

Mozambique

(MozambiqueRN1.1)

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This is one of a set of “random narratives” to complement our statistical findings in regard to civil war onsets. This is a draft of June 17, 2005; comments welcome.

Mozambique became independent after a long civil war against Portuguese colonialism. By our model’s predictions, Mozambique had a 6.2% chance of having a civil war onset in 1975-76, given the fact of its being a new state and having a relatively low GDP/cap (\$1,182). In the complete dataset for the year 1975 (Mozambique’s first year as a new state), Mozambique was among the four most-likely countries to have a civil war onset (along with Angola, China, and Papua New Guinea). All four countries had subsequent civil war onsets. The case of Mozambique allows us to examine the “newstate” variable in a particular case, in order to observe more closely the mechanisms linking new statehood to propensity for a civil war. With the country mired in a civil war for two decades (and without political instability, anocracy, mountains or oil), the probability for a second onset in Mozambique was negligible – indeed below the world average – and indeed there was no new onset. But in 1994, the Polity score for Mozambique jumped from -6 to +8, a move from autocracy to nearly unvarnished democracy, without passing through the zone of anocracy. This radical change in political regime type gets coded in our model as instability, which lasts for three years. Thus from 1995-97, our model gives Mozambique an above average probability for a renewed civil war onset – yet none occurs. This lack of a new civil war when conditions while not ripe were somewhat dangerous allows us to explore the mechanisms linking instability to civil war.

In this random narrative, the first section provides historical background. The second section addresses the relationship of “new state” and civil war onset. The third section addresses the relationship of “instability” and civil war onset. The fourth section provides a summary of the findings.

I. Historical Background

At the turn of the millennium tribes of Bantu-speaking peoples populated the area of today's Mozambique. The Portuguese arrived several centuries later, in 1498. Yet for the next four centuries, east African kingdoms dominated over society and European power remained peripheral. The kingdom of Muenemutapa (from the Zambesi to the Save Rivers and up to the highlands of today's Zimbabwe), was a rich empire controlling gold mines, and it monopolized trade with Swahili merchants working their way up and down the coast, and trading goods from the Indian Ocean coast to the Arab islands and states. The other major African power in what is today Mozambique was the Malawi Confederation, to the northeast of the Muenemutapa kingdom, and it for a long time monopolized the trade in ivory.

The Portuguese moved in to displace Swahili merchants, for its ports, its gold, and its ivory (and to displace Muslims), and it was victorious in a battle that took place in 1525. In 1567 Portugal sought to defeat Muenemutapa but lost in a big military battle. But after a generation of war and diplomacy, Muenemutapa ceded his mines and acknowledged Lisbon's suzerainty. In 1632 the Portuguese defeated the Malawian king. The Portuguese then dispensed estates in the Zambezi valley (called *prazos da coroa*) to seed a permanent white settler community loyal to the crown. Administered as a part of Goa until 1752, the Portuguese were in the second half of the 17th c. confronted with several uprisings, yet received almost no support from the *prazos*. And they could not crack the Muslim trade network. Indians got control over the cloth and ivory trade in the 18th c., and North American traders took control over the slave marketing in the 19th c. (in the 19th c., more than 1,000,000 captives were exported from Mozambique). As a consequence of its failures to control markets, Portugal effectively ceded authority in the countryside to African authorities and *prazeiros* turned warlord.

At the Congress of Berlin (1884-85), Portugal's claims to Mozambique were questioned for its lack of effective authority and unwillingness to halt the slave trade. This challenge compelled the Portuguese to exert power, and it sent forces to Mozambique for regular campaigns until 1902 when pacification was complete, largely through the use of African levies and reserves.

After pacification, there were three broad periods of Colonial Rule. First, from 1902-26, Portugal exerted broadly decentralized, corrupt, and disorganized rule, in which Mozambique was effectively dependent on South Africa's economy. Then, from 1928-62, under Salazar, colonization was highly centralized and exploitative, in the interests of Portugal's nascent industrial class. And finally, from 1962-75, FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) forced the Portuguese into reforms and ultimately colonial war (coded as a war in Portugal).

In this final stage, several exile organizations of Mozambicans were activated once they got the news of the beginning of the rebellion in Angola. To stem any revolutionary tide, Portuguese authorities increased substantially their force level in Mozambique and organized a voluntary militia, riot police units, and intelligence services. By September 1992 the newly formed FRELIMO began sending volunteers to Algeria for training (Marcum 1969, I: 193-99, 282-4). Portugal's susceptibility to insurgent action, made clear in Angola, motivated leaders of political organizations in Mozambique, and emboldened them to up the ante in their anti-colonial struggles.

Probably the most important element that drove Portugal to war was the presence of settlers in Mozambique. Portugal in the 19th century settled exiled prisoners (*degredados*) into Mozambique. In Mozambique by World War II, there were 27,000 Europeans in Mozambique, most of them farming along the Zambezi valley (Ciment 1997, 25). Due to its neutrality, Portugal thrived in World War II, and the agricultural economy of Mozambique became quite profitable. This created a vast in-migration of whites. From 1950-74, white settlers in Mozambique went from 50,000 to 200,000 (Ciment 1997, 33-34). Throughout the war, Portuguese settlers took on a vigilante role in terrorizing African communities.

On June 25, 1975, Mozambican independence was acknowledged. But the battle from 1972 onwards was fierce. Portugal had considerable support from Western allies fearing a communist take-over in southern Africa. FRELIMO had increasingly sophisticated weaponry from China and the Soviet Union. Guerrillas by 1973 were able to raid settler plantations and to block railways. At the height of guerrilla advances, the regime of Marcello Caetano, Salazar's successor, was overthrown by an Armed Forces Movement, which quickly negotiated its withdrawal from Mozambique with

the FRELIMO leadership. Portuguese settlers attempted a coup to forestall the transition, but a joint Portuguese regular army and FRELIMO exercise crushed the rebellion and a transition government of both FRELIMO and Portuguese members was named as a caretaker (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 105-07). From that point on, it was FRELIMO that designed the constitutional arrangements for independence, as the Portuguese had neither the legitimacy nor the power to play a neo-colonial role.

There are therefore two crucial facts to be kept in mind to understand the security situation in post-independence Mozambique. First, there was no real peaceful transition to independence, with a metropole committed to the security of a newly installed sovereign state. Second, there remained settlers in the country who were deeply angered at their loss of status as preferred citizens of Portugal living in Portuguese-controlled Africa.

II. “New State” and Civil War Onset

The Renamo War

Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, sometimes abbreviated as RNM) was founded in 1976 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) to fight mostly ZANU operatives based in Mozambique,¹ and recruited from the “flechas” (arrows) formed by the Portuguese police (PIDE) when they were fighting FRELIMO to maintain Portuguese rule. After independence, many of these flechas fled to Rhodesia, including Orlando Christina, who later became Secretary-General of Renamo. Christina had confidential PIDE files to blackmail flechas who tried to live peacefully in Mozambique, threatening to expose their membership to authorities in Maputo. Other recruits were FRELIMO dissidents, some of whom were assigned to undergo “re-education” and escaped to Rhodesia when Rhodesian troops liberated their camps. Several other splinter groups that broke with FRELIMO in the 1960s also joined the Renamo camps. Renamo operated in standard guerrilla mode. For example, it differentiated “tax areas” (where periodic extortion was used), “control areas” (near bases, in which the villages became forcibly integrated into the Renamo area of control); and “destruction areas”, which were FRELIMO-supporting villages designated for disaster.

¹ . ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) forces, under the political leadership of Robert Mugabe, was seeking to liberate Rhodesia from the White-controlled regime that had broken from Britain with a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.

By 1979, Renamo was operating in camps within the Mozambique borders. It was originally under command of Andre Matasangaiza, who had been in FRELIMO, but was dismissed.² In 1979, in a violent leadership struggle, Matsangaiza was replaced by his deputy, Afonso Dhlakama. At this point, Renamo had several hundred rebels, and was mostly controlled by the CIO. But in 1980, with Robert Mugabe's election as President of Zimbabwe (and friendly to FRELIMO), South Africa took over the role as Renamo's principal patron. The South African Defence Force removed by airlift those camped in Zimbabwe, and brought them to the Transvaal for logistical training, especially for the disruption of Mozambique's transport network. Renamo got support not only from South Africa, but from anti-communist groups in Portugal, West Germany and the U.S. With this support, by 1990, they built up a force of 20,000 (Morgan 1990, 605-8).

Explanations for the Renamo War

Weakness of the Metropole

There are two factors that made being a "new state" especially vulnerable for Mozambique. First, Mozambique's erstwhile metropole, Portugal, had neither the resources nor the will to commit to the leadership to which it handed power. Portugal was suffering from its own political instability. Its leaders more ran from the African colonies than transferred power to an established elite. Moreover, the class of Portuguese settlers was outraged by the transfer of power, and had an interest in undermining the newly established leadership. Different from the French and British former colonies of Africa, the colonies of Belgium and Portugal, because of metropole weaknesses and internal divisions, were far more susceptible to a civil war onset in the first two years of independence. Of the thirty-eight Sub-Saharan African countries in the dataset that were new states post 1945, six were colonies of Portugal and Belgium. For the thirty-three countries that were not Portuguese or Belgian colonies and who received independence in the post-war era, none had civil wars as new states. For the six countries that were former Portuguese or Belgian colonies, four (Angola, Democratic

² . Some say because as a quartermaster, he was sent to a re-education camp for stealing a Mercedes-Benz, and then escaped; others say that he hoarded arms, in order to protect his Ndaou tribe against the southern leadership of FRELIMO. But according to him, he was a FRELIMO commander based at Dondo (near Beira) and was ordered to repel a Rhodesia invasion. Because his troops were ill-equipped, he refused to obey, leading to the charge of treason, and then imprisonment, inducing his escape (Chingono 1996, 30).

Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Mozambique) had civil wars as new states.³

Revolutionary Euphoria

Second, the FRELIMO government, unlike Botswana (which declared its incapacity to stand up to White-ruled regimes), and with great confidence in its revolutionary power, threatened its stronger enemies who had an interest in mobilizing opposition to it. Most egregiously, FRELIMO defied the interests of strong neighboring regimes by encouraging revolution (and giving aid and cover to its rebels) in Rhodesia and South Africa. Mozambique became a “front line” state upon independence, signaling its solidarity with the Organization of African Unity standing against White minority regimes. In enforcing UN sanctions against Rhodesia, Mozambique’s economy suffered from loss of remittances from Mozambican mineworkers who could no longer migrate to the Transvaal. FRELIMO immediately upon achieving independence opened its 750-mile frontier with Rhodesia to the ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) insurgents in Rhodesia; and resettled 150,000 Zimbabweans in refugee camps. Mozambican reconnaissance forces operated inside Rhodesia with Zimbabwean guerrillas for a year. It closed off the port of Beira to Rhodesian goods, costing it \$500 million in rail and transit fees. These policies assured a strong Rhodesian military response. In the case of South Africa, FRELIMO was cautious enough to refuse sanctioning ANC’s (the African National Congress’) military activities within Mozambique. But it permitted the ANC to have offices in Maputo, refugees were given sanctuary, and Oliver Tambo, its leader, got treated in Mozambique as a head of state. South Africa, largely in response to Mozambique’s revolutionary message and policies, gave full support to Renamo, penetrated its own forces into Mozambique in 1981 carrying out many raids, and organized assassinations of ANC members living in Maputo (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 171-88; Morgan 1990, 610).

Furthermore, and with grave consequences, FRELIMO held officers and soldiers who sided with the Portuguese in contempt, giving them little alternative but to side with rebels. Unlike Zimbabwe, which was able to transform a guerrilla army into a professional military force after

³ . All six of the Portuguese and Belgian colonies suffered ultimately from at least one civil war. Of the British and French colonies, 12 out of 32 ultimately had civil wars.

independence (largely by integrating it with the Rhodesian armed forces, its previous enemy), Renamo demobilized without worry soldiers who fought on the Portuguese side, and in fact the entire Mozambique colonial army (Finnegan 1992, 57). Because of that, Renamo was able to get recruits from these demobilized soldiers.

FRELIMO leaders also refused to develop linkages with petty chiefs, religious authorities, traditional healers, and other local authorities, giving them incentives to link with the opposition. Finnegan (1992, 63ff) writes that if Renamo had wanted to occupy a town, they allied with the *régulos* (petty chiefs under Portuguese rule who were deposed by FRELIMO), got support from the local religious authorities (who were scorned by FRELIMO), and other hangers-on in the Portuguese administration, especially the *curandeiros* (medicine men). Renamo legitimated traditional healers and gave men the right to marry as many wives as they pleased. Renamo made skillful use of Ndao networks (the Ndao are a Shona sub-group, renowned for ritual power throughout the region, a sort of power that was of no use to FRELIMO) to find recruits (Finnegan, 1992, 64-6). Indeed, Renamo's first leader, Andrea Matada Matsangaissa was a Ndao, and connected to high cult networks. Not only was traditional religion scorned by FRELIMO leadership, but the Christian churches as well. Indeed, Renamo used the Christian churches for recruitment, building on FRELIMO's opposition to all religion (Morgan 1990, 613; Chingono 1996, 44).⁴

Unlike Renamo, FRELIMO was insensitive to local imagery. When Renamo arrived in Gorongossa district in 1977, they looted a shop and gave the shopkeeper a poster, which he was ordered to pass on. The picture portrayed Samora Machel, first president of independent Mozambique, in caricature as a monkey sitting on a throne. Here Renamo was playing into traditional folk genres of ridicule. Renamo also used coded whistling tactics, another traditional genre to which FRELIMO was deaf, to alert rebels of government raids (Chingono 1996, 41-3). FRELIMO's nearly complete discounting of the power of traditional power networks turned out to be a boon for Renamo recruitment and sustenance at the local level.

FRELIMO was adamant about its marxist program and worldview, oftentimes in defiance of military reality. FRELIMO created coercive state

⁴ . See Nordstrom 1997, 46-57 for the "cast of characters" that combined together in a rag-tag sort of way to constitute itself, but with no overall coherence, as Renamo.

farms and inefficient rural cooperatives, leading to great peasant discontent, and rapid abandonment of productive land by Portuguese settlers. Because of these policies, small-scale family farms did not get attention, exacerbated by marketing boards that underpaid for crops. This not only yielded discontent, but near famine conditions throughout the country. In Manica, as Chingono (1996, 37) reports, some eight percent of the peasants were collectivized; some were made laborers in state farms. In investment for development, ninety percent went to the state sector; two percent to cooperatives; and nothing to family farms. The pricing of commodities, in which the surplus went to the state, lowered incentives to produce. A *candonga* (black, or grey) economy resulted from the policies, and violators of the law were subject to public flogging. The marxist program was creating hunger and enemies. Worse, in its Operation Production, in which 50,000 city dwellers were shipped to the countryside in 1983, and told to start farming, FRELIMO almost invited a recruiting program for Renamo (Morgan 1996, 610; Finnegan 1992, 69))

When recognizing its early insensitivity, the FRELIMO government offered an amnesty featured on Radio Mozambique to Renamo soldiers who were willing to desist from further rebellious activities. But these offers were more threatening than reassuring. In Finnegan's observations, the tone of the amnesty was too ideological, too imbued with language of socialist realism, to be accepted as genuine (Finnegan 1992, 68).

In sum, in a moment of revolutionary euphoria, FRELIMO leadership acted as if they had no enemies, and thereby gave incentives for those enemies to collaborate with one another to challenge militarily their rule. And thus, "Renamo evolved into a broad, violent collection of FRELIMO's enemies" (Finnegan 1992, 70). Revolutionary euphoria in Mozambique clearly made the task to Rhodesia and South Africa in instilling an insurgency much easier.

Foreign Aid

Renamo is a case in which foreign instigation (even though it built upon local incentives) was the sine qua non. The Iain Smith regime in Rhodesia launched more than 350 attacks in Mozambique in an attempt to stop FRELIMO from its support for the Patriotic Front. Rhodesian forces blew up the bridge on the Beira-Moatize line, and attacked the Limpopo Valley agro-industrial complex 250 miles inside Mozambique. The

Rhodesian Special Branch (according to its former chief, Ken Flowers) in fact created Renamo. From 1976, Rhodesian security officials, with South African counterparts, recruited Portuguese settlers, mercenaries, black and white secret police agents, former African members of the elite special forces who had fled to Rhodesia (these were from the PIDE) to serve as the organization foundation of Renamo. Rhodesia gave Renamo arms and bases, and Renamo bands entered Mozambique to burn villages, plunder agricultural cooperatives, attack railroad lines, and establish re-education camps (from which they then recruited members). In August 1976, Rhodesian militias, under the command of their military-intelligence chief, Ken Flowers, launched raids into Mozambique, bombing bridges, dams, railway lines, and oil storage facilities. In August 1976, they massacred more than 600 refugees in a camp.

With the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 bringing African rule to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the popular militias on the frontiers were disbanded. But the Renamo remnants transferred their base of operations to South Africa, and they got considerable support there, as the South African government saw these bands as a good way to paralyze the African state organization designed to collectively confront South Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). South Africa hoped, amongst other plans, to force Zimbabwe and Botswana away from exports through Maputo and instead through South Africa. When South Africa took over in 1980, with the SADCC as the defined enemy, it staged bloody raids into six nearby countries. In 1981 with South African technical support, Renamo blew up the Beira-Umtali pipeline, cut the railway between Zimbabwe and Beira, and attacked bridges and development projects. It attacked the Maputo-Zimbabwean railroad line in July 1982 in order to promote export through Durban. (It was able to do this to the Benguela railroad through links with UNITA in Angola, whom South Africa was promoting). With the Nkomati Accord in 1984 FRELIMO sued for peace. It agreed to evict the ANC in return for South Africa ending support for FRELIMO. But evidence was uncovered showing continued South African support for Renamo (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 176-8, and fn., p. 219; Finnegan 1992, 31-34)

FRELIMO's (Alleged) Tribalism

Consider Dividas. In his portrait, William Finnegan – who was doing journalistic research for articles in *The New Yorker* – we learn that Dividas,

who became Finnigan's translator, deserted to FRELIMO from the Portuguese army. After he was finally accepted by FRELIMO leaders as not being a spy, he had trouble winning a scholarship he thought he merited, and was told by friends in exile that "because most of our leaders were from the south...the scholarships were going to other people from the south, and because I was from Beira I would never receive one." He later joined a breakaway movement from FRELIMO called Coremo (Comitê Revolucionário de Moçambique), which he was informed, was friendlier to folk from Beira (Finnegan 1962, 45-49).

Indeed, many in Renamo were from the North and Central provinces and had tales of discrimination in educational promotion, admission to the university, and in military promotion. One study argues that the Senas, who are from Beira, are "despised" by the FRELIMO core. In response to these feelings, the Federal Party of Mozambique-Democratic Federalist (PAFEMO-DF) recognized in its manifesto ethnic diversity in a federal principle, but the government refused to register it. PAFEMO-DF was turned down in 1993, and it was constitutionally enjoined from what FRELIMO accused it of doing, viz., promoting divisions.

To be sure, these allegations don't reflect a reality of tribalism. The historical reality that the Portuguese were always weak in the south allowed Protestant Missionaries to establish there a beachhead and build schools as well as a university there. No wonder southerners had an advantage in getting high bureaucratic positions after independence (Chingono 1996, 49) Meanwhile, Renamo recruited better in the Shona-speaking areas of central Mozambique, probably because this was the group most accessible to the Rhodesian recruiters, in terms of having links to the Shonas in their own country (Morgan 1990, 615).

The history of the independence struggle speaks against this notion of tribal issues as the source of the civil war. FRELIMO was established on June 25, 1962. This was the successor of a set of more narrowly (regional, tribal) freedom organizations (MANU – short for Mozambique/Makonde Union – was a Makonde organization; UDENAMO was a southern organization based in Bulawayo, in Southern Rhodesia; UNAMI was mostly from Tete province.) Recognizing the organizational deficiencies and the divisions among these organizations, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere brought all the organizations to Dar es Salaam to establish headquarters there, and this was the source of a pact among organizations that became

FRELIMO. Eduardo Mondlane was elected its leader. His father and uncle fought the Portuguese in the late 19th c. He was mission educated, and later he studied at Witwatersrand, the center of Afrikaner intellectual life in South Africa. Politically active there, he was deported. Back in Mozambique, the colonialists tried to co-opt him with a scholarship to Lisbon, where he met Amílcar Cabral (leader of the independence movement in Portuguese Guinea), Agostinho Neto (an Angolan freedom fighter) and other to-be revolutionaries. But due to surveillance by police, he escaped to the U.S., where he received a Ph.D. [in Sociology at Northwestern University]. He returned to Mozambique under protection as a UN official, but then left the UN, went to Dar, and got elected as President of FRELIMO (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 79-82). He, and other FRELIMO leaders, was alienated from tribal politics and fully at home in western secular company. If anything, FRELIMO leadership was not tribal, but anti-tribal.

Thus, although there were areas of the country in which FRELIMO was weak, this does not ipso facto mean that they discriminated; in fact, due to their marxist framework, they were the least likely among African countries to play the tribal card, and this often to their own disadvantage.

Rough Terrain

Our dataset has Mozambique with only 2.4 percent of its territory in mountainous terrain, which basically says that the country's terrain is inhospitable to rebels. Yet, our measure of rough terrain may well be too narrow. Deep valleys on the foothills of mountains can do quite well for a rebel organization. Finnegan, in describing the central province of Zambézia -- Mozambique's most populous province, with some three million people, and most fertile, with "glinting rivers running dark-green threads through a landscape" -- points out that "in its wildness, [it is an] ideal country for a guerrilla army." Zambézia's town of Morrumbala, situated by the side of Morrumbala Mountain that rises to about 4,000' in southwestern Zambézia, illustrates this point. It was the first town in the province occupied by Renamo. The day Renamo arrived, everyone, including a handful of FRELIMO soldiers, ran off. The rebels destroyed everything. The ability to ambush and hide in mountain foothills surely gave rebels a tactical advantage (Finnegan 1992, 9-15). Chingono extends this terrain argument to the bush. He argues that it took a lengthy drought, depleting the bush, before Renamo lost its ability to "hide", as the bush was largely depleted (Chingono

1996, 52). The terrain useful for insurgents, it could be argued from this case, should include thick bush as well as mountains.

III. “Instability” and Civil War Onset

Mozambique’s civil war reconciliation and political transition, organized through the auspices of ONUMOZ (the UN Operation in Mozambique) was a remarkable success. Mozambique went through a period of instability without a renewal of civil war. In this section, we indicate how this was done, and why instability did not re-ignite the Renamo war. We first look at whether, for some reason, the Renamo war did not bring the kinds of internal hatreds and fears that make civil wars so easy to re-ignite after stretches of cease-fires. Then we look at the organization of the UN PKO, to see if that had a role in preventing a re-ignition of war during the fragile moments of political instability.

Hatreds and Anger as a Consequence of the Renamo War

It would be difficult to maintain that the failure of a new set of insurgents to take advantage of Mozambique’s instability in 1995-98 had anything to do with “good feelings” among war participants. Long delays in the fulfillment of the ONUMOZ mandate were in large part due, in the Secretary-General’s opinion, to the continued mistrust between the Government and Renamo (Alden 1995, 113). Dhlakama was reluctant to concentrate his troops in assembly areas with foreign troops controlling them, for fear that his troops would be overrun and then his army dissipated. And despite clear commitments to demobilize, in the end, both sides retained forces outside the demobilization process, about 5,000 on the government side and 2,000 on Renamo’s, to hedge against future threats in the electoral period (Alden 1995, 119). Many commentators point to a war weariness on both sides that made the success of ONUMOZ more likely – but even that is suspect, given the fact that in Angola, UNITA was at war far longer without any sense of weariness. Perhaps a better answer for the post-war peace is organizational.

ONUMOZ

The UN played a key role in the establishment and maintenance of peace in Mozambique. Accords between the government and representative of Renamo were signed in Rome in October 1992, along with a ceasefire

agreement. By resolution 782 (1992), the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative and up to 25 military observers. Special representative Aldo Ajello arrived later that October. Ajello established a *Comissão de Supervisão e Controle* (CSC) composed of representatives from the government, Renamo, Italy, Portugal, France, UK, and the U.S.. Ajello presented to the Secretary General a peacekeeping plan, and in December, by Resolution 797, ONUMOZ was authorized, providing for 7,500 military personnel and a budget of US\$260 million, with elections scheduled for October 1993. It wasn't till mid-March that the budget was approved; a status of forces agreement with the UN (allowing for foreign troops to have freedom of movement and not be subject to local taxation) was not signed by a delaying government until May 1993; and work did not begin till June 1993.

The peacekeeping operation was made up mostly of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops. Through the long delay before their arrival, the ceasefire agreed to in Rome barely held without international oversight (Jett 2002; Alden 1995).

Demobilization of troops, difficult in most civil wars, was easier in Mozambique, in large part because with the Soviet collapse in 1991, the FRELIMO government in Mozambique found itself without any sponsors. The Swiss government worked with them in creating a *Gabinete de Reintegração*, facilitating the reintegration of soldiers into the economy through the creation of Assembly Areas, and in them the registration and disarmament of troops, the storage of weapons, the monitoring of disputes, job training, and the selection for and up-to-date training of members in the new national army – made up of half government and half Renamo forces, and trained by the British. Because the retirement packages to demobilized soldiers was more attractive than the salaries of those continuing, ONUMOZ had a difficult time in getting any soldiers to agree to joining the national army. Relying on an old hand in development work in Mozambique who implemented this Swiss program for all troops, ONUMOZ got a quick grip on an often intractable problem (Alden 1995).

To be sure, ONUMOZ was not without immense practical problems that could have been pointed to if the operation failed to meet its goals. “Timetables slipped, the local parties delayed compliance, budgets soared, parent UN agencies engaged in obstructionism, and UN resources on the ground [and especially the civilian police] were underutilized and worse...”

(Jett 2002). Also, despite an excellently founded demobilization program, Renamo troops, without arms and status in the assembly camps, became all but uncontrollable. Some attacked UN officials, others took local hostages, and many engaged in local crime (Alden 1995, 118).

Despite these obstacles, Ajello was unyielding in his negotiations with the UN bureaucrats and with the combatants, yet quick to coordinate with the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) and the ambassadors of the leading donor states, such that there was no way either Mozambican party could have played off donor against donor. He was fortunate that the Renamo president Alfonso Dhlakama made credible promises not to resume the war.

Although Mozambique was lucky in that it was a favored son of many big international donors – especially from Scandinavia -- for its heroic fight against apartheid, there was some effort by ONUMOZ to make the local economy pay for at least part of the operation. As a result, after the withdrawal of ONUMOZ, Mozambique was covering somewhat less than half its budget from locally collected taxes, and was surviving without the presence of a gigantic welfare bureaucracy (Jett 1999, 161).⁵

ONUMOZ was entrusted with elections that were delayed several times. In June 1994, an overwhelming 5.2 million Mozambicans registered to vote. Dhlakama contested the election and threatened action if Renamo did not emerge victorious. But when Chissano was elected with 53 percent of the vote (with 33 percent going to Dhlakama), and with FRELIMO getting 129 of the 250 seats in the National Assembly (112 by Renamo), Renamo did not protest and FRELIMO ruled after a democratic election. After the election, to the astonishment of many, ONUMOZ pulled out of Mozambique, compelling the government of Chissano to live without the protection of the UN security blanket.

Dennis Jett, the most qualified international observer to judge the situation in Mozambique, was hardly sanguine about its stability after the UN “declare[d] victory” and sent the peacekeepers home. And if Mozambique succeeded in its post-conflict peace-building, it would not have

⁵ . As Jett sardonically observes, “Ending ONUMOZ was like shutting a military base of 7,000 in a country that is the economic equivalent in gross output of a town of 50,000 in the US. Locally employed staff, landlords, restaurant owners, bartenders and other will all be reluctant to see it come to an end and work to see that it doesn’t” (Jett 2002).

been due to UN attention, in Jett's judgment, since "the institutions in the country remain weak and the peace fragile" (1999, 157). Yet the carving out of chaos an agreement that had the united support of the donor community, and in which the combatants saw no alternative means of support to carry on an insurgency if they lost the election, decreased the probability of a new onset when conditions were dangerous.

IV. Summary of Findings


This random narrative sought explanations for two outcomes – first, the onset of a civil war in Mozambique in 1976; second the lack of a civil war onset in 1995-97 when because of "political instability" Mozambique was especially vulnerable to a second onset.

On the civil war onset of 1975, although we have emphasized the immense level of foreign intervention and the ideological creation of enemies that were willing to be co-opted by these foreigners, the overwhelmingly powerful explanation for the civil war was in that Mozambique was a new state without a security guarantee by a powerful metropole. Two-thirds of those states that were similarly situated in sub-Saharan Africa had civil wars as new states, and all of them had civil wars over the course of their independence period. Weak states without neo-colonial support are easy targets for insurgents. While foreign support and the creation of enemies probably increased the magnitude and duration of the war, the explanation for the onset is best accounted for by the facts of being a new state without neo-colonial protection. Under these conditions, those out of power had an easy time contesting militarily for it, with reasonable expectations of controlling the rents collected by the state.

On the failure of insurgents to re-ignite the civil war in 1995-97, many analysts have pointed to war fatigue and other local circumstances. But the narrative suggests that despite an impressive list of organizational failures, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique gave the opposition a stake in Mozambique's future, and thereby re-incentivized them towards participation in the reconstituted state, knowing well that there were no external allies who would support them if they tried to undermine the peace process. Successful peacekeeping in part accounts for why, when Mozambique was again susceptible to a civil war onset (by our model), none occurred.

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cname	year	pr	gdp~1	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
MOZAMBIQ	1975	.0616281	1.182	10606	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1976	.0616281	1.182	10888	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1977	.0053883	1.095	11179	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1978	.0054135	1.103	11479	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1979	.0055088	1.072	11787	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1980	.0055384	1.078	12103	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1981	.0058691	.923	12426	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1982	.0058811	.939	12756	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1983	.00599	.905	13093	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1984	.0061107	.866	13438	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1985	.0061891	.849	13791	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1986	.0064406	.749	14153	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1987	.0064425	.77	14525	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1988	.0065441	.744	14907	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1989	.0065568	.76	15301	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1990	.0065375	.791	15707	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1991	.006652	.76	16128	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1992	.006738	.743	16511	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1993	.0068531	.711	15005	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1994	.0065751	.757	15420	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1995	.0112306	.791	15820	2.4	0	1	0
MOZAMBIQ	1996	.0112585	.805	16230	2.4	0	1	0
MOZAMBIQ	1997	.0266722	.84	16630	2.4	0	1	0
MOZAMBIQ	1998	.0154077	.911	16947	2.4	0	0	0
MOZAMBIQ	1999	.0150521	.999	.	2.4	0	0	0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	25	.0125642	.0155042	.0053883	.0616281
gdpenl	25	.893	.1492372	.711	1.182
pop	24	14034.58	2007.235	10606	16947
mtnest	25	2.4	0	2.4	2.4
Oil	25	0	0	0	0
instab	25	.12	.3316625	0	1
anocl	25	0	0	0	0

Fearon and Laitin, Random Narratives, Mozambique, p. 18

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	1550	.018723	.0191254	.0006228	.2093887
gdpenl	1561	1.095448	.9549041	.196	7.777
pop	1550	10008.91	14530.35	270	121257.3
mtnest	1593	12.75548	22.33017	0	82.20001
Oil	1593	.0803515	.271922	0	1
instab	1587	.1770636	.3818429	0	1
anocl	1582	.2237674	.4168998	0	1
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0167543	.0228494	2.45e-10	.488229
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1
instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1

. list country year polity2 if country=="MOZAMBIQUE"

country	year	polity2
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MOZAMBIQUE	1978	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1979	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1980	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1981	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1982	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1983	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1984	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1985	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1986	-7
MOZAMBIQUE	1987	-7
MOZAMBIQUE	1990	-7
MOZAMBIQUE	1988	-7
MOZAMBIQUE	1989	-7
MOZAMBIQUE	1994	6
MOZAMBIQUE	1991	-6
MOZAMBIQUE	1992	-6
MOZAMBIQUE	1993	-6
MOZAMBIQUE	1995	6
MOZAMBIQUE	1996	6
MOZAMBIQUE	1999	6
MOZAMBIQUE	1998	6
MOZAMBIQUE	1997	6
MOZAMBIQUE	1975	-8
MOZAMBIQUE	1976	-8