

White Paper on Alleged Subversive Plot. - British Government and Press Reactions. Ghanaian Opposition Statements. - Internal Political Developments. - Further Arrests of Opposition Members.

The Ghanaian Government published on Dec. 11, 1961, its promised White Paper on the events leading up to the arrest on October of some 50 opponents of the Government. Summarized below under cross-headings, it gave details of an alleged plot to overthrow the regime; made accusations against, *inter alios*, the Government of Togo, the British Press, and unnamed foreign companies in Ghana; and criticized the attitude of British officers formerly serving with the Ghanaian forces.

Aims of Plot. Asserting that the strikes which broke out in September had been fomented as part of a conspiracy by Opposition leaders, The White Paper declared that “the object of the plot was to create a state of chaos and confusion..., so that an appeal could be made for foreign aid and then that the Army could be persuaded to enter politics on the pretext of restoring order and preserving national independence.” It was alleged that the conspirators had been “encouraged in the plan” to persuade some senior Ghanaian officer to lead a military intervention “by the widely-held belief that the United Kingdom officers then in command of the armed forces [see 18335 B] would remain neutral in the event of any internal disorders”; that the support of the Republic of Togo” was to be obtained by a promise of ceding to Togo the Volta region of Ghana”; and that the plot had been supported “morally, and in some cases financially,” by “certain expatriate interests” who “resented the new budgetary measures which would compel them to pay their proper share of taxes.”

The White Paper commented in this connexion: “It would be naive of the Government... if it ignored the unhappy fact that certain colonialist and imperialist Powers do intervene directly or indirectly by fomenting plots and conspiracies in other countries because of their vested financial interests. This type of intervention is sometimes undertaken by financial interests with, at the most, the connivance of their own Government. On other occasions, unfortunately, it is actually carried out in a planned way by governmental agencies who have become so powerful that their activities may be hidden even from the officials who are supposed to control them. Ghana has evidence that some such governmental agencies are actually at this moment planning certain subversive terrorist acts in regard to Ghana. In such interference, use is made of dissident elements who are represented as great patriots, true democrats, or simply anti-Communists, when in fact their real purpose is merely to subvert a Government which they dislike.”

Background of Opposition. Surveying the record of the Ghanaian Opposition, under such specifically-named leaders as Dr. K. A. Busia, Dr. J. B. Danquah, Mr. R. R. Amponsah and others, The White Paper alleged that “a small elite,” such as “often exists” in newly-emergent

countries as a “purely dissident element,” had worked in Ghana from pre-independence times not as an organized parliamentary Opposition but as a group “determined to gain power for its own ends.” This group had been prepared, as its ultimate aim, to return the country to a “quasi-colonial status,” abolishing the Republic and reinstating a Governor-General as Head of State, with a Prime Minister as head of the Government. After claiming that the present Government of Ghana enjoyed “true mass support,” as it had done since the time when the Gold Coast was still a colony, the White Paper alleged that the Opposition, in its eagerness to exploit discontent and as a result of its declining electoral strength, had been ready to support “expatriate vested interests and tribalism.” When the Granville Sharp Commission had investigated the charges against Mr. Amponsah and Mr. Apaloo in 1959, “whatever differences of opinion there were between the Commissioners as to the details of what was intended, they were united in finding that these two leading members of the United Party were ‘engaged in a conspiracy to carry out at some future date... an act for an unlawful purpose revolutionary in character’” [see 16958 A; 17319 A]. In view of these facts, the White Paper maintained that the recent “plot” was not an isolated attempt but “part of a long conspiracy”—continuing since the Ashanti troubles in 1954 [see 14455 A]—by the “elite” against the bulk of the people as represented by the ruling Convention People’s Party, the Government, and President Nkrumah.

Togolese Attitude. On the attitude of the Togo Republic, it was argued that the partition of the former German colony after the First World War had produced “a continuing source of trouble”; this had led, *inter alia*, to the unsuccessful “revolt” in the Ghanaian part of Togoland on the eve of Ghana’s independence in 1957 [see 16155 A], and “in part the present plot consists of an attempt to repeat what was unsuccessfully tried in 1957, this time with the support of the Republic of Togo.” Alleging “connivance and active support” on the part of the Togolese Government, the White Paper said that this was “not difficult to understand” since “Togo is one of the countries on the African continent where neo-colonialism has its strongest hold.... “Implicitly reiterating Ghanaian territorial claims to the Togo Republic [see 17357 B], which it asserted was “unviable,” the White Paper said that a plebiscite would be desirable in Togo on the issue of union with Ghana, and that Ghana would await the result “with confidence.”

Plotters’ Activities in Ghana. Giving details of the alleged “conspiracy,” the White Paper said that its principal leader in Ghana had been Mr. Victor Yaw de Grant Brempong, personal assistant to the former Finance Minister, Mr. K. A. Gbedemah. The local conspirators had kept Dr. Busia (the exiled Opposition leader) fully informed throughout, and their plans had included the assassination of President Nkrumah and other Ministers—the Government having “evidence which it is not in the public interest to disclose for the time being” of the taking of secret oaths for that purpose. An alternative idea had been to reduce Dr. Nkrumah merely to a “figurehead,” and the plotters had in fact given more attention to the fomenting of industrial disturbances which, it was hoped, would lead to Army intervention.

Mr. Brempong was alleged to have sought contact with members of the Army, and to have mentioned to his contacts a sum of £2,000,000 which he claimed to have available to finance terrorist activities. He had been arrested, in connexion with the bomb attack against Dr. Nkrumah’s statue on Nov. 4 [see page 18413] while “in the act” of trying to obtain explosives from the Army by bribery. In this connexion the White Paper reproduced in facsimile a cheque for £50 made out by Mr. Brempong, allegedly in part payment.

Industrial discontent had been stirred up in Sekondi-Takoradi by a group led by one Ishmaila M. Annan, which had “misrepresented” the July Budget and had used it as “a pretext to provoke strikes” which the plotters had in fact planned even before the Budget was introduced. It was alleged that this group, “on United Party instructions,” had induced railwaymen to strike and had then tried to bring about a general stoppage in the twin towns, hoping that this would lead to a nationwide general strike. Dr. Danquah, it was alleged, had assisted by giving the “false legal advice” that the strike was permitted under the Industrial Relations Act. Moreover, U.P. members had financed the strike, supplied money to the local market women to buy food for strikers, and had “fomented acts of intimidation and sabotage”; telegrams to foreign unions appealing for support had been “fraudulent,” as they had not been sent by the authorized union officials.

Dr. Busia's Activities. The White Paper said that Dr. Busia, the alleged leader of the whole conspiracy, was planning to set up a “government in exile” in Lome (capital of Togo) with the help of £50,000 supplied by “commercial interests in Ghana.” This attempt, however, had been “frustrated” by the “timely arrest” of Opposition leaders in Ghana, although three Opposition personalities had meanwhile received a total sum of £5,000 from Dr. Busia. The latter had also made efforts “to turn the U.S. Government against the Volta River project.”

Attitude of British Officers. Asserting that “the position taken by the senior British officers in the crucial period immediately prior to the strike was by no means clear,” the White Paper went on: “Major-General H. T. Alexander, then Chief of the Defence Staff, was on leave. He wrote to the President on Sept. 22, shortly after his return, as follows: ‘I have heard rumours that I am accused of issuing instructions that British officers should not be committed on internal security duties. I therefore attach for your information a copy of a signal which I sent through the Ghana High Commission in the U.K. on Sept. 11. I think it is self-explanatory. I sent it because I heard there was some doubt on the position of British officers.’” In this signal, the General had said: “On no account must impression be caused that British officers will not take part in internal security if this is necessary. But it is obviously better that first troops committed should be all Ghanaian-manned.”

The White Paper commented that the above letter and signal confirmed the Government's general information that before the strike broke out, and for the first few days it was in progress, there had been “some doubt” in the minds of British officers as to where their duty lay.

Allegations against Foreign Companies. Setting out the Government's allegations against certain foreign companies (which were not named), the White Paper said: “The same type of interest which is responsible for the Katanga situation operates throughout the whole of the African continent. Ghana is a particular object of their venom because it has shown... that an African State can exist independent of the political support of foreign capitalist enterprises, which have hitherto dominated the African continent. Commercial and financial interests which have large stakes in African exploitation are only too anxious to support any subversive movement which would destroy the Ghanaian economy....”

The Ghanaian Government's recent budgetary policy had been “a challenge to neo-colonialism at its tenderest spot.” Companies which (it was alleged) had been using the U.K.'s overseas trading company regulations to run their Ghanaian subsidiaries at a small profit and to channel most of

their profits into tax-free “overseas trading companies” had been “seriously threatened” by the July Budget, which had provided for the taxation of the Ghanaian operations of foreign firms on the basis of “a fair relationship to the consolidated profits of their world turnover.” The introduction of this tax system had constituted “a threat to the whole scheme by which the African continent has up till now been exploited, and in certain quarters it aroused the bitterest resentment—not so much because of the change in Ghanaian tax methods, but because of the fact that if this system... proved successful in Ghana it would almost certainly be adopted by other African countries and thus bring to an end a most profitable form of business.”

The Budget, therefore, had become a “particular object of hostility to powerful foreign interests,” and some of these had “willingly lent their assistance to those elements in Ghana who sought to overthrow the Government by force.” Claiming that the new income-tax law “in reality reduced on average the amount of income-tax paid by Ghanaians,” the White Paper commented: “The fact that... [it] figured among the strikers’ list of demands is an interesting tribute to the extent to which some expatriate interests were able to influence the policy imposed upon the strikers by the U.P. leadership.”

Attitude of the British Press. In a strong attack on the London Times and other British newspapers, the White Paper alleged that “the effect of these [financial] pressures may be seen from the strange attitude of certain organs of the foreign Press which normally pride themselves on taking a responsible and balanced attitude towards world affairs.... The evidence shows quite clearly that the campaign conducted by *The Times*... is not the result of faulty knowledge of real conditions in Ghana, but is inspired by a deliberate editorial policy.”

Criticizing in particular the dispatches of Mr. John White, a former Africa Correspondent of *The Times*, the White Paper declared: “When this Correspondent was in Africa the London Times printed a number of his dispatches which not only contained derogatory misinformation, but also matter which the Correspondent could have discovered to be completely false had he made any effort to check his sources of information. After he left Ghana, *The Times* published with great prominence two articles written by him and expressly designed totally to misrepresent the financial and economic position of the country. On the basis of these articles, *The Times* indulged in hostile editorial comment. At the time when Mr. White visited Ghana the Economic Survey for 1960 had not yet been published, but the information it contained, showing the true financial position of the country, was available to him.... Instead... he concocted a completely false picture of Ghana's economic position which he had the affrontery to attribute to ‘officials with access to the basic documents.’”

In answer to Mr. White's statement that the country's reserves were running out, the White Paper quoted a detailed denial by President Nkrumah in his speech at the opening of the Assembly session on July 4, 1961, designed to show that Ghana had balances of £100,000,000, and would have had a still greater amount but for the loss of £15,000,000, which had been “squandered” by British “mismanagement” of Ghana's sterling balances before independence. “Had the criticism of *The Times* been genuine [the white paper contented], it might have been natural for them to have argued in defence of the point of view they had expressed.... What is to the Government of Ghana proof of their insincerity is that this newspaper, which prides itself on its fair-minded and impartial approach, printed not one single word of the President's specific refutation of their

allegations.” Asserting that other British newspapers had “taken their cue” from *The Times*, the White Paper declared that “those in control of the editorial policy of *The Times*... can have been under no illusion as to what would be the effect of their suppressing the President's answer.”

In a passage accusing the foreign Press of exaggerating the disorders in Ghana in order to prevent the Queen's visit, the White Paper defended the Government against charges of corruption and dictatorial methods. Referring to Dr. Nkrumah's “Dawn Broadcast” in April 1961 [see 18042 B], which had been followed by the removal of several Ministers, the White Paper stated: “It is the duty of an elected government to see that it is not overthrown by force, and to introduce appropriate means (such as the Preventive Detention Act) for that purpose. The critics of the Ghana Administration argue that the only proper course is to put on trial all offenders and submit them to the full rigours of the law. From every point of view it is extremely doubtful how advisable such a course would be.”

Commenting on the publication of the White Paper, Mr. Tawiah Adamafio (Ghanaian Minister of Information) said at a press conference on Dec. 14 that he knew of no immediate Government intention to bring the alleged conspirators to trial before the new Special Criminal Division of the High Court [see page 18409].

Mr. Adamafio said that the Government did not “want to try these alleged conspirators for treason and then kill them,” because after a period of “reorientation” they could become “useful citizens” and “serve the country well”; moreover, some of those detained were “already regretting what they have done.” Nor, in his opinion, was there a need to ban the United Party, whose members could “hold their views so long as they don't plot or carry out any subversion.” In the case of foreign companies allegedly implicated in the conspiracy, the Government would not introduce nationalization measures—as requested by some Ghanaians—but would take “some appropriate action” in respect of any company which it was satisfied was involved.

A Commonwealth Relations Office spokesman stated in London on Dec. 10 that the Ghanaian White Paper contained points which affected British interests “very directly,” and it was announced on Dec. 21 that a statement of the British Government's views had been sent to the Government of Ghana.

Although this statement was not made public, it was widely reported in the British Press that the U.K. Government had maintained, in reply to the implications concerning the British officers' attitude, that there was nothing improper in General Alexander's signal of Sept. 11; that the British officers had acted correctly and loyally throughout; and that there was no evidence to the contrary, either in the White Paper or elsewhere.

As regards the allegation that unnamed British companies were using U.K. legislation to avoid tax on large profits made in Ghana, the British Government was said to have pointed out that one purpose of U.K. legislation on double taxation was precisely to prevent the kind of abuses mentioned in the White Paper, and that Ghanaian subsidiaries of British companies were subject to local taxation and ploughed their profits back into the country.

The British answer to the charge of “squandering” £15,000,000 of Ghana's reserves before independence was reported to be that it had been estimated that Ghana would spread her development expenditure over 15 years, and that maturities had been arranged on that basis. The assets in question had, however, been used in five years, necessitating the premature sale of investments at a loss.

As regards the strictures on the British Press, it was understood that the British Government had pointed out that it had no control over newspapers, despite the contrary implication in the Ghanaian White Paper.

Dr. Busia strongly denied in London on Dec. 21 that he had any knowledge of the alleged conspiracy or had received money from foreign commercial interests as alleged in the Ghanaian White Paper.

Describing all the White Paper references to his own activities as demonstrably “false” or “distorted,” Dr. Busia declared that this indicated the unreliability of the Ghanaian Government's other accusations. He further specifically denied that he had worked against the Volta scheme in the United States, had been in Lome at the times he was alleged to have been meeting plotters against Dr. Nkrumah's life, or had known Mr. Brempong. He added that the only foreign money with which he had been concerned had been £2,000 contributed by the World Council of Churches to help Ghanaian refugees in Togo.

An exchange of letters between Mr. K. A. Gbedemah and the former Attorney-General, Mr. Geoffrey Bing, who was generally regarded as one of the principal authors of the White Paper, was published by Mr. Bing on Dec. 28, at President Nkrumah's suggestion.

Mr. Gbedemah, whose whereabouts had been unknown since the end of October [see page 18410], declared that he knew nothing about the alleged activities of his assistant, Mr. Brempong, and that “the mention therefore of my name in the White Paper in connexion with Mr. Brempong's activities on Nov. 7 is at once dishonest and wicked.” After asking Mr. Bing to cause corrections to be published to the “abominable lies and fabrications about me in the White Paper,” and saying that he was personally “filled with remorse” for the part he had played in establishing “the machinery that has become a terror to those who built it up,” he added: “I implore you, as a friend, to do one last service to Ghana before you leave Ghana.... Please use your influence to see that justice is done in this great conspiracy case and that the alleged conspirators and would-be assassins are brought to a speedy trial.” Mr. Gbedemah also informed Mr. Bing that he was at present on an “extended vacation,” but that “when I have ended my vacation I shall come back into public life and anyone who wants me for any reason whatsoever can come along.”

In reply, Mr. Bing rejected Mr. Gbedemah's requests and alleged that Mr. Gbedemah's letter was “dishonest, as you know perfectly well that I have no power to alter or change in any way any Government policy as contained in the White Paper.” Mr. Bing added: “Any important statement coming from the President's Office... is the expression of the collective view of the Cabinet. You at least should know how the President's mind works, and you must have realized that the White

Paper bears the stamp of his thinking and expresses, in regard to the particular facts revealed, the political philosophy which he has always held and maintained in action.”

The United Party national executive categorically denied on Dec. 28 that the U.P. had been “party or privy to the alleged conspiracy which the White Paper purports to expose.” It demanded that all those detained in connexion with the alleged plot should receive “the fullest opportunity to vindicate or condemn themselves publicly.”

The White Paper's allegations against *The Times* formed the subject of a leading article in that newspaper on Dec. 11, 1961.

After saying that “it would be wrong to dismiss the tale of plotting and sabotage as insubstantial, even though it is... puffed out by a recital of the whole history of violence in Ghana and presented as a single continuing conspiracy by a section of reactionaries,” *The Times* editorial continued: “It is merely necessary to point out that the Ghana Government cannot have it both ways. If the ‘reactionary elite’ is as unprincipled and unrepresentative as it asserts, then it is surprising that it can engage in such dangerous fire-raising; but if the State was really in danger..., then there must have been (and must still be) a strong undercurrent of dissent and discontent for them to voice. The impression given by the White Paper is of real discontent, for both political and economic reasons, but a very amateurish and incompetent lot of conspirators trying to harness it.”

Since this was “not very convincing as it stands” the White Paper brought in “the time-honoured allegations of outside support for the self-seeking conspirators.” This included foreign companies, which were “flanked more weightily by foreign Powers, who are acting on behalf of vested financial interests,” and “these latter in turn apparently dictate the editorial views of newspapers.” *The Times* “figures largely in this picture, with other United Kingdom newspapers following its lead,” and “ludicrous as the picture is, it may carry conviction to many Africans.”

Commenting on the argument, “whose ingenuity may betray a touch of foreign influence,” that “preventive detention is so much more *humane* than trial in a normal open Court of Law under laws that might send the accused to the scaffold,” *The Times* said this suggested that it was the Ghana Government's intention to continue to hold the alleged plotters in detention for an unspecified term. The editorial concluded: “Any such doctrine clearly moves Ghana farther from the comity of nations which recognize, however imperfectly, the supremacy of law, and proves the very point that the White Paper denies—and arraigns the British Press for probing—that Ghana is steadily tending towards a police State.”

A further series of arrests took place in the early part of November, both in Ashanti and in other parts of the country; it was reported that those detained included Convention People's Party adherents as well as U.P. supporters. Mr. D. K. Apedoh, a United Party M.P., was among a further group of Opposition members arrested in February 1962.

The first wave of arrests began on Nov. 7, two days before the start of the British royal visit [see 18497 A], and included Mr. Mathias Ofori, deputy manager of the independent Accra newspaper *Daily Graphic*; no reasons were given for this action. It was reported from Kumasi on Nov. 10

that some 200 persons had been arrested in Ashanti, including the local officers of the United Party and a number of tribal chiefs; the Kumasi police later stated that there had been 100 arrests in the town for reasons unconnected with the security arrangements for the Queen's visit. Arrests in other areas, including Sekondi-Takoradi, were reported on Nov. 12. Mr. Simon Dombo, leader of the U.P. Opposition in the Assembly, alleged on Nov. 13 that more than 1,000 people had been arrested, including some 500 C.P.P. members.

Mr. Adamafio described the figure of 200 arrests as "nonsense," but subsequently admitted that 50 to 60 people had been arrested at Kumasi; he added that the Government had detained people with bad criminal records while the Queen was in the Ashanti region, but that the detainees would be released as soon as the Queen had left.

The arrest of Mr. D. K. Apedoh was announced on Feb. 18 in the *Ghana Gazette*, which contained an official notice declaring his parliamentary seat vacant on the grounds of the action taken against him under the Preventive Detention Act. No further details were given.

The International Commission of Jurists announced in Geneva on Feb. 7 that the Ghanaian Government had refused permission for Mr. Rama Prasad Mookerjee, a former judge of the Calcutta High Court, to visit Ghana as an observer of the operation of the Preventive Detention Act.

Expressing "profound regret" at the Ghanaian Government's refusal, the Commission pointed out that "some hundreds" of people were detained and that the Ghanaian courts were "powerless to assist" them. It added that the creation of the Special Criminal Division of the High Court had further "increased apprehension" about the situation in Ghana.

It was reported on the same day that the International Press Institute had protested to Dr. Nkrumah against measures affecting the *Ashanti Pioneer*, including the detention without trial of the editor and four members of the paper's staff [see page 18410], and the fact that a Government censor had been installed in the newspaper's offices. The Institute urged President Nkrumah to "restore freedom to the paper and to release or bring to due trial those members of its staff at present detained."

The establishment of a "Ghana Defence and Aid Fund" had been announced by Dr. Busia in London on Nov. 21. He stated that the Fund would have an immediate target of £25,000 and would be used for the relief of Ghanaian refugees in neighbouring West African countries and to help provide legal aid for detainees in Ghana, although no legal representatives had yet been allowed to visit the prisons or detention camps concerned.

The central committee of the Convention People's Party informed the former Ministers Mr. Gbedemah and Mr. Kojo Botsio on Jan. 16 that they had been deprived of their "rights and privileges" as party members, including their committee membership "and membership of the National Assembly." The committee therefore requested them "to take the necessary steps to resign as a party member of the Assembly," but added that they would be permitted to retain their ordinary party membership.

Mr. Botsio accordingly resigned his parliamentary seat on Feb. 11, while in the case of Mr. Gbedemah the official Gazette announced on Feb. 18 that he had forfeited his Assembly seat, having been absent from 20 consecutive Assembly sittings without the Speaker's permission. Mr. Gbedemah had already been expelled from the party on Jan. 24 on the ground that he had failed to appear before its central committee” to answer charges of subversion.”

Measures were taken by the Government of Ghana against a number of British journalists during November 1961.

Mr. Robin Stafford of the *Daily Express* was refused permission on Nov. 16 to leave Ghana when about to return by air to London, being told that he was required for questioning in connexion with possible legal action over articles he had caused to be published in the British Press. Despite assurances by the Ghanaian authorities to the British High Commission that this action was an isolated case, Mr. Jeffrey Blyth, of the *Daily Mail*, was also prevented from leaving Ghana on Nov. 19 to cover the next stage of the Queen's West African tour, on the same grounds as those given to Mr. Stafford. Both correspondents, however, were allowed to leave the country later the same day after Sir Arthur Snelling, then British High Commissioner in Accra, had approached President Nkrumah personally, following a telephone conversation with the U.K. Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Sandys.

Two other British journalists—Mr. Neil Bruce of the B.B.C. and Mr. Arthur Chesworth of the *Daily Express*—were expelled by the Ghanaian Government on Nov. 28 on the grounds that their “continued presence in Ghana is not considered to be conducive to the public good”; they were told by Mr. Adamafio and Mr. Boateng (Minister of the Interior) that their “activities in Ghana were considered such as to lead to a straining of relations between Ghana and Britain.” An expulsion order was also issued against Mr. Henry Tanner of the *New York Times* but rescinded the same day, as the authorities recognized that he had “tried to be fair” in his reporting. The London *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, Mr. John Ridley, was detained for a short time but later told that there had [see 18318 B] been “a mistake.”

Among other recent political developments in Ghana were the following:

Court Jurisdiction extended to Extra-territorial Offences. The National Assembly passed on Nov. 3, 1961, a Bill, with retroactive effect, extending the jurisdiction of Ghanaian courts to offences committed outside the country, including defamation of the President. The law relating to defamation of Dr. Nkrumah had been approved by the Assembly in October.

With regard to the Bill extending the jurisdiction of Ghanaian courts, the Minister of Justice (Mr. Ofori-Atta) explained that, apart from the section dealing with defamation of the President, it was aimed primarily at employees of Ghanaian embassies or public corporations who were guilty of offences which were indictable in Ghana but committed abroad, and who had hitherto escaped trial by Ghanaian courts. Its provisions had been made retroactive in such cases to March 6, 1957, since it was on that date (Independence Day) that Ghana had begun to send officials abroad. In the case of defamation of the President, retroactivity would extend for one year, as from the date on which the defamation law took effect.

Warning to Missionary Institutions. It was reported on Feb. 19, 1962, that the Minister of Education (Mr. Dowuona-Hammond) had given a public warning that the “strongest sanctions” would be taken against any missionary institution among whose students “seeds of indiscipline and disloyalty to the State” were being sown. Declaring that he had seen “disquieting signs” of “subtle but manifest disloyalty to the ideals of the State” in a number of missionary institutions, the Minister declared: “It should be borne in mind that the Government is not against the Church or any religious body which conducts itself within the framework of the laws of the country. When sanctions are therefore imposed, it should be understood as being purely within the context of the educational system.”

Import of Communist Publications. It was announced on Jan. 17, 1962, that the Government had lifted the ban, originally imposed in 1954 [see 13519 B], on the import of publications from Communist countries.

President Nkrumah inaugurated on Oct. 27, 1961, a “Voice of Ghana” transmitting station with four 100-kW. transmitters, broadcasting in six languages and giving world-wide coverage. (Times - DaiLy Telegraph - Guardian) (Prev. rep. Political Developments, 18407; Ghanaian Education, 18571 B; Broadcasting, 18222E.)

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