

‘One Muslim is Enough!’

Evidence from a Field Experiment in France

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Motivation: Integration of Muslims in French Society



Source: <http://lisawallerrogers.wordpress.com>, Marseille 2009

Questions: (1) Do Muslim immigrants face greater barriers to social and economic advance in France than if everything about them were the same but they were not Muslims? (2) If so, what are the mechanisms? And (3) Does French “republicanism” ameliorate or exacerbate the barriers?

Identification Strategy

- Problems in relying on cross-national datasets (confounds)
- Problems in ethnographic inference (selection)
- The Joola/Serer → France solution
- Measurement Techniques: Ethnography, Experiments and Survey

Big Story



(as reported in PNAS)

- Using a c.v. experiment and a survey instrument, we established a clear answer to the first question, viz. there are higher barriers to economic integration for Muslims (SM's) compared to a matched set of Christians (SX's)...

Establishing discrimination : a CV experiment


- Khadija Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard and Marie Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard
- Same CV: French citizens, two years of post-secondary education, unmarried, 3 years of experience on the job market
- Different signals
 - ✓ Names: Khadija is Muslim, Marie is Catholic, Aurélie is secular
 - ✓ Past position: Secours Islamique, Secours Catholique, secular firms
 - ✓ Volunteer: Muslim scouts, Catholic scouts

Results from the C.V experiment on job discrimination in France based on religious cues



Estimating the Implications of discrimination:

Large-n Survey of 2nd Generation Joolas and Serers in France



Introducing Experimental Game Theory

- The c.v. experiment taught us that there was discrimination, but not why.
- The survey taught us that the income effects of discrimination were likely to be substantial
- Now we want to know the individual mechanisms that drive H.R. employees to say yes to “Maria” but no to “Khadija”
- Here we rely on experimental games, which provide clues.

Finding Mechanisms through Experiments

(3 papers in preparation)

- Muslim gender discrimination
 - Identified, but implications for relative economic failure are ambiguous
- Incomplete Assimilation (trust game and survey)
 - Muslims retain religiously identifiable first names
 - Could unwillingness to assimilate → poorer economic performance in France?
- **Cultural Threat to Rooted French**
 - **The “Hortefeux” Effect**

The “*Hortefeux*” Effect:

"When there's one, that's OK. It's when there are a lot of them then there are problems"

- Principal finding: Relying on the treatment, that rooted French (FFF) act in a more anti-generous manner as Muslim salience increases.
- Second finding: FFF expect other FFF to act similarly.
- These findings are sustained by a French cultural convention, as expressed by Brice Hortefeux, French Minister of Interior, as in his remark quoted above.

Experimental Protocols

- Field site (the highly diverse 19th arrondissement, Paris)
w/ SM, SX, FFF
 - Recruitment (random for all but SM and SX)
 - Registration for sessions
 - Quasi-random assignment to sessions
- 10 players in each of 8 sessions, allowing for tests for the salience effect
- Games set up to test for the salience effect and its mechanisms:
 - Dictator (measuring generosity)
 - Strategic dictator (measuring expectations of others' generosity)

Treatment to identify the Horteveux Effect:

Manipulating Contact

- The number of targets (SM and SX) were systematically manipulated across sessions to test for a **group salience effect**:







Does FFF behavior toward SM change with increasing salience of SM?

Does SM behavior toward FFF change with increasing salience of SM?

Dictator Game Details

- 1. What they knew at time of dictator game
 - “These games are about how residents of Ile-de-France think about money”
 - Each other’s first names on a label
 - Confound with Islam and foreign names
 - Considerable facts about 5 of the other 9 players from earlier “speed chatting” game
 - “Noisy” information about religion of players
- 2. Principal Manipulation
 - For FdS behavior, number of targeted religious out-group in session as dictators
- 3. Playing of Dictator Game
 - All 10 players sat together looking at a screen
 - Serial presentation of confederates who were randomly recruited from the same pool as dictators
 - Except for our two Senegalese faces (Michel/Aboubacar; Khadija/Joséphine)
 - Strategic manipulation of confederate names (Muslim to Christian)
 - Grading sheets for how much to give to each confederate (0-5 Euros)

Dictator Game: Manipulation of religious identities of confederates

<u>FdS</u>	<u>Ambiguous</u> <u>Muslim</u>	<u>SM/SX</u>	<u>FdS</u>	<u>Ambiguous</u> <u>Muslim</u>	<u>SM/SX</u>
					
Sylvie	Georges Mohammed	Khadija Joséphine	Jean-Marc	Farida Christine	Michel Aboubacar

Testing for the group salience effect

2. Experimental results

2.1. FFF generosity toward SM when SM numbers increase

- ▶ We estimate the following equation over the set of pairs composed of FFF donors and SM and SX recipients:

$$y = a + b.(FFF \rightarrow SM) + c.(FFF \rightarrow SM).nbSM + d.(FFF \rightarrow SM).nbSX + e.nbSM + f.nbSX + g'.\mathbf{X} + h.Face + \epsilon.$$

- ▶ The impact of one additional SM in the room on FFF donations to SM recipients is given by the sum of coefficients c and e .
- ▶ The impact of one additional SX in the room on FFF donations to SX recipients is captured by coefficient f .

2. Experimental results

2.1. FFF generosity toward SM when SM numbers increase

	Dep. var.: FFF donations to SM and SX		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) FFF → SM	0.265 (1.030)	2.369* (1.201)	2.369* (1.319)
(2) (FFF → SM)*Number of SM	-0.904** (0.416)	-0.970** (0.388)	-0.970** (0.427)
(3) (FFF → SM)*Number of SX	1.422† (0.720)	-0.010 (0.852)	-0.010 (0.936)
(4) Number of SM	-0.084 (0.384)	-0.051 (0.367)	-0.067 (0.273)
(5) Number of SX	0.506 (0.512)	1.222** (0.507)	1.480** (0.623)
(6) Female			0.851* (0.418)
(7) Age			0.010 (0.012)
(8) Education			0.151 (0.202)
(9) Household income			-0.101 (0.095)
(10) Religiosity			0.316 (0.301)
(11) Knows players from previous sessions			0.550 (0.894)
Face fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0	0.01	0.01	0.01
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0	0.33	0.03	0.03
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)-(5)	0.02	0.00	0.00
R ²	0.308	0.364	0.563
Observations	42	42	42

FFF Beliefs: A Discriminatory Convention?

- Hypothesis: it has become a convention in French culture
 - Yorkshire driftwood conventions (Sugden)
 - Conventions → Norms (David Hume)
- Non-rational
 - “grip on the mind” (Elster)
 - not based on beliefs, but feelings
- Test for conventionality in 2009 strategic dictator game
 - After the regular dictator, we chose “randomly” a model among players (but always an FFF), and players were rewarded if they guessed how much the model donated to each confederate
 - Measure the degree to which FFF expected the “model” to give less to SM confederates the more there were FFF in the room (compared to SX)

Test of Convention Hypothesis

- We estimate the following equation over the set of triads composed of FFF guessers, FFF donors, and SM and SX recipients:
 - $y = a + b(\text{FFF} \sim \text{FFF} \rightarrow \text{SM}) + c(\text{FFF} \sim \text{FFF} \rightarrow \text{SM}) * \text{nbSM} + d(\text{FFF} \sim \text{FFF} \rightarrow \text{SM}) * \text{nbSX} + e(\text{nbSM}) + f(\text{nbSX}) + g'(X) + h(\text{Face}) + \varepsilon$
- $c + e$ estimates the impact of one additional SM on FFF guesses about other FFF donations to SM recipients
- f estimates the impact of one additional SX on FFF guesses about other FFF donations to SX recipients

2. Experimental results

2.2. FFF beliefs about other FFF generosity toward SM when SM numbers increase

	Dep. var.: FFF guesses about FFF donations to SM and SX		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) FFF \rightarrow FFF \rightarrow SM	0.849 (0.878)	3.447** (1.485)	3.447** (1.632)
(2) (FFF \rightarrow FFF \rightarrow SM)*Number of SM	-0.164 (0.360)	-0.545 (0.318)	-0.545 (0.350)
(3) (FFF \rightarrow FFF \rightarrow SM)*Number of SX	0.283 (0.512)	-1.485 (0.948)	-1.485 (1.041)
(4) Number of SM	0.108 (0.416)	0.149 (0.387)	0.254 (0.298)
(5) Number of SX	1.349** (0.565)	2.233*** (0.659)	2.780*** (0.829)
(6) Female			0.997** (0.362)
(7) Age			-0.008 (0.012)
(8) Education			0.023 (0.215)
(9) Household income			0.018 (0.086)
(10) Religiosity			0.352 (0.286)
(11) Knows players from previous sessions			-1.582** (0.714)
Face fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0	0.33	0.31	0.35
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0	0.03	0.00	0.00
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5)	0.02	0.00	0.00
R ²	0.269	0.350	0.363
Observations	42	42	42

Wald test (2)+(4)=(5) reveals strong significance comparing FFF expectations about other FFF donations to SM (SX) with increasing numbers of SM (SX)

What drives the Hortefeux effect?

- A rational model (section 4) augmented with other-regarding preferences shows that two mechanisms can be at work:
- **▲ Mechanism 1:** the Hortefeux effect may be a response to changes in the total amount given by non-FFF donors to the recipients in the dictator game when Muslim numbers increase; not supported by our data.
- **▲ Mechanism 2:** the Hortefeux effect may result from changes in FFF preferences and notably from the activation of FFF taste-based discrimination against Muslims when FFF are surrounded by a higher number of Muslims; we infer this is the correct mechanism.

Conclusions

- Game protocols identify the channels through which anti-Muslim discrimination is sustained in France: players who are rooted French exhibit less generosity towards Muslims as the number of surrounding Muslims increases
- Rooted French practice discrimination against Muslims not due to (rationally based) updated beliefs about Muslim social behavior but rather due to a (non-rational) distaste, or a sense of threat (unjustified by their experience), in being surrounded by many Muslims.
- Rooted French believe other rooted French will act similarly, and thus this discrimination becomes conventional, such that the Minister of Interior could refer to it in a rather self-assured and unreflective manner.