermore, it was painfully obvious to even a casual observer that the rapacious conduct of Athenian admirals was not only unjust but also destructive of good will felt toward Athens by the allies. These factors tended to turn the orators against the archē. On the other hand the orators could not forget that Athenian greatness was a product of her naval power. No one could deny that the greatest age of Athenian power was the era of the fifth-century empire. The connection between sea power and Athenian glory seem to be the reason for the praise of the great imperialistic generals which contrasts so glaringly with the anti-imperialistic thrust of some speeches. This is especially clear in Demosthenes' Against Leptines (20.79), where Chabrias is praised as the source of great honor (τοοούτων καλόν α'ίτυ) for Athens because of his capture of cities and ships. Whether or not one approved of the empire, it was imperative to show a proper respect for Athens' honor and glory.

The other main reason for the praise of Athenian sea power in the "ambivalent" speeches is the recognition that the navy was vital to Athenian self-defense and security. This is well demonstrated in Isocrates' Panathenaicus (see above, page 127). Thus, the orators' views on the uses and limits of sea power tended to create in them a certain dichotomy of feeling on the subject of the archē of the sea and the empire. Because of this ambivalence, external factors (e.g. the Social War) could turn the orators and perhaps the demos against the idea of the archē of the sea for a time. Inevitably, however, the positive aspects of sea power would be remembered and would therefore crop up again in orations.59

Perelman (above, note 48) loc. cit. 56 This view is somewhat overstated in Mossé FDA 416ff. See also Jones AD 55 and the literature there cited. 58 The financial program of Eubulus is a case in point. Eubulus advocated abandoning imperial ambitions and was able to get popular support for this program. He did not, however, seek to cut down the navy. See especially Cawkwell (above, note 50) 65. Cf. Sealey "AASW"; P. Cloché, La Politique Etrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338 av. J.-C. (Paris 1934) 180; Mossé FDA 329ff.
One final aspect of the orators’ views on sea power remains to be considered: the connection between sea power and democracy. Modern writers have made much of this relationship, generally citing the very definite statements in Aristophanes, “The Old Oligarch,” Plato, and Aristotle. These authors contended that the radical nature of Athenian democracy was the product of Athenian dependence on the rowers of the triremes, the so-called nautikos ochlos. Of all the fourth-century orators only Isocrates made this sort of connection.

Although he was not strictly speaking an oligarch, Isocrates was no friend of radical democracy. Beginning with his anti-arche speech On the Peace, Isocrates made a series of statements decrying the constitutional changes resulting from Athenian dependence on sea power. In On the Peace (8.64) Isocrates claimed that Athens should give up the arche of the sea because it was this arche that had led Athens into her present disorder and caused the overthrow of the old-style democracy. Later in the same speech he claimed that sea power was similar in its corrupting influences to tyranny (114f). In his Panathenaeicus (12.114ff) of 339, Isocrates softened his statements somewhat. Here he expresses dissatisfaction at the political changes that followed from Athenian dependence on sea power, but admits that Athens could not have resisted the Spartans without the navy.

Lysias presents a somewhat different view of the relationship between sea power and democracy. For Lysias the loss of the fleet was intimately associated with the overthrow of the democracy. His most explicit statement to this effect comes in the speech Against Agoratus (13.15f) in which he defends the policy of several Athenian generals who wanted to retain the walls and the fleet after the surrender to the Spartans because they believed that giving them up would lead to the subversion of the democracy. In 388 Lysias (28.11) warned against a bribe-taker because “he would also betray your walls and ships and replace the democracy with oligarchy.” Andocides expresses somewhat similar views in On the Peace with Sparta (3.5, 7, 12).

It is interesting to note that there are no clear allusions to the connection between sea power and democracy in any of the younger fourth-century orators. It seems likely that Isocrates, Lysias, and Andocides made this connection because they grew up and undoubtedly formed many of their opinions in the fifth century. This era was the parallel growth of Athenian naval might and democracy. The three older orators had also experienced the loss of the fleet and the subsequent overthrow of the democracy. Given this background it is not surprising that they tended to associate sea power with democracy. The younger generation of orators, on the other hand, had less reason to make the connection. They lived through an age that saw the Athenian navy vary in size and Athenian control of the sea wax and wane with the fortunes of war and diplomacy. All through this period, however, the democracy remained strong. There was, therefore, no particular reason for them to associate these two factors. While concerned with both democracy and sea power, the younger generation of orators saw them as two discrete aspects of the Athenian politeia.

Finally, one may ask: how important were the attitudes of the orators? Do they, in fact, represent the attitudes of the Athenian demos as a whole, or any significant portion thereof? In attempting to answer this question it must be kept in mind that the orators were writing to influence a public. That public, with the possible exception of Isocrates’ panhellenic orations, was the citizen body of Athens or some part of that body. Political speeches in the Assembly were obviously meant to influence public opinion, but forensic speeches and political pamphlets were also aimed at a fairly large segment of the citizenry. When attempting to sway public opinion it is not wise to break too abruptly with the preconceived attitudes and biases of one’s public.

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60 Aristophanes, Waspies 1093ff; Ps-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians 1.2); Plato, Laws 4.70A-B; Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 27.1; Politics 2.9.4, 5.3.5, 6.4.3. Among numerous modern studies making this connection see for example E.M. Walker CAH 5 (1935) 111; Ehrenberg The Greek State (Norton: N.Y. 1964) 81; de Romilly RFS 33.
62 See also 12.43; 30.10.
63 My trans.
64 The only reference which might be taken as such is a statement in [Demosth.] 13.14. Here the speaker alludes to a theft of a few oars and denounced the orators who yell “scourge the thieves; torture them... the democracy is in danger.” The speech was certainly not delivered by Demosthenes and appears to be a forgery.
65 Aristotle is the only member of the “younger generation” to draw the parallel, but his research and training were of a nature very different from that of the orators. It is hardly surprising that he was able to transcend the conditions of his own time to a greater degree than were the orators. Besides his superior theoretical insight, he was writing for a very different audience.
66 As Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.1.5, recognized. See Cope and Sandys, (above, note 53) 3. ad loc., on the interpretation of this passage. On Isocrates and his political influence see above, note 4.
67 Dover (above, note 51) 54 is certainly correct in stating: “In making his tactical plan for success in a lawsuit, the speech-writer must take into account (among much else) the currents of feeling which are predominant in juries at the time of the suit.”
Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1.9.30) recognized this when he advised aspiring orators to tailor their speeches to fit the views of their audiences. Plato (*Republic* 6.493A-C) complained that orators told the demos only what it wished to hear. It seems likely, therefore, that in general the views of the orators were mirrored by a significant portion of the citizen population of Athens. This is not to say that any individual statement by an orator can be said to reflect popular opinion at any given moment, and indeed some statements undoubtedly contradicted public opinion. When it is possible, however, to detect a drift of opinion in the orators, it is probably safe to say that this opinion was current at Athens. As noted in the introductory statements of this paper, there was a remarkable unanimity of opinion among the fourth-century orators on the subject of the uses of sea power. It may be assumed, therefore, that the prevailing fourth-century Athenian views on the uses of sea power were similar to those of the orators.

Thus, it seems probable that the Athenian demos considered that the primary functions of the navy were to defend Athens, fight enemy ships, and enhance national prestige. The economic advantages secured by the navy were probably a secondary consideration for most Athenian citizens. Significant minorities—the overseas traders and craftsmen who manufactured for the export market—were undoubtedly very concerned with the navy’s function in protecting trade, but these were certainly not the majority of Athenian citizens.

On the question of sea power and *arche* the ambivalent feelings of the orators were also probably reflected by the citizens. The constant expenditure for trierarchies was probably enough to create a certain ambivalence in even the most patriotic wealthy Athenians, but even the lower classes probably did not benefit substantially from the *arche* in the fourth century. It has often been assumed that the lower classes at Athens were pro-sea power and pro-empire because they made their living rowing the triremes. This may have been true in the fifth century, but by the mid-fourth century pay was minimal and very irregular; the navy would certainly have been a most problematic source of income. Furthermore, in the fifth century the benefits of empire were clearly manifested in the great buildings and general prosperity of the city. This was not the case in the fourth century. A good many of even the poorest citizens must have asked themselves if it was worth risking their lives for unsure pay when not even the polis seemed to be benefiting materially from it.

The orators are not as enlightening on the relationship between sea power and democracy. It seems probable, arguing from the silence of the younger orators, that the generation born after 403 did not make this connection. On the other hand this concept may never have impressed itself on the mass of Athenians. The relationship between sea power and democracy lies in the realm of theoretical political science and was perhaps not the sort of problem with which most Athenians concerned themselves in any age.

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64 Cf. Plato, *Epinomis* 976A. Thus we find Isocrates in his *Areopagitcicus* (7.60ff) attempting to show what a good democrat he is, even while advocating what might be considered anti-democratic reforms. The 1976 Carter-Ford debates provide an enlightening modern parallel. Both candidates constantly reiterated the need for a “strong” national defense, as it would have been political suicide to suggest any weakening of the nation’s armed might.

65 If Hasebroek, *TPAG* 22ff, is correct, traders were metics, not citizens, and could not, therefore, influence Assembly debate. This view is, however, probably somewhat overstated; see de Ste. Croix (above, note 12) 393 and the literature there cited.


67 Cf. Apollodorus’ comments in [Demosth.], *1.9.30* attempting to show what a good democrat he is, 157-178. Thucydides (6.24) claimed that the lower classes were eager for the Sicilian expedition because they hoped for employment with the fleet. In 392 Aristophanes (*Ecclesiazusae* 1971) claimed that the poor thought it right to launch the ships, perhaps inferring that they hoped for jobs as rowers. See also the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 1.2f (O.C.T), for a similar statement also referring to the period of the Corinthian War. The situation had changed dramatically, however, by the mid-fourth century.

68 In the fourth century the numbers of volunteers were insufficient to man the ships, and Athens had to resort to conscription; see Jones *AD* 32.
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