

Linguistic Nationalism as a Consumption Item

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The Sardana

The problem of linguistic normalization in Catalonia



- Catalonia is the apotheosis of a bourgeois society
- Linguistic normalization increased a Catalan's communicative range by zero
- Income effects were negative
- Questions:
 - Why did they do it?
 - Can Picasso's image of jubilant carefree nationalists be correct?
 - What sustains nationalism in rich societies?
 - What stops the emerging European state from becoming "English speaking"?

Hypothesis 1

Free Riding Subverts Nationalism

- The Private Subversion of a Public Good
 - On the 1910 ballot, voters rejected an initiative to allow liquor sales in cities, which had been prohibited in Oklahoma's original constitution. It was the first of several Prohibition-repeal initiatives. The Oklahoma humorist Will Rogers would later say, "Oklahomans vote dry as long as they can stagger to the polls."
- Examples in Linguistic Revivals
 - Varanasi and Private English Medium Schools
 - Catalonia: Avui vs. El País
- But No Mass Defection (as in Oklahoma)

Hypothesis 2

Linguistic Nationalism as a Protection Racket

- Local Jobs Only to Those Fluent (*mulki* rules)
- Subsidies from UNESCO, Summer Institute of Linguistics, European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages
- The India Model (a 3 ± 1 language equilibrium with its Mulki rules) as the future of the EU (with a 2 ± 1 equilibrium)

Hypothesis 3

Language as Opium for the Masses

- It keeps social equality off of the political agenda (Brian Barry)
- Nationalism as a 2nd dimension of political contestation in order to split the votes of the poor (William Riker called this “heresthetics”)
- Example: CiU in Catalonia (Pieter van Houten); 2009 alliance of Socialists and PP in País Vasco; Milosevic in former Yugoslavia

The Scylla and Charybdis of Nationalism Research

- Hypotheses 1-3 treat nationalism as a canard.
- Need to avoid the Scylla of taking nationalism too seriously (Anthony Smith)
- But also need to avoid the Charybdis of viewing nationalism as irony –
 - Gellner's Ruritania vs. Megalomania treats nationalists with contempt [see next slide]
 - Hobsbawm and Barry treat nationalism as a form of false consciousness

The “Wrong Address Theory” of Nationalism:
Gellner is more ironic about Marx than about Nations

“Just as extreme Shi’ite Muslims hold that Archangel Gabriel made a mistake, delivering the Message to Mohammed when it was intended for Ali, so Marxists basically like to think that the spirit of history or human consciousness made a terrible boob. The wakening message was intended for *classes*, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to *nations*.”

Hypothesis 4:

Linguistic Nationalism as a Consumption Item: Introducing the *HEN*

- Grows up in Norway – shares TV, literature, humor, notable local events with fellow Norwegians, thereby becoming a cultural Norwegian
- Education combines Norwegian culture with skills to compete in the international labor market
- Seeks jobs that maximize wages (with no geographical constraints) until children arrive
- Wants children to become “Norwegians”, and this is hard to do while living abroad (evidence from Russians in Brighton).
- Seeks employment in Norway (lowering wages) while children are in school.

This scenario can be formalized→

A Model: Government and Its Highly Educated Population -- The Provision of National Education through the medium of the National Language

		HEN	
		Remain	Emigrate
GON	Norwegian	v_N $r - c$	0 $-c$
	English	v_E r	0 0

- The game has two players, GON (Government of Norway) and a HEN (a Highly Educated Norwegian)
- The game is played in two periods. In the first period GON chooses between “Norwegian” and “English” as the language of instruction. In the second period HEN chooses to “Remain” in Norway or to “Emigrate” to the country that pays the highest wages for the HEN’s skills.

Utilities over Strategy Combinations

		HEN	
		Remain	Emigrate
GON	Norwegian	$r - c$	$-c$
	English	r	0

- v_N is a HEN's utility for staying in Norway providing public instruction in Norwegian relative to emigrating with public education provided in the national language of the country to which the HEN migrated. It is the sum of the income and the consumption value of the educational experience of the HEN's children relative to what the HEN would receive by taking the best offer overseas;
- v_E is the utility for HEN to staying in an English instruction Norway relative to emigrating;
- r is the benefit to GON of retaining HENs in country relative to losing the taxes if the HEN emigrates;
- c is the cost to GON of keeping Norwegian as the language of instruction

Assumptions

		HEN	
		Remain	Emigrate
GON	Norwegian	v_N $r - c$	0 $-c$
	English	v_E r	0 0

- Assume that $v_N > v_E$, that is that HENs prefer the reproduction of a national culture to the assimilation of international culture within Norway. This assumption underlies the support for retaining national languages.
- Assume that $c > 0$, that is, given the size of its market, instruction in English is more efficient than developing curricula materials just for Norway. In making this assumption we therefore stack the deck *against* a multilingual Europe.

Solution: Play in the Second Period

		HEN	
		Remain	Emigrate
GON	Norwegian	$r - c$	0
	English	r	0

- Assuming that, when indifferent, HEN chooses to stay, then in the second period there are two cases to consider.
- In case 1, in which GON chooses NORWEGIAN, HEN chooses REMAIN if $v_N \geq 0$.
- In case 2, in which GON chooses ENGLISH, HEN chooses REMAIN if $v_E \geq 0$.
- Since by assumption $v_N > v_E$ we then have three cases of interest:
- Case A: If $v_E \geq 0$ then HEN always remains no matter what the government does
- Case B: If $v_E < 0 \leq v_N$ then HEN remains if the government chooses Norwegian but leaves if the government chooses English.
- Case C: If $v_N < 0$ then HEN always emigrates no matter what the government does.

Solution: Play in the First Period

		HEN	
		Remain	Emigrate
GON	Norwegian	v_N $r - c$	0 $-c$
	English	v_E r	0 0

- Considering GON's first period strategy, given HEN's second period strategies (and assuming the government chooses English if indifferent), the government will choose English in Cases A and C. In Case B however, the government chooses Norwegian if and only if $r - c > 0$.
- Therefore a Norwegian language equilibrium holds if and only if two conditions are satisfied:
 1. $v_E < 0 \leq v_N$
 2. $r - c > 0$

Discussion Points (1)

1. To retain skilled tax base, GON will want to increase vN to HENs; government can do this through the attraction of foreign capital, which will occur if there is a strong ESL (English as a Second Language) program enabling foreign investors to operate in Norway with low transactions costs. Here HENs get Norwegian medium of instruction and industry gets a skilled English-language workforce.
- 2. HENs remaining in Norway, having their children enculturated in a Norwegian curriculum will be observed under conditions of high country wealth, that is, where the income differences between the best opportunity abroad vs. the best opportunity in Norway will be less than the premium for getting one's children educated in Norwegian.
- 3. Given implication #2, we should observe the national language as medium of instruction in richer rather than poorer countries (where $vN < 0$), that is we will see education in national languages in countries where the income differential between working abroad and working at home are the smallest. (In poorer countries where the national language is the medium of instruction, we would expect to see a growing private market providing English-medium instruction).

Discussion Points (2)

- 4. *Ceteris paribus*, remaining abroad during child-rearing years is more likely the larger the sending country, because the larger the country (e.g. Germany or Japan), the more likely emigré parents can provide a reasonable substitute for national education (e.g. through schools providing education in the home language in major cities) abroad. Thus, long-term emigration is more likely for HENs from larger countries.
- 5. Protection of national languages would not necessarily be less in larger countries, however. On the one hand, for large countries vN will be lower. HEGs (Highly Educated Germans) will not have a fear of cultural extinction, and so no individual HEG would feel, by the logic of free riding, the need to pay for nationalism. On the other hand c , the marginal cost of producing educational material in German (as compared to Norwegian) will be lower, making the cost to the GOG (government of Germany) in providing German language education lower. Therefore, even if HEGs are more likely to spend child rearing years in countries with the highest wages, this does not imply that the GOG is less likely than the GON to provide a German-language national curriculum.
- 6. If the parameters of the model are as assumed, and the equilibrium is (Norwegian, Remain). This demonstrates why the protection of national languages and cultures will remain stable in Europe.

Empirical Tests of Observable Implications:

Data from the OECD corporate labor environment webpage on the age and skill of workforce


Observable Implication 1: the pull to the distinct-language homeland will be on average greater for small countries than for large countries.

	20-24	40-44	60-64	
Czech Republic	0.653	0.973	0.818	SMALL COUNTRIES
Denmark	0.871	0.971		
Finland		0.977		
Israel	0.589	0.981	0.795	
Luxembourg		0.833		
Norway	0.658	0.900		
Slovak Republic	0.773	1.000	1.000	
Switzerland		0.960	0.753	
France	0.504	1.000	0.655	LARGE COUNTRIES
Germany		0.955	0.675	
Korea	0.824	0.835	0.323	
Mexico	0.463	0.800	0.340	
Poland	0.751	0.966	0.391	
Spain		0.965	0.762	
Turkey	0.728	0.902	0.247	

On average, second period is .949

On average, second period is .918

Non English Speaking Countries: Skilled Labor Participation Rate



Observable Implication 2:

The greater percentage of English medium of instruction primary education in a country, irrespective of age, the greater the skilled workforce would be willing to emigrate.

Participation Rate for Skilled Population in the Workforce: Comparing English and non-English Speaking Countries

	English-Speaking Countries (n=6)	Non-English-Speaking Countries (n=21)
Participation Rates for ages 20-64	.863	.901

Conclusion: On the Microdynamics of Linguistic Maintenance

- Sociolinguists have modeled the rapid decline in the number of world languages, fearing the loss of linguistic diversity in the world
- Globalization has made English the focal language of economic mobility
- Yet as wealth increases in a globalized world, and highly educated people have consumption choices, they will invest in educations for their children that will sustain world linguistic diversity.