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British Reinforcements for Far East. - Indonesian Military Build-up in Borneo.

From the autumn of 1964 onwards, Indonesian military operations against Malaysia under President Sukarno's "confrontation" policy increasingly took the form of seaborne infiltrations on the coast of the Malay peninsula, and in one case of a large-scale parachute drop inland, in addition to continued incursions across the jungle frontier in Borneo. Between August 1964 and January 1965 bands of Indonesian regulars and guerrillas, varying in numbers from about 100 men to small groups of ten or a dozen, landed at different points on the southern Malayan coast, notably in the Pontian area of Johore, but were in nearly all cases rounded up by the security forces—Malaysian, British, Australian and New Zealand—aided by spotter aircraft and helicopters. A small number of Indonesians remained at large in the jungles and coastal swamps and were being hunted down weeks after the original landings.

The seaborne infiltrations were effected from the Rhio archipelago, the group of Indonesian islets only three or four miles from Singapore, and from islands off the coast of Sumatra facing Johore across the Malacca Straits; it was believed that centres for sabotage tactics and guerrilla warfare had been set up by the Indonesians in the Rhio Islands and in coastal areas of Sumatra opposite Malaya, and that training was being given there both to Indonesians and to Malaysian collaborators, mostly Chinese. Operations in the Malay peninsula and Borneo during the past six months are summarized below.

Seaborne Landings in Malaya. A strongly-armed Indonesian force estimated at 90 to 100 men landed on Aug. 17, 1964, on the swampy coastland in the Pontian district of Johore, 50 miles north-west of Singapore. Within a fortnight the Indonesians had been dispersed by the security forces, who killed 14 of the invaders, captured about 40, and seized a quantity of arms and equipment, including sub-machine guns, hand grenades, small arms, and a large amount of ammunition. About 40 Indonesians still remained at large at the end of August, singly or in small groups, and were being hunted down in the swamps. Among those who went ashore with the invading force were a number of Malaysian collaborators, mostly Chinese but including some Malays; 11 of them appeared in court at Pontian on Aug. 23, together with a number of captured Indonesians, on charges of carrying arms in a security area—an offence for which the mandatory penalty was death by hanging. The security forces suffered very few casualties—two killed and two wounded—in the mopping-up operations, during which

they found two 30-ft. boats with outboard motors, apparently used by the invading force, abandoned in mangrove swamps.

A group of 52 armed men—the great majority Indonesian regulars and volunteers but including a few Malaysian collaborators—went ashore on Oct. 29 at the mouth of the Kesang River, in the Merlimau area 20 miles south of Malacca; within 48 hours all but two had been rounded up by the security forces, owing to the prompt warning given by villagers. The invading group was led by an Indonesian Army sergeant—one of the 50 prisoners—who said that they had been told beforehand that they would be welcomed as "liberators" by the local population. Equipment captured included a two-in. mortar, Sten guns, rifles, pistols, grenades of Russian and Chinese origin, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The landings had been made from the island of Bengkalis, off the coast of Sumatra and about 20 miles from Malaya, the raiders having used five fishing vessels captured from Malaysian fishermen by Indonesian naval forces in the Straits of Malacca.

A small group of some 10 armed Indonesians who landed on Nov. 6 in the Kota Tinggi area of Johore 50 miles N.E. of Singapore (the first landing on the east coast) were nearly all hunted down by the security forces within a fortnight; three were killed, six captured, and only one still remained at large by the end of the month. Seven heavily armed Indonesians trying to enter Singapore by boat during the night of Nov. 13 near the Jurong industrial area were captured after their leader, an Army lieutenant, had asked for assistance from a Chinese farmer, who took him on his bicycle to the nearest police station. A second sabotage group was intercepted off Singapore by a Malaysian patrol boat, three Indonesians being captured, one killed, and five missing. On Dec. 9 another small group of seven Indonesians, wearing civilian clothes but all heavily armed, went ashore on the west coast but gave themselves up without offering resistance after a woodcutter had told the local security forces of their presence.

Twenty-eight armed Indonesians landed in the Pontian area on Dec. 23; during the following week three were killed by the security forces and 25 were captured. Nine more Indonesian raiders, heavily armed but not wearing uniform, had landed in the swamps on the west coast of Singapore Island on Dec. 27 but were caught two days later. Another 24 Indonesians went ashore in the same area on Jan. 8, 1965, after crossing from Sumatra in a fast assault craft; 11 were rapidly captured by the security forces, and four more by a Malaysian naval vessel which intercepted a sampan on which some of the raiding party were trying to return to Indonesian territory. One of the prisoners was a Malay who had been made a major in the Indonesian-sponsored "Malay National Army." Twelve Indonesians who had landed with a larger party a few days earlier at Kota Tinggi (south-east Johore) were captured on Jan. 9.

Five armed Indonesians landed on Feb. 23 at the coastal village of Panchor (Perak)—the farthest north that landings had occurred to date; the group was hunted down by Malaysian forces aided by an Australian helicopter, two of the raiders being killed, two captured, and the fifth escaping. On Feb. 25 a security operation was launched in the uninhabited Pengarang peninsula of Johore State after reports that 12 armed Indonesians had gone ashore in that area, where an abandoned boat containing ammunition was found.

The Labis Parachute Drop. About 100 Indonesian paratroops were dropped from two transport planes on Sept. 2 in the Labia area of central Johore, an important centre of the rubber and palm-oil industry 106 miles N. of Singapore and 150 south of Kuala Lumpur. Local members of the Vigilante Corps (a Home Guard organization formed throughout Malaya after the first seaborne landings at Pontian) informed the security forces of the landing of parachutists, and during the next four weeks intensive operations were conducted to round up the invaders. By the end of September, 27 Indonesians had been killed, a large number captured (believed to be about 60, the actual figure being withheld for security reasons), and not more than about a dozen remained at large in the jungles. A number of parachutists gave themselves up in an emaciated and semi-starved condition, telling their captors that they had gone without food for several days.

The Indonesians had apparently aimed at establishing a central base in the Labia area from which to carry out sabotage operations such as the destruction of bridges, communications, and public facilities. The landings, however, were dispersed over a wide area and were apparently not co-ordinated, the Malaysian security forces recovering from the jungle a number of crates containing arms, ammunition, food supplies, and first-aid kits. Moreover, it was disclosed in Kuala Lumpur at the end of September that a third transport plane engaged in the Labis operation had crashed in the Malacca Straits; the fate of the occupants was unknown but presumably all were killed.

Among the prisoners was the commanding officer of the parachute troops, a regular officer of the Indonesian Army named Lieutenant Soetikno Tjitrosomarto. He told his captors that he had had orders from Jakarta to set up a base in the Labis area to help the "liberation of the Malaysian people," and had also been told that the parachutists would be welcomed as "liberators"; he and his comrades had been "shocked," however, to discover that the local population was hostile, as shown by the fact that he had been promptly handed over to the security forces when he and some of his men had asked villagers for food. Admitting that the entire operation had been a "big flop," Lieutenant Soetikno strongly criticized his superior officers in Jakarta for having misled him and his men, adding that "those who died have died for nothing."

The security forces suffered a small number of casualties during the mopping-up operations, among them the British major of a Gurkha patrol who was shot dead by an Indonesian parachutist.

Naval Operations against Infiltrators. While on patrol on Nov. 16 in the Straits of Johore, the British minesweeper *Fiskerton* opened fire with her Bren guns on a motorboat after three Indonesians on board had thrown grenades into the British vessel when ordered to come alongside to have their papers checked. There were no casualties on the *Fiskerton* but the Indonesian motorboat sank almost immediately, all three men on board losing their lives and only one body being recovered.

Two fast-moving speedboats approaching the shore were intercepted on Dec. 13 by the Australian minesweeper *Teal* about a mile off Raffles Light, inside Malaysian territorial waters at the approaches to Singapore harbour. One of the vessels turned tail and fled but the other opened fire with automatic weapons, to which the *Teal* replied with her Bren guns. When H.M.A.S. *Teal* came alongside the badly damaged Indonesian speedboat it was found that of the seven Indonesians on board one had been killed and two others had disappeared over the side, believed killed. The other four, two of whom were wounded, were taken to Singapore for questioning and the boat, light weapons, and grenades were handed over to the Singapore police. The *Teal* suffered no damage or casualties.

On the same night (Dec. 13) the 2,900-ton British frigate H.M.S. *Ajax* opened fire with her main armament against six fast-moving vessels in the Straits of Malacca which were heading at high speed for the shore and had been spotted on the frigate's radar. The vessels turned back towards Sumatra without returning fire; from their appearance they seemed to be Russian-built motor torpedo-boats of a type acquired by Indonesia from the Soviet Union.

The patrol vessel *Sri Perak*, of the Royal Malaysian Navy, sank a tug and the boat she was towing on Jan. 9 in Malaysian waters off the coast of Negri Sembilan; the tug (which was Malaysian and had been seized by Indonesian naval forces) carried about 20 men, of whom 15 Indonesians and a Malaysian (believed to be a press-ganged guide) were rescued, while several other Indonesians were drowned. On the following day the *Sri Perak* intercepted two motorboats full of armed Indonesians near Kukup (Johore). One of the motorboats was seized and ten men on board captured, but the other reached the shore and loaded 14 men; they were intercepted by a local patrol, one of the raiders being killed after an exchange of fire and eight captured, while five escaped into the jungle.

H.M.A.S. *Teal* had another success on Feb. 23 when she captured nine armed Indonesian infiltrators attempting to land about 20 miles N. of Malacca. The raiders gave themselves up without offering resistance.

The Borneo Border. Clashes on the border of Malaysian and Indonesian Borneo continued to be reported from time to time during the second half of 1964, during which period Indonesian patrols in varying strength continued to infiltrate into Sarawak and Sabah. Incidents announced by the Malaysian military authorities between July and December included the following: six Indonesians killed on July 31 in an attack on a position in Sarawak held by a British unit (the Green Jackets), who suffered no casualties; five more terrorists killed on the Sarawak border on Aug. 3; two of a band of 40 Indonesians killed, and several others wounded, on Aug. 30 when the band entered Sarawak and then withdrew across the border; five guerrillas killed and others wounded in a clash on Sept. 6 near Pensiangan, in the interior of Sabah, in which five members of the security forces were wounded; an Indonesian force of about 120 repulsed on Oct. 5 in the Terbat Bazaar area of Sarawak after fierce fighting, suffering heavy casualties; and three guerrillas killed on Dec. 17 near Terbat Bazaar.

The Malaysian Defence Ministry announced on Feb. 18 that four Indonesian marine commandos and four sergeants had been captured the previous day off Sebatik Island, east Sabah; while on Feb. 20 it was announced that two of a group of six Indonesian guerrilla raiders had been killed in a brief engagement in the Pedawan area of Sarawak.

In a statement on Sept. 10 to the Federal House of Representatives in Kuala Lumpur, the Prime Minister of Malaysia (Tunku Abdul Rahman) stated that Indonesian casualties in Sarawak and Sabah up to July 31, 1964, were 280 killed, 150 captured, 53 surrendered, and 83 wounded and escaped, against casualties among the security forces of 45 killed and 60 wounded.

A leaflet raid over Indonesia—the first retaliatory action of its kind since Indonesia began her "confrontation" against Malaysia two years ago—was carried out by Malaysian and British aircraft on Nov. 2, 1964. It was stated in Kuala Lumpur that about 2,500,000 leaflets had been dropped warning the Indonesians not to engage in any further raids on the Malay peninsula, and that the leaflet included an appeal by Lieutenant Soetikno, the commander of the Indonesian paratroops dropped at Labis. It was not stated where the leaflets were dropped, but it was generally assumed that the targets were in Sumatra and the Rhio islands near Singapore.

In view of the commencement of Indonesian seaborne raids on the Malayan coast, and of reports of a strong Indonesian military build-up in Borneo and Sumatra, reinforcements of British troops, warships, and aircraft were moved to the Far East in

the autumn of 1964 and in January and February 1965. The U.K. Ministry of Defence stated on Jan. 5 that a number of V-bombers with conventional bombing capacity had been put on alert to go to the Far East if necessary.

In September 500 men of the Rhine Army were flown out to Malaysia, and the Far Eastern Fleet was reinforced by the 30th Escort Squadron moved from the Mediterranean, comprising a destroyer, two frigates, and a radar ship. During January 1965 it was officially announced that 2,000 troops of the Strategic Reserve in the United Kingdom were to be flown out to the Far East, including the 2nd Parachute Battalion; the 1st Green Jackets, 43rd and 52nd; H.Q. 19th Infantry Brigade; the 4th Light Regt. Royal Artillery; a detachment of the Royal Engineers; and an armoured squadron of the 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards stationed in Northern Ireland. It was also disclosed (Jan. 1) that the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards, were being sent from Singapore to Malaysian Borneo as a precautionary measure and that four minesweepers and two coastal defence ships were being taken out of the "mothball" reserve in Singapore. Further troop reinforcements, as well as an additional squadron of helicopters and an Australian Special Air Service squadron of parachute troops, arrived in Singapore and Borneo during February.

An assurance that Britain would "respond in an appropriate way to whatever aggressive acts the Indonesians commit" was given in Kuala Lumpur on Jan. 7, 1965, by Mr. Fred Mulley, U.K. Minister of Defence for the Army, at the commencement of an 11-day tour of British bases in the Far East which included visits to Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, and Hong Kong. Mr. Mulley, who had talks with Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak (Malaysian Deputy Premier and Defence Minister), reiterated that Britain was "determined to defend Malaysia" and expressed the hope that "Sukarno will have the sense not to increase the build-up for an attack."

On returning to London on Jan. 20 Mr. Mulley said that while the Indonesians had been reinforcing the Borneo border, these reinforcements were not in great numbers but in groups of 50 to 200, adding that it was "rather an exaggeration" to describe them as musing for an attack. Much surprise was expressed in Malaysia at this statement, which was regarded as "playing down" the Indonesian threat, and on Jan. 22 Mr. Mulley gave the following clarification:

"The impression has been given that the build-up of Indonesian forces on the borders of Malaysia in Borneo was exaggerated. It was not my intention to give this impression. On the contrary, my intention was to point out that the build-up was taking place but that a massive co-ordinated attack, as opposed to an intensification of the raids which Indonesia has been carrying out since 1963, was unlikely as of today...."

"At present the Indonesians are increasing the number and the size of raider units, rather than bringing up to the border a major force of all arms suitable for invasion purposes. My mention of reinforcements from 50 up to 200 referred to the strengths of these individual raider units. My comments were not intended in any way to detract from our assessment of the build-up... of [indonesian] forces available to operate against the defences of eastern Malaysia.

"There is no doubt in my mind, after having inspected the ground, of the gravity of the threat, the scale of the build-up, and the necessity for and the size of our reinforcements (which have been planned in consultation with the Malaysian Government).... We stand firmly by Malaysia."

In addition to the military reinforcements flown out from Britain, more than 80 ships had been assembled in Far Eastern waters by the middle of January consequent upon the Malaysian emergency, including vessels of the Australian and New Zealand navies as well as those of the Royal Navy and the Royal Malaysian Navy.

The Australian Acting Prime Minister, Mr. John McEwen, announced after a Cabinet meeting on Feb. 3, 1965, that Australian combat troops would be made available for the defence of Malaysian Borneo, comprising the 3rd Australian Infantry Battalion (stationed in Malaya as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve) and Special Air Service troops based in Western Australia. Mr. McEwen stated that about 1,000 men would be involved and that the ground forces would serve in rotation with Malaysian and British units. For security reasons it was not stated when the troops would be moved to Borneo.

It had been announced in Canberra on Oct. 6, 1964, that Indonesia had closed her airspace to Australian military flights. A spokesman explained that as a result flights would be made to Malaysia by the longer route via the Cocos Islands instead of directly north through Darwin.

The New Zealand Acting Prime Minister, Mr. J. R. Marshall, also announced on Feb. 3 that the New Zealand Battalion of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya would be available for service in Borneo if needed; that a 40-man Special Air Service detachment had been offered to the Malaysian Government; and that N.Z. Navy crews had been offered to man minesweepers in coastal waters.

During a visit by the Malaysian Prime Minister to Ottawa on July 27-28, 1964, following the Tunku's visit to Washington, it was announced that a Canadian military mission would visit Kuala Lumpur to assess Malaysian military needs, at the Malaysian Government's request; that military training equipment and technical

instructors would be sent out; and that Canada would make credit arrangements available to allow Malaysia to purchase *Cariboo* air transports and *CL-41* jet trainers.

The Canadian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Paul Martin, stated on Jan. 15, 1965, that the proposed sale to Indonesia by de Havilland of Canada of eight *Otter* aircraft would be halted "until we have examined the situation." The planes had been ordered by the U.N. Fund for the Development of WestIrish, and it was understood that their sale had been held up pending consideration of the possibility of their use by Indonesia in her "confrontation" with Malaysia, e.g. for dropping supplies.

Tunku Abdul Rahman announced in Washington on July 22, 1964, during a 10-day visit to the United States and after a meeting with President Johnson, that the President had agreed to admit Malaysians to U.S. military training schools; in addition, he (the Tunku) had made a request for helicopters, reconnaissance planes, and small landing craft which was being studied by the Defence Department. As a direct result of President Johnson's talks with the Tunku, an American military mission visited Malaysia from Nov. 11 to Nov. 23, 1964, when it was announced in Kuala Lumpur that the U.S.A. had offered to assist Malaysia to buy military equipment, principally aircraft, on medium-credit terms and to train some members of her Army and Air Force. [Defence missions from Australia and New Zealand had previously completed surveys of Malaysian military needs, while the above-mentioned Canadian military mission left Kuala Lumpur on Nov. 10, 1964, after completing its survey.]

No U.S.-Government sponsored military aid had been sent to Indonesia since the autumn of 1963. The State Department announced on Nov. 21 of that year that "military aid equipment to Indonesia was cut off late in September [1963]" and that no U.S. military "hardware" was being sent to that country.

Following the dropping of Indonesian paratroops at Labis, the Malaysian Government requested an urgent meeting of the security Council to consider Indonesia's "blatant and inexcusable aggression." After lengthy debate, a Norwegian resolution "deploring" Indonesia's action received nine votes in favour and only two against, but was negated by a Soviet veto—the 102nd veto cast by the Soviet Union in the security Council. The Council began its debate on the Malaysian complaint on Sept. 9, when it heard statements by Dat Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs, and Mr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister.

Dato Ismail gave the security Council a detailed account of the Indonesian paratroop operation at Labis, and produced—from sacks brought into the Council chamber—a quantity of captured Indonesian war material, including a 52-mm. mortar, an automatic

rifle, a parachute, a camouflaged uniform, a helmet, and other military equipment. [The chairman of the security Council—Mr. Morozov, of the U.S.S.R.—ordered the sacks and equipment to be removed from the room before the Malaysian representative was allowed to continue his statement, pointing out that their introduction into the C Dato Ismail said that a long series of meetings aimed at finding a peaceful solution had failed "owing to Indonesia's growing appetite for concessions." At the suggestion of President Macapagal Malaysia had agreed to further talks provided her integrity and sovereignty were respected; in spite of this, however, a large party of heavily armed Indonesians had landed on the shores of South Malaya. Dato Ismail called upon the security Council to condemn Indonesia's "International brigandage" and to demand an assurance from Indonesia that there would be no further acts either of airborne or seaborne invasion.

Dr. Sudjarwo reiterated that Indonesia did not recognize the Malaysian Federation, which he described as a creation of the "British colonialists." Accusing Britain of responsibility for the existing situation in South-East Asia, he alleged that there had been more than a score of British air incursions over Indonesian Borneo in 1962, 1963, and 1964; that a British plane had machine-gunned an Indonesian patrol in Indonesian territory on Nov. 3, 1963; and that British military personnel had violated Indonesian territory on various dates. He did not deny that Indonesian "volunteers and guerrillas" had been fighting in Malaya for some time, but this was to help "their brothers in the fight for freedom," and the "problem of Malaysia" had to be considered "in the context of a deeper and broader conflict—that between the new emerging countries and the remnants of colonialism."

The problem was therefore a political, not a legal one, and the "so-called international law of the world of colonial Powers" could not be "used to stop the struggle for freedom." Indonesia had agreed to refer the dispute to an Afro-Asian conciliation commission as suggested by President Macapagal, but Malaysia had demanded that Indonesia should first stop her confrontation policy. This, however, Indonesia would do only after the dispute had been settled.

[The Indonesian representative did not deny that the Labis parachute drop had taken place, although when it was first announced in Kuala Lumpur the Indonesian authorities had described the Malaysian reports as "fabrications and imaginative lies." The Indonesian Foreign Ministry stated at the time that a transport plane with "Cambodian dancers" returning to Pnom-Penh after performing in Jakarta had flown over central Malaya owing to a "navigational error."

Mr. Adlai Stevenson (U.S.A.), speaking on Sept. 10, said that the Indonesian representative had been "very frank" in telling the Council that "in dealing with neighbours Indonesia does not like, the use of force on the territory of

those neighbours is justified." Declaring that the security Council "cannot condone the use of force in international relations outside the framework of the Charter," Mr. Stevenson pointed out that the Council's "larger duty" was to keep the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute from spreading; if this were not done, "we are face to face with the dread prospect of escalating violence, with unforeseeable consequences for us all." Indonesian attacks on the Malayan mainland were "clearly inadmissible" and required action by the Council calling for the cessation of such attacks.

Dr. Sudjarwo said that he had not accepted Malaysia's charges. Even if he had spoken about "our guerrillas and volunteers" being in Malaysia, he did not accept the allegations as to how they had got there. The complaint, he asserted, must be judged "in the context of the whole picture" and the vital question was not "how" it had happened but "why" it had happened.

Mr. Platon Morozov (Soviet Union) upheld the Indonesian view that Britain bore the major responsibility for the situation by creating the "so-called Federation of Malaysia" in order to preserve "British colonialist domination" in South-East Asia. He said that while Mr. Stevenson had "tried to play the role of defender of the Charter," the United States was the leader in "the chain of criminal acts of the colonialists in South-East Asia."

Dato Ismail, speaking again on Sept. 14, replied to Soviet and Indonesian charges that Malaysia was dominated by Britain. As a sovereign State, he emphasized, Malaysia had the right to enter into a military alliance with another country; faced with the actual use of force by Indonesia, she had entered into a military agreement with Britain which was for defensive purposes only, and which could be terminated when the threat to Malaysia no longer existed. The danger threatening Malaysia was not "colonialism," as alleged by the Indonesian and Soviet representatives, but "the neo-imperialism of a big neighbour whose avowed purpose is to crush Malaysia," and the essence of Malaysia's complaint was that Indonesia had committed "unprovoked and blatant aggression."

Sir Patrick Dean (Britain), speaking on the same day, said that the security Council's first task was "to help to bring to an end the undeclared war on Malaysia." To do this, the Council should first show "in unmistakable terms its disapproval of the admitted actions of the Indonesian Government against the Government and people of Malaysia." Secondly, it should make it clear that it expected Indonesia in the future scrupulously to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Malaysia. As regards the allegations of British aerial and other "violations" of Indonesian territory, it might have been possible for the British Government to refute them in detail had they been the subject of complaint at the time they occurred; however, the lapse of time before they were "dragged out here" made proof one way or the other virtually

impossible, Nevertheless, with one possible exception for which Britain had apologized before any Indonesian complaint was received, there was no substance in the allegations.

The Norwegian delegate (Hr. Sivert Nielsen) presented a resolution on Sept. 15 which, in effect, specifically placed the blame on Indonesia for the Labis parachute operation and called upon both countries to refrain from threats or acts of violence and to enter into negotiations for a peaceful settlement of their differences.

The resolution (1) "regretted" all the incidents that had occurred in the region, "deplored" the Labis parachute drop, and requested Indonesia and Malaysia to "make every effort to avoid a recurrence of such incidents"; (2) urged both parties to "refrain from threats or the use of force and to respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence, thus creating a conducive atmosphere for the continuation of talks"; recommended the Governments concerned to "resume their talks on the basis of the joint communique issued by the Heads of Government following their meeting in Tokio". [i.e. the meeting between Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Sukarno in the Japanese capital in June 1964, in which President Macapagal of the Philippines also participated—see 20181 A].

The Norwegian resolution received nine votes in favour on Sept. 17 and two against but, as stated above, was negated by the Soviet veto. Voting in support of the resolution were Britain, the U.S.A., France, Nationalist China, Norway, Brazil, Bolivia, Morocco, and the Ivory Coast, with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia opposing. Dato Ismail welcomed the near-unanimity of the vote as a moral victory for Malaysia.

Following the Indonesian landings and infiltration attempts during December, it was announced in Kuala Lumpur on Jan. 4, 1965, after an emergency meeting of the Cabinet, that the Malaysian Government had decided (1) to ask the United Nations for assistance in the event of an intensification of Indonesian attacks; and (2) to request Malaysia's allies to "review the position under the defence agreement and send reinforcements if necessary," The official statement said that Indonesia, by her actions, had "defied world opinion, the rule of law, and the United Nations," and that "the existence of small independent sovereign nations like Malaysia is being threatened by the aggressive bullying and expansionist tactics of our neighbour."

A letter listing seven Indonesian acts of aggression since mid-December—including the attempted landings intercepted by H.M.S. *Ajax* and H.M.A.S. *Teal*—had been sent to the president of the security Council by the Malaysian Government on Dec. 31, 1964. It was pointed out that there had been over 200 incidents in the previous 12 months; that casualties among Malaysia's security forces during this period numbered over 100

dead and wounded; and that Indonesian casualties in killed and wounded over the same period totalled over 500.

In a second letter to the security Council on Jan. 7, 1965, the Malaysian Government spoke of a "heavy build-up" of Indonesian forces on the Borneo border; stated that Indonesia had reinforced her troops by several brigades in the border area; and suggested that these developments were of special significance in view of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations [see 20576 A]. The Malaysian Government expressed the opinion that the Indonesian military build-up, taken in conjunction with the landings and attempted landings in the Malay peninsula, were "the precursors of a more vigorous and concentrated enforcement, with the fullest use of force and violence, of the policy of 'crush Malaysia,' obviously intended to be carried forward now that Indonesia presumably feels freed from the moral and legal restraints imposed by the U.N. Charter that membership of the Organization involves." The security Council was informed that "in the event of such attacks being launched against Malaysia, [theMalaysian] Government would immediately seek U.N. assistance in defence of its territorial integrity."

Following the dropping of Indonesian paratroops at Labis, a state of emergency was proclaimed throughout the whole of Malaysia under a royal proclamation issued by the *Yang di-Pertuan Agong* on Sept. 3, 1964. As stated above, a state of emergency had previously been declared in Johore, Malacca, and Negri Sembilan after the first Indonesian seaborne landing in the Pontian area.

The entire territory of Malaysia—including Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah—became a security area under the state of emergency, involving the following penalties: death for unauthorized possession of firearms, explosives, or ammunition; death or life imprisonment for consorting with armed terrorists or subversives; life imprisonment for demanding, collecting, or receiving supplies for terrorists or subversives; and imprisonment for up to 10 years for failing to give information to the police. All persons over the age of 12 were required to carry an identity card bearing a photograph and thumbprint.

The Internal security Act (under which the state of emergency regulations were issued) empowered the Government to proclaim danger zones where unauthorized persons could be shot at sight; gave police officers powers to impose local curfews; and authorized the police and the security forces to arrest suspected persons without a warrant and to stop and search any individual, vehicle, train, vessel, or aircraft.

A resolution approving the state of emergency was adopted by the Federal House of Representatives in Kuala Lumpur on Sept. 10, 1964, with the support of all parties except the *Barisan* Socialists. Pointing out that the Indonesian seaborne and airborne

landings could not have been achieved without the support of Indonesian agents and local "fifth columnists," Tunku Abdul Rahman said that over 2,000 youths from Sarawak and Sabah, some 300 from Singapore, and about 200 from Malaya—mostly Chinese, but including some Malays—had gone to Indonesia in the past two years for training as saboteurs and in guerrilla warfare; after political indoctrination they had been sent back to Malaysia to carry out subversion.

It was announced in Kuala Lumpur on Jan. 27, 1965, that the Special Branch had arrested four men—all Malays—who were alleged to have been involved in a plot to launch an armed revolution in Malaya and to have sent a number of Malaysians to Indonesia for guerrilla and sabotage training. The arrested men were Dato Raja Mohamed Hanifah, vice-president of the conservative Pan-Malayan Islamic Party and a former member of Parliament; Dato Kampo Radjo, treasurer of the left-wing Socialist Front and a former State assemblyman; Hussein bin Yaacob, a reporter on the *Utusan Melayu* (organ of the United National Malays' Organization, the party of Tunku Abdul Rahman); and a certain Rais Annuar, of whom no details were available.

A further official announcement of Jan. 29 reported the arrest of three Opposition leaders allegedly involved in an Indonesian plot to raise armed rebellion in Malaysia and to set up a Malaysian "government-in-exile." The three men named were Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, a former Minister of Agriculture and now president of the National Convention Party; Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, president of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party; and Ishak bin Haji Mohammed, a former chairman of the Socialist Front. [Abdul Aziz bin Ishak is the younger brother of Singapore's Head of State, Tun Yusuf bin Ishak; a strong critic of Malaysia's pro-Western alignment, he had been relieved of his ministerial post and expelled from the U.N. by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1962.]

The Kuala Lumpur statement said that the three politicians named above had been in contact with an Indonesian intelligence officer—Mr. R. M. Soenita, formerly an attaché at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur (now closed down)—from whom they were alleged to have received large sums of money. They were said to have planned to leave Malaysia and to set up a pro-Indonesian "government-in-exile" abroad.

Tunku Abdul Rahman revealed on Feb. 6, 1965, the arrest at Kuala Lumpur airport of a "master spy" whose mission was to co-operate with certain Opposition leaders and help them to establish a "government-in-exile." The Tunku did not disclose the identity or nationality of the person arrested, but stated that a White Paper on the subject would be issued shortly.

During the summer and autumn of 1964 serious communal rioting occurred in Singapore between Malays and Chinese, the responsibility for which was attributed by Malaysian leaders to Indonesian instigation. During the four days July 21-24 clashes between the two communities resulted in 22 deaths, over 500 persons injured, and over 200 arrests on charges of unlawful assembly, disturbing the peace, and curfew-breaking. The rioting began after the minority Moslem population had held processions and rallies to celebrate the anniversary of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday. Tunku Abdul Rahman (then in Washington) said on July 23 that he had evidence that Indonesia was behind the Singapore rioting, adding that it was "more than a coincidence that this has happened at a time when we are meeting Indonesian aggression."

Some 10,000 police and troops were called out in Singapore to deal with further extensive communal rioting from Sept. 2-6 in which 13 lives were lost, 78 people injured, and some 700 persons arrested, among them many agitators and gangsters belonging to Chinese secret societies. Police raids on the underground haunts of these societies resulted in the seizure of spears, daggers, acid bombs, bicycle chains, and explosives.

The *Daily Telegraph* Correspondent in Singapore, Mr. Ian Colvin, stated in a dispatch on Sept. 6: "Officers of the Secret Societies Branch are convinced that key groups of Chinese gangsters are being paid by Indonesian agents to keep racial tension high.... Investigating officers are closely watching the movements of the larger secret societies. They have such names as the "108 Gang" and "Ang Bin Hoay" (Red-Faced Society).... Their leaders are known as 'tiger generals.' Using extortion tactics, these groups terrorize the poorer sectors of Chinese business life. They are specialists in torture and murder and parcel out Singapore on Prohibition Chicago lines...."

"Intelligence officers believe that the Indonesians first made contact with the secret societies during the time General Gusti Djatikusumo was Indonesian Consul-General in Singapore in 1959. The Malaysian Government has said publicly that General Djatikusumo was the organizer of an extensive espionage network throughout Singapore and Malaya during his term of office. A few weeks ago the Philippines Government rejected General Djatikusumo when his name was submitted as prospective Indonesian Ambassador to Manila...."

The Malaysian Deputy Premier and Minister of Defence, Tun Abdul Razak, said on Sept. 8 that Indonesian agents arrested by the security forces were responsible for the latest outbreak of communal rioting in Singapore; he claimed that the Government had foiled an Indonesian plot to create racial disturbances in Singapore simultaneously with the landing of Indonesian paratroops in Johore. Tun Abdul Razak did not give details of the plot, nor did he disclose the number of agents

rounded up.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - U.N. Information Centre, London
- U.N. Monthly Chronicle Australian News and Information Bureau - Directorate of
Information, Wellington - External Affairs Department, Ottawa - New York Times)

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