Muslims in France: Identifying a discriminatory equilibrium

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Motivation: Integration of Muslims in Europe:
A Deeply Divisive issue throughout the EU Zone

Questions: (1) Do Muslim immigrants face greater barriers to social and economic advance in France than if everything about them were the same but they were not Muslims? (2) If so, what are the mechanisms?
Identification Strategy

• How can we possibly estimate the barriers to labor market success of a group that is alike in all respects to a Muslim group, but isn’t itself Muslim?
  – Problems in relying on cross-national datasets (confounds)
  – Problems in ethnographic inference (selection)
  – The Joola/Serer → France solution
Establishing discrimination: a CV experiment

- Khadija Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard and Marie Diouf vs. Aurélie Ménard
- Same CV: French citizens, two years of post-secondary education, unmarried, 3 years of experience on the job market
- Different signals
  - Names: Khadija is Muslim, Marie is Catholic, Aurélie is secular
  - Past position: Secours Islamique, Secours Catholique, secular firms
  - Volunteer: Muslim scouts, Catholic scouts
Estimating the Implications of discrimination:
Large-n Survey of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation Joolas and Serers in France
Introducing Experimental Game Theory

• The c.v. experiment taught us that there was discrimination, but not why.
• The survey taught us that the income effects of discrimination were likely to be substantial.
• Now we want to know the individual mechanisms that drive H.R. employees to say yes to “Maria” but no to “Khadija”
Core Findings on Mechanisms

• 1. No “social network” disadvantage
• 2. Taste-based discrimination of FFF toward Muslims activated by a threshold effect
• 3. Gender norms of Muslims differ from those of FFF, though no job market effects revealed in experiments
• 4. Institutionalized discrimination and reluctance to assimilate are elements of a social equilibrium
Data (1): The Survey

1. 511 Serers and Joolas in France
   18-40 years old;
   born in France;
   ≥ one grandparent born outside of France who was a Joola- or Serer speaker
   339 SM’s; 127 SX’s

2. Recruited through cell phones and face-to-face through chain referrals

3. Questions on Assimilation
   Identification with African homeland
   Identification with a secularized French culture and society
## Assimilation: Survey Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Attachment to Country of Origin (dummy: where would you want to be buried?; answer Senegal or Africa)</th>
<th>Identification with French Culture (dummy for those who answer “best friend” is French)</th>
<th>Secularization (those who accept their child’s marriage outside the religion; ordinal, 1=approve; 3=disapprove).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegalese Muslims</td>
<td>.386*** (0.068)</td>
<td>-.262*** (0.061)</td>
<td>.174** (0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of significant results/∑ number of questions</td>
<td>7/9 (all with positive coefficient)</td>
<td>7/7</td>
<td>4/6 (all with positive coefficient)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OLS; Controls in all specifications: Time in France; Education; Gender; Age; Robust standard errors; * = p<.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.01.
Survey Summary

• 1. Muslim immigrants assimilate less than matched Christians

• 2. Over time, there is no “catch up”, but Muslims remain behind Christians on all levels of assimilation (Results on model specification where SM*Time in France is added are in paper).
Data (2): Field Experiments

• 1. Field site (19th arrondissement, Paris, 2009)
  – 10 players in each of 8 Sessions
    • Separately recruited Senegalese targets: SM’s and SX’s
    • From 2-5 such players in each session
    • All spoke French and wore non-distinguishable dress
    • Wore labels with first name on chest –
      – Helps distinguish SMM’s and SMA’s
  – Remainder of players randomly selected at metro stations
    • Save for deviation to recruit FFF, with 2-4 in each session
  – Games to test for effects of assimilation:
    • Simultaneous Trust Game (measuring altruism)
    • Strategic dictator (measuring expectations of SMs and SXs)

• 2. Field site (18th arrondissement, Paris, 2010)
  – 50 FFF from 19th arrondissement playing games on computer
    • Name Game for Muslim identification
    • Beauty, Friendliness, Trustworthiness from photographs of players
    • Test of Beliefs of FFF about SM and SX behavior
First Names of SM and SX Players: The 2010 Name Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firstnames of SM players</th>
<th>Firstnames of SX players</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMADOU</td>
<td>CECILE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIE</td>
<td>CHRISTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTOU</td>
<td>DANIEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWA</td>
<td>EPHIGENIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRE</td>
<td>GASTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATOUMATA</td>
<td>HELENE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBOU</td>
<td>LOUIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRAHIMA</td>
<td>MAMADOU JEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALS</td>
<td>NINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHADY</td>
<td>ROBERT ANTOINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAMADOU LAMINE</td>
<td>THERESE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUSTAPHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDEYE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSMANE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMSIR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YACINE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Simultaneous Trust Game

• Game Description
  – Sequential pairing of Senders and Receivers
    • Every SM and SX played both roles with all FFF’s
  – Path of Play
    • Sender is allocated 3 euros and can send \{0, 1, 2, 3\} to receiver;
    • Receiver is allocated 3X what Sender has sent
    • Receiver simultaneously decides whether to return \{0, 1/3, 2/3, or 1\} of the tripled allocation to Sender
    • Sender and Receiver never learn what the other has sent
  – Interpretation of strategies
    • Sender will raise allocation if Receiver is believed to be trustworthy
    • Receiver will return more a sign of altruism in favor of Sender
Strategic Dictator Game

• Dictator Game
  – Played after trust and speed chatting
  – All 10 players see the same screen
    • Each allocated 5 euros to keep or share with each guise
    • Each marks privately how much (0,1,2,3,4,5) to allocate to each guise
    • Guises are “matched” to control for “face” (see next slide)

• Strategic Dictator Game
  – An FFF player is “randomly” chosen as a model
  – Nine other players guess how much s/he allocated to each recipient with a big prize for coming closest
  – Testing to see who, if anyone, expects an FFF to discriminate against Muslims
Dictator Game:
Identity of confederates

FdS
Sylvie

Ambiguous Muslim
Georges Mohammed

SM/SX
Khadija Joséphine

FdS
Jean-Marc

Ambiguous Muslim
Farida Christine

SM/SX
Michel Aboubacar
Strategic Dictator Game

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  – Testing to see who, if anyone, expects an FFF to discriminate against Muslims
Test for Statistical Discrimination

• FFF Beliefs About SMs and SX’s
  – 2010 field experiment
## Summary of Game Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game</th>
<th>Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous Trust</td>
<td>SM’s are less generous to all other players in this French environment compared to SX’s (but not less generous to family in Senegal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous Trust (with Name Game Control)</td>
<td>FFF’s send back less to SM’s than to SX’s, and the entire difference driven by recognition of SM’s as SMM’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Game</td>
<td>FFF’s do not believe that SMM’s send back less to FFF’s than to SX’s or SMA’s; therefore behavior of FFF as receivers not based on expectations of SM distrust (i.e. statistical); it is due to level of altruism (i.e. taste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Dictator</td>
<td>SM’s expect FFF give less to all SM and SX; significantly lower than expectations of SX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back to Survey</td>
<td>SM’s on six of seven questions distrust French institutions significantly more than do the SX’s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12: Comparing SM and SX distrust toward French institutions. OLS analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schooling system</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Judicial system</th>
<th>Trade unions</th>
<th>Private firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) SM</td>
<td>0.380***</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.313**</td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td>0.357***</td>
<td>0.209**</td>
<td>0.277**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Time</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.011*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Education</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.066**</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Female</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.193*</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Age</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Robustness Tests

• We perform a set of tests to rule out:
  – 1. The mix of early migrants (SM and SX) was different from the later ones, with early SM’s less prepared for assimilation
  – 2. That most of the results from SM lack of generosity is due to gender norms
  – 3. Our trust game results are due to beauty, not religion
Why Not Change Names?
An Ethnographic Answer

• We performed 40 in-depth family interviews, 20 Muslim and 20 Christian, from Joola and Serer families in four French cities

• Clues that are revealed from these interviews
  – SM’s do not perceive FFF discrimination more than SX’s (and attribute all the discrimination they feel to race)
  – SM’s feel far more French than Arab
  – SM’s feel that they will always be foreigners in France – eating rules and prenoms give them away
  – SM’s feel higher status in the Senegalese community than do SX’s (and conversion goes from SX→SM)
  – Vague sense that even if they changed eating rules and names, France will always be foreign to them
Conclusion

• Research Findings:
  – FFF population is less altruistic toward SMM’s than to SX’s or SMA’s
  – SMM’s don’t feel face-to-face discrimination more than SMA’s or SX’s
  – All SM’s feel powerful institutional discrimination in France
  – SM’s respond with:
    • Incomplete Assimilation in France
    • Investment in Identification with Ancestral Homeland
The Equilibrium Re-stated

• Muslims and rooted French are locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium whereby rooted French exhibit taste-based discrimination against those they are able to identify as Muslims and Muslims perceive French institutions as systematically discriminatory against them.

• This equilibrium is sustained because Muslims, perceiving discrimination as institutionalized, are reluctant to assimilate and rooted French, who are able to identify Muslims as such due to their lower assimilation, reveal their distaste for Muslims.
Policy Implications

• Recognition of an “equilibrium” provides clues as to why discrimination is hard to overturn – i.e. no party has an incentive to unilaterally change its behavior.

• Two-pronged approach is therefore merited:
  – Broadcast that FFF are not living to their own republican ideals (cf. the NBA-referee results); i.e. reliance on shame
  – Encourage Muslims to retain Muslim names only for family and community; raising the costs to FFF to identification of others as Muslims
Final Thought

• Linking policy recommendations directly to the mechanisms that research shows driving sub-optimal outcomes should be a goal of political science

• Here we have identified mechanisms clearly, but translating that into strategies of equilibrium shift is much less successful