The separation that exists between Stanford and the rest of the world seems far greater than six degrees. But our connection to the world is real. This publication is committed to providing an arena for Stanford students to create awareness of human rights issues across the globe based on their personal experience and inspiration.
Coit Blacker, Director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute
Terry Karl, Professor of Political Science
Associated Students of Stanford University (ASSU)
The Stanford Fund
Amnesty International
Kylea Liese
David Smith
To our readers:

As the magazine enters its third year of publication, we are excited to see new faces, new perspectives, and a host of possibilities. We are expanding our horizons as a human rights publication in hopes of reaching a broader community that not only encompasses Stanford, but connects our school to the global arena of human rights awareness and discussion. In the coming year, we aim to create a Six Degrees Human Rights Fellowship, a coalition of Stanford faculty committed to human rights as an academic pursuit, and a stronger human rights community at Stanford through co-sponsorships of events on campus. We invite you to contact us with your suggestions and comments.

Adam Forest  
Lija McHugh  
Jess Steinberg  
Kate Pedatella
NICHOLAI LIDO

Sri Lanka

Nicholai Lidow is a senior majoring in Political Science. His interest in conflict resolution led him to Sri Lanka this summer, where he conducted research on the ways in which the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam cooperate to run the education system in rebel territory.

CHELSEA BURKETT

Sri Lanka

Chelsea Burkett is a junior majoring in History and International Relations. She received a Chapell Lougee Scholar grant last fall to fund her summer research. Her interest in the military recruitment of children in violent conflict led her to Sri Lanka.

ZUBIN AGARWAL

US Refugees

Zubin Agarwal is a sophomore majoring in Biological Sciences and Political Science. He was inspired to write about this topic while taking “Words, Deeds and Dreams,” a class taught by Paul Bator. He looks forward to further studies in immigration law and the consequences it has on the world.

CHRISSE COXON

Rwanda

Chrisse Coxon is a sophomore majoring in International Relations and African Studies. She began an in depth study of Rwanda as a freshman in Stephen Stedman’s seminar and has been pursuing it passionately ever since. This summer, Chrisse plans to travel to Rwanda to study children’s health post-genocide and to volunteer for an NGO that incorporates sport, health education, and reconciliation for children. Contact her at ccoxon@stanford.edu.

LUV REYK

Mexico

Luz is a sophomore studying Political Science and Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity. She hopes to become a lawyer and advocate on behalf of underrepresented communities. She wants to continue to do field research on the current situation in Juarez and believes that it is important for students to take a more active role in denouncing human rights injustices. Her family, professors, and love for Mexico inspired her to write this article.

VICTOR MARSH

East Timor

Victor Marsh is a senior majoring in International Relations. He spent the latter half of 2003 in Dili, Timor-Leste (East Timor), where he worked for the World Bank. After graduation, he will work in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability at the US Department of State as an intern before pursuing graduate studies. In 2007, Victor will work as a US Foreign Service Officer through the Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellowship.
Spotlight On: Darfur, Sudan
A coalition of campus groups has founded the Darfur Relief Campaign to raise funds for victims of war in the region.

Whose Justice?
In East Timor, transitional justice has meant conflict between the UN and the local conception of the law.

Breaking the Silence
Investigations into the murders of women working in the maquiladoras of Juarez, Mexico have stalled.

US Refugees
Several key structural problems in the US refugee program continue to prevent the fulfillment of refugee quotas.

Sri Lanka in Limbo
Though Sri Lanka is a land of great beauty, it is currently being ravaged by ongoing conflicts, despite an official ceasefire.

Sri Lanka at War
Providing stability in the hostile background of the Sri Lankan War, the Jeeva Jothy girls’ home helps children flourish.

Interview: William Abrams
A professor at Stanford, William Abrams speaks about his experience working in death penalty law.

Reconciliation in Rwanda
Over 125,000 Rwandans await trial for crimes committed in the 1994 genocide. An effective justice system is needed.

Contact Us
Letters of 250 words or fewer can be submitted via the “Contact” page on our website.
sixdegrees.stanford.edu
Darfur, Sudan

The Darfur Relief Campaign, a newly organized coalition of campus groups including Amnesty International, Six Degrees, and the International Human Rights Law Association, has begun a local campaign to provide relief for the victims of genocide and displacement in Darfur. Please visit our website for information on upcoming events: sixdegrees.stanford.edu.

In early 2003, two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began attacking military installations in Darfur. Today, the rebels persist in their attempt to end the region’s continuing economic and political marginalization. Some of them seek similar political promises as those given to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the largest rebel group in the country: in July 2002, for example, the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol, an agreement addressing Sudan’s long civil war (between southern populations and the Khartoum government) in general and the right of self-determination for the South in particular.

The rebel groups in Darfur also seek to protect their communities against a 20-year campaign of violence by government-backed Arab militias. Over the past year, these Janjaweed militias have intensified their systematic, scorched-earth campaign: receiving more and more support from the government, the Janjaweed are killing innocents, looting and burning down villages, and using rape as an instrument of warfare. At the time of this writing (Nov. 2004), more than 70,000 Darfurians have been murdered, while about 1.5 million have been forced from their villages and farms. About 200,000 have fled to Chad.

To learn more, visit Human Rights Watch’s website: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/darfur. The site also has donation links to humanitarian organizations working in Darfur and Chad.

Photograph courtesy of Amnesty International

Information adapted from International Crisis Group and U.S. Institute for Peace.
In May of 2002, a new flag was raised outside the old Portuguese colonial governor’s mansion in Dili, Timor-Leste. As interesting as the new flag going up was the one coming down—the flag of the United Nations. On May 20, 2002, in a ceremony just outside of Dili, sovereign authority for the Democratic Republic of East Timor transferred from an international organization to create the first new nation of the 21st century. The following June, as I began my six months there, the first elected government of Timor-Leste was struggling with difficult questions about justice and political reality as it implemented the new Constitution and National Development Plan.

Transitional justice is always hard to address fairly and effectively. In the aftermath of conflict involving severe human rights violations, the presence of an outside peacekeeper raises several questions. Whose law takes precedence? How will courts be governed? Justice systems tend to be linked integrally with the particular culture of a nation and the norms its state enforces. While the UN is in a country, it often acts as the de facto government, in whole or in part, depending on the mission. Given the UN’s role in governing, it must take care not to wholly substitute the wisdom of the “international community” for that of the local population. In Timor-Leste (East Timor), the UN Serious Crimes Unit should engage in consensus building between its prosecutors and the political leadership. While this plan may not satisfy Western conceptions of justice in Timor-Leste, measures to respect the wishes of the political leadership will ensure that Timor’s justice system is sustained and home-ruled long after the UN departs.
they did act collectively in the UN General Assembly to denounce the subsequent occupation, which lasted every year from 1975 through 1999. It took a massacre at a funeral procession-turned-demonstration in November of 1991 to alert the mass media and the world to Indonesia’s brutal rule and spark the global movement to “Free East Timor.”

The human rights story of Timor-Leste is an astounding tragedy that has left many observers in awe of its people and their resilience and determination to fight for freedom. It is a case that deserves attention, not only for its historic tragedy, but also for its new start.

The Timorese justice system is currently splintered into three parts. The UN Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) prosecutes and judges all the crimes against humanity committed during the 1999 violence. The SCU tribunals typically consist of two international judges and, as of 2003, one Timorese judge as well. The office of Timor’s Prosecutor-General, Longuinhos Monteiro, prosecutes other crimes, especially those committed since the transition to independence. For crimes committed during the Indonesian occupation period from 1974 to 1999, there is a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR), which works to document atrocity and facilitate reconciliation between survivors and the perpetrators of violence backed by the Indonesian army during its nearly 25 years of occupation. The UN controls the SCU, the Timorese government controls the justice system, and a panel of Timorese leaders from religious and civil society and government bodies controls the CAVR. With three-part leadership of the justice system, conflicts are bound to arise.

Timor-Leste continues to be one of the most daunting missions

PREVIOUS PAGE: Indonesia-backed militias destroyed entire villages in the Same District of Timor-Leste in 1999.

ABOVE: The author rides from the airport into Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste. Dili has a population of nearly 52,000.

Though there have been UN transitional administrations before, Timor-Leste was the first territory to be completely governed by the UN since the Trusteeship system of decolonization. From November of 1999 through May of 2002, its executive, legislative, judicial, foreign, and all other affairs were the responsibility of one man appointed by the UN Secretary-General. This Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Sergio de Mello, was the head of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)—a mission to prepare the way for democratic self-rule in a territory that had been under foreign control for over four and one-quarter centuries.

“The human rights story of Timor-Leste is an astounding tragedy that has left many observers in awe of its people and their resilience and determination to fight for freedom.”

By 1999, Timor-Leste was a nation badly in need of a new start. Twice the victims of mass murder and other atrocities at the hands of Indonesia, its people kept their nationalist goals alive in the face of international ignorance and apathy toward the tragedies. During the 1975 Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste, the world’s great powers stood either complicit or unaware that a third of the Timorese population had been slaughtered (200,000 people). While individual states took no action to stop Indonesia,
responsible for building justice during a post-conflict transition because of two factors: the lack of trained legal professionals and the lack of clarity in the legal system. Indonesian oppression in Timor-Leste was so complete (and its prior colonizers so indifferent) that there were virtually no Timorese lawyers in Timor in 1999...As it stands now, there is still a shortage, and caseloads for the courts are heavy.”

Yet, Timor-Leste is not the only post-conflict nation with a confusing justice dilemma. In nations receiving special attention from the United Nations Security Council for crimes against humanity, an international tribunal often differs from indigenous legal practice. In Rwanda, for example, the international tribunal

“Indonesian oppression in Timor-Leste was so complete (and its prior colonizers so indifferent) that there were virtually no Timorese lawyers in Timor in 1999...As it stands now, there is still a shortage, and caseloads for the courts are heavy.”

Timor in 1999. The handful with legal training became the top judges during the transition period. Some lawyers of Timorese descent in the diaspora returned to their homeland to serve and the government began a capacity-building program, sending promising students to neighboring countries for law school. As it stands now, there is still a shortage, and caseloads for the courts are heavy. In this area, the UN has proved useful. Its SCU has been able to prosecute the most complex cases—those of the 1999 atrocities. Other types of cases have been more straightforward criminal prosecutions.

With respect to complications of the law itself, it is hard to imagine a more difficult situation than Timor-Leste’s legal codes. For example, because Kosovo was a province of Serbia, it made sense for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to use Serbian regulations and Kosovar provincial laws that were in place before the intervention, as long as they complied with international human rights law. In Timor, however, things were not so obvious. The UNTAET mission took over after illegal Indonesian occupation, which had replaced 400 years of Portuguese colonization. There existed not only one set of potential laws in Timor, but two: Portuguese and Indonesian. The very first UNTAET transitional regulation declared Indonesian law the transitional law of the land. Many prosecutions took place using the Indonesian legal code and penalty system during the UNTAET period. Conflict came to the fore in July of 2003, when the Timorese appellate court, sitting as a provisional supreme court, declared Portuguese law the base law in Timor-Leste. What would happen to the hundreds whose judgments UNTAET rendered inconsistent with Indonesian law? Currently, the Parliament disputes the appellate court’s ruling and is expected to vote to make Indonesian law applicable for regulations where no new legislation has already been approved.

The splintered system of justice was bound to give rise to conflict and turf wars. The most serious battle involved the UN Serious Crimes Unit and the Timorese Government over the issue of bringing high-level criminals in the Indonesian army to justice.

based in Arusha, Tanzania brought with it international standards that led to a large backlog in cases for trial. Likewise, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, the International Criminal Tribunal has likely granted more representation rights to former President Milosevic than his own courts would have granted. In Rwanda, Serbia, and Timor-Leste, the issue of justice came up after a political determination by great powers to intervene in a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission. The latter two missions took on serious governmental responsibilities. Now that Timor is independent, the UN has transitioned out of its government responsibilities in most sectors—except in the administration of justice for serious crimes.

In 1999, the people of Timor were able to vote on their future in a referendum that the UN managed, Indonesia permitted, and the UN’s Security Council and General Assembly legitimized.

INDONESIA’S EAST TIMOR TRIALS
These Timorese officials were indicted in 2002 by the Indonesian Supreme Courts for human rights violations committed in East Timor. Sixteen of the 18 were immediately acquitted. Soares was the only person jailed; he was acquitted after a few days. Guterres is the only person whose conviction still stands. Today, he remains free, as his appeal is pending.

Adam Damiri, military commander
Hulman Gultom, former police commissioner
Eurico Guterres, militia leader
Colonel Nur Muis, ex-military leader
Timbul Silaen, police chief
Abilio Soares, former governor

Timorese bravely went to the polls, knowing that the anti-independence minority was small in number but powerful. The anti-independence minority was armed with weapons while the pro-independence armed group FALINTIL had disarmed and demobilized. In the aftermath of the overwhelming vote for independence (nearly 80 percent in favor), militias and army regulars wrought havoc across Timor-Leste. Certain elements of the Indonesian army that opposed the pro-independence majority directed the atrocities. According to the World Bank Joint Assessment Mission, the military and militia burned 70 percent of all standing structures to the ground. Further, over three-quarters of the entire population were displaced from their homes, and over 1,000 were killed as they ran to the hills for safety.

Indonesia appointed a special panel of judges to investigate the atrocities, but this panel lacked the credibility and the will to prosecute those responsible for the acts of violence. As of November of 2004, the panel acquitted 16 of the 17 people it charged—and the last individual continued to appeal his conviction. The former chief of all Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, faced at least indirect implication in these crimes by failing to keep his soldiers in line. General Wiranto has said publicly that his soldiers did nothing wrong, but evidence points to the contrary. In February of 2003, the UN Serious Crimes Unit officially indicted General Wiranto for crimes against humanity committed in Timor-Leste in 1999 while he was leading the armed forces. These reported abuses led to his forced resignation in 2000; still General Wiranto remained popular with the Indonesian populace, which tended not to believe the charges.

The timing of the indictment just prior to the first popular presidential election in Indonesia further complicated his prosecution. General Wiranto enjoyed widespread electoral support as a serious candidate for the presidency. His most important support came from the former governing Golkar party—the most entrenched party throughout Indonesia, even at the village-level. Challenger Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri beat him back into third place. If elected, General Wiranto would have been a standing president unable to travel due to an Interpol warrant for his arrest—an awkward situation at best and a geopolitical disaster at worst.

Timor’s Prosecutor-General and Foreign Minister have led the effort to distance Timor-Leste from the rulings of the UN Serious Crimes Unit. A year-and-a-half after the indictment, the Prosecutor-General still has not forwarded the warrant to Interpol on behalf of Timor-Leste. So, though indicted, Wiranto theoretically would not have been picked up by police if he traveled abroad. The Foreign Minister and President expressed time and again in public that maintaining positive relations with Indonesia would take precedence over seeing Wiranto in prison. It was a contentious political decision, in many ways unfairly derided by international human rights organizations and international media.

The Timorese government is no stranger to a fight for freedom and justice, but one would think differently listening to the lectures of international human rights groups. Timor’s top leaders, most notably President Gusmão, Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta, and Parliament President Lu-Olo, were also the leaders of the global effort to free East Timor. Gusmão sat in an Indonesian jail cell as the inspiration for the movement, Lu-Olo led the forces in the jungles and fields to disrupt the occupation at every turn, and the exiled Ramos-Horta lobbied in New York at the UN for every resolution denouncing Indonesian atrocity. Today, these leaders have decided controversially to try to smooth over relations with
Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia is Timor’s largest neighbor and trading partner. The two countries share a border as well as an embattled and bitter past.

Timorese leaders insist that positive relations with Indonesia are the cornerstone of its foreign policy. The West, among other nations, is horrified by the human rights violations that took place in 1999 and throughout the occupation. However, no matter how much revenge the West may advocate against the perpetrators, it is necessary to respect the right of the Timorese to make the decision to reconcile. The Serious Crimes Unit consists of people raised with Western conceptions of justice. Furthermore, in my own discussions with them, very few of the international lawyers at SCU (who are largely from other continents) have experience working on Indonesian cases. In Indonesia, itself, there tends to be little accountability for crimes any government official commits, so how would it be feasible to successfully indict a high-level official? Furthermore, given that the probability of success is so low and the potential economic and political costs of stirring the controversy are so high, it is hard to justify the SCU’s actions on a cost-benefit basis.

While cultural relativism sometimes goes too far, in this case of the application of justice, it seems wholly appropriate on three grounds. First, the purpose of the UN mission was to ready Timor for democratic self-rule. To disrupt the decision to reconcile would negate the decision that the democratically-elected leadership body arrived at, thereby opposing the UN’s purposes in Timor. Secondly, the Timorese leaders have accurately assessed the importance of their neighbor, and the actions of the UN Serious Crimes Unit have the potential to damage Indonesia-Timorese relations. Finally, justice systems constitute a class of government sectors nearly impossible to simply import from one society to another—the literature on organizational theory and government institutions illuminates this point. As a public sector whose outputs are difficult to measure and whose tasks depend on skilled people exercising discretion (i.e. interpretation of the law), justice systems are the most difficult to create and sustain. Societies bring culturally appropriate institutions into creation through years of trial and error. Thus, Western conceptions of justice cannot simply be imposed on Timor-Leste in its relations with Indonesia.

The above case study from Timor-Leste illustrates key problems for the future of human rights law as the United Nations or other outsider-led transitional governments apply it. We must determine definitively whose law will rule until a new consultative body legislates in the post-conflict government. Whenever the UN or any outside state builder is involved in a local justice system, it may be wiser to defer to local wisdom when it is in conflict with the international body’s judgment. Perhaps this sounds extreme, but in missions from the tribunal in Rwanda to the case of Timor-Leste, it may be argued that the UN had much to learn from the local population. Consensus-building consultation on justice matters is crucial to effectively account for domestic sentiments. The blue flag of protection raised by the UN must not symbolize yet another colonial project, but instead become a signal of commitment to assist local leadership in transitions to independence.
Cherrie Moraga’s book, *The Last Generation*, comments that the border between Mexico and the United States is a “1950-mile-long open wound.” Issues of violence, death, and disease on the border give the term “open wound” a distinct validity. As one drives across the border, the visual representations of separation are evident—the invisible divide between Mexico and the United States creates an instantaneous change that can be perceived in the traffic signals, architecture, smells, and landscape. The drastic changes on either side of the border do not end with the aesthetic differences. Upon closer inspection, you see the coarse hands of the women who work long hours in factories, or maquiladoras. The dire conditions of the factories also mean that security within the compound is minimal. The sweatshop standards of the factories, coupled with the lack of security enforcement, make the women who work in maquiladoras susceptible to assault. How could these factories exist in such conditions? The development of the maquiladoras is a result of the economic agreements between Mexico and companies in the United States. These maquiladoras not only contribute to the struggle of these women (who make meager wages), but they also hold a much darker secret. The appalling murders of countless maquiladora workers, which began in 1993, have gone unresolved for over 11 years as a direct result of the negligence and lack of action from both American and Mexican law enforcement departments.

In the city of Juarez, Mexico, Rebeca Contreras, a 23-year-old mother of three, wakes up at 6 am on a March morning to get ready for the long day of work ahead of her. Rebeca works in one of Juarez’s many maquiladoras, factories that manufacture parts for international corporate businesses. As she shuffles through her small home, tripping over the blow dryer lying on the hand-knit Mexican rug, Rebeca stops to kiss her children goodbye. She notices that her children are wearing the hand-me-down clothes that they perpetually wait to “grow into.” She tells herself that she works to make things better for her children.

Several hundred miles away in Los Angeles, Corina Montanez, a 25-year-old mother, is getting ready for work as a housekeeper and nanny. She immigrated to the United States nine years ago and now lives in a modest apartment with her husband and toddler. Memories of the border are violent ones, and she finds herself still amazed at the differences in the standard of living between neighboring Mexico and the United States. Corina walks past her white washer and dryer and remembers the pain of washing clothes by hand as a child. As she leaves for work, Corina says goodbye to her toddler as he watches cartoons on the television.
Looking through the newspaper a month later, Corina reads an article entitled, “Another Woman Found Dead in a Mexican Border City.” The article describes the discovery of Rebeca Contreras’s body, found buried in the desert that lies on the outskirts of Juarez, Mexico. The article explains that Rebeca has become the latest victim in a string of murders dating back 11 years. Since 1993, over 250 women have been killed and more than 600 have been reported missing from Juarez. Most of the victims were sexually assaulted, strangled, and dumped or buried in the desert. Another important link between many of the murdered and missing women is their connection to the maquiladoras. As one of the only sources of wages, the sweatshop maquiladoras attract many of the neighboring young women living at or near the poverty level.

As a result of the reinvigorated trade fueled by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), maquiladoras have developed in border cities, such as Juarez, which house close to 300 assembly plants. The term “maquiladora” has evolved to mean any subsidiary plant of a foreign company (primarily from the United States) involved in export from Mexico. The maquiladora system works by making the foreign firms register with the Mexican government before establishing in a town. Once they are established, they are eligible for several benefits such as preferential tariffs on inputs and machinery, as well as simplified Mexican customs procedures.

The boom in trade and retail sales since the signing of NAFTA has assisted economic stability on both sides of the border. The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1992. Since then, exports from the United States to Mexico have more than doubled to a total of 107.5 billion dollars, while exports from Mexico to the United States have grown by 242 percent. The Trade Agreement eliminated tariffs on bilateral trade conducted between the United States and Mexico. A key feature of the agreement involves “product sharing,” whereby final products are produced with parts, labor, and manufacturing resources from the United States and Mexico. U.S companies benefit from the trade arrangement because companies can increase specialization and take advantage of low labor costs in Mexico.

The relationship between the United States and Mexico is especially evident in the economic codependence of the border regions such as El Paso and Juarez. Approximately $200 billion in trade went through the US-Mexico border in 2002. In addition, in 2002, 62 percent of US exports to Mexico originated in American border states, and 70 percent of the exports were destined for Mexican border states. Consequently, the circulation of trade and money has led to an economic stability that the trade between these border cities has gradually forged.

The results of the relationship between the United States and Mexico have not all been positive. Labor, women’s rights groups, and antiglobalization groups have targeted the multinational factories and maquiladoras, and have accused the companies of being indirectly responsible for murdered women. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International criticize the plants for “not providing better security for their low-wage, largely female work force.” The maquiladoras have also been accused of showing “little interest in pursuing the investigation of these murders…or in seeing justice prevail.” The murders, themselves, are some of the most grotesque examples of brutality ever seen in the country and Chicano rights activists point to the violent nature of the crimes as an offense against an entire people. Alicia de Alba states that “these crimes are more than murder: They are ritual acts of pure and unadulterated hatred.

A handmade dress, created by Meagan Gipson, is the center exhibit at a multi-day event entitled “Gender, Justice and the Border” organized by the Border Justice Forum at Arizona State University’s West Campus.
and brutality towards the impoverished mestiza female body.”

The word “mestiza” is used to describe the mixing between Mexican and Spanish blood as a result of the Spanish conquest of Mexico. Alicia de Alba implies that most of the victims are characterized as being darker skinned, presenting the question about whether the murders can be classified as hate crimes fueled by tension between US and Mexican citizens along the border.

Although the initial response to the killings has been primarily centered within Mexico, international sources have stepped up in calling on the Mexican government to take more aggressive action to solving the crimes. Last year, Amnesty International and the Mexican National Human Rights Commission released several reports “faulting the Mexican government for grossly inadequate forensic work, faking evidence, coercing confessions and mistreating victim’s families.” These two organizations have been influential in pressuring the Mexican government to take action against the injustices occurring in Juarez. Corruption within the law enforcement establishment of Juarez has led to the resignation and termination of over 500 local and state law enforcement officers in the Mexican state of Chihuahua.

Members of the US Congress are skeptical about the murders in the border region, and they would rather place blame on Mexican authorities and the apathetic attitude of the federal administration of Mexico during the past 11 years. United States Representative Hilda Solis, a Democrat from California, has introduced a bill in Congress calling on the State Department to put the murders at the top of its bilateral agenda with Mexico. Her resolution has gained some attention on Capitol Hill, with over 100 signatures condemning the murders and calling for further action. A delegation led by the congresswoman spoke to the victims’ families and visited the sites where the bodies were found in March of 2003. These are initial steps the United States is taking, but the murders continue to happen and more needs to be done.

In addition to growing support from congressional officials in the United States, President Fox has also taken steps to acknowledge the fault of the officials in Chihuahua and has traveled to the city to speak with the families of victims. In addition, the Mexican government has invited the FBI to aid in the investigation because there is a possibility that up to twenty of the missing women may have been American citizens. This is a milestone in the process of uncovering the truth about this situation, as well as an international milestone in the cooperation between two nations over criminal offenses. The FBI’s cooperation will effectively demonstrate that “cross-border police cooperation is indeed possible.” Government officials make up only one component of the forces that are driving attention towards this subject.

In the attempt to get as much attention and exposure about this continuing dilemma, different sectors of society and the media have made an effort to increase awareness about the issue. On the social activist level, prominent Mexican celebrities have taken a stand against the brutal killings, especially against the government’s lack of action and attention to the problem at hand. Most recently, Mexico’s most prominent “norteno” band, Los Tigres del Norte, released a song entitled, “Las Mujeres de Juarez (The Women of Juarez)” This song speaks out against the recklessness of police officials that has allowed the murders of hundreds of young women. Even more, although the problem is centered primarily in Mexico, the United States has also responded to the call for a moral obligation to aid in the effort.

Across the border, muralists and artists in Los Angeles have painted murals and paintings depicting the brutality and injustice of the killings. Artistic expressions depicting the murders have gradually taken on a much bigger role in social activism for
this cause. In April of 2003, Arizona State University held a two-day forum to raise awareness about the situation in Juarez. The Public Art Project of the forum was intended to represent the lives of the women who have died in Juarez, Mexico through the use of women’s dresses. The Project decorated dresses to represent the abuses toward women and displayed them on pink crosses on university lawns.

In addition to this, some American celebrities have also taken a stand against the injustice in Mexico. Jane Fonda, Sally Field, and Salma Hayek, along with groups such as Amnesty International, have participated in speeches and organized massive rallies in the United States as well as in Juarez. With the formation of these rallies, protesters have been able to get the media to cover the emerging movement for the women of Juarez. The killings in Juarez have become the primary issue for artists and social activists in Mexico and their supporters elsewhere. The Associated Press has published articles about the grievances made against the Juarez murders, depicting activists marching outside Mexican consulates in Washington, D.C., Minneapolis, Austin, and El Paso who carry signs that read “Not one more” and “Justice for our daughters.”

Interested people are constantly sending letters through mass e-mails and mailings, urging Americans to write to their congressmen and senators to bring this issue to light in Congress. The national response to the killing of women in Juarez is growing, and it points fingers at the lack of responsiveness and responsibility of the Mexican federal government. According to a report from the Center for Public Opinion and Democracy, 31 percent of Mexicans think the state government of Chihuahua and the Federal government of Mexico are equally to blame for the “lack of decisive action in the case of the women assassinated in Ciudad Juarez.”

This comes as reports and interviews with family members of the dead women have shown that families complained of sloppy police work, corruption, and government apathy towards the deaths of their daughters. In addition to censuring the government’s lack of action to stop the murders, some families have outwardly blamed American companies, pointing out that many of the women worked in assembly plants “that produce electronics, toys and other items for U.S. consumers.” The women make the dangerous trek to the factories every day, lured by the promise of good jobs and are only paid $3 to $5 dollars a day to work under unsafe conditions and lack of protection from the companies. The question then becomes: why can’t the two nations agree to solve and stop the murders of women if they can devise trade agreements?

“The thirty-one percent of Mexicans think the state government of Chihuahua and the Federal government of Mexico are equally to blame for the ‘lack of decisive action in the case of the women assassinated in Ciudad Juarez’”

LEFT: Pink crosses are erected at the edge of Ciudad Juarez where the bodies of six women were found. RIGHT: Friends, family and supporters of victims raise a handprinted banner in a march to end theJuarez murders.
With 13 million refugees in the world, global resettlement needs vastly exceed the resettlement capacity of the United States. Yet, the United States welcomed only 27,508 refugees during the 2002 fiscal year, the lowest number accepted in 25 years. Why did the US admit so few refugees? The US certainly could have admitted more—President Bush approved a ceiling of 70,000 refugees earlier that year. The Bush Administration contends that the lower number of refugees reflects the increasing ability of refugees to repatriate or resettle in other countries. This explanation, however, fails to account completely for the dramatic drop in refugee admissions. A close examination reveals that several factors contributed to the decline in refugee admissions, including the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the structure of the United States resettlement program, and security measures implemented after the September 11th attacks.

The Bush Administration has argued that the decline in refugee admissions is a function of fewer refugee applications. The Administration maintains that “positive changes” in the world, including the rebuilding of Afghanistan, allow refugees to repatriate or resettle in nearby countries. To some extent, this explanation is true. In 2002, the number of refugees in the world dropped from 12 million to 10.4 million. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), this decline was a result of the return of two million refugees to Afghanistan. Despite the decline in the number of Afghani refugees, the number of applications for resettlement in a third country rose dramatically. Development of a global communication network and availability of inexpensive travel enable refugees to migrate to distant countries. According to Jack Straw, Home Secretary of the United Kingdom, “Thousands of would-be migrants are taking advantage of...an obligation on states to consider any application for asylum made on their territory.”

Unfortunately, the rapid increase in refugee applications has not resulted in raising the ceiling for refugee admissions. In fact, the number of refugees the United States is authorized to admit dropped by more than 50 percent after 1992, when...
former President Bill Clinton authorized the United States to admit 142,000 refugees. The Presidential Determination (PD) for the 2004 fiscal year authorizes the United States to admit only 70,000 refugees. Furthermore, the PD assigns 50,000 admissions to specific countries or regions of the world. The remaining 20,000 slots can be used only upon notification of Congress. Advocates of “aggressive recovery” thus urge the United States to make full use of the unallocated slots.7

Several structural problems prevented the United States from achieving its goal for refugee admissions in recent years. One such structural problem that causes the resettlement program to suffer is the United States’ dependence on the UNHCR to refer refugees to the program. Because the UNHCR is responsible for the care and maintenance of refugees, it does not always have time to identify refugees who need to be resettled. Non-governmental organizations should be allowed to refer refugees to the United States resettlement program. Advocates agree that “permitting NGOs to pre-screen and refer refugees to INS officers for final screening and review...could bring to INS’s attention a larger pool of individuals who are of potential humanitarian or foreign policy interest to the United States”.8

Another structural problem of the resettlement program is a systematic exclusion of certain groups. Refugee Reports, a news service focused on immigration and refugee services, writes, “The current system excludes the vast majority of the world’s refugees from being considered for resettlement in the United States.” This exclusion is due at least in part to the allocation of 50,000 spots to specific groups, countries, and regions of the world. For example, the United States has refused to admit anyone from Iraq, arguing that “dramatic changes in Iraq...are making it possible for Iraqi...refugees to return to their home countries.” However, not all Iraqis are comfortable repatriating; some have been traumatized too seriously by their past persecution to return to Iraq.9 The United States should, therefore, allow these Iraqis to resettle in the United States.

Haiti is a case in point. For years, the United States has refused to consider Haitian refugees for resettlement in the United States. On February 26, 2004, President Bush announced, “We will turn back any refugee that attempts to reach our shore, and that message needs to be very clear as well to the Haitian people”.10 The Coast Guard returned about 500 migrants in February alone.11 The President’s refugee policy is a direct violation of Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, which states, “No state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever...where his life or freedom would be threatened.”12 President Bush claims that the overwhelming majority of Haitian migrants flee poverty, not political repression. However, the United States evacuated all non-essential government personnel in February and deployed marines to protect the American Embassy in Haiti.13 The government deemed Haiti dangerous enough to order an evacuation, yet Haitian migrants cannot claim fear of persecution if returned to Haiti.

Additionally, the resettlement program excludes groups by imposing overly strict eligibility requirements. For example, 23,000 Armenian refugees, who fled from the city of Baku to Moscow, applied for US resettlement during the fiscal year 2002. 8

“The current system excludes the vast majority of the world’s refugees from being considered for resettlement in the United States.”
Of those who applied, only 1,260 were eligible for resettlement. The majority of applicants were deemed ineligible solely because they were Russian citizens. So far, only 265 Baku-Armenians have made it to America. The Bush Administration claims, “In Russia, there has been a precipitous decline in the number of new applicants and the percentage of those appearing for interview.” The cause for the decline in applicants is not a decline in refugees, however, but the strict eligibility requirements that prevent the vast majority of refugees from applying to resettle in the United States.

The final structural problem of the resettlement program regards US policy towards “long-stayers,” refugees who have spent years in refugee camps. After the end of the Cold War, the State Department shifted its focus toward the resettlement of refugees with “immediate protection needs.” Since long-stayers are not protection cases in immediate danger, inhabitants are left waiting in refugee camps for their entire lives. The United States claims that the current application process enables qualified long-stayers to escape the refugee camps. Still, the fact that tens of thousands of resettlement places remain unused year after year proves the current process is insufficient to meet US goals. Officials also argue that many long-stayers have remained in refugee camps for so long that they may not demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution.” However, the unwillingness of long-stayers to repatriate indicates they harbor significant fears. The United States must make a more concerted effort to recognize long-stayers that meet the criteria for a refugee.

Although structural problems contribute to the decline in refugee admissions, the major reason for the decline is tighter security measures. According to Alyson Springer, policy analyst at the United States Committee for Refugees, the administration implemented a number of new security measures, including “enhanced background checks for refugee applicants; verification of claimed relationships in family reunification cases; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) review of selected refugee applications; and fingerprinting of all refugees arriving at U.S. ports of entry (POEs) designated for arriving refugees.”

Three implications for refugee admissions result from tighter security. First, tighter security delays the arrival of refugees because they cannot travel until enhanced background checks are completed and claims for family member relationships are verified. The enhanced background checks entail obtaining Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) from the FBI. The State Department claims that the SAO takes only 45 days to process. However, the FBI has not adhered to this time frame—the verification process takes more than six months. The process of verification delays the arrival of thousands of refugees as “many languish in camps where they face hunger, disease, rape, or forcible return to the countries they fled.”

Tighter security measures also limit the number of refugees who can arrive each day. The INS limits the number of arriving refugees who may travel on a single flight because the on-ground arrival process takes several hours. In fact, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—the organization responsible for arranging refugee transportation and transit—has had to cancel some flights because of the bottleneck created by new security enhancements.

The final implication of tighter security is an inability to recruit and assist refugees in foreign countries. The United States has had to evacuate a site when the security of its personnel was threatened. In June of 2003, for example, staff members evacuated the Kakurna camp in northeast Kenya. When
The United States refugee program is at a critical juncture. Structural and security issues prevent the admission of more refugees. In order to address these issues, the United States must permit NGOs to refer refugees to the United States and address the eligibility requirements’ exclusion of certain refugees such as long-stayers. Streamlining the new security enhancements in order to process refugee applications more efficiently and surmounting security concerns at refugee processing sites are also crucial to maximizing U.S. refugee intake. The inability of the United States to meet its capacity for admissions indicates a dangerous indifference to human rights. It is important that the United States signal its commitment to upholding global human rights by actively pursuing a more effective policy of refugee admissions. America has been a beacon of freedom for the persecuted since its founding. It is only just for the United States to remain faithful to its history of providing a haven for the oppressed people of the world.

“The inability of the United States to meet its capacity for admissions indicates a dangerous indifference to human rights.”

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The number of refugees allowed admission into the U.S. continues to drop despite the significant increase in the total number of people seeking refuge.

Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.
Here, in brief, are the human rights issues examined in this issue of *Six Degrees*. It is our aim to select articles that cover a large part of the globe. Please turn to the topics' respective page numbers to learn more.

**United States**
Despite a rise in applications for resettlement, United States refugee admissions reached their lowest point in 25 years in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Structural and security issues inhibit the fulfillment of US admissions capacity, placing the program at a critical juncture to address the need for a more effective policy. Page 18

**Mexico**
Over the past eleven years, a series of murders and disappearances linked to the *maquiladora* factories in Juarez, Mexico continue to go unsolved. Human rights organizations have been calling for investigations, yet the Mexican and American governments have been slow to address the murders. Page 14

**Rwanda**
The 1994 conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda left hundreds of thousands dead. In order to ensure justice for both the victims and the accused, the government has implemented the *gacaca* judicial system. Many wonder if this is the fairest system Rwanda can offer. Page 33

**Interview with William Abrams**
The *Six Degrees* Interview Team had the opportunity to speak with Professor Abrams about his work representing inmates on death row in the South, many of whom had not received fair trials. Professor Abrams says this is a human rights violation, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Page 30
Sri Lanka
The ongoing internal conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam continues to paralyze the country. The fighting has compromised the education and growth of the nation's children. One man is challenging this reality by empowering young girls in the war-torn Eastern province. Page 24

East Timor
In 2002, the United Nations transferred its sovereign authority for the Democratic Republic of East Timor to the Timorese people. The transitional justice system has been hindered by its three-part leadership, lack of local lawyers, and conflict between Portuguese, Indonesian, and local laws. Page 9

Sudan
Rebel groups are currently battling for power and protection in Darfur, leading to a year-long campaign of genocide and displacement. Stanford's newly organized Darfur Relief Campaign hopes to provide relief for the victims in Sudan and raise awareness of the human rights violations occurring in the area. Page 8
Sri Lanka is a country of breathtaking beauty and staggering contradictions. The country boasts a high literacy rate and a democratic government; tourists from all over the world flock to the tropical beaches, the elaborate temples, and the ruins of ancient cities—but Sri Lanka is also a place where children die on the battlefield and Buddhist monks scream for war. Modern cities lie in ruins—shelling destroys schools, hospitals, and homes. Over one million Sri Lankans have fled this island paradise in search of a better life abroad. The government of Sri Lanka and rebel groups are neither in a state of peace nor war.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a rebel group, is fighting for a separate state in northeastern of Sri Lanka. This state would be a homeland for the Tamil people, a minority ethnic group that feels dominated by the Sinhalese majority. So far, 64,000 people have died, and the extensive use of land mines by

Sri Lanka in Limbo
by Nicholai Lidow

Sri Lanka in War
by Chelsea Burkett

We had plateaued. Over the course of four weeks in Sri Lanka, the energy that once enlivened our steps had been eroded slowly by stuffed buses and mosquitoes, by holes that doubled as toilets, and by taxi drivers that doubled as nagging salesmen. Our enthusiasm for research had been thwarted by bureaucracy and “I will not comment on that,” by circumlocution and the party line, by army checkpoint, police checkpoint, rebel checkpoint, and rebel police checkpoint.

So there we were. Sweaty, admittedly a little uninspired, our attitudes languishing right alongside the two year-old peace talks in the five o’clock sun. Nicholai and I stood in front of the Jeeva Jothy Girls’ Home in Batticaloa, a town situated firmly in the middle of Sri Lanka’s highly contested Eastern province. Jeeva Jothy served as a refuge for orphaned and economically desperate girls living in areas controlled by a group of rebels known as the LTTE. The group’s cry for a separate ethnic Tamil state had
both parties results in 15 new casualties per month.1 The war has produced more than 917,000 refugees and 800,000 internally displaced persons.2 Throughout the conflict, the government and the LTTE have committed myriad human rights violations.

The government is responsible for countless cases of disappearance, rape, and torture.3 In 1983, members of the government and armed forces participated in anti-Tamil riots that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Tamil civilians and displaced 200,000 persons.4 Throughout the war, the army has indiscriminately bombed civilian areas, destroying schools, hospitals, and homes.5

On the other side, the LTTE pioneered the use of suicide bombing and rely heavily on child soldiers. The group is responsible for 75 of the 186 suicide attacks that occurred worldwide between 1980 and 2001.6 An attack on the Central Bank of Sri Lanka killed 150 civilians and injured 1,500 more.7 The group has engineered countless assassinations of political officials and several large-scale massacres, including the 1990 slaughter of 103 Muslims during prayer at a mosque in Kattankudi.8

Yet, in these contradictions there is hope. Sri Lanka, unlike most countries torn by 20 years of war, has the skills and resources needed to recover from the conflict and create a brighter future for its people. Since the ceasefire agreement in 2002, the prospects for peace have never been greater. However, the situation remains unstable. While large-scale fighting has ended, assassinations have become a daily occurrence and the recruitment of child soldiers has intensified. Neither actor wants to return to the battlefield, but neither actor trusts the other.

bloodied the last two decades of Sri Lankan history. The home held tremendous promise, as the LTTE was the focal point of both our projects—Nicholai’s on their education system and mine on their infamous recruitment of child soldiers. Little did we know how quickly this promise would materialize.

A frenzied voice from inside the home: “Nicholai and Chelsea! Oh good, good, good—you have come again!” Mr. Ilanko’s thin frame shuffled quickly out of the house and down the driveway to open the gate, words pouring by the dozen from his mouth, a mouth unable to keep pace with the brain behind it. “I have let you down twice, my friends, twice! I must offer my deepest apologies. I have been very busy with appointments, and when I heard we had visitors I was so eager to speak with you, and then we have missed each other, and….”

In a matter of minutes, we were seated under the shade of an enormous tree in the house’s yard, tea in hand, cookies on the way, surrounded by two dozen giggling, smiling girls, and faced by Mr. Ilanko, whose boundless energy made it seem as though he would leap from the chair at any moment. “I am here for you,” he said. “Whatever it is you need for your studies, I will not let you down again my friends.” We knew we had stumbled upon something special.

As to just how special, we would soon learn. Mr. Ilanko launched headlong into an explanation of the unique workings of Jeeva Jothy and the philosophy and purpose upon which he founded it 10 years ago. He described the process by which a girl is brought to the home and, if she decides to stay, the methodical steps taken to integrate her into the community. To establish trust, he has the girl choose another already living in the home to serve as a mentor of sorts. To make her feel loved, he makes
enough to begin peace negotiations.

The 2002 ceasefire established the boundaries of government and rebel territory—the rebels control most of the interior of the northeast, while the government controls most of the towns on the coast. Neither side is allowed to carry weapons across the lines. The ceasefire was supposed to bring an end to the violence, and for a while it did. However, in March 2004, Col. Karuna, an LTTE commander in the East, broke off from the northern leadership of the LTTE, taking 5,000 trained cadres with him. When it became known that the Sri Lankan government was assisting this “renegade commander,” the honeymoon period of the ceasefire came to a close.

In April 2004, the LTTE invaded Karuna’s territory in the East. In a series of pitched battles lasting two days, it an absolute imperative to show affection and eases the often shaken girl into the simple notion of a hug. He satisfies any and all material needs that he can, and emotional needs are likewise attended to in his open environment of tolerance and healing.

Underpinning all of these and his other ideas, though, Mr. Ilanko made it clear that his fundamental concern was human rights. He hoped that they might be learned, taught, and disseminated through his humble project.

He offered a proud example of his efforts. With the release of over a thousand child soldiers in March of this year, Mr. Ilanko has housed up to a dozen former cadres in his home at any given moment. For girls, the transition from the LTTE back into society is particularly challenging, with suspicion and judgment conflated by their easily identifiable short haircuts. Their biggest fear upon return, according to Mr. Ilanko, is an encounter with the Sri Lankan armed forces, whose presence on the streets of Batticaloa has been ubiquitous since the ceasefire in 2002.

Picture this: It is a typical day in Batticaloa. The streets are filled with men and boys, moving freely about to do the day’s business. Present to a lesser extent are Sri Lankan soldiers, armed and camouflaged beyond recognition. Fewer still are women, who, as per tradition, never cut their hair and, as per tradition, are fully clothed in saris. And now this: Mr. Ilanko enters the town center. He brings with him not one, but 12 young girls, all clad in short-sleeved dresses reaching just below the knee, all with hair cut just above the ear. He promptly locates the nearest cluster of soldiers and instructs the girls to follow him as he continues down the road directly in front of them.

And so he does on a regular basis, no matter the result. Should the girls be met with only the grim stares of soldiers, Mr. Ilanko is content knowing they will be ever more confident the next time they go. He is no stranger to confrontation, though, and recalled for us several instances where the soldiers had been more obtrusive, yelling threats and demanding that the girls
northern faction recaptured the eastern territory. Karuna escaped with the assistance of the Sri Lankan government, and the troops under his command either scattered into the jungle or returned to their homes. Since then, a guerrilla war has erupted between Karuna loyalists in the jungle and the LTTE cadres in the villages. This sudden instability has given the government an excuse to increase its presence in the East, flooding the area with troops. The implications are grave for human rights in the East. Now, the Tamil people find themselves torn among three sides, and they are afraid to speak. If they support the Karuna faction, they risk being murdered by the LTTE, but supporting the LTTE is equally dangerous. Every day, new bodies are found on the streets, and the increased number of Sri Lankan soldiers has led to greater repression and abuse of Tamil civilians in government areas. In Batticaloa, soldiers patrol the streets constantly, automatic rifles in hand, questioning anyone who catches their eye. On one occasion, soldiers entered the Butterfly Peace Garden, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that works with school children, searched the children at gunpoint, and claimed that some of them were child soldiers.

Freedom of the press has also deteriorated in recent months. One prominent Tamil journalist, Aiyathurai Nadesan, produce papers. In cases such as these he teaches by example. “I told the soldiers it was every person’s right to walk the streets freely, and that if the girls had done nothing wrong, they were in no way obligated to show their papers.” He smiled widely. “I told them I would take them to court and have them regret they ever joined the army to begin with.”

Jeeva Jothy, as we would learn during this and several more visits to come, is awash with such stories—stories of incredible courage and risk in the heart of a town at the heart of a conflict that has known no limits in its victims, its brutality, and its lasting impact on the Sri Lankan psyche. Mr. Ilanko’s home has been challenged

LEFT: Land mines are responsible for 15 casualties every month in Sri Lanka, but local and international organizations are making significant progress in clearing the minefields and raising awareness among the locals. CENTER: Bullet holes still mark the walls of this mosque in Kattankudi, a reminder of the 103 civilians whom the LTTE killed during prayer in 1990. Religious tensions are currently on the rise in eastern Sri Lanka. RIGHT: Despite their traumatic pasts, the orphans at Jeeva Jothy Girls’ Home have plenty of reasons to smile.
commented, “We are always caught in the crossfire...with both the security forces and the Tamil Tigers. And when a local news article is released from Colombo, we may face reprisals in the field.”

Members of the government-backed Karuna faction assassinated Mr. Nadesan on May 31, 2004. Several other journalists received death threats in June, and there was a flood of journalists out of the region. By August, only 10 reporters were left. The government has made no attempt to bring Nadesan’s killers to justice, nor to protect the security of the remaining journalists. According to Reporters Without Borders, “The impunity which prevails in cases involving the murder and assault of journalists is seriously jeopardizing press freedom and the peace process in Sri Lanka.”

The government has made no attempt to bring Nadesan’s killers to justice, nor to protect the security of the remaining journalists. According to Reporters Without Borders, “The impunity which prevails in cases involving the murder and assault of journalists is seriously jeopardizing press freedom and the peace process in Sri Lanka.”

Without information, there is no way to monitor or to protect human rights.

The prospects are bleak for the immediate future. The LTTE lost several thousand cadres when Karuna broke off, and, combined with the recent increase of government soldiers, the LTTE feels highly vulnerable to attack. As a result, it has stepped endlessly by the threats and demands of the Sri Lankan army, the LTTE, NGOs, and everyone in between, yet his practices have never wavered. Nor have they pandered to the cultural rigidity visible just outside the home’s gates. “I want to make these girls powerful women,” he told us on another occasion. “I am trying little by little to undo the enormous inequalities faced by women in this culture.” If not by encouraging them to speak and move freely outside the confines of domesticity, Mr. Ilanko empowers them by allowing the older girls to have a say in whom they will marry, a practice anathema to the traditional Tamil.

While speaking of other ways that he supports the girls’ personal growth, Mr. Ilanko paused abruptly, and, as was clearly his nature, decided to show by example. He quickly ushered over one of the onlooking girls, put one arm lovingly around her shoulders, and declared without hesitation, “When this girl was six her village was burned and her parents killed. She moved in with her grandfather and, at nine, saw him hacked to death by the Sri Lankan forces. When she came to us at 11, she had been working as a servant for another family, without education or proper food.”

And as if the beaming smile on her face were not testament enough to what had been an enormous improvement in her well-being, Mr. Ilanko continued to name more of her accomplishments since she had moved into the home. She had scored the highest marks on her recent A-level exams, was one of a few students in the East chosen to sit on a UNICEF Youth Parliament, one of the few students in the country chosen to attend a pan-Asian youth peace conference in Singapore, and still proudly wore a first place
up recruitment, especially of children. In some areas, the LTTE demands that each family give up one person to the movement. Oftentimes children must go, as families cannot afford to send adults. In the month prior to the Karuna split, the LTTE released 256 child soldiers into UNICEF custody as a sign of good faith in the peace process. In May 2004, a month after the split, UNICEF recorded at least 80 new cases of child recruitment, and the numbers have remained high ever since.

After the ceasefire, NGOs and development organizations were able to enter the conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka for the first time in 20 years. Schools were rebuilt and the people's standard of living began to improve, but since the recent fighting, the work has slowed and local people describe the eastern province as a “dustbin” forgotten by the outside world. Widespread disillusionment has swept the population, replacing their bright medal from the district-wide badminton championships held a few days earlier. The list was met with unabated applause from a roomful of girls no less well-adjusted and absolutely content with their surroundings.

En route to Jeeva Jothy for the last time, there was an unusually powerful army presence in the streets. In our short time in Batticaloa, a number of political killings had taken place; optimism continued to erode in the face of suspicion and fear, and the peace process trudged on, seemingly in circles. As we approached the intersection that immediately preceded the home, sure enough, a soldier stepped in front of the car and held up his hand to stop us as four stern-faced others opened doors, went through bags, checked passports, and asked questions.

We were reminded once again of the miles and miles Sri Lanka has ahead of it with regard to human rights. Though an understanding of human rights is at least nascent in most parts of the country, both tradition and ethnic strife challenge this understanding continually. The dynamic tension this produces makes it fairly easy to slip into disillusionment with a place where the value of human rights is a measure of their political expediency to some, and non-existent or simply unknown to others.

We were lucky enough, though, to see Sri Lanka as a place capable of producing a Jeeva Jothy, a Mr. Ilanko. Countless faces and stories teeming with promise are chiseled into history’s rough façade. It was on our last visit to the home that we met one 16 year-old who epitomized the inspiration found at Jeeva Jothy. To the LTTE, she may have been a former member of the Special Forces who, months ago, had dutifully administered a lethal injection to an important government official. To society, she may be conspicuously short-haired, suspicious, and shamefully unwomanly. To Jeeva Jothy, she is the friend, athlete, contributor, dreamer, and poet whose words follow:

\[
\text{I want something but am unable to say what I am going to say.}
\]
\[
\text{It may be bitter,}
\]
\[
\text{but I will say it anyway,}
\]
\[
\text{And see if it is bitter or sweet.}
\]

**Limbo**: “The LTTE feels vulnerable to attack. As a result, it has stepped up recruitment, especially of children. In some areas, the LTTE demands that each family give up one person to the movement. Oftentimes children must go, as families cannot afford to send adults.”
William Abrams is a professor in Stanford's Program in Human Biology and a lawyer and partner at the law firm of Winthrop Pillsbury LLP. While his work at the firm focuses primarily on intellectual property law, he is an active member in the American Bar Association's Death Penalty Representation Project. Specifically, Professor Abrams works to ensure that inmates on death row receive due process and adequate representation in areas where the state system for representation is inadequate. At Stanford, he teaches “The Death Penalty: Human Biology, Law and Policy” and “Children, Youth and the Law.”

Acclaimed lawyer and Stanford Professor, Abrams speaks to Six Degrees about his pro bono work with capital punishment and his view on the American justice system.

William Abrams

SD: What sparked your interest in capital punishment pro bono work?

WA: As a young child I was inspired by To Kill A Mockingbird, the story of this courageous figure in a small Southern town, representing an impoverished black man that had been falsely accused of a crime. It’s my favorite movie of all time. It had a monumental impact on me, and so I always had this idea in the back of my mind. I always thought, ‘Wouldn’t it be neat to do something similar in Mississippi or Alabama?’

There’s something about the death penalty that intrigues me, concerns me. And it’s not so much the philosophical issue of whether or not capital punishment as a theory is good or bad—

The ABA [American Bar Association] has a project called the Death Penalty Representation project, which I became involved with. I knew that I wanted to take the case of somebody that didn’t get a fair shot at a trial, and I wanted something where innocence was ambiguous. And so we looked at various cases and I took my first case with a man named Jimmy Davis Jr. These cases, by way of background, are called post-conviction challenges: these are people who have been convicted and all their appeals exhausted. They are considered to be final. After that, these clients have a narrow opportunity in first the state system and then the federal
system to contest the conviction on the grounds of a constitutional flaw in the process: for example, if they didn’t have effective assistance in counsel, or other things which are discovered during or after the process.

We have seen lawyers who have tried capital cases and have been asleep during trial. And courts in Texas have said that that is not, per se, ineffective assistance in counsel, because, as one court said, ‘There was no evidence that the counsel slept through the important parts of the case.’ We have seen lawyers who have been drunk, lawyers who have been wholly incompetent to take cases, who haven’t prepared. That is what bothers me, because everyone is entitled to the due process of law, and the best possible representation.

Our first case is of a man who was convicted of murdering a clerk in a convenience store in a town in Alabama. He was convicted and sentenced to death. His lawyers were non-existent. They called one witness, they ignored alibi evidence, they spent little time preparing for the case. They had mental retardation claims that they did not pursue. They had excellent alibis, people who would vouch for where their client was, and they didn’t call one of them. I believe in his innocence, and we will continue to fight in the Alabama state court appeals system.

SD: How do you—along with the ABA Death Penalty Project—pick a specific case?

WA: The ABA has a list of a whole lot of cases, more than they are able to provide lawyers for. They work with several great groups, one’s called the Equality Justice Initiative, based in Alabama, and they work with another organization called the Southern Center for Human Rights, in Atlanta. They monitor and are involved with cases in the South. So there’s a list of people who need representation. I’ll talk to the directors and explain what I’m interested in. Mostly, I look for cases where innocence is ambiguous. I want one where no one really knows, where the guy is saying ‘I’m innocent.’

It’s important that you spend a lot of time selecting a case, and it’s hard because you know that there are all these other cases that are not going to get your attention, but you have to live with these cases. It’s extremely intense dealing with a person who is sitting across from you, just like you and I are, except they are sentenced to death. You’re in death row, you’re at the prison. You look at their hands, their face, and you wonder if this person really did it. Did they use their hands to murder somebody, to take another person’s life? What got them to where they are? If they did do it, they’re still human beings. But maybe they didn’t do it. Maybe a gross error was made. And so these things flood your mind, and you think about the victims. You think about everybody in the process.

SD: The partnership with the Southern Center for Human Rights is particularly interesting. At what point do you consider your work within the context of human rights?

WA: I’m not sure I’ve thought about it like that. I think the way I’ve thought about it is that we have a wonderful Constitution in this country, which I guess from a human rights perspective, is an incredible set of safeguards. The Constitution provides protection for people accused of crimes, especially people accused of

**Executions by Region since 1976***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas and Virginia</td>
<td>430</td>
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</tbody>
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*The United States Supreme Court reinstituted capital punishment in 1976.
serious crimes, where their life is at stake. In the cases in which I’m involved, my clients—the people convicted—did not get the full protection that they were entitled to. In both my cases, these are people who are impoverished, who have experienced racism. Certainly none of that gives a person a license to commit a murder, but neither of them had in their cases the same kinds of protections afforded to them that other people have.

Statistically, the death penalty is imposed at a far higher rate when a white person is a victim than when a black person is the victim. That’s a fact. It’s just a statistical fact. The fact is that [our two clients] did not receive the kind of defense that you or I would expect. I went to look at the notes from the lawyer that represented Jimmy Davis, Jr.—it was just a handful of papers. That’s not how you represent someone in a capital case. That is a denial of a person’s human rights.

SD: You said that you had not originally thought of your work in the context of human rights. Has that changed since you’ve worked in this area?

WA: You ask a very good question, and it causes me to think. I think that in this context this really is a human rights issue. It’s also kind of an American issue. I don’t want this in my country. We can do a lot better.

SD: We know that in your classes at Stanford you refrain from telling students your opinion on capital punishment. What is your position on the death penalty?

WA: I don’t want to be seen as influencing my students in that regard. There’s no right answer, and no wrong answer. You can disagree. As long as you can come up with a principled basis, that’s what’s important, that’s where you get the emotion out of it. I think where I am is this: I am dissatisfied with the fairness of the application of the death penalty in the United States, and I believe it is unconstitutional, because it is not applied evenly, fairly, by geography, by race, by class, and by a lot of other provisions. And that’s where my focus is right now.

“I went to look at the notes from the lawyer that represented Jimmy Davis Jr.—it was just a handful of papers. That’s not how you represent someone in a capital case. That is a denial of a person’s human rights.”

SD: It seems sort of unlikely that someone with your background would be taking up these capital punishment cases. Why does someone like you, a lawyer of intellectual property rights, end up defending disenfranchised minorities on death row?

WA: There is tremendous demand for our work, but as Hellen Keller said, ‘It’s better to light a single candle than curse the darkness.’ I try to do what I can one case at a time, and it will have an impact. I don’t want to judge my counterparts who work in firms that don’t have the interest in doing this—it’s a hard thing to do. But I don’t know that I could look at myself in the mirror without trying to do something. President Kennedy was fond of saying that Dante reserved the innermost chamber of Hell for those who stood silent during times that required moral courage, and that always struck a chord with me.

There was a theologian in Germany between World War I and World War II named Martin Niemoller who said, ‘First they came for the Communists, and I didn’t speak up, because I wasn’t a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak up, because I wasn’t a Jew. Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn’t speak up, because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me, and by that time there was no one left to speak up for me.’ So that’s why I think it’s really important to do this kind of thing.

Professor Abrams will be teaching classes in both Winter and Spring quarters of this year. He would be happy to connect students to organizations like the Southern Center for Human Rights, the ABA Death Penalty Project, and Texas Defenders, Inc.
Beginning on April 6, 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were slaughtered over the course of 100 days. The number of deaths averaged approximately five and a half people slaughtered for each minute of each of those days. The genocide ended in June, and Rwanda began to redress and punish citizens, mostly Hutu, who participated in the massacres. By the year 2000, approximately 125,000 people were in jail on charges of genocide-related crimes, and the accused persons were confined in facilities with a total capacity of only 15,000 people. Perhaps one could excuse this high incarceration rate if it were matched with an equally high number of trials. In reality, however, between December of 1996 and March of 2001, only 5,310 prisoners received judgments. At this pace, it would take “literally hundreds of years” to judge the detained suspects.

The Rwandan judicial system will have to speed up the trial process because a large number of the incarcerated people may not be guilty. Some estimate that as many as one-third of those imprisoned may be innocent. There is a sense of urgency in the Rwandan judicial system because it cannot continue to allow the confinement and deaths of innocent people who await trial hearings. In order to achieve a lasting reconciliation, justice must be achieved within the lifetimes of the accused. If innocent prisoners die before their trials, their deaths could potentially legitimize and fuel future strife in Rwanda.

Since the 1994 genocide, perpetrators, returned refugees, and victims have continued to interact and live in their old neighborhoods. Despite continued coexistence, however, the memory of the atrocities is still potent within communities.
In a study the Rwanda Ministry of Justice conducted seven years after the genocide, 15 percent of the 1,670 respondents reported that distrust was still a “major problem” in Rwandan society. In the same survey, 43.5 percent reported “fear of repeated occurrence.” These findings indicate that memory of the genocide continues to affect significantly the dynamics of Rwandan society. As Gérard Prunier writes, “The probable result of these sour feelings is relative peace in the near future but extreme fragility in the long run.”

Tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi groups continue to divide communities. As a Hutu leader states, “There exist two societies that come into contact: one of those who killed and one of those who survived. It is not possible to tell a survivor to forget.” Although it may indeed be impossible to tell a survivor to forget, it remains important to find a way to prevent further conflict between the two “societies.” To achieve unity, Rwanda must pursue a system of justice that simultaneously remembers and unites.

As questions of justice have come to the forefront of post-genocide debate, the chasm between Hutu and Tutsi—between suspected perpetrator and living victim—has grown. Elizabeth Neuffer describes, “The country’s Tutsi and Hutu population, already divided by the bitter legacy of the genocide, became even more polarized over questions of justice.” Justice—in this case the formal evaluation of crimes committed and subsequent punishment for those crimes—is prerequisite for reconciliation in Rwanda. Alison des Forges, special reporter for Human Rights Watch, explains, “Without justice, there is no relief—psychological and material—for the victims and there is no hope of reconciliation.
Justice is essential not only for its own sake, but also for the effect its perception will have on the society. It is needed to “exorcise the long-entrenched culture of impunity and collective guilt.” However, it is the “sense of justice” that will allow healing of society to begin. Neuffer explains, “In fragile, post-conflict societies, the perception of justice is often as important as its delivery. Justice must be done, but it must be seen to be done fairly.” Once society internalizes the observation of justice, it can begin to move forward from the crimes in question.

Reconciliation, by definition, establishes peaceful relations between opposing groups. “Reconciliation means an assurance that the past rivals form peaceful relations and view themselves and each other in a way that is functional to the completely new relations.” Can there be a system of justice that can simultaneously punish crimes and build these peaceful relations? Paul E. Nantulya suggests the need for a justice system that includes a “process of community reconciliation and healing” by involving the people in the process.

The current classical judicial system that operates in Rwanda may not be suitable for the purpose of reconciling past atrocities and healing the community. “The classical justice system…does not holistically or organically address the rehabilitation of its convicts or the fundamental causes of the genocide…The securing of convictions does not automatically translate into the eradication of a culture of impunity.” The bottom line is that the classical justice system “has little to do with [the victims] and their suffering.” A full response to these problems needs to establish a system that involves the victims themselves, automatically eliminating the communication gap between groups and also promoting a community discussion about the genocide.

Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda, states, “The justice problem is not a simple question of texts or tribunals. It’s about finding an intermediary voice between classical justice, the reconstitution of the social fabric, and the prevention of another tragedy, another genocide.”

- Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda

The gacaca courts are superior to the classical system because gacaca actively involves citizens in the judicial process, whereas the classical system does not create a forum to engage the suffering community. Because gacaca serves a double purpose—assigning punishment and engaging the community in assigning and accepting that punishment—gacaca is a restorative system.
Rwanda celebrates Liberation Day on July 4 to commemorate the liberation of Kigali by Tutsi-led rebel forces. In Butare, a Tutsi-dominated area and one of the last towns to succumb to massacres, citizens celebrate with dance performances. Dancing is not identified as either an exclusively Hutu or Tutsi tradition, so it has great symbolic weight in events intended to celebrate reconciliation.

Hutu and Tutsi women perform traditional celebratory dances at Butare’s Huye Stadium as a guard maintains security. Butare is the intellectual heart of Rwanda, with the country’s only university as well as the National Museum. During the genocide, Butare’s many Tutsis gathered in the town’s common spaces, such as this stadium. Often, this provided the means for efficient massacres, since thousands of Tutsis were concentrated in one place.

Prisoners give a drumming performance in front of a craft fair in Butare, where they are also selling their handmade goods. Justice in gacaca trials emphasizes reintegration those found guilty into society, often through commerce.
system. In this sense, the ceremonial rendering of justice is a political necessity. Reconciliation through gacaca is pivotal in the dissipation of potentially violent sentiments among the population. Reconstitution of the facts surrounding the genocide could be cathartic. It would first permit the victims to share their pain, then allow the accused to give their version of the facts, and finally allow witnesses to contribute to the clarification of facts. If this occurs, Rwandans might have the opportunity to understand and perhaps surmount the pain that is rooted in the genocide.\footnote{22}

Gacaca could serve as a supplement to the international justice system that judges the planners and leaders of the genocide. The Rwandan National Assembly approved the gacaca system in June of 2001, and pilot projects launched in 12 judicial sectors on June 19, 2001.\footnote{22} In October of 2001, the population participated in a general election to select 260,000 judges to conduct the gacaca trials at the different administrative levels.\footnote{23} Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 2002, the first phase of the gacaca judicial system started on the national level.

The 13 members of La Commission Nationale Gacaca orchestrate the national gacaca judicial system, and the Rwandan Minister of Justice directs this commission. Gacaca law designates four categories of genocide crimes: (1) planners, leaders, and sexual torturers; (2) murderers and accomplices; (3) people who attacked without the intent to kill; (4) those who damaged property. Under gacaca, confessions of crimes result in reduced sentences. At the same time, the confession system creates “strong incentives to speak out, to discuss, and to not follow the law of silence.”\footnote{24} In effect, the confession system bolsters the community dialogue essential to gacaca’s success.

Gacaca trials are conducted in two phases. In the first phase, detainees at trial are categorized into one of the four aforementioned levels of genocide crimes. The first phase involves a seven-step pre-trial process that identifies victims and suspects and categorizes the suspects according to the degree of offense. In the second phase, the community participates in the assessment of the crimes, and the judges assign a penalty established by gacaca law. As of June of 2003, fewer than half of the 12 pilot gacaca proceedings had completed the first phase, and no single gacaca trial had started in the country.\footnote{25}

As a result of a presidential decree issued on January 1, 2003, by April of that year, 25,029 of the estimated 112,000 prisoners were able to face gacaca trials. Despite efforts to categorize and expedite the trial process, the gacaca courts remain in their pre-trial phase.

Human rights objections constitute the most prominent opposition to the implementation of gacaca jurisdictions. As voiced by Peter Uvin, the gacaca system is “simultaneously extremely promising and very dangerous.”\footnote{26} Human rights activists cite a number of flaws in the gacaca system. “There is no separation between prosecutor and judge, no legal counsel, no legally reasoned verdict, strong pressure toward self-incrimination, a potential for major divergences in punishment, and so on.”\footnote{27} However, despite opposition to gacaca trials, critics do little to offer a better alternative. A blanket amnesty, an idea that may...
be an alternative to the current proceedings, would not placate survivors of the genocide. Furthermore, a blanket amnesty could potentially fuel tensions and future violent retribution.

Other critics claim that gacaca jurisdictions cannot be valid because of their vulnerability to false witnesses and influential local power-holders. For example, prisoner Jean Pierre Mugabo wonders, “When gacaca starts, how will the judges know who is telling the truth and who is not?” These accusations and fears may pose a serious risk, but gacaca trials can still prove effective. For instance, witnesses speak out before the community, and community members hold the witnesses accountable to the truth, thus preventing witnesses from providing false testimony.

Whereas the gacaca judicial system may have its faults, so does the classical justice system. Some areas of the classical justice system violate human rights. Prison conditions remain abominable and many prisoners lack access to legal counsel. Furthermore, since 1995, an estimated 5,000 minors have been arrested, and as of 2000, many still lacked case files. With strict oversight and monitoring mechanisms, the gacaca system could be the better option compared to the classical system of justice.

The success of gacaca trials depends on the establishment of a monitoring system that can act quickly to correct abuses when they occur. If authorities ignore violations, reconciliation cannot occur and gacaca will become the perpetrator of further injustice. As gacaca jurisdictions move from the pre-trial phase into the second phase, a monitoring system that is “fast, local, reliable, gacaca-specific and centralized” must be in place. With the commitment of sufficient resources, the establishment of this monitoring system will not be difficult, and gacaca will continue to be the much-needed agent of justice and reconciliation in Rwanda.

Gacaca jurisdictions, the best option for the fulfillment of justice in Rwanda, must be a priority. If delays to the start of the trial phase continue, gacaca will become yet another failed attempt at reconciliation and contribute to the growing list of unsuccessful judicial systems in Rwanda. In these communities, painful memories will fester, and divisions will persist—future violence will become more and more likely. Rwanda cannot afford the failure of gacaca—it establishes a truth the community both creates and recognizes and can become the catalyst for reconciliation in Rwanda.
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Whose Justice: East Timor

1 For more on UN led decolonization, see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/history.html>.
4 The Commissions’ official name is Portuguese: Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacao (CAVR)
5 UNMIK Regulation No.1999/24, of 12 December 1999, established the applicable law in Kosovo as the UNMIK Regulations and the applicable law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989, in so much as the latter was not in conflict with international human rights standards. <http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/justice.htm>.
6 The UN General Assembly declared the Indonesian occupation illegal every single year from 1974 through Timorese independence in 2002. All these resolutions called for immediate withdrawal of Indonesian forces and for Portugal to be responsible for decolonization.
11 The UN-SCU technically may not have standing with Interpol. However it is unclear whether the SCU has clout that it could leverage to get an Interpol warrant without Timorese ascent.
14 This also applies to great powers acting as outsider governments — such as the USA in Iraq, the USA in Afghanistan or NATO, the EU and the UN in the Balkans.

Breaking the Silence

3 “Mexicans Blame Government…”, 6-7
4 “Mexicans Blame Government…”, 7-8
5 “Mexicans Blame Government…”, 8
8 Gaspar de Alba, 3
9 Benitez, Rhyo e al., El Silencio que la Voz de Todas Quienza: Mujeres y Victimas en Ciudad Juarez. Azar, Chihuahua, Mexico, 1999. Appendix A
10 Burnett, 2
11 Burnett, 2
13 “Digging up police skeletons” The Economist. 11 Dec 1999. 35.
14 Kong, 1
15 Center for Public Opinion and Democracy. 1.
16 Kong, 1
17 Kong, 1
18 Gaspar de Alba, 4

US Refugees

1 The term “refugee” has many meanings. The United States definition (Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended) is, “(A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
3 United States Department of State, 2
5 Straw, Jack.
6 Hyde and Lantos.
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10 USCRI, 4
12 USCRI, 4
13 Swarns, 11
15 Refugee Council USA, 9
16 Refugee Council USA, 9
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18 Springer, 8
19 United States Department of State, 2
20 Springer, 8

fall2004

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9. Personal interviews
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13. Personal interviews
14. Personal interviews
15. Personal interviews

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9. Ntaganda, 139.
17. Des Forces, 746.
18. Ntaganda, 35.
22. Ntaganda, 66.
27. Uvin, 11.
28. Uvin, 3.
Reaching Out

Human Rights-Related Fellowships & Internships

Many students who have published in Six Degrees traveled abroad to explore human rights issues through research, hands-on community development, and activism. Below is a short listing of fellowship and internship opportunities through which you can become involved around the world.

Fellowships

**African Service Fellowship**: work on social issues in southern Africa
Edith & Norman Abrams Service Fellowships in Public Interest Law: gain experience in the practice of public interest law
**Stanford Pride Summer Fellowship**: promote activism and civil rights work in the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender communities
**Urban Summer Fellowship**: work with an organization that addresses urban issues
**Haas Summer Fellowship Program**: develop and implement a community service project
Andrew Daher Fellowship: design a project combining economics or business, and public service
**Sand Hill Fellowship in Philanthropy**: learn about philanthropy by working with a Bay Area foundation
**Tom Ford Fellowship in Philanthropy**: explore philanthropic work as a possible career path
**John Gardner Public Service Fellowship Program**: work with a mentor who can help foster professional growth and development for recent graduates devoted to public service

For more information on summer and post-graduate opportunities through the Haas Center, visit http://haas.stanford.edu, e-mail fellowships@haas.stanford.edu, or call (650) 725-7408. The first seven listings include a $3,000 stipend and last nine weeks.

Internships

**Center for Constitutional Rights, Ella Baker Internship Program**: encourages young law professionals to become “people’s lawyers” and activists. Contact Denise Reinhardt at denise@ccr-ny.org
**Human Rights Resource Center, Center for Justice and International Law**: gain comprehensive knowledge of the function of the inter-American system of human rights protection, a firm grasp of the human rights situation in Latin America, and practical experience in the day-to-day operation of an international NGO. Visit http://www.hrusa.org/field/internships/cejilintern.shtm
**International Rescue Committee**: conduct legal research and draft memoranda on international law and humanitarian aid. Visit http://www.theirc.org/jobs/index.cfm/number/2003-425
**Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders)**: volunteer in the medical field or in the New York and Los Angeles-based offices. Visit http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/volunteer/
**Toledo Institute for Development and the Environment (TIDE)**: help promote sustainable development, and assist cultural groups by monitoring both marine and terrestrial reserves through community outreach programs. Visit http://www.tidebelize.org
**Urban Justice Center**: work on a community development project. Visit http://www.urbanjustice.org/opportunities/index.html

For more information on internships, an additional listing is available through Global Action Network at: http://www.globalactionnetwork.org/partners/fellowships/prof/index.php
where, after all, do universal human rights begin? in small places, close to home—so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. yet they are the world of the individual person: the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.

-Eleanor Roosevelt

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