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### **Continued Preparations for Election of Constituent Assembly - South African Acceptance of Five Western Powers' Proposals for Transitional Period - Internal Unrest -South African Military Operations - UN Security Council Warning against Further South African Incursions into Angola**

During December 1977 and January 1978 Mr Justice Marthinus T. Steyn, the Administrator-General of South West Africa appointed by the South African Government [see 28789 A; page 28498], took further measures with the objective of creating a suitable climate in which elections could be held on the basis of one man, one vote for a constituent assembly which would evolve a constitution for an independent Namibia.

Mr Steyn announced on Dec. 12 that as from January 1978 the system of separate "Bantu" education would be repealed in the territory and that all population groups would be "educated under one country-wide curriculum".

As for the general dismantling of *apartheid*, Mr Steyn said on Dec. 24 that he had no authority to repeal all apartheid practices but only those which were "an impediment to free political association".

On Jan. 12 Mr Steyn announced that municipal elections which would normally have been due would be suspended in view of the proposed general elections for a constituent assembly.

On Jan. 30 Mr Steyn took over control of the administration of the Department of Mines from the South African authorities.

Mr M. D. J. Steenkamp, a South African acting judge, was on Jan. 31 appointed as assistant to Mr Steyn. With regard to the proposed elections, Mr Steyn said on Dec. 24 that, even if the current negotiations with the five Western powers [see page 28791 and below] were unsuccessful, independence would be achieved; despite the fact that this might be regarded as "illegal" by the United Nations, there was, he maintained, "a good chance" that the new country would receive "a modicum of recognition".

The territory's principal political parties and organizations, as evolved by early 1978, were as follows: The "Turnhalle" parties—i.e. those which had agreed on constitutional proposals. evolved during the Turnhalle negotiations in 1977 [see 28366 A], consisting (i) of the Action Front for the Preservation of Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR), launched on Dec. 6, 1977, by the (White) National Party (NP) led by Mr A. H. Du Plessis and Mr Eben van Zijl, and (ii) the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), formed on Nov. 5, 1977, by the Republican Party led by Mr Dirk Mudge [see 28789 A] and the 10 Black groups represented at the Turnhalle negotiations, and with Herero Paramount Chief Clemens Kapuuo as president and Pastor Cornelius Ndjoba Chief Minister of the Ovamboland Government, as vice-president. (A proposal by Mr Mudge to form one multiracial Turnhalle alliance had been rejected on Oct. 26 by Mr Du Plessis, who had said on Oct. 19 that the formation of an interim government, on which a consensus had been reached in the Turnhalle negotiations, would have to be postponed because of the initiative by the five Western member-states of the UN Security Council.)

(2) Parties outside the Turnhalle groupings, but also supporting a peaceful settlement- (i) the Namibia National Front (NNF), with Mr Kephias Conradie as secretary and embracing 10 Black groups, among which the South West African National Union (SWANU), led by Mr Gerson Vei, was the strongest; (ii) the Federal Party, led by Mr Bryan O'Linn [see page 28790; 28366 A 27852 A], who said in March 9, 1978, that his party would join the NNF; (iii) the Namibian Patriotic Coalition (NPC), formed in Rehoboth on Jan. 28, 1978, by the (opposition) Basterbevrydingsparty and the Young Pioneers' Movement, with Professor Mburumba Kerina as national chairman, Mr Hans Diergaardt as president, Mr Paul Helmuth as foreign secretary and Mr Michael Narib as vice-president. Together with Mr Herman Toivo Ja-Toivo, who was still in detention in South Africa, Professor Kerina and Mr Helmuth had earlier been co-founders of SWAPO [see below and 27929 A]. (Professor Kerina said on Feb. 2, 1978, that the NPC represented all groups which felt excluded from the Turnhalle and the DTA and stood for peaceful transition to independence and no co-operation with SWAPO's external wing unless the latter renounced the use of force, and for the retention of South African troops in the territory until a Namibian security force had been established.)

(3) The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), whose internal wing under the national vice-chairmanship of Mr Daniel Tjongarero was as opposed to the Turnhalle proposals as its external wing under the presidency of Mr Sam Nujoma in Lusaka—see the latter being responsible for continued guerrilla warfare against South African forces as well as against Blacks thought to co—see operate with the South African authorities.

In addition to the above parties there were in the territory other groups representing White sectional interests such as the (extreme right-wing) *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (HNP) and the *Interessengemeinschaft* of the German-speaking community.

It was reported on April 22, 1978 that two of Namibia's newspapers—the (English-language) *Windhoek Advertiser* and the (German) *Allgemeine Zeitung*—had been acquired by Dr Dieter Lauenstein, a wealthy German resident in South West Africa and supporter of the DTA. The editors of both newspapers thereupon resigned, saying that they had regularly published statements by all political parties in Namibia, including SWAPO, but that they expected the papers to publish anti-SWAPO propaganda in future.

The negotiations begun in 1977 by the five Western member-states of the UN security Council—Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States—were continued from November 1977 onwards by a group of envoys headed by Mr Don McHenry, US deputy permanent representative at the United Nations, with the object of achieving agreement on an internationally recognized transition to independence for Namibia (South West Africa) between the Government of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the latter being recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia.

The envoys of the five Western powers had several rounds of talks with representatives of the Governments of the five African "front-line" states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), with Mr Sam Nujoma, the president of SWAPO, in Lusaka (Zambia), with Mr B. J. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, and Mr R. F. Botha, his Foreign Minister (in Pretoria on Dec. 2–3), and with Mr Botha alone (on Dec. 27).

Mr Botha stated on Dec. 11 that, while South Africa was "committed to an election" in South West Africa which would enable the people's leaders to decide on their future, it was also committed not to withdraw all its troops because it had to maintain law and order, but he added that the size of the forces could be reduced if the threat to law and order (constituted by SWAPO's armed struggle) could be diminished. On Dec. 31 Mr Botha made it clear that South Africa would not discuss the future of the territory with any one political party and that there would be no direct consultations with SWAPO.

On Jan. 15, 1978, Mr Botha said on television that the negotiations were held up by two issues—the date for elections to a constituent assembly on the basis of one man, one vote, and the presence and number of South African troops until an independence government was formed. At the same time he indicated that if "the price for international acknowledgement" was "too big"—leading the territory to destruction or to war and conflict—then the territory must proceed on its own, carefully planning its future and hoping that international recognition would be forthcoming eventually.

SWAPO had earlier, on Dec. 2, 1977, accused South Africa (in a statement issued in London) of "preparing a twin strategy aimed at ensuring its continued control over Namibia". This strategy, the statement said, involved a "plot" whereby the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA, which was waging guerrilla warfare against the Government of President Neto—see 28892 AA) would declare a separate break-away state in southern Angola, and South Africa would use Angolan refugees in Namibia to vote for the Turnhalle parties. According to the statement Dr Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, had visited West African countries (including Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo and Zaire) to seek support and recognition for his proposed "Black socialist republic" and had accused the West of "selling out" Namibia to the Soviet Union "represented" by SWAPO the statement further said that Dr Savimbi had affirmed that he would fight SWAPO in order to disrupt any elections which might bring SWAPO to power because a SWAPO victory would make it impossible for him to continue to operate from Namibia.

In Windhoek the Republican Party of Mr Mudge had, in its weekly newspaper *Die Republikein* late in December, published an article stating that, if agreement with the West could not be reached soon, the talks would have to be broken off and South West Africa would have to "go it alone" before SWAPO gained the upper hand.

Chief Clemens Kapuu, president of the DTA, claimed at a rally at Katutura (the Black township near Windhoek) on Jan. 21 that (unnamed) African states had advised him that he and other Black leaders should accept independence if offered by South Africa.

However, Mr Justice Steyn said on Jan. 20 that it was "extremely important...that a real, lasting, peaceful and internationally acceptable solution" should be found for the territory, and he appealed to all political leaders in South West Africa not to impede South Africa's difficult task at this "delicate stage" in the negotiations.

The five-power envoys (also known as the "contact group") announced on Jan. 27 that "proximity talks" (i.e. separate but simultaneous talks with the South African Government and with SWAPO) would take place in New York on Feb. 11–12, with South Africa being represented by Mr Botha and the contact group by the five countries' Foreign Ministers.

On the same day (Jan.27), Dr Nicolaas Diederichs, the South African State President, speaking at the opening of the newly-elected House of Assembly in Cape Town, made it clear that South Africa intended to grant South West Africa independence during 1978 whatever the outcome of the New York talks might be, and that a military presence of South Africa would be maintained "for as long as the inhabitants wish it".

"Final" proposals of the five-power group were presented to the South African Government and to SWAPO in Lusaka on Feb. 2, to the five "front-line" states on Feb. 3 and to political organizations in South West Africa on Feb. 4 (in this case by a delegation led by Mr William Bowdler, the US ambassador to South Africa).

Although the proposals were to be kept secret until studied by South Africa and SWAPO Mr Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's representative at the United Nations, on Feb. 4 described them as "a basis" for talking, while Mr Charls Kauriasa (the leader of SWANU's delegation in New York and its secretary for foreign affairs) said that on the basis of these proposals SWANU, and thus the NNF, would contest the coming elections.

The New York talks on Feb. 11–12 were attended by Mr Donald Jamieson (the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs), M. Louis de Guiringaud and Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher (respectively the French and the West German Foreign Minister), Dr David Owen (the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary), Mr Cyrus Vance (the US Secretary of State) and Mr R. F. Botha (the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs) and also by a SWAPO delegation led by Mr Sam Nujoma

Namibian party representatives present in New York (i)were Mr Chris Mouton (a member of the territory's Legislative Assembly) and Mr Jariretundi Kozonguizi for the DTA; (ii) Mr Du Plessis, Mr Van Zijl and Mr Percy Niehaus for the AKTUR; (iii) Mr O'Linn, Mr John Kirkpatrick and Mr Hans Berker for the Federal Party; and (iv) Mr Daniel Tjongarero (vice-chairman), Mr Mokganedi Tlhabanello (publicity secretary), Mrs Martha Ford, Paster Festus Naholo and Mr Hendrik Witbooi for the internal wing of SWAPO.

Mr Vance said on Feb. 12 that, although no final agreement had been reached at the talks, the West would try again and submit modified proposals which would be discussed with South Africa and SWAPO.

Mr Botha listed as "sticking points" the questions of Walvis Bay[see page 28791], the presence of South African troops and the release of detainees, and on Feb. 12 he announced his immediate return to South Africa, saying: "There are aspects of these proposals that would be so totally unacceptable and so dangerous that there is a serious and real danger of the people in the territory being overrun and being governed by a Marxist terrorist organization...It is a very serious situation." He reaffirmed, however, that independence would be granted to South West Africa by Dec. 31, 1978.

The Western proposals, as described in *The Cape Times* on Feb 13, were understood to provide for a carefully controlled transition period of from seven to eight months before the achievement of independence on Dec. 31, 1978.

There were to be "free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity under appropriate UN supervision and control", with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General [see page 28791] ensuring the "fairness and impartiality of the election process" and administering the territory jointly with the South African-appointed Administrator-General during the transitional period.

To carry out this plan, an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council would have to adopt a resolution asking the UN Secretary-General to appoint his Special Representative, who would submit a plan for UN involvement, which would have to be endorsed by the Security Council a week later. Thereafter the transitional period would begin, South African and SWAPO forces would be restricted to bases, and the UN Special Representative and his observer team would travel to South West Africa and start monitoring the ceasefire. Six weeks later South Africa's forces were to be reduced to 12,000 men, and the dismantling of the command. and structure and the demobilization of the Citizen Force, the commandos and ethnic forces would begin—with South African forces attached to these units being withdrawn—and all weapons other than personal arms being stored at UN-monitored drill halls.

The return of exiles would be assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; political prisoners would be released; discriminatory and repressive legislation would be repealed; and the general rules for an election would be established and published. The peaceful repatriation of SWAPO dissidents [i.e. from Tanzania and Zambia—see page 28497] would begin after nine weeks.

South African forces would be further reduced to 8,000 within nine weeks after the start of the transitional period, and to 1,500 after 12 weeks, when they would be confined to bases at Grootfontein and Oshivello (in northern Namibia) and military bases in the more northerly areas would be de-activated or placed under civilian control, while facilities such as power stations and hospitals would, where necessary, be guarded by UN forces.

The official election campaign would start in the thirteenth week and would last four months. A week after the election result was certified, the remaining South African troops would leave the territory, SWAPO would close its military bases, and the constituent assembly would be convened and hand over power to an independence government by Dec. 31.

These transitional arrangements did not affect the future of Walvis Bay (it being understood that this would have to be negotiated by the independence government).

As no agreement had been reached at the New York "proximity talks" there were renewed indications that the South African Government might proceed to an "internal" settlement without SWAPO's involvement. Mr Botha said in the House of Assembly in Cape Town on Feb. 24 that it looked to him unlikely that an internationally acceptable solution could be reached and that "difficult times" lay ahead when "we may get possible sanctions, pressure on us will increase and an escalation of violence may come in southern Africa". Although the South African Government would still "lean over backwards" to achieve a settlement in South West Africa, he continued: "We cannot allow the territory to fall into the hands of a Marxist tyranny."

Mr Mudge returned to Windhoek on Feb. 25 after leading a DTA delegation to West European countries to seek a possible recognition of a DTA government in Namibia.

For SWAPO, Mr Nujoma had said in New York on Feb. 16 that he would continue to negotiate for the creation of an independent Namibia under UN auspices.

According to US officials quoted on Feb. 13, Mr Nujoma had accepted the proposed reduction of South African forces to 1,500 men, to be retained until the elections, but had objected to their being stationed at bases in the north and had demanded that their base should be at Karasburg (in the far south of Namibia). South African opposition to dealing with SWAPO was further strengthened by remarks made by Mr Nujoma in a television interview on Feb. 26, when he declared inter alia that Black majority rule was "out" and stated: "We are not fighting for majority rule. We are fighting to seize power in Namibia for the benefit of the Namibian people. We are revolutionaries, we are not counter-revolutionaries."

Mr Vorster responded on the following day, saying: "He has now confirmed what we have always suspected and what we have accused SWAPO of. He has made it clear that he is not really interested in the welfare of the people but only in SWAPO's revolutionary doctrines for the sake of power over the territory and its peoples. Now that Nujoma has spoken, the Western powers must obviously reply."

Mr Mudge said in the South West African Legislative Assembly on the same day that the time had almost been reached when SWAPO could no longer be regarded as a political party which had the right to take part in the democratic process in South West Africa, and that it was "virtually impossible to hold a free and fair election campaign in Ovamboland [bordering Angola] because of SWAPO's intimidation and terrorist activities".

However, for the internal wing of SWAPO Mr Tlhabanello said on Feb. 28 that his organization's aims were "to establish in Namibia a democratic secular government founded on the will and participation of all the Namibian people"; that it was prepared to test its strength in "free and fair elections"; and that it would accept the same restrictions on the movements of its active forces in northern Namibia as those applying to the South African troops, and also the presence of a "token force" of 1,500 such troops in Namibia up to the elections.

During March the five Western Governments pursued further negotiations with the parties involved.

On March 8 representatives of the five powers had a meeting with Mr Botha in Cape Town, while Herr Hans-Joachim Eick, the West German ambassador to South Africa, explained the latest developments to representatives of the DTA, the AKTUR, the NNF, the Federal Party and the *Interessengemeinschaft* in Windhoek.

Mr Botha confirmed on March 12 that the Western ambassadors had been shown what he described as a secret SWAPO document, code-named "Mongolia" and apparently compiled in Angola, rejecting SWAPO's participation in elections and containing detailed plans for the intensification of the "liberation struggle", involving also the assassination of all "prominent puppets", whose names were given in the document. SWAPO, however, subsequently described this document as a "forgery".

Mr Nujoma himself said in Lusaka on March 15 that SWAPO rejected "majority rule based on the creation of mini-states and a Bantustan like Transkei", but added: "If the South African Government accepted to hold elections in Namibia under UN supervision, SWAPO would definitely sweep all the seats in such elections."

At the opening of a special session of the 25-member UN Council for Namibia in Lusaka on March 20 Mr Nujoma said that SWAPO was ready to work for a negotiated settlement but not "to participate in a scheme engineered to undermine the victories which we have won over long years of bitter struggle", and he called for a UN General Assembly review of the usefulness of continued negotiations. (At its session the UN Council for Namibia inter alia recommended the rejection of any internal settlement in Namibia and the strengthening of SWAPO as "the vanguard of the Namibian struggle for genuine national liberation".) The "final" proposals of the five Western powers, dated March 13, were handed to the South African Government, the SWAPO leaders in Lusaka and the Governments of the five front-line states on March 30. At the same time the contact group made it clear to South Africa that, if these terms were rejected, they would be placed before the UN Security Council—the implication being that the Western powers would raise no further objections to any punitive measures against South Africa which might be decided upon by the Council.

In Windhoek the proposals were explained to Black and White leaders by envoys from the five Western powers on March 31.

As reported on April 16, the AKTUR had rejected the proposals and had called for a Whites-only referendum on whether to accept them or not; whereas Mr Mudge said at a meeting on April 15 that the security measures contained in the proposals were "by and large" acceptable to the DTA, which also endorsed a provision that all SWAPO guerrillas would have to be back at their bases in Angola and remain there for six weeks before the first South African soldiers were withdrawn, while the general withdrawal of South African troops to their bases would not be required for another three months.

On April 1 it had also been disclosed that the modified proposals provided that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General should be aided by a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which would include a military section.

Mr Vance and Dr Owen had further discussions with Mr Botha in Pretoria on April 16 and thereafter also with Mr Nujoma in Dar-es-Salaam.

Following another meeting of the five Western powers' Foreign Ministers in London on April 23 and the presentation of clarifications of their proposals to Mr Botha in Cape Town on April 24, Mr Vorster announced in the South African House of Assembly on April 25 that his Government had accepted the Western proposals.

Mr Vorster emphasized that his Government had received assurances that the Administrator-General would remain at the head of the administration; that there must be an end to all hostilities (including mine-laying, killings and abductions) before troop withdrawals began; that the South African police would continue to maintain order in the transitional period; and that the future of Walvis Bay would not be part of the proposed agreement. As a result of the clarifications received by Mr Botha, he said, he was able to assure the people of South West Africa that his Government would be guided by the wishes of the constituent assembly (i.e. on the question of troop withdrawals). Mr Vorster also said that he was satisfied that the role of the Administrator-General remained unimpaired and that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General would co-operate with Mr Justice Steyn to ensure the orderly transition to independence. Mr Vorster also stated that the proposals had been accepted by the various political parties and church groups in South West Africa.

The South African Government's decision was welcomed as "a constructive step" by Mr Richard Moose, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, by the US State Department and by Dr David Owen. SWAPO, however, neither expressly accepted nor rejected the Western proposals but stated, in a document circulated among members of the African group at the United Nations on April 28, that it agreed to a ceasefire, although it continued to maintain (i) that Walvis Bay should remain a non-negotiable part of Namibia", (ii) that the proposed reduction of South African troops should apply to Walvis Bay also, and

(iii) that South Africa's role during the transitional period should be subordinate to that of the United Nations.

At a special session of the UN General Assembly, held in accordance with Resolution 32/9 H adopted on Nov. 4, 1977[see page 28841], from April 24 to May 3, 1978, a resolution was adopted by 119 votes to none with 21 abstentions (including the Western powers) calling for the immediate transfer of Namibia to SWAPO control and recommending that the UN Security Council should order South Africa's withdrawal from the territory forthwith, failing which full economic sanctions should be applied against South Africa. The Assembly took no formal notice of the five Western powers' proposals, but Mr Nujoma stated after the vote on the resolution that he hoped that new talks which he and his delegation would have with the envoys of the five Western powers would be "fruitful".

During February and March 1978 numerous clashes between Herero supporters of the DTA and Ovambo followers of SWAPO, in particular at Katutura, the Black township near Windhoek, caused the deaths of at least 14 persons and injuries to over 100 others.

Mr Toivo Shiyagaya, the Minister of Health and Welfare in the Ovamboland Government, was assassinated on Feb. 7 at a political meeting held at Okahao (Ovamboland) in the presence of Pastor Ndjoba (the Chief Minister), Chief Clemens Kapuuu (the president of the DTA and Paramount Chief of the Herero tribe) and Mr Barney Barnes (a Coloured leader).

The alleged assassin, who was shot dead by members of the Ovambo Home Guard, was named as Mr Mathias Mauni (25), who had recently returned from two years absence from Namibia and who was said to have used a Soviet-made Tokarev machine-pistol.

Less than two months later, Chief Kapuuu (55) was himself fatally shot in his own backyard at Katutura on March 27 by unknown assailants who escaped, having also used one or two Tokarev pistols.

While these assassinations were generally attributed to SWAPO members, Mr Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO's spokesman in London, denied any SWAPO involvement in Chief Kapuuu's death and held South Africa responsible, claiming that that country would now seek to justify an "internal" settlement for Namibia. Mr Nujoma declared at the same time: "It is not SWAPO which is responsible for the killing of the puppet Kapuuu, but it is the responsibility of the people of Namibia who were resisting oppression."

Mr Tlhabanello said on March 28 that Chief Kapuuu was "yet another victim of violence at Katutura", and that of 26 people killed in recent violence 23 had been Ovambos. He added: "Up to now no judicial commission of inquiry has been set up to go into these murders. SWAPO feels that these deaths— all of them—were not necessary at all, especially in these crisis times in which everyone, we hope, is in search of a peaceful settlement in Namibia."

When on April 8 Ovambos threw stones at the Chief's funeral procession at Katutura, Herero armed guards fired on them, killing five and wounding another 10 Ovambos.

Following these events, police reinforcements were sent to South West Africa from South Africa, and all prominent DTA leaders were given bodyguards.

Mr Steyn, the Administrator-General, assumed powers of arrest and detention under a proclamation gazetted on April 18.

The proclamation provided that any person judged to be a threat to the territory's security could be detained indefinitely without being able to challenge the Administrator-General's decision in the courts—although the detainee's family would have to be informed directly and the Administrator-General would, if requested in writing by the detainee, have to give the reasons for his decision within seven days from the detainee's arrest.

The proclamation also provided for the setting up of a secret review committee, although the Administrator-General was empowered to ignore any recommendation made by it; detainees under the proclamation would not be interrogated; and the conditions of their detention would be at the Administrator-General's discretion, though provision was made for visits to detainees by doctors at intervals of not more than three days and by magistrates every fortnight.

The proclamation was supported by the DTA and the AKTUR but deplored by the NNF and SWAPO.

Mr Steyn explained that the measures had been precipitated by "deep public outrage and repeated requests for action against public violence" and that they were needed to protect the lives of politicians. The recent escalation of violence, he said, was "obviously aimed at wrecking the political process". He disclosed that he had taken these measures without consulting the five Western nations involved in negotiations, but he added that he felt certain that the steps taken would have been approved by a UN representative if he had been in Windhoek.

(Under an earlier proclamation AG 9-which had come into force in the "homelands" of Ovamboland Okavango and Eastern Caprivi in November 1977 persons could be detained "for the continued security of the territory and the maintenance of law and order therein", but not for longer than 96 hours without the express permission of the Administrator-General.)

Mr Steyn announced on April 25 that nine persons who were "promoting the commission of violence and intimidation" had been detained under the emergency regulations. All nine were members of the 13-member executive committee of SWAPO's internal wing.

Earlier, on Jan. 9, Mr Peter Manning (31), a (White) South African who had for two years been working for SWAPO's publicity department, had been arrested and questioned about documents found at his home. After being detained under the 1967 South African "Terrorism" Act [see 22620 A] he was, on April 20, discharged in the Windhoek Supreme Court after the prosecutor had stated that he was satisfied that the information which Mr Manning was alleged to have sent abroad did not materially affect the security situation.

In a booklet entitled *Torture-a Cancer in Our Society*, compiled by Father Heinz Hunke, a Roman Catholic priest, and Mr Justin Ellis, an Anglican worker at the Christian Centre in Windhoek, and published on Jan. 18, 1978, it was alleged that "institutionalized torture" was proliferating in the territory despite a statement made by Mr Justice Steyn (in a letter to Fr Hunke released on Nov. 13, 1977) to the effect that the allegations had been investigated and found to have no substance.

The booklet contained 13 affidavits by persons reported to have seen or suffered torture at the hands of the South African police. These affidavits had previously been submitted to the Supreme Court in Windhoek in support of an application made by Mr Franciscus Petrus for an interdict to restrain the police from assaulting his son Bernadus (a SWAPO member who had been arrested on Dec. 2), but the application was dismissed on Dec. 13 as not urgent.

Mr Steyn said on Feb. 1 that he had decided not to appoint a commission of inquiry into alleged torture of detainees but that each complaint would be investigated and dealt with on its merits.

The booklet was banned by the South African Government on Jan. 27, but it was released by SWAPO in Lusaka on Feb. 10 and its contents were republished in London on Feb. 28 by the Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches.

A six-member UN group investigating violations of human rights in terms of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* [see pages 26345; 28622] submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva on Feb. 15 containing the names of 13 South African security police officers accused of torturing Namibians.

In addition to the increase in political violence described above, there was during the early months of 1978 an intensification in SWAPO guerrilla activities along South West Africa's border with Angola.

Major-General Wally Black, Director-General, Operations, of the South African Defence Force, said in Pretoria on Dec. 23 that during 1977 there had been fewer South African casualties in the South West African operational area than in 1976, but that landmine incidents had increased significantly near the Angolan border. He also declared that there were 25-300 "terrorists" operating inside South West Africa, and a further 2,200 in camps in Angola and 800 in south-western Zambia who, although being trained by Cuban instructors, were "by no means good soldiers".

Defence headquarters in Pretoria continued to make periodic announcements on clashes between SWAPO groups and South African troops and on casualties suffered by both sides.

Invitations to SWAPO guerrillas to return to South West Africa to take part in the political process which would lead to independence had repeatedly been issued by Mr Steyn, the military authorities, Pastor Ndjoba and Mr Mudge and on Feb. 6 Major-General Jan Geldenhuys, GOC South West Africa Command (the new command set up in 1977 — see page 28789), disclosed that troops had been instructed to be cautious about firing at "terrorists" who wanted to return to take part in the territory's peaceful development.

SWAPO guerrillas were also held responsible for several mass abductions of Ovambos to Angola.

Among these, 206 pupils were taken from the Anglican mission school at Odibo (north-west of Ondangwa in Ovamboland) by some 80 SWAPO followers on Feb. 20, but some of them escaped and subsequently returned to their school. Mr Moses Garoeb, administrative secretary of SWAPO in Lusaka, claimed on Feb. 23 that the pupils had left their school on their own and that SWAPO had merely "provided security".

On April 22 a bus with more than 70 passengers was diverted to Angola between Oshikati and Ruacana by some 70 armed SWAPO guerrillas.

Mr P. W. Botha, the South African Minister of Defence, announced on May 4 that in a "limited operation" against **SWAPO** forces South African troops had invaded Angolan territory, and according to Angolan sources these troops had occupied the mining town of Cassinga (155 miles north of Angola's border with South West Africa—see map on page 28892).

Lieut.-General Jack Dutton, Chief of Staff, Operations of the South African Defence Force, stated in Pretoria on May 5 that a base with the code-name "Moscow", which had been SWAPO 's, headquarters, had been practically totally destroyed and a considerable amount of ammunition and documents had been captured, and he also indicated that some Angolan or Cuban troops might have been killed (while five South African servicemen had lost their lives in the action). At the same time he, as well as Mr R. F. Botha (the Foreign Minister), emphasized that the raid had been made in response to an upsurge in SWAPO guerrilla activity, including a SWAPO attack on the Ruacana hydro-electric power station in northern South West Africa on May 3.

In Angola, Commander "Iko" Teles Carreira, the Angolan Minister of Defence, stated on May 6 that more than 600 people, mainly Namibian refugees (including women and children), had been killed, 500 of them in Cassinga and about 100 in an operation to the south of that town, while 420 others had been wounded. In South West Africa, SWAPO prisoners, interviewed at Oshakati (Ovamboland) after the raid, claimed that they had been forcibly conscripted by SWAPO squads and trained at Cassinga where, they said, there were many Cubans.

The UN Security Council, at an urgent meeting held on May 6 to consider a complaint by the Government of Angola of South African "aggression" against its territory, unanimously decided to condemn South Africa's action and to call for the "immediate and unconditional" withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, this decision being coupled with a warning that, in the event of further violations of Angolan territory by South Africa, the security Council would meet again to "consider the adoption of more effective measures" as provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (including the severance of diplomatic relations and the imposition of trade sanctions).

Mr Elise de Figueiredo (Angola) claimed during the Council debate that, contrary to its earlier assertion that it had withdrawn its forces, South Africa was still sending in reinforcements, and that the attack had caused the death of 504 refugees and injury to 224 others.

Mr James Leonard (USA) expressed dismay at the "senselessness" of the raid, emphasized that the fact that the Pretoria Government had accepted the five-power plan did not give it "a licence to massive violence" and asked how "an already sceptical world" was to judge such an action "on the eve of further and, we hope, decisive talks".

In South Africa Mr R. F. Botha said on May 7 that the resolution was merely a reflection on the Council's own integrity, seeing that South Africa had accepted the Western powers' proposals whereas SWAPO was delaying the implementation of the plan and "apparently demanding the right to murder innocent people". A South African Defence Force spokesman on the same day issued a warning that South Africa would continue its border crossings if SWAPO "terrorists" carried on further activities inside South West Africa. SWAPO announced in New York on May 8 that in view of "the grave situation created by [South African]the invasion of the People's Republic of Angola" it had decided not to take part in new talks with the five Western powers, scheduled to begin that day, and Mr Nujoma, in a separate letter, advised these powers that the South African military and other actions had cast serious doubts on the prospects for successful talks. (Cape Times - Times - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times -Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Sunday Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - UN Information Centre, London - International Communication Agency, US Embassy, London)(*Prev. rep. 28789 A*)