

WOMEN, MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN FRANCE

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Muslim immigrants to Europe display distinctive attitudes toward women in a wide range of survey data. This study investigates whether this translates into distinctive behavior. Relying on a dictator game in France and an identification strategy that isolates the effect of religion from typical confounds such as race, we compare the donations of matched Christian and Muslim immigrants and rooted French to in-group and out-group men vs. women. Our results indicate that Muslim participants deviate from Christian immigrant and rooted French participants in their behavior toward women: while the latter favor women over men, Muslim immigrants favor men over women.


1. INTRODUCTION

Muslim immigrants to Europe are distinctive on a number of attitudinal measures. In the United Kingdom, Bisin et al. (2007, 2011a) show that the strength of ethnic identity among Muslim immigrants does not dissipate over time, whereas the strength of ethnic identity among non-Muslim immigrants does. In France, Adida et al. (2013) compare a group of Senegalese Muslim and Christian immigrants on a number of attitudinal measures, and show that Senegalese Muslims exhibit greater attachment to their culture of origin and less attachment to their host country than do Senegalese Christians. One notable area of distinction has been attitudes toward women. In France, Brouard and Tiberj (2011) survey French immigrants and citizens, and reveal distinctive Muslim attitudes toward the status of women. Inglehart (2003) and Fish (2011) corroborate these patterns in their analyses of the World Values Surveys: Muslims are significantly more likely to agree that “a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl,” to think that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women,” and to support the idea that “men make better political leaders than women do” (e.g., Fish, 2011, pp. 181–193). Alexander and Welzel (2011) confirm these findings, reporting that both Muslims in Muslim societies (where more than 50% of adults are Muslim) and Muslims in non-Muslim societies hold more “patriarchal” values than do non-Muslims.¹

Less well understood is whether distinctive Muslim attitudes translate into distinctive Muslim behavior. This question is critical if we are to understand Muslim immigrant integration, both economic and social, into European societies. Indeed, three possible mechanisms might link socio-economic integration with distinct behavior toward women. First, distinct behavior toward women might lead to an under or overinvestment in female education and thus to differential rates of human capital accumulation. Second, distinct behavior toward women might affect the balance-of-

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¹Alexander and Welzel (2011) measure “patriarchal values” as a summary index of the three indicators listed above.

	
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power women have in their households, and their ability to contribute to consumption and investment decisions.² Finally, distinct behavior toward women might trigger a backlash by a hosting community that feels culturally threatened.³

Empirically, scholars have substantiated a link between immigrant attitudes and behaviors, and socio-economic integration. Bisin et al. (2011b), relying on data from the European Social Survey, show a negative relationship between the strength of an immigrant's ethnic identity and her labor market outcomes.⁴ Similarly, Meng and Gregory (2005) and Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) show a positive link between rates of intermarriage of immigrants and their labor market outcomes. But such investigations have not yet put the question of gender-based behavior of Muslim immigrants to systematic test.

We investigate whether Muslim immigrants in France behave differently toward women than do matched Christian immigrants. France is home to the largest Muslim community in western Europe both in absolute numbers (an estimated 4.7 million in 2010) and as a percentage of its population (an estimated 7.5% in 2010) (e.g., Pew Research Center Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2011). Furthermore, the issue of gender equality and discrimination in a country that considers itself the cradle of enlightenment and progress has been incendiary. For example, France voted to restrict veiling in 2004 and to ban the full-face covering in 2010 in the name of gender equality.

For purposes of identification of a religious effect on gender behavior, our investigation focuses on a sample of Serer and Joola immigrants to France. Each of these two homogeneous language communities from Senegal is divided along religious lines (Muslim and Catholic), and members from both religions migrated to France at the same time and with the same economic motivations.⁵ In March 2009, we brought together these Senegalese Muslims and Christians, matched on a number of parameters such as nationality, race, and migration history, with a random sample of participants from a diverse district of Paris, to play a dictator game.⁶ In this game, players were shown on a large screen the same set of six faces with accompanying first names. The first name of each recipient varied across game sessions, such that dictators would see the same face but with alternated religious identities.⁷ With this treatment, we

²See Duflo (2012) for a review of the literature on the role of female education and bargaining power on development outcomes.

³See Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), Hainmueller and Hangartner (2011), and Sniderman et al. (2004) on cultural threats driving immigrant exclusion.

⁴The results apply only to immigrants from a non-European country of origin. See also Algan et al. (2012).

⁵In the late 1990s, approximately 70% of France's Muslims were estimated to originate from North Africa, while 6% were estimated to originate from sub-Saharan Africa (Boyer, 1998). Focusing on a smaller and less visible group of immigrants is fundamental to our identification strategy, though it raises issues of generalizability as well. But since sub-Saharan Africans are less readily associated with Islam than are North Africans (Diop, 1988), our approach is likely to capture a lower bound of the Muslim effect. We further discuss the scope conditions of our research in a later section of this study.

⁶In this classic experimental game introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986), players view pictures of people whom they have never met and are given money either to keep for themselves or to share with the person (the "recipient") whose picture they are viewing (being assured that the amounts accruing to each recipient will actually be transferred to them). There is no penalty for keeping the entire amount, and no one can influence the players' donations. In other words, the action of giving in the dictator game is traditionally interpreted as capturing unconditional altruism: it is *unconditional* because dictator believes about recipient behavior cannot be a factor in the donation, given that recipients take no action in this game.

⁷This type of manipulation is common in correspondence tests, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). See also Fong and Luttmer (2011) for another example of a dictator game where donors' perception of the recipient is manipulated.

1 therefore avoided confounds between the recipient's ethnic type and the recipient's
2 face and were able to measure dictator behavior toward in-group and out-group men
3 vs. women. More precisely, this study measures behavioral distinctiveness with a dif-
4 ference-in-difference-in-difference analysis, comparing the difference in donations to
5 men vs. women of Senegalese Muslim and rooted French (FFF)⁸ players to that of
6 Senegalese Christian (SX) and rooted French (FFF) players. This analysis enables us
7 to capture, if it exists, the divergence in behavior toward women between Senegalese
8 Muslims, relative to a Senegalese Christian reference group, and rooted French.

9 Our experimental results indicate a significant divergence between SM and FFF
10 donations to female recipients, which is not matched by SX and FFF patterns. ~~While~~
11 ~~FFF and SX players tend to~~ favor women over men, SM male players consistently
12 favor men over women. Furthermore, such behavior is not limited to male partici-
13 pants: in donations to in-group players, SM women also favor SM men over SM
14 women, whereas both SX and FFF women favor in-group women over in-group men.
15 When it comes to behavior toward women among Senegalese Muslim and Christian
16 immigrants in France, our results reveal a distinctly Muslim divergence from rooted
17 French behavior.

18 Our study contributes to comparative research on Muslim immigrant integration
19 into European societies by offering a behavioral rather than an attitudinal account of
20 Muslim immigrant treatment of women. Our behavioral indicator – which captures
21 the donation of money to actual game partners – mitigates social-desirability bias,
22 whereby survey respondents may express politically correct, rather than their true, atti-
23 tudes (e.g., Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2011; Kuklinski et al., 1997). By masking
24 respondents' true preferences, social-desirability bias prevents researchers from identi-
25 fying effects that may very well exist. Our behavioral approach with monetary stakes
26 gets us closer to identifying players' true preferences.

27 Furthermore, our approach improves on isolating the Muslim effect from typical
28 confounds such as nationality or ethnicity: relying on a unique identification strategy,
29 we focus on a sample of immigrants who are matched on their country of origin as
30 well as the timing of, method of, and reasons for migrating to France. This identifica-
31 tion strategy thus resolves a fundamental measurement problem in studies of Muslim
32 immigrants to Europe: Muslim immigrants to France are typically from North Africa,
33 Muslim immigrants to England are typically from South Asia, and Muslim immi-
34 grants to Germany are typically from Turkey. Hence, country or region-of-origin con-
35 founds religion. Our attention to a ~~small,~~ homogeneous population of Senegalese
36 immigrants to France offers a solution to this measurement problem.

37 The rest of this study is as follows. In the next section, we survey the literature on
38 gender relations in Islam. Next, we introduce our research design allowing us to cap-
39 ture the divergence, if it exists, between Muslim and rooted French behavior toward
40 women. We then present our experimental results showing that Muslim immigrants
41 treat women differently from both matched Christian immigrants and rooted French.
42 Next, we address the scope of our results. We conclude with implications for future
43 research.

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47 ⁸By rooted French, we refer to French citizens with four grandparents born inside metropolitan France.
48 In other words, they are, at least, third-generation French (hence the FFF acronym). We are thus comparing
our SX and SM players to those French players who are most deeply rooted in French culture.

2. WOMEN AND ISLAM

Scholarship on the place of women in Islam and among Muslims delivers ambiguous results. Historical accounts of women's status in the Middle East claim that Islamic traditions explain female repression in both public and private life in the region (e.g., Mernissi, 1987; Sharabi, 1992). Cross-country analyses suggest that Muslim-majority countries tend to repress ~~their~~ women (e.g., Boone, 1996; Dollar and Gatti, 1999). Survey analysis indicates that Muslims hold distinctive attitudes toward women (e.g., Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Bisin et al., 2007, 2011a; Fish, 2011; Inglehart, 2003). And Blaydes and Linzer (2008) explain why and how Islamic fundamentalism represses women.

More recently, carefully controlled analyses that emphasize the role of confounding factors suggest instead that there is no significant relationship between Islam and the repression of women. Ross (2008) contends that oil is an important omitted variable that accounts for female underrepresentation in public life in oil-abundant Muslim countries.⁹ Hajj and Panizza (2009) analyze individual-level data and use a difference-in-difference approach to compare the investment of Muslims and Christians in female education in Lebanon. They find "that other things equal, both Muslim and Christian girls receive more education than their male counterparts, and that there is no significant (either statistical or economic) difference between the education gender gap of Muslims and Christians" (e.g., Hajj and Panizza, 2009, p. 344).¹⁰

In this study, we extend this research to the context of Muslim immigrants in Christian-heritage societies. We weigh in on the debate about a distinct Muslim/Christian cleavage regarding behavior toward women by comparing the behavior of SM (vs. SX) immigrants and their rooted French hosts toward women. Our contribution lies not only with our focus on behavior, but with our efforts to isolate the effect of religion from that of natural confounds such as race and nationality.

3. IDENTIFYING MUSLIM IMMIGRANT BEHAVIOR IN FRANCE

To measure cultural divergence in behavior toward women between Muslim immigrants and their hosts, we designed a dictator game where players have an opportunity to altruistically donate to people whom they do not know. In this game setup, we analyze differential donations toward men vs. women. Our version of the dictator game was played among a series of experimental games, in which we brought together our Senegalese players and a ~~quasirandom~~ sample of residents living in the 19th district of Paris.¹¹

We conducted these experiments in eight sessions over two weekends in March 2009, with at least 10 players attending each session. We chose to conduct our games in the 19th *arrondissement*, a particularly diverse district of Paris. Indeed, according to the 1999 French census, the percentage of individuals living in this district who are

⁹According to Ross, oil production reduces the number of women in the work force; this suppresses their political influence (Ross, 2008).

¹⁰Problems undermine their analysis, however: they rely on two populations that share only a small overlap in socio-economic status, introducing estimation bias in regression analyses. This is because the algorithm used in regression analysis extrapolates from a comparison of those overlapping populations (i.e., rich Muslims with poor Maronites), two subsets that surely differ on many unobservables. Our strategy, to be explained in the following section, avoids this problem, as the overlap in socio-economic status between our comparison groups – SM and SX – is large.

¹¹For purposes of ethical oversight, all experimental protocols were reviewed and approved by the Stanford University IRB.

born in France is 63.5 (against 82.5 for all Paris). We aimed for an ethnically diverse setting because we did not want any of our players to consider the ethno-religious diversity of our game sessions (and notably the presence of SM and SX players) as exceptional, thus avoiding potential social-desirability bias in their behavior.

We recruited 29 Senegalese players: 18 self-identified as Muslims (SM) and 11 as Christians (SX). These Senegalese Muslim and Christian players were recruited from three separate networks. Two of the networks came from ethnographers who were conducting family histories for our wider research project; they were asked to recruit Senegalese subjects by merely telling them they had heard about experiments with a chance to earn a lot of money. No mention was made about Senegalese specificity or religion. The third network came from a Senegalese night watchman (not from the Joola or Serer community) who worked at a student dorm. He was never informed about the purpose of the games, but was paid for each of his Joola and Serer recruits who showed up for registration and participated in the games. Here again, no mention was made about Senegalese specificity or religion at any point in the recruitment or registration.

We complemented our game sessions with the recruitment of 62 non-Senegalese players, among which 23 were FFF. We recruited these players using a stratified (by population density) but not always fully random recruitment procedure centered on the 21 metro stations in the 19th district of Paris. In a fully random protocol, we assigned a weight to each metro station based on the density of the area in which it is located, with the higher density stations getting more cards in our random draw. Each recruitment team drew a metro station for each recruitment day, and then a number from 1 to 10 to determine which passerby to invite as a game recruit. But, because we wanted to ensure a large number of interactions between our SX/SM and our FFF players for our larger project, we deviated from this protocol to assure ourselves a sufficient number of FFF players. When potential FFF subjects walked by, recruiters were instructed to ignore the sequence of selection, and to ask them to participate in our experiment. Passersby who were willing to hear our appeal were told that they could win up to 148 euros for about two and a half hours of game participation,¹² games which were designed to investigate “how people from Ile-de-France [Parisian region] make decisions about money.” Table 1 provides summary statistics for our three groups of players, SM, SX, and FFF.¹³

In our version of the dictator game, players (whom we call dictators) sat in groups of 10 in a single room and were shown the same set of six partners (whom we call recipients) on a large screen revealing only their faces and their ascribed first names. The dictators were asked to make a decision to allocate $a = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ euros to each recipient, out of 5 euros allotted to them for each recipient. Dictators were assured that the amounts accruing to each recipient would actually be transferred to them, and this indeed took place. Dictators were handed a piece of paper and provided with enough space to record their decisions in a private manner, albeit in a public space.¹⁴

¹²This stands for roughly 8.5 times the hourly minimum wage in France in 2009.

¹³Note that our sample of SM and SX is balanced for all variables listed in Table 1, except religiosity. Our results hold whether or not we control for religiosity.

¹⁴Players were not prompted as to why they should donate. Our protocol reads: “In this game, we are projecting pictures of individuals on the wall. You will see a total of six pictures, sequentially. For each face, we will give you 5 euros. You are to decide how much of these 5 euros (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or all of it, 5) you wish to give to the individual in the picture. This individual will never know who you are or how much you will have given him/her. Your decision is therefore entirely private.”

TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS (*N*) FOR SM, SX, AND FFF PARTICIPANTS IN THE MARCH 2009 DICTATOR GAME

Variable	SM	SX	FFF
Female	0.44 (18)	0.55 (11)	0.52 (23)
Age	33.56 (18)	31.45 (11)	42.74 (23)
Education	7.59 (17)	7.63 (8)	8.57 (23)
Religiosity	2.71 (17)	4.9 (10)	1.65 (23)
Political ideology	4.73 (15)	4.43 (7)	4.26 (21)
Born in France	0.06 (18)	0.09 (11)	0.91 (23)
Family income	3.87 (15)	4 (9)	5.52 (23)
French national	0.17 (18)	0.18 (11)	1.00 (23)
Total <i>N</i>	18	11	23

Notes: The table reports arithmetic means (with *N* in parenthesis) for the subsamples of SM, SX, and FFF players. “Female” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is female, and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the individual. “Education” is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). “Political ideology” is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (most left wing) to 10 (most right wing). “Born in France” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is born in France, and 0 otherwise. “Family income” is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (less than 500 euros a month) to 11 (more than 7500 euros a month). “French national” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is a French national, and 0 otherwise. Note that our sample of SM and SX is balanced on all these variables, except for religiosity. Our results hold whether or not we control for these variables.



Firstname	Version 1	Sylvie	Georges	Khadija	Jean-Marc	Farida	Michel
	Version 2	Sylvie	Mohammed	Joséphine	Jean-Marc	Christine	Aboubacar
Type	Version 1	Rooted French	Rooted French	SM	Rooted French	North African	SX
	Version 2	Rooted French	North African	SX	Rooted French	Rooted French	SM

Figure 1. Variation in the ethno-religious identity of the recipients.

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We varied the first names of the recipients such that dictators would see the same face but with alternated religious identities (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Fong and Luttmer, 2011). More precisely, among the six recipients, two were apparent rooted French with typical French names, two were ambiguous with alternatively Muslim and Christian names (such that dictators could reasonably think they were rooted French with Christian names or North Africans with Muslim names), and two were apparent black Africans (these were our Senegalese recipients, alternately SM or SX). For half of the sessions, subjects viewed one of the ambiguous recipients and one of the Senegalese recipients with a Christian name and the other with a Muslim name; for the other half of the sessions, this was reversed. The purpose of this treatment is to avoid confounds between the ethnic type and the face of the recipient.

Figure 1 illustrates the faces and alternating names of our recipients. It shows, for example, that a random half of our dictators could choose to give money to Khadija and Michel, while the other random half could choose to give money to Joséphine and Aboubacar. Khadija and Joséphine on one hand, and Michel and Aboubacar on the other, are exactly the same recipient: the only parameter that varies is their first

name, one that signals a Muslim affiliation (Khadija and Aboubacar) and one that signals a Christian affiliation (Joséphine and Michel). This protocol thus allows us to measure, all else equal, generosity levels of FFF, SM, and SX dictators toward (1) male and female rooted French recipients ({Jean-Marc, Georges} – {Sylvie, Christine}), (2) male and female North African recipients (Mohammed – Farida), and (3) male and female co-ethnic and coreligious (heretofore *in-group*) recipients [(Aboubacar–Khadija) for SM, (Michel–Joséphine) for SX, and {Jean-Marc, Georges} – {Sylvie, Christine} for FFF]. A difference-in-difference analysis, such as one that compares FFF vs. SM dictator donations to female vs. male recipients, cleanly isolates the effect of gender on generosity levels among dictators of various types. Furthermore, a difference-in-difference-in-difference analysis, which compares the extent to which SM and SX dictators diverge from FFF dictators in their donations to female vs. male recipients, identifies – if it exists – the *Muslim* effect on behavior toward women.

Our results, from both difference-of-means (Tables 2 and 3) and regression (Tables 4 and 5) analyses, indicate that SM dictators distinguish themselves from FFF dictators in a way that SX dictators do not: while both FFF and SX dictators tend to favor women over men in several different contexts, SM dictators favor men over women instead.¹⁵

Tables 2 and 3, relying on differences of means, offer an initial glimpse into the divergent patterns of donations we have identified among SM, SX, and FFF dictators. In Tables 2A–C, focusing on male donations, we see that SM male dictators consistently give more money to men than to women (column (a)), whether the recipient is an average recipient (Table 2A), a rooted French recipient (Table 2B), or an in-group recipient (Table 2C); by contrast, both SX and FFF male dictators consistently give more money to women than to men (columns (b) and (c)). A difference-in-difference analysis suggests that both SM and SX male dictators differ from FFF male dictators; but differential donations follow the same direction for SX and FFF male dictators, while they follow opposite directions for SM and FFF male dictators. For example, Senegalese Christian and rooted French male dictators both favor rooted French women over rooted French men: Senegalese Christian male dictators give them on average 1 more euro, while rooted French male dictators give them on average 49 more centimes. By contrast, SM male dictators exhibit the opposite tendency, giving FFF men an average 38 centimes more than FFF women. On average, SX and FFF behavior toward women converge, whereas SM behavior toward women diverges from the FFF norm.

Tables 3A–C provide results from difference-of-means analyses of the donations of female dictators. These average patterns are also revealing: SM, SX, and FFF female dictators all tend to favor women over men – and thus do not differ significantly in this regard – *except* when it comes to in-group donations. Here, SM female dictators favor in-group men over in-group women, whereas both SX and FFF female dictators favor in-group women over in-group men. The difference-in-difference analysis indicates that these effects are statistically significant, confirming that SM female dictators diverge in their treatment of in-group women from both SX and FFF female dictators.

¹⁵A second pattern stands out in our results: Senegalese Muslims tend to be less generous toward all players in our dictator game. This result is analyzed in Adida et al. (2013), who find that Muslim immigrants show significantly lower assimilation (i.e., higher attachment to their culture of origin and lower identification with their host culture and society) than do their Christian counterparts.

TABLE 2. MALE DICTATOR DONATIONS, DIFFERENCE-OF-MEANS ANALYSIS (N IN PARENTHESIS)

	Muslim dictator (a)	Christian dictator (b)	French dictator (c)	Difference-of-means (b-a)	(c-a)	(c-b)
(A) Senegalese Muslim, Senegalese Christian, and Rooted French donations to all recipients						
All female recipients (d)	0.27 (30)	1.67 (15)	2.06 (33)	$\Delta_1 = +1.40$ $p = 0.00$	$\Delta_2 = +1.79$ $p = 0.00$	$\Delta_3 = +0.39$ $p = 0.32$
All male recipients (e)	0.70 (30)	1.53 (15)	1.42 (33)	$\Delta_4 = +0.83$ $p = 0.03$	$\Delta_5 = +0.72$ $p = 0.03$	$\Delta_6 = -0.11$ $p = 0.78$
Difference (e-d)	$\Delta_7 = +0.43$ $p = 0.06$	$\Delta_8 = -0.13$ $p = 0.75$	$\Delta_9 = -0.64$ $p = 0.09$	Diff-in-diff: Sig. at 99%	Diff-in-diff: Sig. at 99%	Diff-in-diff: Sig. at 99%
(B) Senegalese Muslim, Senegalese Christian, and Rooted French donations to Rooted French recipients						
French female recipients (d)	0.38 (13)	2.00 (6)	1.86 (14)	$\Delta_1 = +1.62$ $p = 0.00$	$\Delta_2 = +1.47$ $p = 0.00$	$\Delta_3 = -0.14$ $p = 0.80$
French male recipients (e)	0.76 (17)	1.00 (9)	1.37 (19)	$\Delta_4 = +0.24$ $p = 0.57$	$\Delta_5 = +0.60$ $p = 0.20$	$\Delta_6 = +0.37$ $p = 0.43$
Difference (e-d)	$\Delta_7 = +0.38$ $p = 0.28$	$\Delta_8 = -1.00$ $p = 0.06$	$\Delta_9 = -0.49$ $p = 0.37$	Diff-in-diff: Sig. at 99%	Diff-in-diff: Sig. at 99%	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.
(C) Senegalese Muslim, Senegalese Christian, and Rooted French donations to in-group recipients						
Co-ethnic female recipients (d)	0.14 (7)	3.00 (1)	1.86 (14)	$\Delta_1 = +2.86$ $p = \text{Not available}$	$\Delta_2 = +1.71$ $p = 0.00$	$\Delta_3 = -1.14$ $p = \text{Not available}$
Co-ethnic male recipients (e)	1.33 (3)	2.00 (4)	1.37 (19)	$\Delta_4 = +0.67$ $p = 0.44$	$\Delta_5 = +0.04$ $p = 0.94$	$\Delta_6 = -0.63$ $p = 0.46$
Difference (e-d)	$\Delta_7 = +1.19$ $p = 0.05$	$\Delta_8 = -1.00$ $p = \text{Not available}$	$\Delta_9 = -0.49$ $p = 0.37$	Diff-in-diff: Not available	Diff-in-diff: Sig. at 99%	Diff-in-diff: Not available

TABLE 3. FEMALE DICTATOR DONATIONS, DIFFERENCE-OF-MEANS ANALYSIS (N IN PARENTHESIS)

	Muslim dictator (a)	Christian dictator (b)	French dictator (c)	Difference-of-means	
				(b-a)	(c-a)
					(c-b)
(A) Senegalese Muslim, Senegalese Christian, and Rooted French donations to all recipients					
All female recipients (d)	1.38 (24)	2.06 (18)	2.39 (36)	$\Delta_1 = +0.68$ $p = 0.04$	$\Delta_2 = +1.01$ $p = 0.00$
All male recipients (e)	0.96 (24)	1.67 (18)	1.97 (36)	$\Delta_4 = +0.71$ $p = 0.01$	$\Delta_5 = +1.01$ $p = 0.00$
Difference (e-d)	$\Delta_7 = -0.42$ $p = 0.16$	$\Delta_8 = -0.39$ $p = 0.18$	$\Delta_9 = -0.42$ $p = 0.15$	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.
(B) Senegalese Muslim, Senegalese Christian, and Rooted French donations to rooted French recipients					
French female recipients (c)	1.38 (13)	2.11 (9)	2.14 (21)	$\Delta_1 = +0.73$ $p = 0.14$	$\Delta_2 = +0.76$ $p = 0.05$
French male recipients (d)	0.73 (11)	1.67 (9)	1.6 (15)	$\Delta_4 = +0.94$ $p = 0.01$	$\Delta_5 = +0.87$ $p = 0.04$
Difference (d-c)	$\Delta_7 = -0.65$ $p = 0.08$	$\Delta_8 = -0.44$ $p = 0.35$	$\Delta_9 = -0.54$ $p = 0.21$	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.
(C) Senegalese Muslim, Senegalese Christian, and Rooted French donations to in-group recipients					
Co-ethnic female recipients (d)	0.33 (3)	2.33 (3)	2.14 (21)	$\Delta_1 = +2.00$ $p = 0.01$	$\Delta_2 = +1.81$ $p = 0.01$
Co-ethnic male recipients (e)	1.40 (5)	1.67 (3)	1.60 (15)	$\Delta_4 = +0.27$ $p = 0.63$	$\Delta_5 = +0.20$ $p = 0.70$
Difference (e-d)	$\Delta_7 = +1.07$ $p = 0.09$	$\Delta_8 = -0.66$ $p = 0.23$	$\Delta_9 = -0.54$ $p = 0.21$	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.
				Diff-in-diff: Not sig.	Diff-in-diff: Not sig.

TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MALE DICTATOR DONATIONS

	Model (1) All recipients		Model (2) FFF recipients		Model (3) In-group recipients	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
(1) SM → FemaleRecipient	-0.169	0.290	-0.557	0.504	-1.196*	0.334
(2) SX → MaleRecipient	0.829	0.439	0.196	0.432	0.642	0.678
(3) SX → FemaleRecipient	1.188*	0.457	0.999	0.803	1.667*	0.297
(4) FFF → MaleRecipient	0.743	0.501	0.659	0.597	0.051	0.591
(5) FFF → FemaleRecipient	1.633*	0.524	0.891	0.681	0.514	0.568
<i>p</i> -Value: $\Delta_1 = (1) = 0$	0.565		0.280		0.001	
<i>p</i> -Value: $\Delta_2 = (3) - (2) = 0$	0.031		0.125		0.105	
<i>p</i> -Value: $\Delta_3 = (5) - (4) = 0$	0.002		0.726		0.308	
<i>p</i> -Value: SX vs. FFF difference-in-difference = 0	0.031		0.249		0.465	
<i>p</i> -Value: SM vs. FFF difference-in-difference = 0	0.002		0.159		0.006	
<i>p</i> -Value: Difference-in-difference-in-difference = 0	0.073		0.003		0.004	
Session (Mundlak–Chamberlain)	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Recipient Ethno-religious identity	Yes		N/A		N/A	
Recipient face	Yes		Yes		N/A	
R^2	0.266		0.221		0.190	
Observations	156		78		48	

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad comprising of a SM, SX, or FFF male dictator and one of the six recipients. The dependent variable is categorical, ranging from 0 (the dictator gives nothing to the recipient) to 5 (the dictator gives his total endowment to the recipient). “SM → FemaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SM and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. “SX → MaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. “SX → FemaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → MaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → FemaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the dictator level. In all tables, * indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% level.

In Tables 4 and 5, we turn to regression analysis with the following model, applied first to male SM, SX, and FFF dictators (Table 4) and then to female SM, SX, and FFF dictators (Table 5):

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Donation} = & a + b_1 \cdot (\text{SM} \rightarrow \text{FemaleRecipient}) \\
 & + b_2 \cdot (\text{SX} \rightarrow \text{MaleRecipient}) + b_3 \cdot (\text{SX} \rightarrow \text{FemaleRecipient}) \\
 & + b_4 \cdot (\text{FFF} \rightarrow \text{MaleRecipient}) + b_5 \cdot (\text{FFF} \rightarrow \text{FemaleRecipient}) \\
 & + b'_6 \cdot (\mathbf{X}) \\
 & + b'_7 \cdot (\text{Session}(\text{Mundlak--Chamberlain})) \\
 & + b'_8 \cdot (\text{RecipientEthnoReligiousID}) \\
 & + b'_9 \cdot (\text{RecipientFace}) + e
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where *Donation* refers to the amount given by the dictators to the recipients in the dictator game. The dummy *SM → FemaleRecipient* is equal to 1 if the dictator is SM

TABLE 5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FEMALE DICTATOR DONATIONS

	Model (1)		Model (2)		Model (3)	
	All recipients		FFF recipients		In-group recipients	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
(1) SM → FemaleRecipient	0.442	0.453	0.575	0.560	-1.094	0.544
(2) SX → MaleRecipient	0.671*	0.278	0.919*	0.319	0.239	0.438
(3) SX → FemaleRecipient	1.089*	0.342	1.255	0.733	0.841*	0.371
(4) FFF → MaleRecipient	1.036*	0.330	0.887*	0.425	0.209	0.496
(5) FFF → FemaleRecipient	1.474*	0.413	1.358*	0.600	0.768	0.474
p -Value: $\Delta_1 = (1) = 0$	0.339		0.315		0.055	
p -Value: $\Delta_2 = (3) - (2) = 0$	0.094		0.584		0.046	
p -Value: $\Delta_3 = (5) - (4) = 0$	0.250		0.356		0.181	
p -Value: SX vs. FFF difference-in-difference = 0	0.957		0.820		0.932	
p -Value: SM vs. FFF difference-in-difference = 0	0.994		0.856		0.022	
p -Value: Difference-in-difference-in-difference = 0	0.954		0.697		0.011	
Session (Mundlak–Chamberlain)	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Recipient Ethno-religious identity	Yes		N/A		N/A	
Recipient face	Yes		Yes		N/A	
R^2	0.225		0.189		0.202	
Observations	156		78		50	

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad comprising of a SM, SX, or FFF female dictator and one of the six recipients. The dependent variable is categorical, ranging from 0 (the dictator gives nothing to the recipient) to 5 (the dictator gives her total endowment to the recipient). “SM → FemaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SM and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. “SX → MaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. “SX → FemaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → MaleRecipient” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → FemaleRecipient” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the dictator level.

and the recipient is female, and to 0 otherwise. Similarly, the dummy $SX \rightarrow MaleRecipient$ is equal to 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is male, and to 0 otherwise; the dummy $SX \rightarrow FemaleRecipient$ is equal to 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is female, and to 0 otherwise; the dummy $FFF \rightarrow MaleRecipient$ is equal to 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is male, and to 0 otherwise; and the dummy $FFF \rightarrow FemaleRecipient$ is equal to 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is female, and to 0 otherwise. The omitted interaction is the donation of SM dictators to male recipients. Coefficient b_1 thus compares the donation of SM dictators to female recipients with that of SM dictators to male recipients. The difference between coefficients b_3 and b_2 compares the donation of SX dictators to female recipients with that of SX dictators to male recipients. The difference between coefficients b_5 and b_4 compares the donation of FFF dictators to female recipients with that of FFF dictators to male recipients. With X , we control for a vector of socio-economic characteristics of the dictator: the dictator’s age, religiosity, education level, and family income; whether the dictator was born in France; whether the dictator is a French national; and whether the dictator personally knew someone who participated in one of our earlier

experimental sessions.¹⁶ \mathbf{b}'_8 summarizes the effect of this vector \mathbf{X} .¹⁷ *Session(Mundlak–Chamberlain)* is a vector of the average value of donations to all recipients in the session, such that \mathbf{b}'_7 captures the effect of session-specific characteristics.¹⁸ *Recipient–EthnoReligiousID* is a vector of controls for the ethno-religious identity of the recipient (relevant only for the analysis of donations to all recipients) and *RecipientFace* is a vector of controls for the face of the recipient (relevant only for the analysis of donations to all recipients and to French recipients, since the analysis of donations to in-group recipients already naturally controls for the face of the recipient). We cluster the standard errors at the individual level, since donations from the same player to different recipients cannot be considered as independent from one another.

Table 4 presents results from a regression of male dictator donations to all recipients (Model (1)), to rooted French recipients (Model (2)), and to in-group recipients (Model (3)).¹⁹ Three patterns stand out. First, the negative sign on coefficient b_1 indicates that SM male dictators consistently give less money to female recipients than to male recipients, and this holds across all three models. This difference, however, is statistically significant only when it comes to in-group donations (see the p -Value for Δ_1). Second, the difference between coefficients b_3 and b_2 indicates that SX male dictators consistently give more money to female recipients than to male recipients, and this also holds across all three models. Moreover, this difference is statistically significant – or closely approaches statistical significance – in all three models (see the p -Value for Δ_2). Finally, the difference between coefficients b_5 and b_4 indicates that FFF male dictators also consistently give more money to women than to men across all three models. This difference is statistically significant for Model (1) only (see the p -Value for Δ_3). In sum, the direction of donations indicates that SM male dictators distinguish themselves from SX and FFF male dictators; however, statistical significance is not achieved throughout. These patterns are consistent with those identified in our difference-of-means analysis in Tables 2A–C, columns (a–c).

Our identification strategy requires that we perform a difference-in-difference analysis and systematically compare SM and SX behavior with FFF behavior. This analysis reveals that SX do not diverge from FFF the way that SM do: they either do not differ significantly from FFF (p -Values of 0.249 and 0.465 in Models (2) and (3), respectively), or if they do (p -Value of 0.031 in Model (1)) it is only because their *profemale* bias is substantively smaller than that of FFF male dictators. By contrast, SM male dictators differ substantively and significantly (in Models (1) and (3)) from FFF male dictators, by revealing a *promale* rather than a *profemale* bias. These results are consistent with those identified in our difference-of-means analysis in Tables 2A–C, columns (c–a) and (c–b). Consequently, the difference-in-difference-in-difference analysis, comparing the extent to which SM and SX male dictators differ from FFF male dictators in their donations to male vs. female recipients, confirms a distinct SM pattern across *all three* models: SM male dictators, who consistently favor male over

¹⁶The results we present in Tables 4 and 5 are specifications without these controls. We discuss robustness checks, in which we include these controls, later in this section.

¹⁷The notation \mathbf{b}'_6 is the transpose of \mathbf{b}_6 , a mathematical requirement for the product of two vectors.

¹⁸We rely on this Mundlak–Chamberlain device, rather than session fixed effects, which we cannot use in our model.

¹⁹Recall that by *in-group*, we refer to recipients who are both *co-ethnic* and *coreligious* with the dictator. For SM dictators, the in-group is a Senegalese Muslim; for SX dictators, it is a Senegalese Christian; and for rooted French dictators, it is a presumably Christian-heritage French recipient.

1 female recipients, diverge from FFF male dictator behavior more than do SX male
2 dictators, whose profemale bias mirrors FFF behavior.

3 Table 5 presents results from female dictator donations to all recipients (Model (1)),
4 to rooted French recipients (Model (2)), and to in-group recipients (Model (3)). The
5 patterns are remarkable: for the most part, SM female dictators – just like SX and
6 FFF female dictators – favor female over male recipients (although statistical signifi-
7 cance is not achieved throughout), *except* when it comes to in-group donations: here,
8 SM female dictators favor men over women, whereas both SX and FFF female
9 dictators continue to favor women over men (and significantly so for SX). The differ-
10 ence-in-difference-in-difference analysis confirms these results: SM in-group donation
11 patterns diverge from FFF in-group donation patterns, whereas SX in-group donation
12 patterns do not.²⁰

13 This section has offered an analysis of Muslim behavior (and not merely attitudes)
14 toward women relative to that of their hosts. Using a novel identification strategy that
15 isolates the religious effect by comparing SM and SX players, our analysis confirms
16 patterns previously identified by survey research (e.g., Bisin et al., 2007, 2011a; Brou-
17 ard and Tiberj, 2011; Fish, 2011; Inglehart, 2003). When it comes to behavior toward
18 women, our SM players distinguish themselves from their hosts in a way that is not
19 apparent for SX players: they favor men over women.

21 4. DISCUSSION

22 Our identification strategy relies on a sample of SM and SX immigrants in France.
23 Our focus on internal validity thus raises two concerns with external validity: the fact
24 that our sample of migrant SM and SX may be systematically different from those
25 who stayed in Senegal; and the fact that we focus on Senegalese Muslims in France
26 rather than North African Muslims, who constitute the large majority of the immi-
27 grant Muslim community in France. In this section, we consider the scope of our
28 results. Furthermore, we address the concern that our dictator game might miss a
29 wider set of intragroup bargains among Senegalese Muslim men and women and thus
30 could underestimate real-world generosity toward women.

31 First, we consider whether the migrating SM community is significantly different
32 from that which did not migrate, such that the differences we observe in our dictator
33 game are driven by unique characteristics of the SM population sampled. We address
34 this source of bias by turning to behavioral indicators of gender discrimination in *Sen-
35 egal* using Afrobarometer data from Senegal. We merge data from all three rounds
36 (2002, 2005, and 2008), and focus on a subsample of Christian and Muslim respon-
37 dents from the Joola and Serer language communities. These data allow us to measure
38 behavior by focusing on the three questions that were common to all three rounds
39 and which measured respondent behavior during the interview, rather than attitudes
40 toward survey questions: the interviewer's assessment of whether the respondent's
41 spouse was present during the interview, whether the respondent summoned others to
42

44 ²⁰We check the robustness of our results by adding, sequentially, controls for: whether the dictator per-
45 sonally knew someone who played in a previous session; the age of the dictator; the religiosity of the dicta-
46 tor; and the education and family income of the dictator, whether the dictator was born in France, and
47 whether the dictator is a French national. We also run all specifications as ordered probit rather than linear
48 regressions. None of the difference-in-difference-in-difference results changes as a result of these robustness
checks.

TABLE 6. ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR TOWARD WOMEN BEFORE MIGRATION (AFROBAROMETER DATA)

	Spouse present: Model (1)	Summoned others: Model (2)	Influenced by others: Model (3)
(1) Female SM respondent	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	0.034 (0.016)
(2) Male SX respondent	0.028 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.023)	0.013 (0.039)
(3) Female SX respondent	-0.048 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.032)	-0.044 (0.031)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interviewer controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>p</i> -Value: Difference-in-difference = 0	0.264	0.199	0.012
<i>R</i> ²	0.047	0.045	0.040
Observations	497	497	494

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the individual SM or SX respondent in the Afrobarometer survey. The dependent variable in Model (1) is based on Afrobarometer questions Q99 (round 2002) and Q104 (rounds 2005 and 2008). It is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the interviewer noted that the respondent's spouse was immediately present during the interview, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Model (2) is based on Afrobarometer questions Q100 (round 2002) and Q105A (rounds 2005 and 2008). It is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the interviewer noted that the respondent checked with others before answering any question, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Model (3) is based on Afrobarometer questions Q101 (round 2002) and Q105B (rounds 2005 and 2008). It is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the interviewer noted that someone influenced the respondent's answers during the interview, and 0 otherwise. "Female SM respondent" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a female SM, and 0 otherwise. "Male SX respondent" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a male SX, and 0 otherwise. "Female SX respondent" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a female SX, and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is the male SM respondent. "Respondent controls" includes the age and education of the respondent; how often the respondent has gone without food in the previous year; and whether the household is in an urban or rural area. "Interviewer controls" includes the sex, age, education, and urban/rural origins of the interviewer. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the regional level. *indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% level.

answer questions, and whether the respondent was influenced by others in her responses. Our regression analysis comparing SM and SX male and female respondents includes fixed effects for each of the Afrobarometer rounds, socio-demographic controls of the respondent and the household, and socio-demographic controls of the interviewer; and clusters the standard errors at the regional level. Our results in Table 6 show that what we observed in the laboratory in Paris is compatible with what Afrobarometer surveyors reported in Senegal: relative to male SM vs. male SX, female SM are more likely to have been influenced by others during their interview than are female SX ($p = 0.01$ for the difference-in-difference analysis).²¹ These results allay concerns that those SM who migrated to France are systematically different, at least with regard to behavior toward women, from those who stayed in Senegal.

Second, SM migrants might systematically differ from other Muslims in France, in such a way that prevents us from generalizing about Muslim immigrants to France. In what direction might our reliance on SM – rather than North African Muslims – bias our results? Recall first that our reliance on Senegalese Muslims, rather than North African Muslims, is precisely what enables us to identify a Muslim effect, controlling for country of origin and ethnicity. Furthermore, according to Diop (1988), the French population associates Black African Muslims less readily with Islam than they

²¹Results hold in a logit specification. Furthermore, difference-of-means analyses (not presented here) indicate that SM women were more likely than SX women to have a spouse present and to have been influenced by someone during the interview (statistically significant differences at least at the 95% confidence level).

do North African Muslims because Black African Muslims speak little to no Arabic and interact indiscriminately with African Muslims and African non-Muslims (e.g., Adida et al., 2010). If true, then our estimate is likely to be a lower bound on the measure of behavior toward women among Muslim immigrants to France.

Finally, one could argue that the differential donations we observe in our dictator game do not capture the fact that Muslims are less generous toward women than are Christians, but the fact that Muslims prefer to support women through alternative channels – for example, by keeping the money they earn in our laboratory games and taking it home to their wives. Put differently, FFF or SX dictators might donate more to Christian women because they view them as more vulnerable and thus deserving of their generosity, whereas SM might donate less to Muslim women due to the belief that women will be taken care of by their family. We rule out this possibility by emphasizing the fact that Muslims in our experiment (and notably Muslim men) do not discriminate against Muslim women only. What we find is a pervasive lack of generosity toward all women on the part of male Muslim players. When given the opportunity to donate to the average female recipient, or to rooted French female recipients, male Muslim players continue to refrain themselves. Our experiments are thus capturing a phenomenon that cannot be explained merely by intragroup gender bargains.

5. CONCLUSION

This study has identified a religious foundation for differential behavior toward women in France, with Muslims acting less generously toward women than matched Christians. Relying on a careful identification strategy and analyzing behavior rather than self-reported attitudes, it isolates the religious effect from national, racial, and ethnic confounds. Senegalese Muslims, our analysis demonstrates, favor men over women in a laboratory experiment, whereas their rooted French hosts favor women over men. This result identifies a specific Muslim effect, since matched Senegalese Christians in the same laboratory experiment mirror rooted French behavior by favoring women over men. Therefore, this study not only replicates results from previous survey research (e.g., Bisin et al., 2007, 2011a; Brouard and Tiberj, 2011; Fish, 2011; Inglehart, 2003) but it also improves them by offering evidence of a behavioral difference, and by isolating a religious effect.

Previous research has found the economic integration of Senegalese Muslim immigrants to France to be problematic (e.g., Adida et al., 2010). Although this study cannot explain the lapsed economic integration of Muslims in France, it highlights a potential area for further investigation. In a laboratory experiment, Muslims deviate from French norms of generosity toward women while matched Christians do not. Research has shown that cultural distinctiveness can impede economic progress.²² For instance, relying on 400 interviews with human resources managers in large French firms, Bouzar and Bouzar (2009) show that H.R. personnel report partly conditioning their hiring decisions on their beliefs about what Muslims will do to the esprit-de-corps of their work teams. They list Muslims' behavior toward women among the factors underlying their preferences for hiring non-Muslims over Muslims. Research has also shown that there is a link between female empowerment and economic

²²See, for example, Bisin et al. (2011b).

development.²³ ~~Investigating whether Muslim immigrants owe their economic predicament in France to their own cultural norms is thus a natural avenue for future research.~~ The question of Muslim integration into Europe, and the gender issues that surround it, are too important to allow either prejudice or denial to reign.

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
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
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


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How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the **Replace (Ins)** icon in the Annotations section.
- Type the replacement text into the blue box that appears.

standard framework for the analysis of microeconomics. Nevertheless, it also led to the emergence of strategic behavior in the number of competitors in an industry. This is that the structure of an industry, its main components, and the level, are exogenous. In an important work on entry by Shirasaka (henceforth) we open the 'black b



2. Strikethrough (Del) Tool – for deleting text.



Strikes a red line through text that is to be deleted.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the **Strikethrough (Del)** icon in the Annotations section.

there is no room for extra profits and the number of competitors are zero and the number of firms (net) values are not determined by the number of firms. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), in a paper on perfect competition in general equilibrium, discuss the effects of aggregate demand and supply in a classical framework assuming monopoly. In an exogenous number of firms

3. Add note to text Tool – for highlighting a section to be changed to bold or italic.



Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text box where comments can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight the relevant section of text.
- Click on the **Add note to text** icon in the Annotations section.
- Type instruction on what should be changed regarding the text into the yellow box that appears.

dynamic responses of mark-ups consistent with the VAR evidence

with well-labeled demand curves. The VAR model is consistent with the demand-



4. Add sticky note Tool – for making notes at specific points in the text.




Marks a point in the proof where a comment needs to be highlighted.

How to use it

- Click on the **Add sticky note** icon in the Annotations section.
- Click at the point in the proof where the comment should be inserted.
- Type the comment into the yellow box that appears.

and supply shocks. Most of the standard framework for microeconomics. Nevertheless, it also led to the emergence of strategic behavior in the number of competitors and the impact is that the structure of the sector



USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION


5. Attach File Tool – for inserting large amounts of text or replacement figures.



Inserts an icon linking to the attached file in the appropriate place in the text.

How to use it

- Click on the [Attach File](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click on the proof to where you'd like the attached file to be linked.
- Select the file to be attached from your computer or network.
- Select the colour and type of icon that will appear in the proof. Click OK.



6. Add stamp Tool – for approving a proof if no corrections are required.




Inserts a selected stamp onto an appropriate place in the proof.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add stamp](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Select the stamp you want to use. (The [Approved](#) stamp is usually available directly in the menu that appears).
- Click on the proof where you'd like the stamp to appear. (Where a proof is to be approved as it is, this would normally be on the first page).

of the business cycle, starting with the
 on perfect competition, constant re
 production. In this environment goods
 extra profits and the market for marke
 he market for goods is determined by the model. The New-Key
 otaki (1987), has introduced produc
 general equilibrium models with nomin
 and... Most of this literature




7. Drawing Markups Tools – for drawing shapes, lines and freeform annotations on proofs and commenting on these marks.

Allows shapes, lines and freeform annotations to be drawn on proofs and for comment to be made on these marks..

How to use it

- Click on one of the shapes in the [Drawing Markups](#) section.
- Click on the proof at the relevant point and draw the selected shape with the cursor.
- To add a comment to the drawn shape, move the cursor over the shape until an arrowhead appears.
- Double click on the shape and type any text in the red box that appears.



For further information on how to annotate proofs, click on the [Help](#) menu to reveal a list of further options:

