Published Papers

The 1980’s (including the late 1970’s)

  • Safety Regulation,” (with Nina W. Cornell and Roger G. Noll), in Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (eds.), Setting National Priorities: The Coming Decade (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976).
  • “A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms,” American Journal of Political Science 24 (1979), pp. 245-262.
    • Reprinted in Congress: Structure and Policy, ed. by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 4.
    • Reprinted in Philip Norton, ed., Legislatures and Legislators. (Gower House, England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998.)
  • Congress, Regulation, and the Decline of Nuclear Power,” Public Policy 28 (1980), pp. 231-55.
  • Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). Public Choice 37 (1981), pp. 503-19.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol. II. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, ed., The International Library of the New Institutional Economics. vol 1. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004)
  • Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). American Journal of Political Science 26 (February 1981), pp. 86-111.
  • The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen). Journal of Political Economy 89 (August 1981), pp. 642-664.
    • Comment by G. Tullock, Journal of Political Economy 90(4): 824-26.
    • Reprinted in Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds., Monetary and Fiscal Policy. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1994).
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009).
  • “Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency-Clientele Relationships,” Law and Contemporary Problems 44 (Winter 1981), pp. 147-177.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol. III. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993);
    • Reprinted in Lisa Schultz Bressman, Edward L. Rubin, and Kevin M. Stack, eds., The Regulatory State. (New York: Aspen Publishers, forthcoming.)
  • Congress as the Source of Regulatory Decisions: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission,” (with Mark J. Moran). American Economic Review 72 (May 1982), pp. 109-113.
  • Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). American Economic Review 72 (May 1982), pp. 367-71.
  • Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the FTC” (with Mark J. Moran). Journal of Political Economy 91 (October 1983), pp. 765-800.
    • Reprinted in: Robert Mackay, James C. Miller, and Bruce Yandle (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987), Ch. 3.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol. III. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993).
    • Reprinted in Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Foundations of Regulatory Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999).
    • Reprinted in part in: Walter Gellhorn, Administrative Law 8th ed. (West Publishing Co.);
    • Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law 9th ed. (Foundation Press);
    • Reprinted in Thomas P. Lyon, Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007).
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Comment by Timothy J. Muris, “Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): pp. 884-89.
    • Reply, “Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986), pp. 890-4.
  • Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). American Journal of Political Science 29 (February 1984), pp. 49-74.
  • When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). Journal of Politics 46 (February 1984), pp. 206-221.
  • Political Solutions to Market Problems,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). American Political Science Review 78 (June 1984), pp. 417-34.
    • Reprinted in Andrew Levine (ed.) The State and Its Critics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992), ch. 17.
  • “Legislative Politics and Budgetary Outcomes,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), in Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer (eds.), Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1984), pp. 343-57.
  • The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (with applications to the SEC),” in “Carnegie Papers on Political Economy,” edited by Alan Meltzer, Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal, special supplement to Public Choice 44 (1984), pp. 147-91.
    • Comment by Joseph P. Kalt, Public Choice 44 (1984), pp. 193-95.
    • Comment by Elizabeth E. Bailey, Public Choice 44 (1984), pp. 197-200.
  • The Institutional Foundations Of Committee Power,” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle). American Political Science Review 81 (March 1987), pp. 85-194.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol. II. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1993);
    • Reprinted in Philip Norton, ed., Legislature and Legislators. (Ashgate Publishing, 1998);
    • Reprinted in Steven S. Smith, Jason M. Roberts, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen, eds., The American Congress Reader, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
    • Comment by Keith Krehbiel, “Controversies,” American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987), pp 929-35.
    • Reply: “Reflections on Committee Power” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), “Controversies,” American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987), pp. 935-45.
  • Congressional Influence over Policymaking: The Case of the FTC” (with Randall L. Calvert and Mark J. Moran), in Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds.), Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 19.
  • Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control” (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger G. Noll – McNollgast), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Fall 1987): 243-77.
    • Reprinted in part in Arthur Earl Bonfield and Michael Asimow, Federal and State Administrative Law (West Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 16-18 and 531-35;
    • Reprinted in Paul L. Joskow, ed., Economic Regulation (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2000);
    • Reprinted in Cary Coglianese and Robert Kagan, eds., Regulation and Regulatory Processes (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007).
    • Reprinted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed., The Economics of Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming).
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009).
    • Reprinted in Samuel Kernell and Steven S Smith, eds., Principles and Practice of American Politics: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 5th Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012.
    • Reprinted in Pablo Spiller, ed., Institutional Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming).
  • Constitutional Regulation of Legislatures: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference” (with William H. Riker), Virginia Law Review 74 (March 1988): 373-401.
    • Reprinted in Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, eds., Constitution, Democracy, and State Power: The Institutions of Justice. Vol. I. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1997);
    • Reprinted in Lee Epstein, ed., The Economics of Judicial Behaviour. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2013.)
  • The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Market” (with William J. Marshall), Journal of Political Economy 96 (February 1988): 132-63.
    • Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., Public Choice Theory. Vol II. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1993).
    • Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Masten, Transaction Cost Economics. vol. I. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 1995).
    • Reprinted in Dennis C. Mueller, The Economics of Politics. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2001).
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The International Library of the New Institutional Economics vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004).
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, forthcoming 2009).
    • Translated into Spanish in Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, eds. La Nueva Economia Politica: Racionalidad e Instituciones. Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1998;
    • Translated into Chinese: Ma Jun, Bin, Xiao and Yaping, Liu., eds., Selected Collection of Transactions Cost Politics (Beijing: Chinese RenMin University Press, 2008).
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
  • Penultimate Power: Conference Committees and the Legislation Process” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle) in Morris P. Fiorina and David H. Rohde (eds.), Home Style and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics (University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 199-217.
  • Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll – McNollgast), Virginia Law Review 75 (March 1989): 431-82.
    • Reprinted in Thomas P. Lyon, ed., Regulation. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming, Spring 2007.)
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Reprinted in B. Guy Peters and John Pierre, eds., Public Administration. Sage Publications (forthcoming).
  • A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion,” (with Randall L. Calvert and Mathew D. McCubbins). American Journal of Political Science (August 1989) 83: 588-611.
  • Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887” (with Thomas W. Gilligan and William J. Marshall), Journal of Law and Economics 32 (April 1989): 35-61.
  • Floor Behavior in Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule,American Political Science Review (September 1989) 83: 795-815.
  • Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England” (with Douglass C. North). Journal of Economic History. (December 1989) 49: 803-32.
    • Reprinted in: Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds., Monetary and Fiscal Policy. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1994);
    • Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Masten, eds., Transaction Cost Economics. vol. I. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995);
    • Reprinted in Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
    • Translated into Spanish, “Constituciones y compromiso: la evolución de las instituciones públicas gubernamentales en la Inglaterra del siglo XVII,” THÉMIS-Revista de Derecho (1997) 36: 213-231
    • Reprinted in Svetozar Pejovich, ed., The Economics of Property Rights. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001);
    • Reprinted in Colin D. Scott, ed., Regulation (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The Political Economy of Institutions vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004).
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009);
    • Reprinted in Kevin E. Davis, ed., Institutions and Economic Performance (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in Andreas Dahlkvist and Lars Magnusson, eds., Twentieth-Century Economic History: Critical Concepts in Economics (New York: Routledge, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in Pablo Spiller, ed., Institutional Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming);
    • Reprinted in Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn, eds., Gunnar Myrdal, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Robert W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Amartya K. Sen (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2011).
    • Reprinted with a new introduction, “Limited Government and Liberal Markets: An Introduction to ‘Constitutions and Commitment,’” in Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
    • Translated into Spanish, Estado, Gestión Pública y el Desarrollo en América Latina, third volume “Economia Política I” (CAF, Development Bank of Latin America forthcoming).
    • Excerpted, Angela Anderson, Dan Nuttell and Alan White, Revolutions in Early Modern and Modern Europe. Bristol, UK: Pearson Education Ltd.
    • Reprinted in Daniel Klerman, ed., Economics of Legal History. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2015);
      • Comment by Bruce G. Carruthers, “Politics, Popery and Property: A Comment on North and Weingast,” Journal of Economic History (Sept. 1990) 50: 693-98.

The 1990’s

  • The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: The Economic and Political Consequences of the Short-haul Pricing Constraint” (with Thomas W. Gilligan and William J. Marshall). Rand Journal of Economics 11 (Summer 1990): 189-210.
  • Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures,” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1990) 6: 307-32.
  • The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs” (with Paul R. Milgrom and Douglass C. North) Economics and Politics (March 1990) 2: 1-23.
    • Reprinted in Douglas Irwin, ed., Trade in the Pre-Modern Period: 1400-1700. (Edward Elgar, 1996);
    • Reprinted in Daniel Klein, ed., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1997);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The Political Economy of Institutions vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Lisa Martin, International Institutions in the New Global Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005);
    • Reprinted in Edward Stringham, Anarchy and the Law (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2006);
    • Reprinted in Eric A. Posner, Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.)
  • Congress: The Genesis of the Thrift Crisis” (with Thomas Romer), Stanford Law and Policy Review (Spring 1990) 2: 37-46.
  • Rational Actor Theory, Social Norms, and Policy Implementation: Applications to Administrative Processes and Bureaucratic Culture” (with Roger G. Noll), in Kristen Monroe (ed.), The Economic Approach to Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1991).
  • Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle,” (with Thomas Romer), Ch. 6 in Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, eds., Politics and Economics in the 1980s, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Series (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
    • Reprinted in James Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh, and Joseph Stiglitz, eds., Deposit Insurance Reform. (New York: HarperCollins, 1992)
  • The Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information” (with Jeffrey Banks). American Journal of Political Science (1992) 36: 509-24.
  • Fighting Fire with Fire: Amending Activity and Institutional Change in the Post Reform Congress,” Ch. 8 in Roger Davidson, ed., The Post-Reform Congress (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992).
  • The Theory of Interpretive Canons and Legislative Behavior: A Comment on Rodriguez,” To be published under “McNollgast” (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger G. Noll), International Review of Law and Economics (1992) 12: 235-38.
  • A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation” (with John A. Ferejohn), International Review of Law and Economics (1992) 12: 263-79.
    • Reprinted in Richard A. Posner and Francesco Parisi, eds., Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar, Publishing);
    • Reprinted in Lee Epstein, ed., The Economics of Judicial Behaviour. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2013.)
  • Limitations of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,” (with John A. Ferejohn), Georgetown Law Review (1992) 80: 565-82.
  • Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs and American Political Development in the Late 19th Century” (with Charles Stewart III), Studies in American Political Development (1992) 6: 223-71.
  • Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), Georgetown Law Review (1992) 80: 705-42.
    • Reprinted in Singer, Norman J., ed., Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction. 5th ed. (Deerfield, Illinois: Clark-Boardman-Callaghan. 1992) Volume 3A, pp. 739-762.
    • Reprinted in Singer, Norman J., ed., Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction. 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000).
    • Reprinted in Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction. 7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group).
  • Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. (1993) 149: 286-311.
    • Reprinted in Stefan Voight, ed., Constitutional Political Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The Political Economy of Institutions vol. 6 (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Rudolf Ritcher and Eric Furubotn, eds., The New Institutional Economics of Markets. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Translated into Chinese: Ma Jun, Bin, Xiao and Yaping, Liu., eds., Selected Collection of Transactions Cost Politics (Beijing: Chinese RenMin University Press, 2008);
    • Comment by Peter Bernholz, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. (1993) 149: 312-20.
  • Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC Internal Market,” (with Geoffrey Garrett), in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.), The Role of Ideas in Foreign Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
  • “Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), Law and Contemporary Problems (1994) 57: 3-37.
    • Reprinted in Daniel A. Farber, ed., Public Choice and Public Law. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Robert A. Cooter and Francesco Parisi, eds., Legal Institutions and Economic Development. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010).
  • Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle), Legislative Studies Quarterly (May, 1994) 19: 149-79.
    • Reprinted in Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions University of Michigan Press. 1995.
  • Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism,” Political Research Quarterly (June 1994) 47: 319-28.
  • Douglass C. North’s Contributions to Economics and Economic History” (with Johan Myhrman), Nobel Symposium, Scandinavian Journal of Economics. (1994) 96: 185-93.
    • Translated into French: “Douglass C. North: Le Changement Institutionnel au Cœur de la Croissance Économique,” Problèms Économiques No. 2.395 (26 Octobre, 1994), pp. 7-11.
  • Banking Reform: Economic Propellants, Political Repellents” (with Kenneth Scott), in George G. Kaufman, ed., Reforming Financial Institutions. Ch. 2. (Boston: Kluwer Pub., 1994.)
  • Commitment, Coordination, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guilds” (with Avner Greif and Paul Milgrom). Journal of Political Economy (1994) 102: 745-76.
    • Reprinted in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. Explaining Social Institutions. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1995);
    • Reprinted in Elias L Khalil, ed., Trust (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The International Library of the New Institutional Economics vol 3. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Eric A. Posner, Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009);
    • Reprinted in Lisa Bernstein and Francesco Parisi, eds., Customary Law. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
  • Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law,” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), Southern California Law Journal (September 1995) 68: 1631-83.
    • Reprinted in Lee Epstein, ed., The Economics of Judicial Behaviour. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2013.)
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.)
  • Elements of a Theory of Jurisdictional Change” (with Alessandra Casella), ch 2 in Barry Eichengreen, Jeffry Frieden, and Jürgen von Hagen, eds., Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe. (New York: Springer Verlag, 1995).
  • A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation,” Politics and Society (December, 1995) 23: 449-64.
  • Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China” (with Gabriella Montinola and Yingyi Qian), World Politics (October, 1995) 48: 50-81.
    • Reprinted in Chun Lin, ed., China. Vol. II (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000);
    • Reprinted in Etisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio, eds., Effective Federalism and Local Finance (Edward Elgar, Publishing).
    • Reprinted in Anthony Saich, ed., The Politics and Governance of China (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming).
  • The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Spring 1995) 11: 1-31.
    • Reprinted/ translated into Spanish as “El papel económico de las instituciones políticas: el federalismo de mercado y el desarrollo económico, in Pablo Beramendi and Ramón Maíz, eds., Federalismo y Neoinstitutionalismo, Zona Abierta 104-105 (2003).
    • Reprinted in Peter J. Boettke, ed., The Legacy of Friedrich von Hayek (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Stefan Voight, Constitutional Political Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004);
    • Reprinted in Claude Menard, The International Library of the New Institutional Economics (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2005);
    • Reprinted in Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, eds., Economics of Federalism (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Nicholas Mercuro, ed., Critical Concepts in Law; Major Work: Law and Economics (Routledge Publishing, 2007);
    • Reprinted in Dewan, Torun, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Rational Choice Politics. (London: Sage, 2009);
    • Reprinted in Richard Epstein, ed., The Economics of Constitutional Law. (Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2010);
    • Reprinted in Pablo T. Spiller, ed., Institutional Law and Economics. (Edward Elgar, Publishing);
    • Reprinted in John Kincaid, ed., Federalism. (SAGE Publications, forthcoming 2010);
    • Reprinted in Peter J. Boettk and Peter T. Leeson, eds., The Economic Role of the State (Edward Elgar, Publishing, forthcoming).
  • China’s Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style” (with Yingyi Qian). Journal of Policy Reform. (1996) 1: 149-86.
    • Translated into Chinese, Economic Highlights (serialized, beginning August 18, 1995).
  • Rational Choice Perspectives on Institutions,” Ch. 5 in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.)
  • Off-the-Path Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Counterfactuals and Its Implications for Political and Historical Analysis,” in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
  • The Political Foundations of Limited Government: Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th and 18th Century England.” in John V.C. Nye and John N. Drobak, eds. Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. (Academic Press, 1997).
  • “A Comparative Theory of Federalism: The Case of India” (with Sunita Parikh) Virginia Law Review (October 1997) 83: 1593-1615.
  • The Origins of American Trade Policy: Rules, Coalitions and International Politics,” (with Michael Bailey and Judith Goldstein) World Politics (April 1997) 49: 309-38.
    • Reprinted in Jeffry Frieden, David Lake, and Lawrence Broz, eds., International Political Economy, 5th Edition (New York: W.W. Norton).
  • The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American Political Science Review (June 1997) 91: 245-63.
    • A Postscript to ‘The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” in Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski, eds., Introduction to Democracy and the Rule of Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003);
    • Translated into Chinese, Comparative Studies. 50 (December 2010).
  • Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives” (with Yingyi Qian), Journal of Economic Perspectives (Fall 1997) 11: 83-92.
  • Constructing Trust: The Politics and Economics of Ethnic and Regional Conflict,” in Virginia Haufler, Karol Soltan, and Eric Uslaner, eds., Institutions and Social Order. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
  • From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style” (with Yuanzheng Cao and Yingyi Qian) Economics of Transition (1999) vol 7 no. 1: 103-31.
    • Excerpted in part, “The Sale Goes On — Transforming Small Enterprises in China,” Transition (February 1998) 9: 5-7.
  • “Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition,” (with Robert Bates and Rui de Figueiredo). Politics and Society (December 1998). 26: 603-42.
  • Limited Governments, Powerful States” (with Kenneth A. Schultz), in Randolph Siverson, ed., Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
  • Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy,” in Analytic Narratives, Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
  • Political Control of the Bureaucracy,” published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. (London: Palgrave, 1999).
  • Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict” (with Rui de Figueiredo), in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Military Intervention in Civil Wars. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
  • The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act,” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (April 1999) 15: 180-217.
    • Reprinted in part, Walter Gellhorn, Clark Byse, Peter L. Strauss, Todd Rakoff, Cynthia Farina, and Gillian Metzger. Administrative Law. 11th ed. (Foundation Press.)

 

The 2000’s

  • Analytic Narratives Revisited,” (with Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal) Social Science History (Winter 2000) 24, 4: 679-690.
  • The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB” (with Susan K. Snyder). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (November 2000) 16: 269-305.
  • The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition” (with Kenneth A. Schultz). International Organization (Winter, 2003) 57: 3-42.
  • The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation” (with Daniel Rodriguez). University of Pennsylvania Law Review (April, 2003) 151 (4): 1417-1542.
  • Constructing Self-Enforcing Democracy in Spain Joe Oppenheimer and Irwin Morris, eds., From Anarchy to Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
  • Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, And the Political-Bureaucratic System,” in Joel Aberbach and Mark Peterson, eds., The Executive Branch and American Democracy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)
  • Persuasion, Preference Change, and Critical Junctures: The Microfoundations of a Macroscopic Concept,” in Ira Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast, eds., Preferences and Situations: Points of Contact between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005.)
  • Self-Enforcing Federalism,” (with Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr.). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. (April, 2005) 21: 103-35.
  • Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style,” (with Hehui Jin and Yingyi Qian) Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005): 1719-42.
  • The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic LibertyJournal of Economic Perspectives 19(3) (2005): 89-108.
  • Equilibrium Alternative to the Study of Culture” (with David D. Laitin), The Good Society 2006. 15(1): 15-20.
  • Conditions for Judicial Independence” Published under “McNollgast” (With Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues (forthcoming, 2006).
  • Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-Confirming Equilibrium: A New Understanding of the American Revolution” (with Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Jack Rakove) Journal of Theoretical Politics (Oct. 2006) 18: 384-415.
  • The New Separation of Powers Approach to American Politics” (with Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Tonja Jacobi) in Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., Handbook of Political Economy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
  • Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates,” (with Dara Kay Cohen and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar), Stanford Law Review (Dec. 2006) 59(3):673-727.
  • Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia” (with Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Michael McFaul) Publius: The Journal of Federalism (2007) 37(2): 160-189.
  • The Paradox of Expansionist Judicial Statutory Interpretations” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) Northwestern University Law Review (2007) 101(3): 1207-55.
  • Administrative Law Agonistes” (McNollgast and Daniel B. Rodriguez), Columbia Law Review Sidebar (April 21, 2008) 108: 15-22.
  • The Political-Economy of Law” written by “McNollgast” (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Roger Noll), in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Stephen Shavel, eds., Law and Economics Handbook (North Holland, 2008).
  • Why Developing Countries Prove So Resistant to the Rule of Law,” in Robert L. Nelson, ed., Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law. (New York: Routledge, 2009.)
  • Violence and the Rise of Open Access Orders” (with Douglass C. North and John Joseph Wallis), Journal of Democracy (January 2009) 20: 55-68.
  • Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: The Implications of Fiscal IncentivesJournal of Urban Economics (May 2009) 65: 279-93.

The 2010’s

  • Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cut Point Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty” (with Edward H. Stiglitz) Legislative Studies Quarterly (2010) 35(2): 157-85.
  • The Rule of Law Unplugged” (with Mathew D. McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez) in Emory Law Journal (2010) 59 (6):1455-94.
  • A Theory of the Politically Independent Judiciary” (with Rebecca Bill-Chavez and John A. Ferejohn), in Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-Figueroa, eds., Courts in Latin America. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
  • The Constitutional Choices of 1787 and Their Consequences” (with Sonia Mittal and Jack N. Rakove), in Douglas Irwin and Richard Sylla, eds., Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.)
  • Constitutional Stability and the Deferential Court” (with Sonia Mittal). University of Pennsylvania Constitutional Law Journal (2011) 13 (2):337-52.
  • Democratization and Countermajoritarian Institutions: The Role of Power and Constitutional Design In Self-Enforcing Democracy” (with Susan Alberts and Chris Warshaw), in Tom Ginsburg, ed., Comparative Constitutional Design. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.)
  • Why So Much Stability?: Majority Voting, Legislative Institutions, and Gordon Tullock” (with Kenneth A. Shepsle) Public Choice (2012) 152 (1-2): 83-95.
  • What is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order” (with Gillian K. Hadfield) Journal of Legal Analysis (2012) 4(1):1-44.
  • Limited Access Orders: An Introduction to the Conceptual Framework,” and “Lessons: In the Shadow of Violence,” (with Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Steven B. Webb) in Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast, Вопросы ЭКОНОИКИ (Problems of Economics) (2012) 3: 4-31.
  • Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With An Application to Democratic Stability in America’s First Century” (with Sonia Mittal). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2013) 29(2):278-302.
  • Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development,” World Development (2013).
  • Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment” (with Gillian K. Hadfield). Journal of Law and Courts (February 2013) 1(1): 1-32.
  • Endogenous Institutions: Law as a Coordinating Device” (with Gillian K. Hadfield), in Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened, eds., Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.)
  • “Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian Institutions,” Supreme Court Economic Review, (2015) 23:255-77.