

ocrats concentrated their propaganda
ht of Azerbaijan to have schools con-
ge and to have provincial autonomy.
to the central government, the second
ially because of the presence of Soviet
on this subject between the Democrat
id not help to settle the issue. By No-
ling to achieve their aims by negotia-
/ to take matters into their own hands.
arge quantities of arms had been dis-
erents and the peasantry. It was com-
t that the arms were supplied directly
dictated, by the Red Army. Following
ats launched a new offensive to seize
armerie posts were attacked and dis-
arious centers were occupied by the in-
army and police officers, and some in-
ere killed. This action was carried out
of Soviet military authorities, although
rene openly. Soviet tactics consisted in
s of the Iranian army or gendarmerie
ll the riots; (b) protecting all meetings
ocrats by posting armed Soviet detach-
(c) intimidating the population by the
fficials in scattered points under various
Soviet army commanders pretended to
th Iranian civil and military authorities.
f Soviet connivance with the Democrats
nment sent north regular troops to quell
were barred from entering the Soviet

ocratic party displayed vigorous political
Central Committee issued a proclama-
complete autonomy of Azerbaijan. On
ublished a list of Iranian officials who
st included the names of the Command-
is chief of staff, and several gendarmerie

and police officers. On the other hand, a Provisional Congress of Azerbaijan that had been called into being earlier in the fall and that was composed of party supporters, designated a thirty-nine-man commission to organize elections to a provincial National Assembly. These elections were carried out in an atmosphere of terror and intimidation and in their own crude way followed Soviet patterns. The Democratic party was the only one presenting candidates. No organized opposition existed. The nationalist press and even mail from other parts of Iran was barred entry into Azerbaijan or—in some cases—was burned outright by Soviet censors.

On December 12 the provincial National Assembly was formally inaugurated in Tabriz. It was composed of 101 deputies, all Democrats or individuals forced into collaboration under duress. Its first step on its first day was to proclaim the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and to designate a government under the "premiership" of the veteran Comintern agent Ja'afar Pishevari. The "government" of Azerbaijan announced that the autonomous state would be conducted on "democratic principles" but that it did not desire separation from Iran. It also issued a program that said that private property would be inviolable; that "traitors and reactionaries" would be purged from the gendarmerie; that a "people's army" would be formed from local militia groups; and that Turkish would be the official language of the state. It added that the government would distribute to the peasants government-owned land as well as that of "reactionary landlords who ran away from Azerbaijan."

A few days after the constitution of the revolutionary government was completed, the Azerbaijan Assembly was disbanded and its functions were transferred to the provisional presidium, whose authority overlapped with that of the cabinet. The new regime quickly proceeded to carry out its plans. It started a land-distribution program. It nationalized all banks in Tabriz holding 3,000,000 tomans or more. It introduced Turkish in the administration and the schools and took steps to establish a university. Several measures were also taken favoring the workers over the industrialists. Furthermore, a commission formed from representatives of the Ministries of Trade, Economics, and Finance was called upon to establish trade connections with foreign governments.

ne resembled a police state. Although a l in the beginning of 1946, allegedly ac- f universal and secret suffrage, yet little evidence. Hundreds of refugees complain- an or Iraq. At the same time the Azerbai- modeled after N.K.V.D. patterns. It was , Minister of Interior and a veteran Com- . Foreigners were generally barred from d those who happened to get there were rned by the local authorities not to show government itself was composed of men o the Soviets or directly imported from people's army" or the partisans, *fedailar*, s of Soviet agents from the Caucasus and rmenians or those Iranian "immigrants," returned to their native country from the ationary troops were, as a rule, clad in ijani insignia.

ntly seconded by the Tudeh propaganda reen frank statements of having received als that this help was anything more than cast from Tabriz he once openly thanked owing "the tyrannical regime of Iran." ⁴ ing to T. C. Young of the American Em- ply admitted that the success of his party e Soviet army in Azerbaijan. Asking why am T. Sexton, the American military attaché in id was unsuccessful because the armed Democrats nined him under arrest, and released them only y would return straightway to Teheran.

d Biriya, educated in Russia, Minister of Educa- ter of Interior, a Communist active in the 1919- ijian with Russia, and Governor-General of Azer- on from the premiership; Sadiq Padegan, born ral Committee of the Democratic party; Adalat, nist party in Baku, founder of the Democratic Danishiyani, Commander-in-Chief of the Demo- urkish, knew no Persian and spoke, read, and

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the Democrats should refuse this help, he stated that it was not the first time in the history of the world or Iran that a revolutionary move- ment had been aided by a foreign Power. To add weight to this argument Pishevari cited the example of early Iranian constitutional- ists who had received aid from Britain and pointed out the assistance given by France to the American Revolution.⁵ On the other hand, Tudeh's leader Iraj Iskandari, bluntly declared in the spring of 1946:

Russia extended its help to us, but Britain opposed the Tudeh Party and went even further by actively supporting reactionaries. . . . So long as the Russians are not harming our country we refuse to believe rumors of Soviet domination of Iran. Their only interference came when the reac- tionary central government tried to send troops to quell the movement. This [Russian] interference was applauded by all anxious to see popular progressive movements grow.⁶

Simultaneously with the events in Tabriz a Kurdish uprising took place in western Azerbaijan. On December 15, 1945, a number of leaders of the Kurdish Democrat party met in the presence of Soviet officers at Mahabad and proclaimed a Kurdish People's Republic. In January, 1946, Qazi Mohammed, chief of Mahabad, was elected to the presidency of the Republic. Among the members of the new gov- ernment were his cousin Seif Qazi and Mulla Mustafa, a rebellious chief from Iraq. Five Kurdish chieftains received the title of marshal and were given Soviet uniforms. The Kurdish Republic sent ob- servers to the Azerbaijan parliament but insisted on separate identity from the revolutionary government in Tabriz. Following the negotia- tions among Pishevari, Qazi Mohammed, and the Soviet representa- tives, a treaty was signed on April 23, 1946, between the Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments which provided for military alliance, fair treatment of minorities, exchange of diplomatic missions, and com- mon diplomatic action toward the Teheran government.⁷

Thus the Kurdish uprising completed the separation of the whole province of Azerbaijan from the control of Teheran authorities. It

⁵ This information is based on information given to the author personally by Professor T. C. Young. It is confirmed by the *Washington Post*, Dec. 12, 1945.

⁶ *New York Times*, April 12, 1946.

⁷ For a fuller description of the Kurdish-Azerbaijani relations see Archie Roose- velt, Jr., the "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," *Middle East Journal*, July, 1947.

acceptable to the Russians before entering into parleys with them. Then, following the Security Council's recommendation, Qavam at the head of a five-man mission left for Moscow. He stayed in the Soviet capital from February 19 till March 11 but failed to reach an agreement. During this two-and-a-half-week stay he saw Stalin twice and Molotov four times. According to the official revelation of Hosein Ala, Iranian Ambassador in Washington, the Soviet leaders formulated the following proposals:

- (1) Soviet troops would continue to stay in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period.
- (2) The Iranian government would recognize the internal autonomy of Azerbaijan. If the Iranian government acquiesced in this request, the Soviet government offered to take steps to arrange that:
 - (a) The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, in relation to the central government, would bear the designation of Governor General.
 - (b) Azerbaijan would have no Ministry of War or Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 - (c) Thirty per cent of the Azerbaijan revenue would be paid to the Iranian central government.
 - (d) All correspondence with the central government would be in Persian.
- (3) The Soviet government would abandon its demand for an oil concession. Instead it proposed that an Iranian-Russian joint stock company be set up with 51 per cent of the shares owned by the Soviets and 49 per cent by Iran.¹¹

On March 2, 1946, during Qavam's stay in Moscow, the deadline came for evacuation of all Allied troops. In practice the deadline referred only to British and Soviet troops, as the Americans had left Iran by January 1. The British forces were withdrawn by March 2, but there was no sign of Soviet evacuation, except for some military movements from one district to another inside Iran. The approach of March 2 was watched in Washington and London with growing uneasiness and tension. The failure of the Soviets to evacuate would place before the West a new violation of an international agreement by the Russians and thus complicate the whole matter. It would also call for more positive action on the part of the West, as non-

¹¹ *New York Times*, March 20, 1946.

them toward the Turkish and Iraqi borders in the west and toward Teheran in the east. Sherman tanks were observed by Major Carl P. Garver, American air attaché, at Karaj, only twenty-five miles west of Teheran. During the Iranian New Year's holiday of March 21-27 an armed coup by the Tudeh and the Soviet agents was generally expected in the capital. Yet it never materialized. Diplomatic observers ascribed Soviet hesitation at this juncture to the stiffening of the American attitude as evidenced by immediate publicity given the Russian troop movements by the State Department and, on the other hand, by the determined measures taken by the gendarmerie adviser, Colonel Schwarzkopf, to protect the capital.

Despite all pessimistic prognostications, Qavam showed himself an astute statesman and diplomat. Following his instructions, Ambassador Ala appealed for the second time to the United Nations. This time he accused the Soviets of keeping their troops in Iran despite their March 2 deadline for withdrawal and of continued interference "through the medium of Soviet agents, officials and armed forces." Ala's accusation made sensational news in the United States where the Security Council was then meeting. A prolonged debate was characterized by extreme frankness on the part of the Iranian delegate, whose testimony was impressive for its legalistic precision. The Soviets procrastinated and through procedural devices tried to stop the hearing of the case and to keep the Iranian delegate from speaking. At one time the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko walked dramatically out of the conference room. During this debate the American government took upon itself the burden of defending the principles of international intercourse. Secretary Byrnes, who appeared in person before the Council, boldly led the American delegation and gave clear signs that the United States assumed responsibility and leadership in international affairs.

For the Soviets the publicity of an international gathering in which they stood in the defendant's box was obviously most inconvenient. Their only hope lay in continuance of direct negotiations with the Iranian Premier, which might result in an agreement favoring their interests. This is probably the explanation why on March 26 Gromyko suddenly announced that his government had reached an agreement with Iran providing for the evacuation of Soviet troops

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within six weeks after March 24 "if no unforeseen circumstances occur." Steady Soviet pressure on Qavam caused him to instruct Ambassador Ala to demand the removal of the dispute from the Council's agenda. With truly patriotic intransigence Ala declined to follow this instruction, making it clear that his government must have acted under duress. This was undoubtedly true. In fact, the instructions given by Qavam during this nerve-racking period were largely conditioned by his alternating conversations with the Soviet and the American Ambassadors in Teheran. Unfortunately for Iran, the American Ambassador, Mr. Murray, was at this juncture confined to bed at his doctor's orders. As a result, the Soviet Ambassador's calls on the Premier were more frequent and his insistence on a solution satisfactory to Moscow stronger. At this point the American delegation to the United Nations seemed to waver in its resolve to pursue the matter energetically and appeared inclined again to leave Iran to face her formidable neighbor alone. On Secretary Byrnes's suggestion the Security Council decided on April 4 to accept the Soviet statement and "to defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until May 6th, at which date the Soviet government and the Iranian government are requested to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed and at which time the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required."¹³

The Soviet promise of evacuation was well calculated. On one hand it caused the temporary removal of the dispute from the Council; on the other it served as an inducement to Qavam to comply with the Russian demands. In both points Russia succeeded. On April 4, the day of the Council's decision to defer further proceedings, the Soviet Union and Iran concluded an agreement that comprised the following provisions:

(1) The Red Army was to be evacuated within one month and a half after March 24, 1946.

(2) A joint stock Irano-Soviet oil company was to be established and ratified by the Fifteenth Majlis within seven months after March 24.

(3) "With regard to Azerbaijan, since it is an internal Iranian af-

¹³ *New York Times*, April 5, 1946.

fair, peaceful arrangements will be made between the Government and the people of Azerbaijan for the carrying out of improvements in accordance with existing laws and in benevolent spirit toward the people of Azerbaijan."

The details concerning the oil company were contained in the letters exchanged on the same day between Qavam and Sadchikov, the new Soviet Ambassador to Iran. The Soviet government would acquire 51 per cent and the Iranian government 49 per cent of the company's stock. The agreement would be valid for twenty-five years, after which the Soviet and Iranian governments would each possess 50 per cent of the stock. This arrangement would hold for another twenty-five years.

Thus a settlement was reached between Iran and Russia, but at a heavy price. The British press regarded it as a Soviet triumph and even suspected that a secret agreement might be hidden behind it. The comment of the London *Sunday Dispatch* of April 7 was typical of British editorials: "Russia got most of what she wants in fact, if not in form, while Soviet troops were still in Persia. The oil agreement will not be formalized until the Persian Parliament gives its consent. But there is no such parliament and the next elected will, it is understood, contain a sufficient number of pro-Soviet deputies to insure that the oil concessions go through."

NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT WITH AZERBAIJAN

Once the oil agreement had been extorted, the Soviet government was interested in bringing about an agreement between the central government of Iran and the Azerbaijan rebels as soon as possible. Such an agreement would permit Azerbaijan, as an Iranian province, to send a substantial number of deputies to the Majlis, who, together with other pro-Soviet elements, would ensure the ratification of the oil deal. On his part Qavam, anxious to reach an agreement with Tabriz, announced on April 22 a seven-point program for the return of Azerbaijan to the jurisdiction of the Iranian state. The program, while conceding many points to local autonomy, made it clear that Azerbaijan must be returned as an integral province of Iran.

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
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On April 28 Pishevari, heading a six-man delegation, arrived in Teheran for negotiations. A fortnight in the capital brought no results. Pishevari insisted on three points unacceptable to Qavam. These were (a) the right of the Azerbaijan government to appoint a governor for the province; (b) the distribution of state-owned land to the peasants; and (3) the appointment of commanders of the Azerbaijan army and gendarmerie by the Azerbaijan government.


On May 15 Pishevari returned to Tabriz, and in a broadcast through the local radio warned the central government that any attempt by Iranian forces to invade Azerbaijan would constitute a breach of the agreement with the Soviet Union. This statement seemed to imply that Pishevari was on the defensive. This was undoubtedly so, because on May 9, during his stay in Teheran, the Red Army had evacuated the territory of Iran. At Lake Success, New York, where the Security Council was wrangling about the legal aspects of the evacuation, the news was greeted with joy, for it indicated that the United Nations was able to settle a problem "leading to international friction." This rejoicing was premature. The Soviets did evacuate their forces, but only after having obtained an oil concession and having left behind a revolutionary Communist regime in Azerbaijan apt to act as a powerful lever of pressure on Iran. With these two factors the Security Council was unwilling to deal. It only paid lip service to international morality by retaining the matter on its agenda despite Soviet protests at the final session devoted to Iran.

The break in negotiations with Azerbaijan leaders in Teheran was not final. Both sides had good reasons for desiring a settlement. On May 17 talks with Pishevari were reopened, this time at Tabriz. The Iranian mission was headed by Mozaffar Firuz, Director of Propaganda under Qavam, who throughout the whole crisis maintained a decidedly pro-Soviet attitude.¹⁴ On June 14 a ten-point agreement was finally concluded. Its provisions were:

¹⁴ While Ambassador Ala courageously defended the cause of Iran before the Security Council, Firuz, at press conferences in Teheran, frequently contradicted Ala's statements and publicly disavowed him. On certain occasions he went so far as to make statements opposed to the wishes of his chief Qavam. Acting as Qavam's interpreter at some conferences, he distorted the Premier's statements and thus provoked complaints from foreign correspondents. This eventually led



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BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

Hamilton College



Map of Iran.

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