

# **Panama**

(PanamaRN1.3)

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This is one of a set of “random narratives” to complement our statistical findings in regard to civil war onsets. This is a draft of June 27, 2006; comments welcome.

## **I. Introduction**

On many of our key variables, Panama is a likely candidate for a civil war onset. Since 1945, it has suffered from nine years of instability and twenty-six years of anocracy (and three years in which there is both anocracy and instability), suggesting that potential rebels had clear signals that the political regime was fragile. Moreover, as an exporter of (refined) oil (and as a rentier state receiving annual payments from the U.S. for use of the Canal Zone), we should expect, and potential rebels condition their behavior on, a weak state. Finally, GDP/cap has been below the regional and world average, another signal of state weakness. Yet there has been no civil war onset in modern Panamanian history. The accompanying table suggests two distinct lines of inquiry for our narrative.

As the accompanying table reveals, the height of Panama’s susceptibility to a civil war onset is from 1956-58, when our model assesses the probability of a civil war onset at above four percent, some two and a half times the world average. This is in large part due to the combination of anocracy and instability at a time when GDP/cap ranged from \$1362 to \$1,493. A first question is whether internal forces in Panama were attuned to this susceptibility during these three years, such that we would observe if not a civil war onset, then near-onsets.

The accompanying table also reveals that in general, throughout the post World War II period, despite all Panama’s susceptibility on key variables, our model’s predicted probability for a civil war onset is still low. It averages .015 per year, accumulating to a probability of .78 civil war onsets over the half-century of the dataset. One reason that our model accords such a low probability is that Panama’s population is low, the twenty-third smallest country in our dataset for 1990. But we might question whether low population is the key to Panama’s success in keeping violence within non civil war limits. The historiography of Panama would suggest not smallness, but rather U.S. surveillance and commitment to sustain order is the key. And so, a second question for this narrative is whether low population, US surveillance, or some other factor (or set of factors) best accounts for Panama’s success in avoiding for a half-century a civil war onset.

After providing an historical background – which clearly demonstrates that a bloody history doesn't necessarily presage of bloody present – we address each of these questions in separate sections.

## II. Panama: Historical Background<sup>1</sup>

Spain's possessions in the Caribbean were under near constant attack, first by Francis Drake in the sixteenth century, and by the seventeenth century, during the Thirty Years War, England, France, and the Netherlands began seizing colonies in the Caribbean. Later still, pirates such as the notorious Henry Morgan (who had held Portobelo, the best port on Panama's Atlantic coast, for ransom in 1668) seized Spanish beachheads. Later, Morgan defeated a 2,600-strong Spanish garrison in Panama City. Through all this, Spain maintained control over Panama.

Panama did not separate from Spain the nineteenth century. Simón Bolívar liberated New Granada in 1819, forcing the Spanish viceroy to flee Colombia for Panama, where he ruled for three years. Though his rule was harsh, he was replaced by a liberal who not only permitted free press and the formation of patriotic associations, but he handed power to a native Panamanian, Colonel Edwin Fábrega. After some jockeying between elites in Panama City and Los Santos, Panama freely united with Colombia. The separation from Spain was entirely peaceful.

Despite the *anschluss* of 1821, Panamanians at three separate times between 1830 and 1840 sought to separate the isthmus from Colombia. An acting governor of Panama who opposed the policies of the president made the first attempt, but Bolívar, then on his deathbed, successfully dissuaded him. The second attempt was a quixotic attempt by a dictator, who was quickly deposed by locals. The third attempt, declared by a popular assembly, responding to a civil war in Colombia, was successful. But reintegration took place a year later.

A railroad built by U.S. financiers was completed in 1855 across the isthmus. The gold rush and the railroad also brought the United States "Wild West" to the isthmus. The undisciplined forty-niners exhibited contempt for the locals. A so-called Watermelon War of 1856, in which some sixteen people were killed, was one of several clashes between locals and North Americans.

Oftentimes violent conflicts between Liberals and Conservatives put Panama's politics from 1850 to 1900 in flux. Liberals pushed for local self-government, but Conservatives when in power retracted. Liberals disestablished the Church; Conservatives reestablished. Political patronage changed hands with changed party fortunes, and this too was a cause for violent clashes.

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<sup>1</sup> . The historical section is structured by Meditz and Hanratty (1987). No page references are given, but references are easily traced through the keyword function on the website. Quotation marks in this historical section refer to the Meditz and Hanratty country study; much of the section includes paraphrasing from the Meditz and Hanratty study.

“Between 1863 and 1886, the isthmus had twenty-six presidents. Coups d'état, rebellions, and violence were almost continuous, staged by troops of the central government, by local citizens against centrally imposed edicts, and by factions out of power.” One review of this period counted fifty riots and rebellions, five attempted secessions, and thirteen interventions by the United States, acting under the provisions of the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty.<sup>2</sup> “The chaotic conditions that had prevailed under the federalist constitution of 1863 culminated in the 1884 election of Rafael Nuñez as president of Colombia, supported by a coalition of moderate Liberals and Conservatives. Nuñez called all factions to participate in a new constituent assembly, but his request was met by an armed revolt of the radical Liberals.

“Early in 1885, a revolt headed by a radical Liberal general and centered in Panama City developed into a three-way fight. Colón was virtually destroyed. United States forces landed at the request of the Colombian government but were too late to save the city. Additional United States naval forces occupied both Colón and Panama City and guarded the railroad to ensure uninterrupted transit until Colombian forces landed to protect the railroad. Panama was drawn into Colombia's War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) by rebellious Radical Liberals who had taken refuge in Nicaragua. Like the rest of Colombia, opinion in Panama was divided, and revolts in the southwest had hardly been suppressed when Liberals from Nicaragua invaded the Pacific coastal region and nearly succeeded in taking Panama City in mid-1900. [By early 1902] the rebels had been defeated in most of Colombia proper. At that point, the Colombian government asked the United States to intercede and bring about an armistice in Panama, which was arranged aboard the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* in the Bay of Panama in 1902.”

President Theodore Roosevelt became convinced during the Spanish-American War (1898-1901) that United States interests required controlling a canal connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific. He therefore supported the Spooner Bill, providing for a canal through the isthmus of Panama, and the Hay-Herrán Treaty of January 22, 1903, under which Colombian officials agreed to giving the U.S. a 100-year lease for the necessary land. on an area ten kilometers wide. But the Colombian government refused to ratify the treaty leading Roosevelt to cultivate a Panamanian separatist movement. By July 1903, when the course of internal Colombian opposition to the Hay-Herrán Treaty became obvious, Roosevelt succeeded in nurturing a revolutionary junta in Panama. “With financial assistance arranged by Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French national representing the interests of de Lesseps's company, the new Panamanian leaders conspired to take advantage of United States interest in a new regime on the isthmus. In October and November 1903, the revolutionary junta, with the protection of United States naval forces, carried out a successful uprising against the Colombian government. Acting, paradoxically, under the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846 between the United States and Colombia – which provided that United States forces could intervene in the event of disorder on the isthmus to guarantee Colombian sovereignty and open transit across the isthmus – the United States prevented a Colombian force from moving across the isthmus to Panama City to suppress the insurrection. President Roosevelt recognized the new Panamanian junta as the de facto government on November 6, 1903; de jure recognition

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<sup>2</sup> . Black, Jan Knippers and Edmundo Flores, in Meditz and Hanratty (1989), p. 21.

came on November 13. Five days later Bunau-Varilla, as the diplomatic representative of Panama (a role he had purchased through financial assistance to the rebels) concluded the Isthmian Canal Convention with Secretary of State John Hay in Washington.”

“The rights granted to the United States in the so-called Varilla Treaty were extensive. They included a grant ‘in perpetuity of the use, occupation, and control’ of a sixteen kilometer-wide strip of territory and extensions of three nautical miles into the sea from each terminal ‘for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection” of an isthmian canal. Furthermore, the United States was entitled to acquire additional areas of land or water necessary for canal operations and held the option of exercising eminent domain in Panama City. Within this territory Washington gained “all the rights, power, and authority . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign . . . to the entire exclusion of Panama.”” The Republic of Panama thereby became a virtual U.S. possession.

“The secessionists of Panama's central government were soon faced with a secessionist problem of their own. The Cuna of the San Blas Islands were unwilling to accept the authority of Panama, just as they had been unwilling to accept the authority of Colombia or Spain. The Panamanian government exercised no administrative control over the islands until 1915 when a departmental government was established; its main office was in El Porvenir. At that time, forces of the Colonial Police, composed of blacks, were stationed on several islands.” Their presence, along with the policies of a group of anti-tribal modernizers governing the island, led to a revolt in 1925.

Factionalism within the secessionist camp did not subside. One faction leader, Simral Coleman, with the help of an American adventurer, Richard Marsh, incited the Cuna people into rebellion in 1925, in which some twenty police were killed before a U.S. cruiser appeared. The naval officials served as intermediaries for a peace treaty that granted the San Blas territories informal semiautonomy.

The U.S. continued to fashion the Panamanian state. When General Estéban Huertas sought to challenge constitutional authority in 1904, the U.S.’s diplomatic mission worked successfully to disband the Panamanian army, and replace it with a more compliant (to the Americans) National Police. By 1920, the U.S. had intervened four times, with almost no violent conflict, and at the request of a local faction, to curb unrest. And so, each faction in Panama learned the advantages of asking for U.S. aid in helping to undermine restive enemies. For example, at the request of Panamanian officials, the U.S. sent six hundred troops (with bayonets) in 1925 to quell rent riots in Panama City.

But buccaneer imperialism was losing favor in U.S. diplomatic circles. In 1928, the Clark Memorandum formally disavowed the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that had given justification for these interventions. FDR proclaimed a Good Neighbor Policy in his inaugural address of 1933. However, while the United States was assuming a more conciliatory stance, nationalist sentiments were growing in Panama.

After World War II, the U.S. War and State Departments, worried about the security of its bases, sent Ambassador Frank T. Hines to Panama, with orders to propose a twenty-year extension of the leases on thirteen facilities. Panama's President Jiménez was in favor, but his Foreign Minister was opposed. When the National Assembly met in 1947 to debate ratification of the proposed treaty, 10,000 Panamanians (mobilized by university students) armed with stones, machetes, and guns demonstrated. Deputies, aware of popular sentiment, voted unanimously to reject the treaty. Student clashes with the National Police, in which both students and policemen were killed, marked the beginning of a period of intense animosity between the two groups. The incident was also the first in which United States intentions were thwarted by a demonstrable expression of Panamanian rage. By 1948 the United States had evacuated all occupied bases and sites outside the Canal Zone.

### Entering the Era of Our Dataset

“A temporary shift in power from the civilian aristocracy to the National Police occurred immediately after World War II. Between 1948 and 1952, National Police Commander José Antonio Remón installed and removed presidents with unencumbered ease. Among his behind-the-scenes manipulations were the denial to Arnulfo Arias of the presidency he apparently had won in 1948, the installation of Arias in the presidency in 1949, and the engineering of Arias's removal from office in 1951.” Ramón himself fell to an assassin's bullet. The subsequent presidency of Ernesto de la Guardia was nearly overwhelmed by rioting, but he completed his full term in office, the first postwar president to do so. His successor, Roberto Chiari, was the first opposition candidate ever elected (in 1960) to the presidency in Panama.

Chiari saw change as inevitable. He told his fellow oligarchs that if they refused to reform, they would be surpassed by radicals, whom they could not forever repress. Indeed, in 1959 an amphibious landing of Panamanian dissidents revealed the weakness of the regime. Nonetheless, Chiari got little support from the National Assembly. He was saved by the Kennedy Administration, coming to power shortly after Chiari, and its plan to stave off rebellion in Latin America with a generous aid package in the Alliance for Progress. This aid took pressure off of cash-starved Latin American leaders.

The goals of the Alliance were incompletely fulfilled. Rioting returned to Panama in January 1964. “The incident began with a symbolic dispute over the flying of the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. After the State Department sought a compromise, American residents of the Zone defied the spirit of the agreement and hoisted American flags in front of their schools, and on January 9, 1964, nearly 200 Panamanian students marched into the Canal Zone with their flag. A struggle ensued, and the Panamanian flag was torn. After that provocation, thousands of Panamanians stormed the border fence. The rioting lasted [three] days, and resulted in more than [twenty] deaths, serious injuries to several hundred persons, and more than US\$2 million of property damage.”

Party competition (until the coup d'état of 1968) regulated conflict among the oligarchical families. Parties were the personal property of patrons, whose clients

received jobs or contracts if their candidate were successful. With Arias as incumbent (having won a rather fraudulent election in 1964) the next election took place in 1968, as scheduled, and tension mounted over the succeeding eighteen days as the Election Board and the Electoral Tribunal delayed announcing the results. Finally the Election Board declared that Arias had barely carried the election. Arias took office demanding the immediate return of the Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction. When he tried to take control over the National Guard, however, the threatened Guard leaders staged a coup. This provoked student demonstrations and rioting in Panama City and in Chiriquí Province, but the Guard prevailed. This set a precedent, and even during the period of democratic contestation, the Guard, and its successor organization, the Panama Defense Forces (Fuerzas de Defensa de Panamá--FDP; but PDF in English), retained control over political life.

By 1969 Brigadier-General Omar Torrijos ruled the country. He rebuffed a coup by colonels late that year, and began constructing a populist coalition. Revolving around the People's Party, the coalition included the National Guard, campesinos, activist students, and some workers. Getting students and the Guard together, groups that traditionally were opposed to one another, was a political feat, one achieved through nationalist ideology (and the demand for a new treaty with the United States).

His efforts led to a major revision in the legal foundation for the Canal Zone, though it had to wait for the Carter presidency in the U.S., and even still is was a mixed blessing for Torrijos. Two treaties were to give Panama by 2000 effective sovereignty in the Canal Zone. But at ratification stage, Senate modifications left upon a crack the right of U.S. troops to intervene to keep the canal open. The inclusion of these modifications, which were never ratified in Panama, was received there by a storm of protest. Torrijos expressed his concern in letters to Carter and to one hundred fifteen heads of state through their representatives at the UN. His outrage induced a series of student protests in front of the United States embassy.

Torrijos' popular support began to wane during the early 1970s and was associated with his graduated and controlled process of "democratization" required to get U.S. support for the new canal treaties. In October 1978, political parties were legalized after a decade of suppression. Exiled political leaders, including former President Arnulfo Arias, were allowed to return to the country. Amendments to the 1972 Constitution reduced the powers of the executive and increased those of the legislature. Yet when the National Assembly elected the former education minister, Aristides Royo, to the presidency for a six-year term, this was seen as accepting Torrijos' man.

National elections in 1980 required Torrijos to convert executive into electoral power, and he did this through the PRD. "The PRD," according to the Meditz and Hanratty country study was "a potpourri of middle-class elements, peasant and labor groups, and marginal segments of Panamanian society – [and] the first party to be officially recognized under the registration process that began in 1979. Wide speculation held that the PRD would nominate Torrijos as its candidate for the presidential race planned for 1984. Moreover, many assumed that with government backing, the PRD

would have a substantial advantage in the electoral process. In March 1979, a coalition of eight parties called the National Opposition Front (Frente Nacional de Oposición--FRENO) was formed to battle the PRD. FRENO was composed of parties on both the right and the left of center in the political spectrum.”

The 1980 legislative elections were partially democratic. Several parties were qualified to run candidates, but they could contest only nineteen of the fifty-seven seats, with the opposition winning only seven. Torrijos appointed the remainder. Despite the lopsided victory of the pro-government party and the weakness of the National Legislative Council (budgeting and appropriations were controlled by President Royo, who had been handpicked by Torrijos), this election represented but a small step toward restoring democratic political processes. (The Polity coders continued to evaluate Panamanian democracy as a -6).

Torrijos was killed in an airplane crash in western Panama on July 31, 1981. His death created a power vacuum in Panama and ended a twelve-year "dictatorship with a heart," to use Torrijos's self-characterization. Torrijos indeed had unified the political system. Royo was safe in the presidency, the PRD was functioning, and the Guard was united. Each of these groups trusted him but distrusted each other.

In the years following Torrijos' death, palace politics were vibrant, but the Guard remained hegemonic. Torrijos was succeeded as Guard commander by the chief of staff, Colonel Florencio Florez Aguilar, a Torrijos loyalist, but he was soon forced to retire. He was replaced by his own chief of staff, General Rubén Darío Paredes, who considered himself to be Torrijos's rightful successor and the embodiment of change and unity, and wanted the presidency for himself. He capitalized on growing labor unrest to encourage strikes and public demonstrations in 1982, directed against the Royo administration. Paredes, pointing to government failure, then forced President Royo to resign. Royo, famous for his anti-American rhetoric, was succeeded by Vice President Ricardo de la Espriella, a United States-educated former banking official.

In August 1982, “General Paredes, in keeping with the new constitutional provision that no active Guard member could participate in an election, retired from the Guard. He was succeeded immediately by Noriega, who was promoted to Brigadier-General. During the same month, Paredes was nominated as the PRD candidate for president. National elections were only five months away, and Paredes appeared to be the leading presidential contender. Nevertheless, in early September, President de la Espriella purged his cabinet of Paredes loyalists, and Noriega declared that he would not publicly support any candidate for president. These events convinced Paredes that he had no official government or military backing for his candidacy.” He withdrew from the presidential race almost immediately after having retired from the Guard. The reality of Panamanian politics was that without support from the commander of the National Guard, presidential aspirations were inconsequential. With Paredes out of the way, Noriega consolidated his power. He restructured the National Guard, which now became the Panama Defense Forces (Fuerzas de Defensa de Panamá--FDP). By law, the president

of the republic would head the FDP, but Noriega held effective power as commander in chief of the FDP

The 1984 elections brought to power Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino, a technocrat with a University of Chicago degree, who led a PRD created coalition of six political parties called the National Democratic Union (Unión Nacional Democrática--UNADE), and because of well-known ties to Torrijos, had the support of the FDP. The vote, however, was close, and claims of fraud induced street demonstrations. In them, one person was killed, and forty others were injured. Once in power, Ardito, true to his World Bank pedigree, pushed economic austerity and quickly alienated many of his supporters. Worse, he committed his government to the investigation of the murder of a critic of the military, who had accused the FDP of drug trafficking and illegal arms dealing. Under these conditions, Noriega then forced Ardito to resign.

Ardito was succeeded by Eric Arturo Delvalle Henríquez, his first vice president. But Noriega focused his attention on Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera, once chief of staff of the FDP, who had been forced to retire. Herrera, in anger with Noriega's broken promises to rotate the position of commander, broke the FDP's code of silence and publicly denounced Noriega and other FDP officers for corruption and for murdering Torrijos.

The U.S. had given Ardito no support because of Noriega's cooperation with the CIA in assisting the Nicaraguan contras. Now out of power, Ardito joined in with the National Civic Crusade to demand a return to democracy, with daily street protests in 1988, organized to spur an internal coup that would unravel the military knot. But the US continued to recognize Delvalle, whose freezing of Panamanian assets in the US caused economic chaos and violence in the streets. A coup attempt failed, for lack of US backing. The US then tried to negotiate Noriega out of office. In the 1989 election, the US funded ADO led by Guillermo Endara defeated the military candidate in a landslide, but Noriega cancelled the elections. He formed "dignity battalions" of public employees and street people, paid by the PDF, and armed them to counter any US military intervention. In October 1989, Noriega survived a second military coup, and in December he assumed the presidency. The night when Noriega assumed presidential powers, a US soldier was killed, and quickly the US intervened militarily, installing Endara to replace Noriega as president.

Endara's government had US backing, but the economy was in chaos, with stores having been looted during the US intervention. The police were demoralized, and the infrastructure was in disarray. Further, with information about drug and arms smuggling, Panama's reputation for a place to invest was destroyed. (But without a central bank, Panama's currency, the balboa, was tied to the US dollar, and so Noriega couldn't destroy the currency). The new government instituted democratic reforms (and was by 1989 rated on the democracy score by Polity as +8); meanwhile the now-minority PRD served as a minority party in the legislature (Ardito 1997, 55-60).

In the 1990s the security apparatus under civilian rule was called the Public Force (PF). In December 1990, the PF rose against the Endara Administration, but was checked

by the US Southern Command. In 1994 – when Polity’s democracy score for Panama attains a +9 -- Ernesto Pérez Balladares, a former associate of Torrijos, won the presidential election. His government re-introduced the Ardito economic program (i.e. austerity), joined the Americans in a fight against drug trafficking, and abolished Panama’s military. Mireya Moscoso de Gruber, a businesswoman and Arnulfo Arias’s widow, was elected president in 1999 under the flag of the Arnulfista Party, in a fair election.

### III. Why No Civil War in the mid-1950s

Our model gives heightened probability for a civil war onset from 1956 through 1958, due in large part to political instability. Up until 1954, the Polity ranking for Panama was on the autocratic side (at -1); but in 1955, due to the reformist policies of José Antonio Remón that permitted a competitive election, Panama (while still anocratic) moved to the democratic side (at +4).<sup>3</sup> This substantial change in regime gave Panama a positive coding on instability for the subsequent three years, and thereby enhanced the probability of a civil war onset.

Instability in the technical sense of regime change, as expected, heightened instability in the sense of encouraging violence. In 1955 President Remón was assassinated. His first vice president, José Ramón Guizado, was impeached for the crime and jailed, but never tried. His motivation for assassinating the President was never made clear, although investigators suspected that he was a co-conspirator with U.S. organized crime figures, dissident police officers, and several oligarchical families. The second vice president, Ricardo Arias, served out the remainder of the presidential term and dismantled many of Remón's reforms. But in 1956, Ernesto de la Guardia, a member of Remón's party, was elected president.

But violence was just beneath the surface in these years. After the Suez crisis in which nationalism threatened big power control over seaways, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal, and this set off hostile reactions in Panama. In May 1958 students in an anti-U.S. demonstration, clashed with the National Guard, and nine were killed. In November 1959 another bout of demonstrations were organized for the two Panamanian independence holidays. Aroused by the media, demonstrators threatened a "peaceful invasion" of the Canal Zone in order to raise the flag of the republic in the Zone. The U.S. army was called in to forestall the demonstration. Several hundred demonstrators crossed barbed wire barricades. U.S. troops, working in concert with the National Guard, held demonstrators back, at the cost of considerable violence -- the windows of the United States Information Agency library were smashed, and the U.S. flag flying on the ambassador's home was torn down and trampled upon.

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<sup>3</sup> . The Remón government had required parties to enroll 45,000 members to receive official recognition. This membership requirement, subsequently relaxed to 5,000, had excluded all opposition parties from the 1956 elections except the National Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacional--PLN) which traced its lineage to the original Liberal Party (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

On Constitution Day, March 1, 1960, as reported in Meditz and Hanratty, “student and labor groups threatened another march into the Canal Zone. The widespread disorders of the previous fall had had a sobering effect on the political elite, who seriously feared that new rioting might be transformed into a revolutionary movement against the social system itself. Both major coalitions contesting the coming elections sought to avoid further difficulties, and influential merchants, who had been hard hit by the November 1959 riots, were apprehensive. Reports that the United States was willing to recommend flying the republic's flag in a special site in the Canal Zone served to ease tensions. Serious disorders were [barely] averted.”

Two points follow. First, in the wake of instability, coordinated popular resistance in the streets of Panama City took place, and this gives some support to our model's expectations of heightened risk of insurgency under conditions of instability. But second, as we discuss the general situation of “no insurgency in Panama” in the next section, the facts that the insurgents aimed their animus at the U.S., and that the U.S. provided an (unwanted) security blanket over Panama, played a crucial role in subverting any emerging insurgent movement.

#### **IV. Why No Civil War in General**

Panama's relatively low population – in mid-1987 population estimated at 2.3 million (Meditz and Hanratty 1987) – plays a big role in our model, yet there is nothing really in the historical narrative showing that leaders could have a keener eye on potential insurgents in Panama than they would have had in a larger country.

Population patterns, however, may better capture the reason why Panama, a country with grave grievances and a disaffected society would have been for a contentious half-century free from a civil war onset. By 1985, due to the dominance of the Canal Zone in Panama's economy, services accounted for seventy-three percent of the gross domestic product, the highest level in the world (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). This factor reflects a country without a rural hinterland for purposes of insurgency. Related to this point is that of geography: “Panama has no generally recognized group of geographic regions, and no single set of names is in common use.”<sup>4</sup> This suggests there is no homeland for particular groups to hide as they seek redress.

To be sure, there were two rural hinterlands with grave grievances. First are the San Blas Indians. Tensions between the state and the Cuna tribe of the San Blas islands increased under the rule of Torrijos as the government attempted to undermine Cuna political institutions, appointing Hispanics to administrative posts. Further tensions arose when the government sought (unsuccessfully) to promote tourism in the region, threatening San Blas's status as a reserve. Still, in the 1977 referendum on the Panama Canal treaties, San Blas was the only electoral district to vote no. For the Cuna, this vote had little to do with the Canal Zone or Panamanian sovereignty. It was a reflection of their demand for autonomy. In 1986, after bringing more Indians into the military, the

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<sup>4</sup> . See “Inside the Passage” <http://www.insidethepassage.com/overview.htm>, downloaded May 3, 2006.

government commissioned a new military zone in the Comarca de San Blas. Still, it took considerable FDP lobbying and the granting of various concessions to get Cuna acceptance for this new zone. Thus, although the government incorporated the Cuna into the national political framework, the San Blasinos retained an ability to confront state authority (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

Perhaps a more threatening situation for the government was that of the Guaymí Indians, where theory tells us might well have fought valiantly for their homeland in a “sons of the soil” insurgency. The Guaymí Indians were concentrated in the more remote regions of Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí, and Veraguas in the northwest of the country, and make up about three percent of the population of the country (more than half of the Indian population).<sup>5</sup> Divided by the Cordillera Central, the Guaymí regional base was divided into two distinct sections with different climates. On the Pacific side, they lived in scattered and remote hamlets; on the Atlantic side, the people were more concentrated near the water. Contact with outsiders going back to the colonial period was rare. Spanish colonial policy tried to group the Indians into mission settlements (*reducciones*), but most Guaymí resisted Christianity and retreated to more remote territories.

Post World War II contact has had the flavor of a land invasion. It has been most intense in Veraguas, where *mestizo* farmers were expanding into previously remote lands at a rapid rate. Increasing population pressure, the expansion of cattle ranching, the introduction of banana production, and better transportation into their regional base, have put pressure on the land base necessary to maintain local slash-and-burn agriculture. Given these new opportunities, many peasants outside the Guaymí areas have migrated to less settled regions in Chiriquí, again threatening the Guaymí (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

Mining too threatened the sons of the soil. In the 1980s, there was a government plan to develop a copper mine along the Cordillera Central in eastern Chiriquí Province. Most of the plans, which included a pipeline, a highway, and a hydroelectric facility, were in Guaymí territory. In response, the Guaymí began to organize politically. Congresses met to protect their land and to publicize their concerns, especially because of the potential implications of dam construction on fishing and water supplies. Their leaders argued that the proposed cash indemnification payments for lands or damages would be insufficient to cover long-term damages (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). To be sure, even when sons of the soil movements are favored, they rarely are taken up by autochthonous groups that have been defeated by modern state builders in the nineteenth century (Fearon and Laitin). Still the lack of a violent rebellion hasn't been fully explained. Further research might help explain the quiescence of the Guaymí, when they had an opportunity afforded to them as sons of the soil to challenge the Panamanian state by ambushing settlers and the police sent in to protect them.

A highly urbanized country, with no powerful group having a rural hinterland to make a credible fight, is relatively immune to an insurgency. This point helps make sense of comments such as the one pointing out that the Public Force in the early 1990s had

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<sup>5</sup> . <http://wrc.lingnet.org/panama.htm> [downloaded June 7, 2004]

failed to forestall violence and criminality in the streets. Moreover, the report continues, “Noriega’s departure set loose the underworld forces the former dictator held in firm grip during his tenure” (Guevara 1996, 196). A highly urbanized society without any serious challenger with a rural base is subject to massive crime but not insurgency.

The lack of a rural base for potential insurgents concerns *opportunities* for rebels to sustain a rebellion. But what about lack of *constraints*? Shouldn’t the relative poverty (low GDP/cap) of Panama serve as a proxy for a weak state that would not be able to curb rebellion? A closer look at Panama suggests why low GDP/cap did not signal to rebels that the opportunity was greater than population demographics would have suggested. First, the GDP was not that low. Until the mid-1980s, when the Latin American economies faced shocks, Panama was considered wealthy but with high inequality. Indeed, Panama registered one of the highest levels of per capita income in the developing world, going above \$2000 in 1966, when it was in the top quartile of countries outside of the West, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup> Second, the repressive apparatus of Panama was doubly stronger than the GDP figure would suggest, in large part due to U.S. strategic interests and a cohesive general staff within Panama’s security apparatus. These issues get separate emphasis in the subsequent sections.

### US Oversight

The most compelling explanation for the absence of an insurgency in Panama is that of U.S. oversight. This was a double edged sword. On the sharper edge, U.S. security interests in the canal was such that America would not permit revolutionary violence in Panama that could jeopardize the security of American shipping. On the blunter edge, the collective sense in Panama that they were all living under the indignity of American imperialism helped unite many factions in Panama that would have split amongst themselves without a common enemy.

Since the early 1900s, the armed forces of the United States had provided the primary defense of the Canal Zone and, in effect, of Panama itself (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). With the canal in place, in 1917 the Americans hired Albert R. Lamb to instruct the National Police, and by 1919 became inspector general. Even after a Panamanian was named commander in 1924, Lamb remained as an inspector and continued to oversee a professional force.

To be sure, discipline, training, and efficiency declined after he left in 1927. In fact, police authority dissolved in 1925 in the face of a renters' strike in Panama City, described earlier. After the rioters were dispersed, American soldiers patrolled the streets for twelve days, maintaining civil order and guarding government officials and property. Similar rent strikes recurred in 1932 but this time with the National Police restoring order. American intervention, or its threat, nonetheless continued over the next several years. It was not until 1936, after negotiations between the two countries that the U.S. promised no longer to intervene in Panamanian civil affairs.

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<sup>6</sup> . Panama’s logged per capita GDP in 1966 was 2.117. Taking out the Western and East European/Soviet Union cases, the bottom of the top quartile was 2.01875.

Intervention was replaced by “training”. “Panama was one of the twenty original signatories to the 1945 Act of Chapultepec, binding the countries of Latin America and the United States to a mutual defense agreement by which all were to respond to an external attack against any one. Two years later most of the same countries (including Panama) signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which also provided for mutual defense against external attack, but further bound the signers to peaceful arbitration of disputes arising among member states” (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

Since the early 1950s, approximately 5,000 Panamanian soldiers were trained by the United States. Although some of these trainees were sent to the United States, the majority attended United States facilities located in the former Canal Zone. During the 1950s and 1960s, supported by United States aid under the Mutual Security Act, the National Guard was militarized and professionalized. The trend toward militarization, with considerable U.S. funding, was largely a response to the perceived Castro threat.

In this period, after the Castro revolution, events in Panama had special significance for the U.S. Amid the independence day celebrations in 1959, as described earlier, riots broke out over the issue of the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. U.S. soldiers were active, relying on bayonets, fire hoses, clubs, birdshot and tear gas. After the incident, the Zone Government built a high steel mesh fence along Fourth of July Boulevard, separating Panama City from the Canal Zone (Tate 1963).

The U.S. kept a careful Cold War eye on Panamanian affairs. In 1964, Mayor Torrijos and Lt. Noriega flew into Panama City from Chiriqui, western province, to defuse radical street violence. They quickly became the darlings of and eventually in the employ of the CIA. As a result, the US increased funding for the Panamanian National Guard so that it could produce order on its own (Sanchez 2002). The CIA throughout this period played a key role in monitoring events in Panama (and protecting Noriega from the wrath of other U.S. agencies due to his drug and arms dealings).

The U.S., despite the 1977 canal treaty, never gave up its role as monitor of Panamanian security. Seeing Noriega as a threat to US interests, the US tried to provoke popular uprisings and coups, and assisted the opposition in the 1989 Panamanian elections. In 1989, in an election, the US funded the ADO party led by Guillermo Endara which defeated the military candidate in a landslide. Noriega, in horror, cancelled the elections. He formed “dignity battalions” of public employees and street people, paid by the PDF, and were armed to counter any US military intervention. In October 1989 Moises Giroldi, a member of Noriega’s inner circle informed officers at the U.S. Southern Command that he would overthrow Noriega. He got support (his family got US protection; certain roads were blocked by US forces), but insufficiently so, and he was caught, tortured and then killed by Noriega loyalists. On December 1989 the Panamanian National Assembly appointed Noriega chief of government and Panama in a state of war with the US. This led to a series of shootings between US forces in Panama and PDF

members. The night of Noriega's assumption of the presidency, a US soldier was killed, and the US intervened militarily, installing Endara in power (Ardito 1997; and Gilboa 1995-6).

In December 1990, the PF rose against the Endara Administration, but was checked by the US Southern Command. Under the Foreign Military Sales Program and Security Supporting Assistance, the Bush administration helped the PF, and the Southern Command gave Endara technical assistance. Furthermore, the International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAO), a US agency, allocated \$13.2 million for police instruction. As Endara failed to get clean leadership in the PF (i.e. that was not implicated in previous regime corruption), he eventually put the PF under civilian direction, with Ebrahim Asvat, a Christian Democrat attorney, as Chief. But this induced several internal rebellions by police officers with help from former PDF members. Eduardo Herrera, a former Noriega officer, was retired from the PF. Herrera made threatening remarks and was put under house arrest, but on 4 December 1990, two policemen abducted Herrera from prison using a helicopter, and took him to the barracks to lead a coup. However, US troops came in on request of Endara, the returned Herrera to custody (Guevara 1996, 189-94). US oversight has long played a crucial role in regulating violent conflict in Panama.

The blunter edge of the American sword is one that helped unify a broad coalition of Panamanians into a nationalist (anti-American) frame of mind. Indeed, the close relationship between Panama and the U.S. was from the start colored by resentment and bitterness. As Meditz and Hanratty (1987) put it, "although there was no ideological unity within the officer corps, there was a consensus in favor of nationalism (often defined as suspicion of, if not opposition to, United States influence)..."

The canal treaty of 1903, by which the United States acquired the right to construct a canal, was the fundamental source of the conflict. From the nationalist point of view, Panama was not a party to the treaty, which was signed by the United States and a French-born entrepreneur. Furthermore, the "in perpetuity" grant was anathema to nationalist sentiments. Consistent with popular outrage, national leaders of all political persuasions focused discontent on U.S. perfidies. Indeed, Panamanian leaders kept popular resentment focused on the United States in a way that took pressure off of their families, who were in large part implicated in American actions.

In the 1960s, discontent within the country became stronger. But Meditz and Hanratty (1987) conjecture that "Concentration on the sins of the United States had served as a safety valve, diverting attention from the injustices of the domestic system." The 1964 anti-US riots led to twenty-one deaths, people now considered "martyrs", and the street on which the violence occurred (basically from demonstrations protesting the defacement of the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone after students failed to get the principal of Balboa High School to fly the Panamanian flag) was later renamed "Avenue of the Martyrs" (Sanchaz 2002, 66).

During the Nixon and Ford administrations (1969-76), the U.S. government had little interest in reviving the (re)negotiation of the 1903 treaty. Torrijos, in response, “began an international campaign to muster world opinion against the United States.” He felt he paid his dues (in avoiding a second Cuba for the U.S.) by putting out the fires of 1964, and taking on a populist program in Panama (to co-opt Fidelistas) without anti-Americanism. Torrijos took the canal issue to the Security Council in 1973, which proposed a resolution supporting Panama’s position that got no negative votes elsewhere, but was vetoed by the US. Security Council support in the face of a US veto enriched Torrijos’s already mythic status. Torrijos then established close diplomatic relations with Cuba, and probably was involved in “mysterious” bombings in the Canal Zone (Sanchez 2002).

Ellsworth Bunker, chief negotiator for the Nixon and Ford administrations, basically had the outline of a revised treaty in hand, but the Pentagon wanted the next administration to address it. President Carter paid a heavy cost to support the outline of the Bunker effort, and the new treaties were signed on September 7, 1977 (though Carter had to buy off two Senators with clarifying language that Torrijos reluctantly accepted).

In June 1987, the U.S. Senate demanded a democratic transition in Panama. The Panamanian government was incensed. It organized a demonstration against the United States embassy and arrested several U.S. diplomatic and military personnel. The United States immediately suspended all military and economic assistance to Panama. Also, Panamanian assets in U.S. banks, worth about fifty million dollars, were frozen, and canal payments were withheld (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

Building on this popular disenchantment with the U.S. Senate’s manipulation of the canal treaty, in later years Noriega tried to absolve himself from his illegal business dealings. He tried to arouse local anti-Yankee passions among the public, suggesting that it was a war of the Whites against the Blacks and Mestizos. When Noriega extended his term of office and his intended successor Col. Roberto Díaz Herrera went public with Noriega’s illegal actions, Noriega used anti-Americanism as a survival tool. When faced with a massive anti-Noriega demonstration of about one-fourth of the country’s population, Noriega responded brutally. But he also organized an anti-U.S. riot at the U.S. Embassy, defusing the public outcry against his rule (Gilboa 1995-96).

Walter LaFeber wrote (in 1973) that if the treaty were not signed in the US Senate “large-scale, anti-United States rioting could erupt in Panama, causing more deaths...” In fact, Torrijos was said to have had a plan to sabotage the Canal if the treaty were not ratified in the US Senate (Sanchez 2002, 74). The breadth and depth of this anti-U.S. feeling took much revolutionary pressure away from the incumbents.

Unity among the political and military class on a foundation of distrust of American motives continues through the democratic era. President Balladares agreed to a treaty with the U.S. in 1997 having to do with drug enforcement, but shortly thereafter renounced it as a *mamotreto* (a bulky ream of paper). He portrayed American motives as seeking a military base in disguise (*base disfrazada*). In 1998 Balladares lost a

referendum (by a 2 to 1 margin) that would have permitted his reelection. This referendum showed strong popular antipathy to any form of a *Centro Multilateral Anti-Drogas* (CMA). With Balladares a lame duck, talks on the CMA collapsed in August 1998. With issues unresolved, but with many in the US defense establishment thinking that the strategic value of the canal had greatly receded, the US military forces left Panama in December 1999 (Sanchez 2002, 83).

All this raises the question as to why there was no anti-US insurgency? The answer is twofold: first, American power would have snuffed it out immediately. Second, anti-Americanism was useful (in small doses) by the military oligarchy to legitimize its rule.

### Unified Military Command

The military command in Panama has shown a remarkable degree of corporate unity, giving them the capacity to protect their interests and as a by-product, avoid a civil war onset. Meditz and Hanratty (1987) write that “Although there was no ideological unity within the officer corps, there was a consensus in favor of nationalism (often defined as suspicion of, if not opposition to, United States influence), developmentalism, and a distrust of traditional civilian political elites.” Moreover, they hold, “The small size and pyramidal rank structure of the FDP's officer corps has helped maintain unity and concentrated effective power in the hands of the commander. This situation facilitated communications and consultations among senior officers, inhibited dissent, and made any effort to defy the wishes of the commander both difficult and dangerous.” This corporate unity manifested itself at many crisis points in recent Panamanian history.

In 1984, President Ardito had Noriega's backing to a sequencing of structural adjustment reforms, though Noriega's second in command, Díaz Herrera, was opposed. This suggested a split within the PDF. However, amid the negotiations over economic policy, the deputy minister of health, Dr. Hugo Spadafora, was found decapitated, and probably an act of corporate vengeance by the PDF. Ardito inauspiciously created an independent commission to investigate, and then went abroad to an international meeting. While away, Díaz Herrera organized to depose him. Noriega delivered to his once-protégé the bad news. When corporate interests were threatened, the army became cohesive (Ardito 1997, 51).

In the late 1980s, Noriega retained power in large part because he intimidated the FDP and it remained loyal. The failure of former Colonel Díaz Herrera to gain officer support following his being fired in June 1987, illustrates Noriega's successful hold over the FDP. Although Noriega's position was challenged by the defection of close associates, he was still able to repel a coup attempt in March 1988. He then purged the FDP of suspected dissidents and surrounded himself with loyalists, again without real opposition from the officer corps.

In the context of an anti-Noriega assault by the US, all verbal assaults on the FDP's commander, on its role in society, or on local corruption, were successfully

portrayed as attacks on the FDP itself. Even junior officers expressed support for Noriega's rule. Popular resentment towards the U.S. helps explain why coercive diplomacy and attempts to split the army command by the American government could not generate an anti-Noriega cabal in the military or in society.

## V. Other Factors

### Ethnicity

Our model makes no predictions based on the ethnic make-up of the population. Although Panama is in the 30<sup>th</sup> percentile of country homogeneity ( $\text{ethfrac}=.26$ ), there is still a considerable amount of diversity from an insider's perspective. Locals divide the country into three major ethnic groups: the Spanish-speaking, Roman Catholic mestizo majority; the English-speaking, Protestant Antillean blacks; and tribal Indians. There are also small groups of blacks (*playeros*), and Hispanicized Indians (*cholos*) along the Atlantic coast lowlands and in the colonial era settlements along coasts and rivers. There have been social tensions between meztizos and blacks, but no political organization dividing them. There has been some mobilization of tribal Indians (the Cuna and the Guaymí), and perhaps it could be argued that if they were more numerous, at least the Guaymí might have been able to organize a "sons of the soil" response to mestizo geographic expansion.

### Oil

Throughout the 1970s, during a period of great economic stagnation, the population of Panama was politically quiescent. The quiescence can in part be explained by increases in the state sector; the number of employees of the central government and of its related institutions grew from about 58,000 in 1971 to about 150,000 in 1986. A large part of the funding for this increase came from foreign capital in the mid-1970s made available to the state through the export of refined oil. Gilboa (1995-96) suggests that much of this spending involved new positions in the government for lower class candidates as a way to buy off potential enemies. Here oil seems to have lowered the incentive to rebel without having weakened the state.<sup>7</sup>

### A Great Man (Torrijos)

Former President Ardito, in his memoirs, addressed the perplexing question of why General Torrijos demanded that Marxists be included in the government of President Aristides Royo: "He may have sympathized...with their demands for social justice...he had viewed them as the one group capable of standing in the way of approval for the canal treaties...he could [thereby] avoid having to deal with the guerrilla violence plaguing the rest of Central America. This may have outweighed concerns about the cost

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<sup>7</sup> . The positive coding for oil for 26 out of the 55 years in the dataset reflects export of refined oil rather than the pumping of crude. It is unclear whether this coding is externally valid, as a positive coding was meant to reflect an abundance of natural resources that the state could tax without establishing control over the society.

of adopting many leftist economic policies” (Ardito, 1997, 35). We do not factor in leadership skill in addressing the question of civil war onset, but in the 1970s, when a communist insurgency might have been able to organize, the co-optive strategy of Torrijos (reflecting his political astuteness for a long period of rule) may have played a significant role.

## **VI. Conclusion**

Our model correctly assesses a low probability for civil war in Panama. However, the primary factor in our model that lowers expectations for a civil war onset is that of low population. Our narrative gives no particular insight as to how low population might have “worked” to deter insurgency. At most, it might be inferred that the cohesiveness of the military command was in part due to the smallness of the country and the multifaceted network ties among the officers. Rather, our narrative points to the strategic importance to the U.S. of the canal, and the implications of this interest for oversight of Panamanian politics. No potential insurgent could avoid the calculation of U.S. response to any social upheaval (not created by the US itself) in Panama. The US oversight had an additional affect of solidifying people of different political inclinations in Panama into a vague anti-U.S. coalition, such that violent protest was organized not against perfidious Panamanian leaders (not even Noriega), but rather against U.S. imperialism.

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
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cname	year	pr	gdp~l	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
PANAMA	1945	.	.	703	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1946	.	.	721	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1947	.0252502	1.071	739	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1948	.0251678	1.102	767	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1949	.0251871	1.131	788	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1950	.0250646	1.169	863	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1951	.0245609	1.309	888	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1952	.0253298	1.237	914	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1953	.0247782	1.33	940	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1954	.0249431	1.333	965	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1955	.0249763	1.351	991	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1956	.0424072	1.362	1022	12	1	1	1
PANAMA	1957	.0421939	1.404	1053	12	1	1	1
PANAMA	1958	.041354	1.493	1084	12	1	1	1
PANAMA	1959	.0246748	1.487	1115	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1960	.0246573	1.513	1145	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1961	.024346	1.575	1180	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1962	.0236556	1.69	1215	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1963	.0231642	1.78	1251	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1964	.0225663	1.886	1288	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1965	.0225851	1.908	1327	12	1	0	1
PANAMA	1966	.0107744	2.014	1366	12	0	0	1
PANAMA	1967	.0105024	2.117	1405	12	0	0	1
PANAMA	1968	.0101917	2.233	1446	12	0	0	1
PANAMA	1969	.0109113	2.314	1488	12	0	1	0
PANAMA	1970	.0105763	2.434	1531	12	0	1	0
PANAMA	1971	.0101513	2.584	1574	12	0	1	0
PANAMA	1972	.0056089	2.772	1618	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1973	.0112966	2.855	1662	12	1	0	0
PANAMA	1974	.0112038	2.903	1705	12	1	0	0
PANAMA	1975	.0112241	2.919	1748	12	1	0	0
PANAMA	1976	.0114305	2.884	1790	12	1	0	0
PANAMA	1977	.011618	2.854	1831	12	1	0	0
PANAMA	1978	.005808	2.793	1872	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1979	.0054539	3.004	1914	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1980	.0053842	3.062	1956	12	0	0	0

PANAMA	1981	.004862	3.392	1999	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1982	.0047338	3.492	2043	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1983	.0072504	3.593	2088	12	0	0	1
PANAMA	1984	.0075682	3.48	2134	12	0	0	1
PANAMA	1985	.0049076	3.437	2180	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1986	.0048374	3.499	2227	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1987	.0048137	3.532	2274	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1988	.0048321	3.538	2322	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1989	.0061652	2.811	2370	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1990	.0107212	2.785	2418	12	0	1	0
PANAMA	1991	.010425	2.888	2466	12	0	1	0
PANAMA	1992	.0097726	3.103	2515	12	0	1	0
PANAMA	1993	.005315	3.332	2539	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1994	.0051288	3.449	2585.24	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1995	.0050957	3.484	2631	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1996	.0051221	3.483	2674	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1997	.0050765	3.524	2719	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1998	.0049406	3.621	2767	12	0	0	0
PANAMA	1999	.0048109	3.717	.	12	0	0	0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	53	.0146298	.0104961	.0047338	.0424072
gdpenl	53	2.472321	.886437	1.071	3.717
pop	54	1644.745	628.4228	703	2767
mtnest	55	12	0	12	12
Oil	55	.4727273	.5038572	0	1
instab	55	.1636364	.373355	0	1
anocl	55	.4727273	.5038572	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	1175	.0137953	.0097721	.0003443	.0695923
gdpenl	1175	2.863283	1.86085	.562	11.738
pop	1187	13595.62	24721.73	621	165873.6
mtnest	1210	22.25446	17.80127	0	57.59999
Oil	1210	.1363636	.3433162	0	1
instab	1210	.1950413	.3963963	0	1
anocl	1210	.3570248	.4793203	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0167543	.0228494	2.45e-10	.488229
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1
instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1