Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
LeZ is a Wahhabi, Salafi-Jihadist organization. Because it is a sub-branch of Al Qaeda, its ideology is assumed to be similar to that of the larger organization.[25]
This group has no known political activities.
LeZ is known for its guerrilla style attacks, often undertaken in conjunction with Taliban or TTP forces.[26] LeZ’s forces are well trained and have allegedly defeated both the Pakistani Army and Afghan security forces on multiple occasions. The group is known to use AK-47s and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) among other weapons.[27]
In Afghanistan, the group primarily targets U.S.-led coalition forces and Afghan security forces. While in Pakistan, its main targets are Pakistani military installations, such as air force and naval bases, and Pakistani military officers known to be working against the Taliban, TTP, or AQ.[28]
LeZ is organized into units analogous to battalions, brigades, and divisions in Western armies. It is believed to include 3-4 brigades, each commanded by a trusted AQ commander.[29]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
December 2007: LeZ allegedly participated in an assassination attempt on two-time Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto (unknown casualties).[30]
July 2008: LeZ, Taliban, AQ, and Hizb-e-Islami forces attacked a U.S. outpost in Wanat in the Nuristan province of Afghanistan. The attack was repelled only after the base was almost overrun and 9 U.S. soldiers were killed (9+ killed, unknown wounded).[31]
November 2008: LeZ claimed responsibility for the assassination of Major General Amir Faisal Alvi, the former commander of the Special Services Group of the Pakistani Army (1 dead, 0 wounded).[32]
December 31, 2009: LeZ is believed to have coordinated with the TTP and the Haqqani Network on the suicide attack on the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman in the Khost Province of Afghanistan (10 Killed, 6 wounded).[33]
January 6, 2010: LeZ claimed responsibility for a suicide attack targeting a Pakistani military base in the Sudhnoti district of Azad Kashmir (4 killed, unknown wounded).[34]
As of July 2018, this group has not been designated as a terrorist organization by any major national government or international body.
The relationship between LeZ and the communities in which it resides is unknown.
LeZ is the “special forces” arm of Al Qaeda and as such has extremely close relations with AQ.[35] The leaders and top commanders in LeZ are experienced Al Qaeda fighters who are drawn from the upper echelons of AQ leadership. The head of AQ, Aymenn al-Zawahiri, is believed to have ultimate control over the group, even though LeZ technically has a command chain independent of AQ. In addition to working closely with AQ Central leadership, LeZ is also believed to work closely with AQ’s newest affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.[36]
LeZ also has close relations with the Haqqani Network, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban, and has often acted as much as an armed wing of the TTP and the Taliban as of Al Qaeda. LeZ has been particularly instrumental in the TTP’s consolidation of power in the Pakistani tribal areas and the Taliban’s successes in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan in the late 2000s.[37] It is somewhat unclear whether the Haqqani network, the Taliban and TTP simply coordinate with LeZ or if they actually contribute soldiers to its ranks. It has been reported, however, that LeZ draws fighters from a range of Afghan, Arab, and Central Asian militant organizations including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) and Jaysh-e-Muhammad.[38] It is believed that being chosen to contribute troops to LeZ is a type of status symbol for these groups and denotes the strength of their relationship with AQ.[39]
As of July 2018, there is no publicly available information on state sponsors or external influences for this group.
[1] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[2] Mir, Amir. “Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir suicide hits.” The News, 11 Jan. 2010. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
[3] “055 Brigade/Lashar al Zil.” TRAC, Date unknown. Web. 9 Nov. 2015; Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015; Celso, Anthony. Al-Qaeda’s Post 9/11 Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle Against the Near and Far Enemy. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014; Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[4] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[5] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[6] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[7] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015; Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[8] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015; Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[9] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[10] Shahzad, Syed Saleem. “The Real danger is that al Qaeda and the Neo-Taliban will drag the United States into regional war.” The Boston Review: January/February 2010. http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR35.1/shahzad.php
[11] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[12] Roggio, Bill. “Mullah Sangeen Zadran, al Qaeda commander reported killed in drone strike.” The Long War Journal, 6 Sept. 2013. Web. 16 Nov. 2015
[13] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[14] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[15] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[16] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[17] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[18] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[19] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[20] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-e-Zil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[21] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[22] Mir, Amir. “Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir suicide hits.” The News, 11 Jan. 2010. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
[23] Roggio, Bill and Caleb Weiss. “Jihadists tout Taliban ‘special forces’ training camp in Afghanistan.” The Long War Journal, 25 June 2015. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
[24] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[25] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[26] Roggio, Bill and Caleb Weiss. “Jihadists tout Taliban ‘special forces’ training camp in Afghanistan.” The Long War Journal, 25 June 2015. Web. 10 Nov. 2015. Roggio, Bill and Caleb Weiss. “Jihadists tout Taliban ‘special forces’ training camp in Afghanistan.” The Long War Journal, 25 June 2015. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
[27] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[28] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[29] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[30] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[31] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.
[32] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[33] Mir, Amir. “Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir suicide hits.” The News, 11 Jan. 2010. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
[34] Mir, Amir. “Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir suicide hits.” The News, 11 Jan. 2010. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
[35] “055 Brigade/Lashar al Zil.” TRAC, Date unknown. Web. 9 Nov. 2015. Celso, Anthony. Al-Qaeda’s Post 9/11 Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle Against the Near and Far Enemy. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.
[36] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[37] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015; Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[38] Zahid, Farhan. “Lashkar-eZil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 12(23): 5 December 2014. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.
[39] Rogio, Bill. “Al Qaeda’s paramilitary ‘Shadow Army’.” The Longwar Journal, 9 February 2009. Web. 9 Nov. 2015.