

HAITI

(HaitiRN1.2)

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This is one of a set of “random narratives” to complement our statistical findings in regard to civil war onsets. This is a draft completed on May 8, 2006; comments welcome.

Over the fifty-three years covered in our dataset, Haiti has had a single insurrectionary onset in 1991. This is largely consistent with our model’s predictions. Because of Haiti’s poverty, with an average GDP/cap from 1945-1999 less than a third of the regional mean, and less than a fourth of the world mean, Haiti’s average probability for an onset of insurgency (.019) is higher than the regional (.014) and the world (.017) means. But because of small population, lack of oil, and a long period of stable autocratic rule from 1958-85, Haiti’s susceptibility to civil war has been significantly lower than many other less impoverished countries.¹ In fact, our model predicts a probability of only of a single onset every fifty-three years. That it has had a single onset over the fifty-five year period covered by our dataset is more-or-less consistent with our model.

Moreover, our model does well in accounting for the timing of the onset. There have been two periods of political instability and/or anocracy, one from 1945-1957 and the other from 1986-1993. In both of these periods the probability estimates for civil war increase, reaching .035 in 1949, and reaching .030 in 1997. The actual civil war broke out when our model predicted a .026 probability of an onset, which while not the highest point in Haiti’s modern history, is a point when GDP/cap was amid a secular decline, descending some 20% lower than the height reached a decade earlier. Also, the onset occurred amidst severe political instability, as the government swayed from strong democracy to powerful autocracy, with the ruling

¹ . In terms of topography, Haiti has five mountain ranges (with a peak altitude of 2,715 meters) that divide the country into three regions: northern, central, and southern. Coverage of territory by mountains is 15.4 percent, below both the world and regional mean. But a rather extensive road network (over 3,700 kilometers of paved roads in 1989, in a country of 28,000 square kilometers) makes the terrain more helpful to the government than to insurgent bands.

classes deeply divided. Growing poverty and political instability made Haiti more susceptible than the world average in 1991 for a civil war outbreak, and this is when it took place.

Our narrative on Haiti, rather than celebrating the model's success in predicting the number and timing of onsets, highlights what may be a category error – lumping together as civil war onsets insurgencies that last many years killing tens of thousands and up to a million and insurgencies that are attempted coups d'état gone awry that last for weeks or months, and barely cross the one thousand death threshold. In the past half-century, there have been scores of such coups, most lasting between days and months, in which fewer than 1,000 are killed. Our statistical analysis gives us confidence that both of these types have more-or-less the same coefficients on the explanatory variables, but surely the mechanisms are different. Narratives should be helpful in specifying the mechanisms that differentiate these two categories of insurgency.

The events of 1991-95 in Haiti that we will recount are more like a coup d'état that got out of hand, and it barely qualified (by our coding criteria) as a civil war. An elected president was ousted in a military coup resulting in the death of several hundred Haitians. In subsequent months political violence between the coup makers and supporters of the deposed president worked together to raise the death rate, reaching 3,000 over the five years of violence. Meanwhile, throughout the half-century that our dataset covers, Haiti (as is the case in several countries without civil wars) has had rather brutal political violence of secret police against the population, and between civilians. Continued political violence but only once crossing the threshold demands explanation not only of the onset but also of the continued political violence that has not amounted to insurrection. Also it would be useful to explain why Haiti's form of political violence, while continuous and brutal, is not in the form of a sustained insurgency.

As we narrate Haiti's modern history in the first section, we try to explain, consistent with our overall model, why Haiti's pre-1945 political history is so bloody while its civil war was so benign. In section 2, we analyze the period from 1945-56, a period of high political instability, poverty and anocracy. This is the period that Haiti experienced its highest probability of civil war onset, but none occurred. Although the probability of onset was still quite low, we need to account for the lack of an onset. We

find, consistent with the model's expectations, a near civil war in 1956. In section 3, we review the period of the Duvalier dictatorships (François *père* and Jean-Claude *filis*) from 1957-85, in which stable autocracy correctly predicts lack of a civil war onset. In section 4, we analyze the period from 1986-92, when there was a split in the ruling class leading to political instability, making Haiti above the world and regional average for susceptibility to civil war. Indeed there was an onset in 1991, and we account for it in this discussion. Finally, in section 5, we analyze the surveillance regime of 1993-99. Here Haiti remains susceptible to a civil war by our model, but international oversight has weakened the opportunities of ambitious insurgents to take advantage of otherwise favorable conditions.

Because Haiti's political history since 1945 has been tumultuous, as an aid to the narrative, we present below a time line of Haitian history in this era.²

Table X: Political Instability in Haiti

Year	Democ	Autoc	Instab	Anoc	Comment
45	3	3	0	1	President Elie Lescot, a mulatto, who was chosen by FDR in 1941 (who as Sec. of Navy had written the constitution). Although at start a liberal, he became highly repressive
46	-88	-88	0	1	Constitutional Revolution by the "Garde", the military created by US Marines, and perhaps the only non-corrupt national organization; done after Lescot jails marxist journalists. Dumarsais Estimé, former schoolteacher, chosen by legislators as new president.
47	-88	-88	1	1	
48	-88	-88	1	1	
49	-88	-88	1	1	
50	0	5	1	1	Army coup; Paul Magloire, from the junta, resigns from junta, and runs and wins presidency
51-55	0	5	1	1	
56	0	5	0	1	General strike after allegations of misuse of funds from aid after hurricane; Magloire declares martial law; riots continue; Magloire retreats to Jamaica; Three provisional presidents hold office in the following months; one resigned and the army deposed

² . This narrative relies principally on Haggerty, Richard A. (1989) *Haiti: a country study* (Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress), on internet at: [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ht0000\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ht0000)). It is also informed by David Malone (1998) *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Robert Maguire (1995) "Demilitarizing Public Order in a Predatory State: the Case of Haiti" (Coral Gables: North-South Center Press, University of Miami), North-South Agenda Papers #17; Morris Morley and Chris McGillion (1997) "'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti" *Political Science Quarterly* 112(3): 363-384; and United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) Background: The United Nations and Haiti http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm

					the other two.
57	0	5	0	1	Duvalier, with support of army, wins election
58	0	8	0	0	Coup attempt leads Duvalier to create a Presidential Guard, a personal army, surpassing in power the Marine-trained Garde, then called the Haitian Army.
59-60	0	8	1	0	
61	0	9	1	0	Rapid expansion of <i>tonton makouts</i> into countryside, creating terrorist rule
62-70	0	9	0	0	
71-76	0	10	0	0	Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeds his father
77-85	0	9	0	0	
86	-88	-88	0	0	Under pressure from the Reagan administration, Duvalier leaves the island; a National Council of Government (Conseil National de Gouvernement--CNG) takes over; military regime led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy
87	-88	-88	1	0	
88	0	7	1	0	Lieutenant General Prosper Avril replaces Namphy in a coup
89	0	6	1	0	
90	7	0	1	0	Riots drive Avril into exile; replaced by Major General (subsequently promoted to Lieutenant General) Hérard Abraham; fair elections are held and Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected president
91	0	7	1	0	Civil War Onset; Pres. Aristide is ousted by a military coup resulting in the death of several hundred people and Gen. Raoul Cedras takes control of the government. The Army subsequently forces the Assembly to remove Gen. Cedras and installs Joseph Nerette, a supreme court judge, as interim President.
92	0	7	1	0	
93	0	7	1	0	UNMIH established
94-95	7	0	1	0	United Nations' Resolution 940
96	7	0	1	0	UNSMIH
97	7	0	1	0	UNTMIH and MIPONUH
98	7	0	0	0	
99	6	0	0	0	

1. The Toussaint Revolution and Modern Haitian History: Brutality without Subsequent Insurrection³

In the prosperous French colony of Saint-Domingue (where coffee and sugar plantations brought wealth to the planting classes), violence pitting white colonists and black slaves was normal. Runaway slaves

³ . The organization in the subsequent paragraphs relies on Aeroflight Countries of the World "Haitian National History" <http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/haiti/Haiti-national-history.htm>, downloaded, May 8, 2006.

(maroons or *marrons*) formed bands. They hid in the colony's mountains and forests, from which they attacked white-owned plantations throughout the colony both for booty and revenge. The infamous François Macandal led a maroon rebellion (1751-57) that killed 6,000. Revered as a voodoo sorcerer, Macandal relied on cult techniques to recruit guerillas. The French planters, with support from their metropole, were eventually able to track him down, and in 1758, they burned him at the stake.

The settlers faced a radically different situation within a generation. During the French Revolution, the new French National Assembly required the white Colonial Assembly to award voting rights to the landed and therefore tax-paying *gens de couleur* (who were a class above the slaves). The Colonial Assembly defied the metropole, provoking the first mulatto rebellion in Saint-Domingue. The rebellion, led by Vincent Ogé in 1790, failed when the white militia was able to recruit – through the fostering of a black/mulatto cleavage – a corps of black volunteers.

Organizing the blacks, however, blew back on the plantocracy. A slave rebellion the following year finally toppled the colony. Launched in August 1791, the revolt ended the internal conflicts among black leaders, as François-Dominique Toussaint L'Ouverture, a literate house slave, emerged victorious and was able to unite the blacks. Slaughters brought devastation to both sides. In this insurrection, an estimated 10,000 blacks and 2,000 whites were killed and more than 1,000 plantations were practically destroyed.

This insurrection was not only a slave rebellion against planters. To be sure, in many of Haiti's regions, black slaves rebelled against white colonists. But in the chaotic environment, there were battles where mulattoes fought against white militias, and other battles where black royalists opposed both whites and mulattoes. Adding to the confusion of battle lines, Toussaint's black forces clashed with Rigaud's mulatto army.

Foreign intrigue and manipulation further complicated the insurgency. Toussaint, in his correspondence with John Adams, then U.S. President, pledged that in exchange for American support, he would prevent the French from using Saint-Domingue as a base for their operations in North America. Adams agreed to the deal and provided Toussaint with military aid that were decisive for him in the so-called War of the Castes. Rigaud was soundly defeated and fled Haiti in 1800. But then Napoleon, fearing a generalized

rebellion in the New World, sent an armada of 46 ships to Haiti's harbours, carrying an army of 46,000 men to subdue Toussaint. Toussaint was captured, and died in the Jura Mountains, a prisoner of France.

Post-rebellion state consolidation in Haiti was made difficult by international shunning of the newly independent regime. In the words of Haggerty (1989) "Because they either resented the existence of a black republic or feared a similar uprising in their own slave-owning regions, the European colonial powers and the United States shunned relations with Haiti; in the process, they contributed to the establishment of an impoverished society, ruled by the military, guided by the gun rather than the ballot, and controlled by a small, mostly mulatto, ruling group that lived well, while their countrymen either struggled to eke out a subsistence-level existence on small plots of land or flocked to the banners of regional strongmen in the seemingly never-ending contest for power. To be sure, the French colonial experience had left the Haitians completely unprepared for orderly democratic self-government, but the isolation of the post-independence period assured the exclusion of liberalizing influences that might have guided Haiti along a somewhat different path of political and economic development. By the same token, however, it may be that Western governments of the time, and even those of the early twentieth century, were incapable of dealing with a black republic on an equal basis." While hardly a full explanation for the brutality of the next two centuries, Haggerty fully recognized that Haiti's peculiar course of history – which we will now recount – demands explanation.

In 1805, Toussaint's successor in leading the rebellion, Jean-Jacque Dessalines, crowned himself Emperor of Haiti. A former field slave, he was reported to have ordered the mutilation of all remaining whites in the territory. He built up enemies among the mulattoes, who hated him for his race, his lack of education, and his unrelenting brutality. But it was disaffection in the army, where Dessalines had lost support at all levels, that sealed his fate. Killers hired by enemy officers shot and then publicly dismembered the emperor. Thus began Haiti's bloody history as an independent state.

Brutality and state-controlled violence continued unabated. In November 1806, an elected constituent assembly drafted a constitution that established a weak presidency and a comparatively strong legislature. Its members selected Henry Christophe (a black and once a close confidant of

Toussaint) as president and Alexandre Pétion, a mulatto, as head of the legislature. This was the first attempt by the Haitian political class to establish a power-sharing system in which a black leader would serve as figurehead over a mulatto-dominated administration. However, Christophe rejected the figurehead role the constitution assigned to him. He put together a militia and marched with them to the capital. Because Pétion had artillery, Christophe's assault on the city failed. Christophe retreated to north and established his own state, which he ruled from Cap Haïtien (later renamed as Cap Henry). Christophe crowned himself King Henry I of this rump area of Haiti in 1811. For security, Christophe imported African militiamen from Dahomey, whom he called the Royal Dahomets. They served as his private police force, and they brought minimal order to the countryside. But low-level clashes persisted for years between Christophe's monarchy and Pétion's republic. The republic was thereby divided until 1820 when General Jean-Pierre Boyer, Pétion's successor, raised 20,000 troops, but didn't need them (as Christophe committed suicide) to reunite the republic. Boyer ruled Haiti until 1843.

In the late 1830s, Hérard Dumesle, a mulatto poet and liberal political thinker, who served in the legislature, began to question the legitimacy of Boyer's rule. Dumesle and his followers were quickly expelled from the legislature. But his militias retreated to the south and attacked government targets. Eventually, forces under the command of Charles Rivière-Hérard, a cousin of Dumesle, worked northwards towards the capital. By February 1843 most of Boyer's army units had joined the rebels. In the course of this so-called Revolution of 1843, Boyer fled to Jamaica. Rivière-Hérard succeeded him as head of state.

Leyburn summarizes this chaotic era in Haitian history. "Of the twenty-two heads of state between 1843 and 1915," he writes, "only one served out his prescribed term of office, three died while serving, one was blown up with his palace, one presumably poisoned, one hacked to pieces by a mob, one resigned. The other fourteen were deposed by revolution after incumbencies ranging in length from three months to twelve years."⁴

One of Haiti's more successful presidents of this period was Cincinnatus Leconte. Unfortunately, he was killed in August 1912, a victim of a freak explosion in the National Palace. Five more contenders claimed

⁴ . J.G. Leyburn (1941) The Haitian people (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. xxx

the country's leadership over the next three years. General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, who was a Leconte ally, was sworn into power in March 1915. Like every other Haitian president of the period, he faced immediate military challenges. His opponent, Rosalvo Bobo, intimated that he supported Germany in Europe's growing political divide. This put Haiti back on the US radar screen as an unreliable neighbor. Although ideas of invading Haiti went back to the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant, this was not politically feasible in the U.S. until 1915 when Sam executed 167 political prisoners. Mob violence in the streets of Port-au-Prince followed. A civilian gang captured Sam hiding in the French embassy and mutilated him. The assassins marched through the streets of the capital bearing the dismembered body of their former president. This spectacle (even without the aid of CNN) so shocked American authorities, they took quick action by sending in marines and sailors. American occupation personnel quickly took control of Haitian customs houses and administrative institutions. They remained in Haiti as an occupying power for sixteen years, working most assiduously to build a national Haitian army.

Rebellion and state-led brutality seem to run seamlessly through Haiti's pre-1945 history. There were intermittent periods of stability when a coalition of blacks and mulattos within the military achieved some degree of balance. But Haiti's bloody history suggests that the explanandum for post World War II Haiti should not be the rebellion of 1991 (killing at most 3,000) but the fact that our dataset reports only a single onset! It is to the period covered by our dataset that we now turn.

2. Anocracy and Susceptibility (1945-1956)

The US occupation forces brought civil peace for as long as they stayed. But shortly after the US withdrawal, General Trujillo of the Dominican Republic took the vacuum in power in his neighboring country as an invitation to terrorize Haitians who straddled the border. In this insecure environment, liberal Haitians wrote a new constitution in 1946 for self-rule. With the country somewhere between constitutional democracy and anarchy, Polity does not code Haiti on democracy. For us, missing values on democracy is one criterion for anocracy.

Anocracy and poverty in this period gave Haiti its highest susceptibility to civil war in the post World War II period that our dataset covers. Yet there was no civil war. Part of the answer is in the legacy of the

US occupation, and the creation of the Garde, an innovative military institution designed for Haiti. It was a force manned overwhelmingly by blacks, with a United States-trained black commander, Colonel Démosthènes Pétrus Calixte. Most of the Garde's officers, however, were mulattoes. The Garde was national in recruitment, and thus quite different from the ethnically divided armies in Haiti that prevailed before World War II. Its power was apparent to all on the island, and above all this deterred insurrection, despite the political chaos in the country.

The election of François Duvalier ended the era of presidential musical chairs. (Though in moving the country from anocracy to autocracy, Haiti is coded as having three years of instability from 1959-61). Duvalier was a physician who had administered an anti-yaws campaign funded by the U.S. After that, President Dumarsais Estimé, a former school teacher, assembly member, and cabinet minister under first post-U.S. occupation President Vincent, appointed Duvalier to a cabinet position in the government. Duvalier took advantage of Estimé's lack of brutal ambition, and became Haiti's de facto strongman.

3. The Duvalier autocratic peace (1957-1985)

François Duvalier, elected September 1957 in what many analysts consider the fairest direct elections in the country's history up till then, went on to establish a dictatorship based on terror (some 30,000 Haitians were the victims of politicide during his rule) and strategic co-optation of the citizenry. His private militia, the Volunteers for National Security (Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale--VSN), but popularly known as the *tonton makouts*, was both vicious and open to recruits from all over the republic. His accession to power inaugurated a near quarter-century of unambiguous authoritarianism and political stability. Although violence in this quarter-century was impressively high, it was state-induced, and insurrection was forestalled.

After François' (Papa-Doc's) death in 1971, power passed to his son, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc), whose corruption drained the country's resources. Yet, despite his limited intellectual capabilities, or apparent interest in political control, he was able to maintain the authoritarian system that his father had perfected. It took about fifteen years before a serious challenge to his brutal but indifferent rule was mounted.

How did the Duvalier's dampen insurrection? Of primary importance is that Haiti had (originally with the help of the US Occupation) a stronger security apparatus than would be predicted by GDP. "By the mid-1960s," according to Haggerty (1989), "the VSN and the army routinely cooperated on internal security matters, even though the two groups were suspicious of each other. There were occasional lapses in the security apparatus, however. In 1967 several bombs exploded near the palace, and the regime subsequently executed nineteen officers of the Presidential Guard. In 1970 the entire membership of Haiti's small Coast Guard staged an abortive mutiny."

Under a Baby Doc entente with the United States, military supremacy of the state over any potential insurgency was maintained. With close US support and aid, the Leopards were organized as a counterinsurgency unit. This unit provided the regime with a relatively modern tool for responding to internal threats. The Leopards also provided Baby Doc with a new force, enabling him to play off the armed forces and the VSN. Moreover, again with US support, Baby Doc's regime reprofessionalized the armed forces. In 1972 the Military Academy reopened, and new equipment was provided to military units. Despite an enormous set of grievances in the population (having lived under a generation of authoritarian repression), and declining GDP/capita, Baby Doc's paramilitaries and the Haitian army were strong enough tools to hold back rebellion.

But also crucial was the lure of emigration (which removed the more politically threatening elements of the population along with thousands seeking economic opportunity). Urban middle-class and upper-class opponents of the government of Papa Doc left Haiti en masse in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, however, they were joined by the rural folk and the lumpen urban elements. Thousands of Haitians illegally emigrated to the United States through nonimmigrant visas, while others entered the United States without any documentation at all. By the late 1980s, some 500,000 Haitians were living in the United States.

4. Political Instability and Civil War (1986-1995)

Haiti's gross domestic product in 1987, according to Haggerty (1989), "was approximately US\$1.95 billion, or about US\$330 per capita, ranking Haiti as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and as the twenty-seventh most impoverished nation in the world. The only low-income

country--defined by the World Bank as a country with a per capita GDP in 1988 below US\$425--in the Americas, Haiti fell even farther behind other low-income countries in Africa and Asia during the 1980s.” Added to this poverty is the political instability that followed Duvalier’s fall from power and the installation of an anocratic regime. Thus in the post-Duvalier period, our model predicts a relatively high probability of civil war; indeed in 1991 Haiti experienced a civil war onset.

The riots of October 1985 shocked Jean-Claude and induced military officers to demand his resignation. He self-exiled four months later, ending the dynastic dictatorship. With Baby-Doc’s exile, Haiti was on a route towards political instability and anocracy, but this time the political class was sufficiently divided such that the regime change spilled over into the streets, turning a coup into an insurgency.

Jean-Claude was succeeded by a National Council of Government (Conseil National de Gouvernement – GNG), made up of two military officers and three civilians. A constituent assembly, elected by popular vote in October 1986, drafted a constitution that was ratified in a March 1987 plebiscite. The presidential election of November 29, 1987 was disrupted by violence perpetrated mainly by former members of the *tonton makouts*. At the electoral polls, the military reportedly killed about thirty-five and injured many more. In consequence, the Permanent Electoral Commission (CEP) annulled the elections; in response the CNG dissolved the CEP.

The armed forces administered a subsequent presidential vote in January, 1988. Leslie F. Manigat was elected president in an election of low turnout. He was overthrown six months later by a military coup led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, who had headed the CNG. Namphy suspended the 1987 Constitution and ruled autocratically .

Lieutenant General Prosper Avril took power in Haiti in September 1988, ousting what had become a highly unpopular military regime under Namphy. Avril was a soldier and a one-time Duvalier apparachik. On his accession to the presidency, he gave assurances that he would oversee a democratic transition. This promise was shortly ignored. With an election scheduled for 1990, he arrested and expelled opponents and declared a state of siege thereby preempting any electoral activity. Street demonstrations, protests, and rioting quickly followed.

Violent demonstrations escalated in early March 1990, provoked by an ugly incident where the army shot and killed a young girl in Petit Goâve. Demonstrators vandalized the streets while chanting anti-Avril slogans. The army entered the scene, only to exacerbate the violence in the streets. The U.S. Ambassador held a private meeting with Avril, and induced him to flee Haiti on a USAF transport. Major General Hérard Abraham replaced him until a transitional government could be formed.

Civilian leaders chose a provisional government. It was to be headed by a relatively unknown judge of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court), Ertha Pascal-Trouillot. It was hard to find anyone who was willing to sit on the hot presidential seat in this charged environment. In fact, judge Pascal Trouillot accepted the post of provisional president only after three other Supreme Court judges refused to serve. She was to head a nineteen-member Council of State, made up of prominent citizens. The sharing of power between the president and Council of State was left ambiguous. But what was not ambiguous was the continued power of the Haitian Armed Forces.

The CEP scheduled local, legislative, and presidential elections for the fall, 1990. Few expected them to pull this off, as political violence was rampant. To be sure, negotiations between the Armed Forces and the CEP sought to establish procedures such that there would not be a repeat of the 1987 electoral disaster. But few were reassured.

In December (only a month later than planned), over 60 percent of registered voters turned out to vote. In what turned out to be a free and fair election, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been a voice in the Church as an advocate of liberation theology, and who had been an unremitting critic of Baby Doc, won the election in the first-round of voting in a multi-candidate list. So enormous was this political change that Haiti's polity score for 1990 reflects a massive shift of thirteen points in the democratic direction in a single year.

But a backlash ensued. The Duvalierist Roger Lafontant attempted to overthrow Aristide on January 6, 1991. Aided by a small army junta, Lafontant seized the National Palace, took the Provisional President Pascal-Trouillot as prisoner, and took control of the state-run television station as well. In the wake of Lafontant's putsch, and in support of Aristide, anti-Macoute violence broke out on 9-10 January 1991, leaving 70 dead. The deputy Nuncio was nearly maimed to death by Aristide's henchmen, as the

more radical of Aristide's supporters took to heart his denunciation of the Church.

Lafontant's pronouncement failed. Loyalist army forces retook the palace hours after the coup announcement. Lafontant and his co-conspirators were either killed, or captured and jailed. The populace took law into their own hands, as mobs lynched supposed Duvalier supporters. Violence continued in the period between the elections and Aristide's inauguration in February. Suspected Duvalierists set fire to an Aristide-administered orphanage in Port-au-Prince. But Aristide's actions did anything but ameliorate the violence. His mobs "necklaced" (called *pèse lebrun*) opponents, taking the law into their own hands (Malone, pp. 60-61).

Aristide ruled from 7 February through 30 September 1991. His unremitting hostility to the *ancien regime* ultimately sealed his fate. The army struck back at Aristide's attempted reform of the Haitian Armed Force's high command, as in response, he *inter alia* eliminated the section chiefs who had been the local sources of extortion and power within the army and police. This the armed forces could not tolerate. Col. Raoul Cédras deposed Aristide and took control of the government. Aristide was permitted to escape to Caracas.

The coup not only took out Aristide, but "community-based organizations and grassroots groups were especially targeted." Human Rights Watch/Americas and the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees confirmed. As observed by Maguire (1995) "The army's campaign...has been systematic and ruthless...Targets of this violence include pro-Aristide elected officials, rural development and peasant organizations, neighborhood and community associations, trade unions, and literacy, pro-democracy, students' and women's rights groups. Soldiers and section chiefs have hunted down, arrested, beaten and killed leaders and members of these groups." This was the onset of a five-year period of violence that qualifies as a civil war in our dataset.

5. The International Surveillance Regime (1993-1999)

The UN General Assembly and the Security Council condemned the September 30, 1991 coup and the illegal régime's use of violence, military coercion and its violation of human rights. It called for the restoration of the legitimate Government. Beginning in 1993, backed by UN Security Council

Resolutions leading initially to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), there have been four UN PKOs that have policed the Haitian regime. And so, despite the continued higher than average susceptibility score for Haiti after 1995 (at a 3% probability of an onset for 1997), there has been no re-occurrence.


The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established in 1993. By United Nations' Resolution 940 adopted on July 31, 1994, the UNMIH was authorized to recruit about 21,000 troops who were to take their positions in September. By mid-October, the coup leaders were escorted out of the country and Aristide and other elected officials returned to their prewar positions. Peace restored, the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was authorized by Security Council resolution 1063 of 28 June 1996. This resolution supported a new multinational armed force, initially be composed of 300 civilian police personnel and 600 troops. This was followed in 1997 by the United Nations Transition Mission In Haiti (UNTMIH) with 250 police and 50 military personnel who were authorized to support and contribute to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, including training specialized units in crowd control, developing a rapid reaction force and ensuring palace security. Finally, the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) followed also in 1997 and completed its mandate on 15 March 2000. Its main task was to continue the assistance to the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police. These successive missions, though small in number of personnel, prevented further political instability by protecting the Haitian government from inside coup plotters. Political instability remained (given our coding procedures, this is a lag due to the rapid change from autocracy to democracy in 1994), but no insurrection got off the ground. International surveillance (with active support by the world's superpower, which had contributed 6,000 troops to the original UNMIH force) explains why above-average susceptibility did not lead Haiti into a civil war recurrence.

Conclusion

Poverty explains the near continuous state of criminal/state violence going back for centuries in Haiti. Haiti has a small population (making surveillance successful), and has developed in the post World War II period a good infrastructure of roads, a strong army and counter insurgency militias (relative to its GDP), and has had a large superpower as a neighbor (that

found acceptable for many years the political stability provided by brutal regimes). These factors all worked to make Haiti's civil war less violent than it would have been had there been large regions far from the center with a weak infrastructure and with little interest in the country's stability by a world power.

Centralized control may have made insurrection difficult; however it channeled opposition not into rural insurgencies but rather into assassination attempts and violent protests. The state took the initiative by brutal repression of potential assassins, and responded to protests with brutality to discourage popular rebellion. In fact, since the successful slave rebellion of 1791, Haitian politics can best be described as viciously brutal but without major insurgencies. This is the result of poverty mixed with a strong repressive apparatus by the state.



cname	year	pr	gdp~1	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
HAITI	1945	.	.	2928	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1946	.	.	2960	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1947	.0351692	.765	3024	15.4	0	1	1
HAITI	1948	.0353711	.765	3060	15.4	0	1	1
HAITI	1949	.0354612	.767	3097	15.4	0	1	1
HAITI	1950	.0345667	.859	3149	15.4	0	1	1
HAITI	1951	.0347538	.856	3188	15.4	0	1	1
HAITI	1952	.0348141	.861	3251	15.4	0	1	1
HAITI	1953	.0213075	.82	3302	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1954	.0209147	.892	3354	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1955	.0211708	.867	3407	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1956	.0209134	.919	3460	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1957	.0211416	.898	3514	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1958	.0212914	.889	3568	15.4	0	0	1
HAITI	1959	.0222653	.919	3623	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1960	.0222872	.929	3857	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1961	.0227047	.924	3923	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1962	.0138366	.879	3990	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1963	.0137727	.908	4058	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1964	.0139208	.889	4127	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1965	.0140344	.878	4197	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1966	.0140272	.894	4256	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1967	.0140899	.892	4316	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1968	.0143946	.837	4377	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1969	.0144407	.839	4437	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1970	.0144484	.849	4535	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1971	.0146047	.834	4598	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1972	.0143817	.894	4677	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1973	.0145043	.882	4757	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1974	.0146932	.856	4838	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1975	.0146345	.883	4920	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1976	.0148908	.843	5003	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1977	.0146378	.911	5087	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1978	.0146624	.92	5173	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1979	.014622	.943	5261	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1980	.0145821	.966	5353	15.4	0	0	0

HAITI	1981	.0143413	1.033	5448	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1982	.0145167	1.01	5546	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1983	.0149506	.933	5648	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1984	.0150541	.927	5754	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1985	.0152519	.902	5865	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1986	.0152878	.911	5980	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1987	.0257453	.902	6099	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1988	.0260467	.882	6221	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1989	.0264605	.849	6346	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1990	.0267292	.834	6486	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1991	.0267434	.851	6625	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1992	.0112812	.836	6760	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1993	.0118071	.711	6860.56	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1994	.0119733	.68	7009.04	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1995	.0123127	.611	7168	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1996	.0123411	.623	7336	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1997	.0296761	.626	7492	15.4	0	1	0
HAITI	1998	.0179262	.621	7634.67	15.4	0	0	0
HAITI	1999	.0179843	.627	.	15.4	0	0	0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	53	.0193159	.0072643	.0112812	.0354612
gdpenl	53	.8508679	.0967652	.611	1.033
pop	54	4831.542	1369.532	2928	7634.67
mtnest	55	15.4	0	15.4	15.4
Oil	55	0	0	0	0

instab	55	.3636364	.4854794	0	1
anocl	55	.2545455	.4396203	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	1175	.0138192	.0097621	.0003637	.0692507
gdpenl	1175	2.863283	1.86085	.562	11.738
pop	1187	13595.62	24721.73	621	165873.6
mtnest	1210	22.25446	17.80127	0	57.59999
Oil	1210	.1363636	.3433162	0	1

instab	1210	.1950413	.3963963	0	1
anocl	1210	.3570248	.4793203	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0167842	.0232433	3.19e-10	.5059608
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1

instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1