

Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives),  
Volume 10, July, 1964 Malaysia, Indonesia, Indonesian, Page 20181  
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**Continuation of Indonesian “Confrontation” Policy. - Mediation Efforts by Dr. Lopez, Norodom Sihanouk, and Mr. Robert Kennedy. - Breakdown of Tokio Summit Meeting. - Indonesian Guerrilla Attacks in Malaysian Borneo. - Malaysian Defence Measures.**

The Indonesian-organized guerrilla attacks and infiltrations along the 980-mile jungle frontier between Malaysian and Indonesian Borneo continued at frequent intervals during the first six months of 1964, in pursuance of Indonesia's “confrontation” policy and of President Sukarno's proclaimed intention to “crush” the Malaysian Federation—a threat which he repeated on numerous occasions during this period. The danger to the peace of South-East Asia inherent in the Borneo situation caused much international concern and led to intensive but abortive mediation efforts by the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Dr. Salvador Lopez (now permanent Philippine representative at the U.N.—see 20081 C); by the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk; and by the U.S. Attorney General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, acting on behalf of President Johnson.

A cease-fire declaration by Indonesia towards the end of January—qualified, however, by an announcement that the “confrontation” policy would continue unabated—was followed in February and March by two meetings in Bangkok of the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Although it was agreed in principle that Thailand should supervise a cease-fire on the Borneo frontier, this proved impossible of accomplishment because Indonesia refused to discontinue her guerrilla and infiltration operations in Malaysian Borneo. Due largely to the efforts of Dr. Lopez, the Presidents of Indonesia and the Philippines and the Prime Minister of Malaysia eventually agreed to hold a tripartite summit meeting in Tokio in June. This meeting, however, ended in complete deadlock and left the differences between Indonesia and Malaysia unresolved.

Throughout the months of inter-governmental negotiations, and at the Tokio summit meeting, the Malaysian Government had insisted on the unconditional prior withdrawal of all Indonesian guerrillas from the Malaysian Borneo territories (Sarawak and Sabah) as a *sine qua non* of any political settlement with Indonesia. The Indonesian Government, however, insisted that the question of withdrawals should be linked with that of a political settlement, which was entirely unacceptable to Malaysia.

President Sukarno, accompanied by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, visited Manila from Jan. 7-11, 1964, for talks with President Macapagal of the Philippines. A communique was issued looking forward to a tripartite summit meeting between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines; regretting the absence of Malaysia from the Manila discussions; expressing the view that the Malaysian question could be resolved within the framework of the "Maphilindo" project [the proposed confederation of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia]; and saying that Indonesia and the Philippines would make "a constructive effort to give substance to Maphilindo as a living reality." While in Manila both President Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio reiterated that Indonesia's "confrontation" of the Malaysian Federation in its existing form would continue, Dr. Subandrio declaring that "we want an Asian-manufactured and not a British-manufactured Malaysia." The Indonesian leaders also expressed their support for the Philippine claim to Sabah (North Borneo).

Commenting on the Manila communique, Tun Abdul Razak (Malaysian Deputy Premier and Defence Minister) said that Malaysia would be ready to attend a summit meeting on the following conditions: that Malaysia was recognized as a sovereign State; that Indonesia agreed to drop her "confrontation" policy so that the meeting could be held in an atmosphere of goodwill; that Indonesia would withdraw her troops massed on the borders of Sarawak and Sabah; that Indonesia would withdraw her troops "now engaged in operations deep in Malaysian territory in Sabah and Sarawak"; that Indonesia would agree to accept a neutral nation, acceptable both to Malaysia and Indonesia, to act as a referee to ensure that the terms of a truce were scrupulously carried out.

It was announced in Washington on Jan. 13 that Mr. Robert Kennedy, the U.S. Attorney General, would confer with President Sukarno in Tokio on the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute [Norodom Sihanouk was in Kuala Lumpur at the same time as Mr. Kennedy but did not meet him.] as the personal representative of President Johnson; according to press reports, Mr. Kennedy had been charged with impressing upon Dr. Sukarno the anxiety of the U.S. President and Administration lest the guerrilla operations in Borneo should develop into a major conflict imperilling peace in South-East Asia. The Indonesian President, who had arrived in Japan for an unofficial visit, had two meetings with Mr. Kennedy on Jan. 17-18 at the Imperial Hotel in Tokio, the talks being officially described as cordial and friendly. A brief statement said that it had been agreed that the problem of Malaysia should be worked out in consultations between the three countries concerned—Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Malaysian Federation—and that "a favourable climate for the consultations should be created." Before leaving Tokio for Manila, Mr. Kennedy said that he had been encouraged to hope that Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines would "sit

down at the conference table and work out their differences in a peaceful manner.” He added that, as President Johnson's personal envoy, the chief purpose of his mission was “to take this controversy out of the jungle... and put it around the conference table.”

After flying to Manila to inform President Macapagal of his talks with Dr. Sukarno, Mr. Kennedy arrived in Kuala Lumpur on Jan. 21 for discussions with the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, followed on Jan. 22 by a visit to Jakarta for a further meeting with the Indonesian President. Before Mr. Kennedy left for Bangkok, it was officially announced in Jakarta on Jan. 23 that President Sukarno had issued a cease-fire order to the Indonesian forces on the Malaysian border; that the Presidents of Indonesia and the Philippines and the Prime Minister of Malaysia had agreed to meet in an effort to improve relations in the region; and that a tripartite summit meeting would be preceded by a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries. A few hours after Mr. Kennedy's departure from Jakarta, however, both President Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio told a mass rally that Indonesia would continue her “confrontation” policy against Malaysia; neither made any mention of the cease-fire, President Sukarno reiterating Indonesia's determination to “crush” Malaysia and asserting that she was supported in this aim by “all the progressive forces of the world.” Mr. Kennedy, who had meanwhile arrived in Thailand for a brief visit, ended his mission by visiting London on Jan. 24-26 for discussions with Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Butler on the Malaysian situation. On returning to New York he visited U.N. headquarters on Jan. 28 and saw U Thant at the request of the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine Governments.

Meanwhile the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had offered his services as a mediator in the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute, independently of the efforts of Mr. Kennedy. Following talks in Kuala Lumpur on Jan. 20-21 between the Prince and Tunku Abdul Rahman, it was announced that the latter would meet President Macapagal in Cambodia during February to discuss questions of interest to both countries, including the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute. After visiting Manila and Jakarta for discussions with Presidents Macapagal and Sukarno, Norodom Sihanouk returned to Pnom-Penh on Jan. 29, expressing satisfaction at the results of his mission.

As envisaged in the announcement of Jan. 21, Ministers of the three countries met from Feb. 5-10 in Bangkok under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Mr. Thanat Khoman. Indonesia and the Philippines were represented by their Foreign Ministers, respectively Dr. Subandrio and Dr. Lopez, and Malaysia by her Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. The Thai Foreign Minister opened the conference with an appeal for the maintenance of the cease-fire in Borneo and for a rapid settlement of the differences in dispute. On Feb. 6 the three Ministers sent

separate but virtually identical messages to the U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, stating that they had formally asked Thailand to supervise a cease-fire in Borneo and requesting him “to designate the Government of Thailand to perform this task.” It was subsequently announced at U.N. Headquarters that Thailand had accepted the Secretary-General's request to supervise the cease-fire arrangements in Borneo, the costs of the operation to be shared between the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine Governments.

The Bangkok conference ended inconclusively with the issue of a communique; an appendix setting out the terms of the proposed cease-fire; and a Malaysian note of reservation pointing out that a cease-fire could not be fully effective while Indonesian military units remained on Malaysian territory. It was understood that the Malaysian delegation had insisted that Indonesia should withdraw her units, both military and para-military, from Malaysian Borneo as a condition of any effective cease-fire, but that the Indonesian negotiators had rejected this.

**The Communique** stated: that the three Ministers were convinced that their countries' differences “could best be solved on the basis of the principles and spirit of the Manila Agreements”; that they welcomed the cease-fire in Sabah and Sarawak “as a means of creating a favourable atmosphere for *Musjawarah Maphilindo* [fraternal consultation between Malaysian, the Philippines, and Indonesia] and had agreed to invite the U.N. Secretary-General to designate Thailand to supervise the cease-fire; that it had been decided to hold another ministerial meeting before the proposed summit meeting.

**The Cease-Fire.** An Appendix stated that the Governments concerned (i.e. Indonesia and Malaysia) had agreed to “exert their best efforts, in co-operation with the Government of Thailand, to observe the cease-fire”; in the event of an incident, to issue immediate orders to their respective forces to halt the fighting; to appoint military liaison officers in Bangkok to assist the Thai Government in supervising the cease-fire arrangements; to accept Thai observer teams on their territories, and provide them with the necessary facilities to enable them to carry out their duties in connexion with the implementation of the cease-fire.

**Malaysian Note of Reservation.** Tun Abdul Razak reserved the position of his Government in the following declaration: “It is the sincere desire of the Malaysian Government to adhere to the cease-fire arrangements. However, as there are members of the Indonesian armed forces—regulars as well as irregulars—on the Malaysian side of the border, the Malaysian Government considers that their presence will provoke incidents. The Malaysian Government therefore considers that the cease-fire would not be fully effective unless the Governments concerned agree to

limit the activities and movements of their armed forces, regulars as well as irregulars, within their respective territories.”

Despite the continuing tension between Malaysia and Indonesia, relations between Malaysia and the Philippines improved markedly as a result of a three-day meeting in Pnom-Penh on Feb. 10-12 between Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Macapagal, arranged by and arising from the mission undertaken by Norodom Sihanouk during January. In separate but similarly worded statements, the Tunku and the Philippine President stated that they had “cleared the air” in the dispute between their two countries; that they had agreed to consider the mutual establishment of consulates as a step towards the resumption of normal diplomatic relations; that they had agreed to attend a summit meeting with President Sukarno after the conclusion of further talks at ministerial level; and that the two Governments would consider the “best way” to settle the Philippine claim to Sabah, including the possible reference of the question to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. As a result of the Pnom-Penh negotiations, consular relations were restored on May 8 between Malaysia and the Philippines.

As stated in, Malaysia had recalled its diplomatic mission from Manila in September 1963 in protest at the Philippine Government's action in downgrading its embassy in Kuala Lumpur to consulate status at the time the Malaysian Federation was inaugurated-age 19748, first column.

The Malaysian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Feb. 18 doubting the value of any further peace talks with Indonesia in view of that country's refusal to withdraw her troops from Malaysian Borneo, and saying that it was “clear that Indonesia has no intention of making the cease-fire effective.”

After pointing out that Dr. Subandrio had promised at Bangkok to communicate by Feb. 12 or 13 the decision of President Sukarno on Tun Abdul Razak's reservation, the Ministry said: “Since the... Bangkok meeting nothing has been heard from the Indonesians. However, yesterday Dr. Subandrio was reported to have declared that the Indonesian troops would not be withdrawn from Malaysian territories before a political settlement of the Malaysian crisis. He is also reported to have said that he would be sending liaison officers to Bangkok to arrange for supplies to be air-dropped to Indonesian guerrillas inside Malaysian territory...”

Despite the hypothetical cease-fire, Indonesian guerrillas remained active in Malaysian Borneo after the Bangkok meeting of Foreign Ministers, a British marine and two Malaysian policemen being killed and 10 British and Malaysian soldiers wounded in Sarawak during the four-day period Feb. 20-23. These violations of the cease-fire agreement caused intense anger

in Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman declaring on Feb. 24 that Indonesia's actions might lead to a risk of war at any moment. Describing the Indonesian leaders as “despicable,” the Tunku said that since being Prime Minister “I have had to deal with terrorists, gangsters, and cut-throats, but never have I had to deal with people so utterly callous, destructive, and irresponsible as our neighbour across the sea....” At the same time the Malaysian Government called upon Indonesia and the Philippines for immediate cease-fire talks “owing to the rapidly deteriorating situation created by Indonesia.”

The Indonesian and Philippine Foreign Ministers and Tun Abdul Razak met again in Bangkok on March 4-5 for a second round of talks, which ended in complete deadlock. Before leaving Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian Deputy Premier had emphasized that an effective cease-fire in Borneo and the withdrawal of all Indonesian forces—regulars and irregulars—from Malaysian territory were indispensable conditions for holding talks on political questions arising out of the creation of Malaysia.

At a press conference after the first day's meeting Tun Abdul Razak said that it would be futile to regard the cease-fire as being operative in view of Indonesia's attitude. “We endeavoured to uphold the cease-fire,” he declared. “Indonesia broke it. A number of direct attacks have come from Indonesian territory. This is obviously not a cease-fire at all. In addition, Malaysia has evidence of a build-up of forces on the Indonesian side of the border. It was clear that Indonesia was not sincere when she said she wanted an agreement.” Tun Abdul Razak reiterated that no agreement was possible until the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Malaysian territory, “otherwise Indonesia would be negotiating from a position of strength.”

Dr. Subandrio said: “We wanted to find a compromise about gradual disengagement and simultaneous political talks. The Malaysians wanted full withdrawal and then talks, would not budge one inch....” Asserting that the cease-fire in Borneo had been “rather effective until this conference,” Dr. Subandrio claimed that the Indonesian Government had no connexion with the “volunteers” in Malaysian territory nor any control over them, and that they would not respond to any withdrawal order. He said that the Indonesian “volunteers” in Malaysian Borneo comprised both irregulars and regulars detached from the forces.

After the breakdown of the Bangkok talks the Malaysian delegation issued a statement saying that there was “no meeting of minds on the issue of the cease-fire” and regretting that Indonesia had “adopted a position which is threatening the peace and well-being of South-East Asia.” Dr. Lopez, acting as go-between, had separate talks with Dr. Subandrio and Tun Abdul Razak in an attempt to save the conference, but admitted later that “no agreement has been possible.” An Indonesian spokesman said

that Indonesia felt there should be a direct linking of the key issues—“a 20 per cent guerrilla withdrawal for a 20 per cent political settlement.”

The Malaysian Cabinet decided on March 10 to call up all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 21 and 28, either for military service or civil defence, to meet any situation that might arise from Indonesia's “confrontation” policy. On March 16 President Sukarno denounced Tunku Abdul Rahman for having “decreed mobilization,” and ordered all Indonesian youths to register as volunteers; addressing 400 political, regional, and military leaders, he declared: “During the West Irian campaign I ordered the youth of Indonesia to volunteer, and 7,000,000 volunteered to be dropped into West Irian; now I again ask them to register to crush Malaysia.” It was subsequently announced in Jakarta that 21,000,000 volunteers had responded to this appeal, that they would be given military training, and that a combat brigade drawn from their numbers would be sent to the Borneo border ready to enter Malaysia “at any time” in support of the Indonesian “volunteers” already operating in Sarawak and Sabah.

From the middle of May Dr. Lopez, as personal representative of President Macapagal, made strenuous efforts to bring about a summit meeting between the Indonesian and Philippine Presidents and the Malaysian Prime Minister. For this purpose he made a number of journeys between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur and conveyed several messages between the Tunku and President Sukarno relative to the proposed summit meeting and the conditions in which it could be held. After a fortnight's negotiations it was officially announced on May 31 in Kuala Lumpur that President Macapagal, President Sukarno, and Tunku Abdul Rahman would meet in Tokio during the first half of June, after a meeting of their Foreign Ministers. The announcement stated: that Indonesia “accepts the principle of withdrawal of her forces, both regulars and irregulars, from Sabah and Sarawak”; that the beginning of the withdrawal would take place simultaneously with the commencement of the Foreign Ministers [of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines] meeting, which would itself immediately precede the meeting of Heads of Government; that Thailand would be requested to verify the withdrawal of Indonesian forces; and that “as soon as such verification is communicated by the Thai Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministers ... the meeting of the Heads of Government will commence.”

The three Foreign Ministers—Dr. Subandrio, Mr. Mauro Mendez (who had succeeded Dr. Lopez as Philippine Foreign Secretary), and Tun Abdul Razak—had their first meeting in Tokio on June 18. A communique said that it had been agreed to establish three more checkpoints on the Borneo border, additional to two already established by Thai inspection teams, where Thai observers could verify the withdrawal of Indonesian guerrillas; and that the Ministers would meet again upon word from the Thai Government that guerrillas had begun to move through the checkpoints

already established. On June 19 the Thai Government verified the withdrawal of 32 armed Indonesian guerrillas through a checkpoint at Tebedu, in Sarawak, manned by Thai observers, and on receipt of this information the Foreign Ministers had a second meeting later the same day and agreed upon a summit meeting of the three Heads of Government.

President Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and President Macapagal accordingly met in Tokio on June 21, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, but the talks broke down the same day in total deadlock—the Malaysians insisting that Indonesia should withdraw her guerrilla forces from Malaysian Borneo as a pro-condition of any political discussions, and the Indonesians refusing to do so and expressing their determination to continue the “confrontation” policy. In an effort to save the conference, President Macapagal proposed the establishment of an Afro-Asian conciliation commission to which Indonesia and Malaysia could submit their differences and which could recommend solutions to existing problems. Only nominal agreement was reached on this proposal, the Tunku accepting the principle of a commission with the proviso that all acts of hostility against Malaysia should cease forthwith, while Dr. Sukarno agreed in principle to the commission but refused to give any specific undertaking to abide by its recommendations.

The Tokio Correspondent of *The Times* described the summit meeting as “a repetitious and sterile *dialogue des sourds*” and commented on it as follows: “From the start, according to participants, President Sukarno, or more precisely Dr. Subandrio—for the three heads never met alone—insisted repeatedly that Indonesia had never accepted the existence of ‘this Malaysia’ maintained that the procedure of its formation violated the Manila Accord [of August 1963]. The Indonesians’ tireless refrain was: Back to the position before the formation of Malaysia and remove the humiliation and insult inflicted on Indonesia by Britain. No less tirelessly, the Tunku and Tun Abdul Razak retorted that the Manila Accord had been fully implemented. Confrontation, aggression, and interference in their internal affairs must cease before the commission discussed political matters. The Malaysians said in effect: You may oppose our formation, but you cannot justify military action against us, either under the U.N. Charter or the Bandung declaration.... To this the Indonesians retorted that they were not committing aggression, because they did not recognize Malaysia. The guerrillas were not fighting Malaysia but helping to liberate the peoples of those territories....”

On returning from the Tokio meeting to Kuala Lumpur, Tunku Abdul Rahman warned the Malaysian people to be “prepared for the worst” from Indonesia. “From my talks with President Sukarno,” he said, “it is clear that there has never been any attempt on their side to have peace. We have a dangerous enemy next door. This is a warning to the Western world. It is not Malaysia's battle; if a battle starts it will be

against the peaceful democratic world. We have a neighbour who has no respect for human rights, peace, and good neighbourliness. We must expect trouble from them.”

As stated above, Indonesian guerrilla activities continued unabated along the remote jungle frontier in Borneo, in many cases deep inside Malaysian territory. In addition to the Indonesian “volunteers,” many of the terrorists were young Sarawak-born Chinese who had been trained and armed in Indonesia and re-crossed the border to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism. The number of Indonesian terrorists operating in Malaysian territory could not be known with any exactitude, as many of the bands withdrew to Indonesian Borneo after carrying out terrorist and sabotage attacks; estimates of their number varied at different times from 400 to about 800 or 900. Among many incidents during the past six months, some of the more important are listed below.

*December 18, 1963*—A British *Auster* aircraft was shot down in the Lundu border region of Sarawak by fire from Indonesian territory and crash-landed at an airstrip; the sole passenger—a chaplain who was on a Christmas tour of British units in remote areas—died from his injuries.

*December 29*—Eight Malaysian soldiers were killed and 19 wounded near Tawau (Sabah), 30 miles inside the border, in an attack by a strong guerrilla force armed with machine-guns, wearing uniforms, and believed to consist of Indonesian regular troops. At least two of the attackers were killed. The losses were the heaviest suffered by the Malaysian forces since the outbreak of the “jungle war,” and led to a strong protest by Malaysia to the U.N. at the Indonesian aggression. It was denied in Jakarta that either Indonesian regulars or “volunteers” had taken part in the attack.

*January 1, 1964*—A British Royal Marine Commando corporal was killed when security forces in Sarawak clashed with a force of some 200 Indonesian terrorists near Kuching on New Year's Day. Some of the terrorists were killed or wounded and a quantity of arms and ammunition captured.

*January 7*—Ten out of a force of 20-30 Indonesians were killed in a clash with Gurkhas near Tawau, the security forces losing two killed.

*January 20*—Another seven Indonesians were killed, and seven captured, during operations in the same area of Sabah.

*February 20-23*—Despite the cease-fire announced by President Sukarno, uniformed terrorists armed with automatic weapons carried out attacks in the Lundu area of Sarawak in which a British marine and two Malaysian policemen were killed and

10 British and Malaysian troops and policemen wounded. Casualties were believed to have been inflicted on the attackers, who were driven off.

*March 20*—The elimination of an Indonesian terrorist group operating in the Tawau area of Sabah was announced by the Malaysian Defence Ministry. It was stated that the group's leader, a regular Indonesian Army officer, had been captured a month earlier and had given information which led to the breaking-up of the group and the capture of most of its members, who had styled themselves the “ Sabah People's Revolutionary Force.”

*March 25*—It was officially announced by the security forces in Kuching that there had been five major Indonesian incursions across the border since the “cease-fire” proclaimed by Indonesia on Jan. 23. In these operations the Indonesian guerrillas had lost 17 killed, 11 wounded, 12 captured, and six surrendered, while the security forces had lost 5 killed and 12 wounded.

*May 10*—The Sarawak Government announced that the security forces had smashed an attempt by two platoons of Indonesian terrorists to set up a “liberated area” in the Lundu region. Because of its complicity in the plot, the Lundu branch of the Sarawak United People's Party and its sub-branches had been closed under public security regulations.

*May 19*—Two Gurkha soldiers and two Indonesian terrorists were killed in the Lundu area when some 30 heavily-armed terrorists attacked a small party of Gurkhas.

*June 13*—At least 10 terrorists were killed and an unknown number wounded when the security forces intercepted two large guerrilla bands who had crossed the Sarawak border about 100 miles from Kuching. Two Malaysian members of the security force were killed.

*June 21-22*—Five Gurkhas were killed and five others wounded in a six-hour battle with about 100 Indonesian guerrillas in the Lundu district of Sarawak, the engagement being the biggest since that of December 29[see above]. The attackers were driven off after a six-hour night battle, taking their casualties with them across the border. The attack followed immediately upon the collapse of the “summit” meeting in Tokio.

*July 9*—A man and a woman were wounded, the latter seriously, when Indonesian terrorists attacked a defenceless village in Sarawak with machine-gun and mortar fire. About 20 Indonesian terrorists were repulsed when they tried to attack a security post in the Biawak area of Sarawak.

Apart from the guerrilla operations in Borneo, cases of attempted Indonesian espionage and sabotage in Malaya and Singapore were reported from time to time during the first six months of 1964. In a statement to the House of Representatives in Kuala Lumpur on July 6, Tun Abdul Razak said that 89 people had been arrested in Malaya and 60 in Singapore since December last in connexion with Indonesian subversive activities. It had previously been announced on June 30 that the security Committee which functioned during the anti-Communist war in Malaya would be revived and extended to all the Malaysian States to keep the people informed of Indonesian "confrontation" tactics; that vigilante corps, similar to those formed in Singapore, would be formed to help the security forces guard vital installations and to report on the presence of strangers, particularly in coastal villages; and that there would be special safeguards for Malaysian fishermen, many of whom had been robbed of outboard motors, nets, and catches by armed Indonesians in fast gunboats.

The discovery of an Indonesian sabotage base on the island of Palau Sakupang, in the Rhiow archipelago 10 miles south of Singapore, had been announced by Tunku Abdul Rahman to the House of Representatives on Dec. 18, 1963. The Tunku said that basic military training had been given at a camp on the island, followed by detailed instructions for sabotage; that 37 persons had been arrested in Singapore, Johore, Kelantan, and Selangor; and that Sten guns, hand grenades, and a large quantity of arms and explosives of Indonesian origin had been seized. The sabotage centre had been in charge of an Indonesian officer—Lieutenant Bambang Partono, formerly assistant naval attache in Singapore—controlling a network of agents who planned to blow up water mains between Singapore and Johore, to destroy the main Singapore power station, to disrupt rail communications, and to sabotage other public facilities and installations throughout the country. The spy ring had recruited its members from Indonesia and had also paid sums of money to the Peninsula Malay Union (P.M.U.), a small ultra-nationalist organization. The secretary-general of the P.M.U. was subsequently arrested.

Detailed accusations of Indonesian sabotage and espionage plans were contained in a 64-page document issued on April 22 by the Malaysian Government, including allegations that Indonesia was training saboteurs and supplying them with arms and explosives to overthrow the democratically-elected governments of the Malaysian States. Indonesia was also accused of plotting to assassinate Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, and the Premier of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.

The report alleged that Indonesian officials, under a screen of diplomatic privilege, had since 1947 been engaged in sabotage and subversive activities with the long-range aim of absorbing Singapore and the Malay Peninsula in a "Greater Indonesia"—a concept to which President Sukarno had given expression as far back as 1945. To this

end Indonesian officials had sought to exploit communal feelings in Malaya and Singapore and to support political groups working for the incorporation of Malaysia in "Greater Indonesia." Brigadier Djatikusomo, who had arrived in Singapore in 1958 as Indonesian Consul-General, was specifically accused of having collected information on the strength of the Malayan armed forces, similar allegations being made against his successor.

Indonesian agents, it was also alleged, had been encouraged by consular officials to infiltrate into Service establishments and to build up a "fifth column" consisting of Indonesians and of Malaysians who were opposed to the concept of Malaysia. In forming these subversive groups, the object had been to train them in sabotage and subversion; build up a number of encircling front-line bases in the Riouw archipelago and Sumatra, overlooking Singapore and Malaya, where stores of explosives could be accumulated and from which attacks could be launched; organize bogus commercial shipping companies in Singapore as "fronts" for subversive action; and make preparations for Indonesian naval landings in Singapore and Malaya. An important task of the agents was to sabotage and destroy military installations and public utilities, disrupt the normal economic and administrative life of the country, and cause chaos and disorder. It was alleged that the Indonesian Government had allotted funds for these plans through its Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

As stated above, the Indonesian Government's "confrontation" policy had led the Malaysian Government in March to call up men in the 21-28 age-group for military or civil defence duties. On Feb. 20 Malaysia had formally requested Britain to provide air defence against any Indonesian attempt to supply their guerrilla forces in Malaysian territory, and on June 28 R.A.F. Headquarters in the Far East announced that British *Bloodhound* anti-aircraft missiles (a defensive weapon) were being sent to South-East Asia. Meanwhile vessels of the Royal Navy and the Royal Malaysian Navy were patrolling Malaysian coastal waters to prevent Indonesian gun-running attempts and attacks by Indonesian naval craft on Malaysian coastal shipping and fishermen.

The U.K. Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Hugh Fraser) stated on July 15 that up to the end of June R.A.F. transport aircraft had carried more than 32,000 men and 2,700 tons of stores between Singapore and Borneo, as well as many helicopters, light aircraft, and more than 350 vehicles and trailers. In addition to the support given by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters transporting men and supplies in forward areas, the R.A.F. was also providing fighter protection over Borneo and maritime reconnaissance along the coasts.

The Australian Defence Minister (then Mr. Hasluck) told the Federal House of Representatives on March 17 that Australia would supply Malaysia with substantial

quantities of ammunition, military engineering equipment, general stores, and small craft, to a total value of about £A3,000,000. In addition, many Malaysian soldiers, sailors, and airmen would be trained in Australia in 1964 and 1965, and a small number of Australian officers and men would be seconded to the Malaysian forces until the training of their own personnel had been further advanced. Mr. Hasluck explained that the agreed terms of aid were all regarded as urgent requirements by the Malaysian Government, and that they had been negotiated by an Australian defence mission which had visited Kuala Lumpur in February.

In a further statement on April 16 Mr. Hasluck announced that Australia had decided to extend further military aid to Malaysia, which had asked specifically for Australian assistance in combating the threat of seaborne infiltrations along the coasts of Sarawak and Sabah; for engineering equipment in Malaysian Borneo; for helicopter support against terrorists along the northern border of Malaya; and for some air transport support. In response to these requests, Australia would make immediately available two minesweepers of the Royal Australian Navy for patrolling the coasts of Malaysian Borneo; send an Army engineer squadron of 120 men, with the necessary equipment (bulldozers, etc.), to construct airstrips, roads, and bridges in Malaysian Borneo; and make available four helicopters of the R.A.A.F., with pilots and technicians, for service on the Thai-Malaysian border, thereby releasing other helicopters for service in the Malaysian Borneo territories.

During a two-day visit to Kuala Lumpur on April 10-11, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Holyoake, announced that New Zealand would provide £NZ550,000 worth of military aid to Malaysia, comprising £NZ250,000 worth of equipment and £NZ300,000 as the cost of training Malaysian servicemen in New Zealand over two years.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - New York Times - Le Monde, Paris - Australian News and Information Bureau - Directorate of Information Services, Wellington)(Prev. rep. Indonesian "Confrontation" of Malaysia, 19746 A; Malaysian Federation, Establishment, 19715 A.)