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**A. PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES —
Coup in Timor - Outbreak of Civil War - Declaration of
Independence by Fretilin - Invasion of East Timor by
Indonesia - Diplomatic Relations broken off by Portugal -
Formation of Pro-Indonesian Provisional Government -
UN Resolutions on East Timor**

The Portuguese territory of Timor (comprising the eastern section of the island of Timor, whose western half forms part of Indonesia—see maps on pages 26908 and 27537) was invaded on Dec. 7, 1975, by Indonesian forces after civil war had raged there since the middle of August; 10 days later a pro-Indonesian provisional Government was formed with a view to integrating the territory into Indonesia. Only a few weeks before the outbreak of fighting, plans had been drawn up in June 1975 providing for Portuguese sovereignty over (East) Timor to continue until October 1978, and for the installation meanwhile of a Portuguese-controlled Government under a high commissioner in place of the former colonial governor and the holding of elections in October 1976 [see 27266 A].

Coup by UDT

The Democratic Union of Timor (UDT), a party which had hitherto favoured the eventual independence of Portuguese Timor and the maintenance meanwhile of ties with Portugal, claimed on Aug. 11 to have staged a coup in the territory following increased internal tension. According to a radio message monitored in Darwin (Australia)—which is some 500 miles south-east of Timor—the UDT had seized key installations including the airport, while on the following day a communiqué from the Portuguese authorities in Timor (published in Macao) reported that the UDT had attacked the police headquarters and kidnapped the police chief in Dili (the capital), as well as gaining control of important sectors of the town.

The UDT followed up its action with a demand to the Portuguese authorities on Aug. 12 for immediate independence. In response, the Portuguese presidency stated in a communiqué issued in Lisbon on the same day that this and the UDT's other demands, which included the imprisonment of all members of the Revolutionary Front for Independence (Fretilin), its left-wing rival, were unacceptable; denied that the UDT had staged a coup; claimed that the Governor of Portuguese Timor, Colonel Mário Lemos Pires, was in full control, although the situation was tense; and stated that families of Portuguese troops in the territory had been evacuated to Darwin.

The coup followed a series of high-level meetings between the UDT and Indonesian officials in Jakarta and Kupang (the Indonesian capital of West Timor), after which the UDT president, Sr Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz (32), warned that his party would soon take action against Fretilin, which was attacking UDT members in outlying areas. Sr Lopes da Cruz told the press on Aug. 6: "We are realists. If we want to be independent we must follow the Indonesian political line; otherwise it is independence for a week or a month."

Fighting broke out in Portuguese Timor on Aug. 18, causing some casualties, and all shops and offices in Dili were closed. Sr José Ramos Horta, the leader of Fretilin, said that the island was moving towards bloodshed and that the UDT's moves were "a desperate action . . . which will lead to inevitable confrontation".

Dr Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, stated on Aug. 14 that Indonesia did not wish to make Portuguese Timor "another Goa" (a reference to the former Portuguese colony invaded and annexed by India in 1961—see 18685 A), and declared: "If we wanted to, [this] could be done easily because the area can be reached on foot from Indonesian Timor; but we want the people there to decide." Indonesia had previously, on Aug. 11, offered protection to Timor's inhabitants "if they want to join the Republic of Indonesia".

Although earlier in 1975 Indonesia had on several occasions stressed that she had no territorial claims to Portuguese Timor, and President Suharto had in March of that year ruled out suggestions of military intervention there [see 27266 A], Indonesia on Aug. 19, following a meeting between President Suharto and military leaders, accused the Portuguese Government of handling problems in Timor "unfairly and undemocratically", and protested that Lisbon was not taking all elements on the island into consideration.

Major Antônio Soares, a special envoy from Lisbon, arrived in Jakarta on Aug. 15 on his way to Portuguese Timor to investigate the situation, which according to officials in Macao was deteriorating. A member of the Timor administration, Major Francisco Mota, reported in Darwin on Aug. 17 that clashes between the UDT and Fretilin, using primitive weapons

such as bows and arrows, had resulted in about 100 dead in outlying areas, although only sporadic fighting had taken place in Dili and other towns.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported on Aug. 17 that the UDT had broadcast appeals for help, and particularly for arms, asserting that "communist Portuguese Army officers" were "attempting to massacre the population". A UDT leader claimed on Aug. 19 that the coup had been staged to eliminate communists from Timor, whom some members of the Portuguese administration actively supported.

**Outbreak of Civil War - Proposal for Four-Nation
Peace-Keeping Force**

Full-scale civil war broke out on Aug. 20 between, on the one hand, Fretilin and, on the other, pro-Indonesian forces comprising (i) the UDT (which also became known as the anti-Communist Movement, MAC), (ii) the Timorese Democratic People's Union (Apodeti)—which favoured the integration of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia—and (iii) two smaller groups, the Kota and Trabalhista (Labour) parties. On Aug. 21 the Portuguese authorities in the territory admitted that they had lost control of the situation and appealed for international intervention to stop further bloodshed (five people having been killed and over 30 injured on Aug. 21).

Dili was bombarded by mortar fire from Fretilin troops on Aug. 22; over 1,000 Portuguese refugees awaited evacuation, and Australia ordered two warships to sail into northern waters to assist with this. A further 1,200 refugees who arrived in Darwin on a Norwegian freighter on Aug. 25 reported brutality and atrocities on the part of both the UDT and Fretilin.

After Colonel Lemos Pires warned in a radio message on Aug. 26 that he could only hold out in East Timor for a further 24 hours, he and members of the administration were evacuated on the following day to Atauro, an island some 30 miles north of Dili, while heavy fighting continued around the capital itself. The Governor said that no exact casualty figures were available, since the dead were being burned for health reasons, but that it was "mostly women and children who fell victim to indiscriminate grenade explosions".

An Indonesian destroyer, whose commander on Aug. 27 landed in East Timor and arranged a temporary truce between the UDT and Fretilin in order to unload food supplies and take on refugees, was ordered by the Portuguese authorities to leave Portuguese waters; the destroyer subsequently withdrew to join two other Indonesian vessels anchored off East Timor, and the truce immediately broke down. Portuguese sources said in explanation that the unloading of food in the midst of fighting might have exacerbated the tense situation.

Dr Antônio de Almeida Santos, the Portuguese special envoy (formerly Minister for Inter-territorial Co-ordination), held talks with Indonesian leaders in Jakarta on Aug. 29, after which an Indonesian statement said that Jakarta recognized Portuguese authority over East Timor. Both sides agreed that it was urgently necessary to take effective measures to restore peace and order, with which Indonesia would assist if she was asked.

Professor Muchtar Kusumaatmadja, the Justice Minister and Acting Foreign Minister in the absence of Dr Malik, revealed on Aug. 31 that, under a tentative plan reached by the Indonesian Government and Dr Almeida Santos the previous day in Jakarta, Indonesian, Portuguese, Australian and Malaysian units would be sent to Portuguese Timor to form a four-nation peace-keeping authority. While Malaysia at once indicated willingness to participate, Dr Almeida Santos left for Canberra and Atauro island to discuss the plan, which he said also needed the approval of the Lisbon Government. Professor Kusumaatmadja said that Dr Almeida Santos had opposed an Indonesian offer to send troops into Portuguese Timor of its own accord.

However, talks in Canberra on Sept. 1 between Dr Almeida Santos and Mr Gough Whitlam, then Prime Minister of Australia (at which the Defence Minister, Mr William Morrison, was also present), proved unproductive, a government statement on the question of Australian participation in a multinational supervisory body being issued as follows: "The Australian ministers said that they were not in a position to indicate a definite view on this question in advance of the outcome of the talks which Dr Almeida Santos will be having in Timor and of the further talks between Indonesia and Portugal in Jakarta on the subject."

Mr Whitlam had on Aug. 26 ruled out any military or political role for Australia in East Timor, stating that "the future of the territory is a matter for resolution by Portugal and the Timorese people themselves, with Indonesia also occupying an important place because of its predominant interest".

Consolidation of Control by Fretilin - Indonesian Warnings to Fretilin

As fighting in Timor intensified, Indonesian sources reported on Sept. 1 that up to 10,000 refugees were waiting to cross into West Timor to escape the fighting, while by Sept. 16 Jakarta radio claimed that over 32,000 refugees had crossed into Indonesian territory. At the same time, military and civilian circles in Indonesia increasingly urged President Suharto to intervene in East Timor.

General Ali Murtopo, Indonesian deputy chief of intelligence, said on Sept. 1 that "world opinion is beginning to accept that the final solution to the Timor problem is integration with Indonesia", while Mr Imron Rosyadi, head of the parliamentary defence commission, declared on the same day that "a green light from the UN Secretary-General, and a mandate from Portugal through her special envoy, Dr Almeida Santos, will be sufficient for Indonesia to restore peace and order".

Fretilin, which had on Sept. 1 taken control of Dili, claimed on Sept. 8 to have gained complete control of East Timor, and said that the movement had now dropped its original demands for immediate independence from Portugal and wanted to move gradually towards self-government, with the installation of a provisional Government in early 1976, the election of a Constituent Assembly, and independence within a few years. Fretilin also said that it was ready for peace talks.

While President Suharto reiterated on Sept. 10 that all movements in the territory should be given the opportunity to decide its future, the Indonesian Defence Ministry had warned on Sept. 7 that Indonesia would consider making pre-emptive strikes against Fretilin positions if they advanced any closer to the Indonesian border, and on Sept. 9 said that it refused to accept any move by Lisbon to hand over Portuguese Timor to a Fretilin Government. Moreover, Dr Malik warned on Sept. 13 that Indonesia had the right to intervene in East Timor if the war there "endangered" her territory, but appealed to all factions to cease fighting.

After further talks in Jakarta, Dr Almeida Santos on Sept. 11 expressed willingness to comply with an Indonesian request that he should negotiate with all three main parties in East Timor, and not just with Fretilin as had been the original intention of the Portuguese Government. However, talks planned for Sept. 20 in Macao did not materialize.

On Sept. 17 the Indonesian High Command was reported to have ordered a substantial reinforcement of its naval fleet around Portuguese Timor, and on Sept. 18-19 Indonesian marines landed briefly in the Portuguese territory to rescue refugees from Maubara (on the north coast), which was controlled by Fretilin. Fretilin subsequently reported numerous instances of border violations by Indonesia during September and October, which were largely denied by Indonesia, and Fretilin was also accused by Indonesia of frequent attacks on her territory.

General Maraden Panggabean, the Indonesian Minister of Defence, warned on Sept. 26 that his country would "strike and destroy" Fretilin forces if there were any further attacks on Indonesian territory, after Fretilin had mortared Motaain (in Indonesian Timor) on Sept. 25. Fretilin subsequently clashed with Indonesian troops in Indonesian territory on Sept. 28, and on Sept. 30 it was reported that Indonesian troops had struck across the border and destroyed a Fretilin base.

The semi-official Indonesian news agency Antara reported on Oct. 8 that 2,000 people had joined up with anti-Fretilin guerrillas in Baucau (Timor's second largest town, on the north coast), Los Palos, Same and Lage (all Fretilin-controlled), and that fighting was taking place in the eastern part of Portuguese Timor for the first time.

Further Indonesian Attacks on East Timor - Change in Australian Attitude to Indonesia - Rome Talks between Portugal and Indonesia

Fretilin claimed on Oct. 8 that Indonesian forces had temporarily taken the town of Batugade using aircraft and helicopters and supported by fire from a ship offshore. The Indonesian Government denied, however, that it had issued orders to attack, and maintained that Apodeti and the UDT had led the operation. (This was later confirmed by Radio Clube Português on Oct. 14, which reported that Batugade was in the hands of the UDT.)

Fretilin announced on Oct. 11 that it was in full control of Portuguese Timor and that it had established a transitional administration. However, the Indonesian Government countered on Oct. 14 that pro-Indonesian forces held large sections of Portuguese Timor and would by the end of October be in control of the whole territory. The UDT was reported to

control the border area, while Apodeti apparently controlled the centre and south of the territory.

Radio Clube Português announced on Oct. 16 that, according to a high Fretilin official, Indonesian troops had again entered East Timor and had taken the town of Maliana. While official Indonesian sources denied this, and claimed that pro-Indonesian forces were responsible for taking Maliana and another town, Balibo, from Fretilin, Dr Malik declared on Oct. 17 that the turmoil in Timor had reached the point where it could disrupt stability in Indonesia and South-East Asia, and that the restoration of order was an urgent priority to "enable an orderly process of decolonization".

Sources in Jakarta estimated on Oct. 5 that between 40,000 and 50,000 inhabitants of East Timor had fled from the territory since the outbreak of the fighting, the population of Dili alone having decreased from 25,000 to 5,000. On the Indonesian side of the border 14 refugee camps had been erected, into which whole communities had fled.

Dr Malik admitted on Oct. 23 that Indonesia gave some military training to refugees before sending them back into East Timor. He said that "we do not send soldiers or supply weapons, but we teach them to steal weapons from Fretilin".

Fretilin on Oct. 25 invited the Governor of Timor to send representatives back to the mainland from Atauro for informal talks, and also proposed that talks should be held with the Portuguese Government in early November to discuss the form of Timor's transition to independence.

The Australian attitude to Indonesia's role in East Timor hardened when in late October Australian officials were hampered in investigating the death of five Australian television journalists who had been killed during an Indonesian-backed attack on Balibo. Moreover, Australian dockers expressed their support for Fretilin (which had an office in Darwin) and their opposition to Indonesian policy in Timor by commencing a boycott of Indonesian ships in October.

The Australian Government on Oct. 29 issued a strongly worded request to Indonesia for more assistance in tracing the bodies of the men, whereupon the next day Indonesia supplied an aircraft to assist the Australian officials. The five bodies were subsequently handed over to the Australian embassy in Jakarta on Nov. 12.

In a statement to the Australian Parliament on Oct. 30, the Foreign Minister, Mr Donald Willesee, called for an end to the war, requested Indonesia to seek a diplomatic solution to the Timor problem, and offered to act as host for peace talks involving all parties. He added that Australia, like Indonesia, could not accept a claim by Fretilin—or indeed by any one party—to be the only representative of East Timor.

Dr Malik flew to Rome on Oct. 31 for discussions on the situation with the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Major Eduardo Augusto de Melo Antunes. After talks on Nov. 1-2 both sides issued a "memorandum of understanding" on Nov. 3 (which was welcomed by Australia the following day), noting principally that Portugal represented the legitimate authority in Portuguese Timor and was fundamentally responsible for its decolonization. The two Ministers agreed on the need to hold a meeting as soon as possible between Portugal and all the political parties of East Timor with a view to bringing the fighting to an end. Portugal, according to the statement, "engages itself to undertake all efforts towards the speedy and orderly implementation of the act of self-determination by the people of Portuguese Timor".

According to Jakarta radio on Nov. 6, Fretilin did not recognize the results of the Rome meeting.

Although Dr Malik said on Nov. 16 that Indonesia's role in the conflict was confined to encouraging the parties involved to negotiate, *The Age of Melbourne* claimed on Nov. 26 that the paper's Asian correspondent had witnessed a direct attack on Atabae (a Fretilin-held border town) by at least one Indonesian warship and an airforce bomber, and that this represented part of a co-ordinated offensive by Indonesia which had begun on Nov. 14. On the same day Fretilin repeated its frequent assertion that a full Indonesian invasion was imminent.

Declarations of Independence by Fretilin and of Merger with Indonesia by Pro-Indonesian Parties

Fretilin on Nov. 28 declared East Timor independent as the "Democratic Republic of East Timor". The movement's president, Sr Francisco Xavier do Amaral, raised the new flag of the territory and said that Portugal's "constant stalling" on the question of peace negotiations had contributed to the present situation. According to Fretilin, some 50 Afro-Asian countries had pledged support for an independent East Timor, while Mozambique recognized the new Republic on Dec. 1.

Sr Amaral (87), a former Jesuit priest, was inaugurated on Nov. 29 as President of East Timor, and on Dec. 1 a Government was sworn in, with Sr Nicolau dos Reis Lobato as Prime Minister.

In the face of this development, the Lisbon Government on Nov. 29 rejected not only Fretilin's declaration but also a statement by the four pro-Indonesian parties (on Nov. 29) which, claiming that Fretilin's action had "removed the last remains of Portuguese sovereignty in Timor", declared East Timor to be part of Indonesian territory. The Portuguese delegate to the UN, in a letter to the UN Secretary General on Nov. 30, formally requested the UN for help in settling the East Timor problem.

Although Indonesia did not immediately comment officially on Fretilin's move, Dr Malik left for East Timor on Nov. 30 for discussions with the UDT and Apodeti, and on Dec. 1 he told a press conference in Atambua (West Timor): "Diplomacy is finished. It is now up to the people of East Timor."

Australia said on Nov. 29 that it would not recognize Fretilin's unilateral declaration of independence, and that the Australian Government's view remained that talks between Portugal and the parties concerned offered the best hope of ending bloodshed, while allowing the Timorese to determine their own future.

Indonesian Invasion of East Timor - Severance of Diplomatic Relations by Portugal

Some 1,000 paratroopers from Indonesia, supported by a naval bombardment, entered East Timor at dawn on Dec. 7, seized Dili and drove Fretilin troops into the surrounding hills. A Fretilin broadcast from near Dili monitored in Darwin reported that the Indonesian troops immediately secured the airport, the military headquarters and the administrative buildings.

A report on Jakarta radio announced that Dili had been "liberated by the people's resistance, spearheaded by Apodeti, the UDT, the Kota and Tralabista", and that "the people's resistance forces were supported by Indonesian volunteers". It went on: "At the request of the people of East Timor, and in the face of the Indonesian people's pressure exerted via Parliament, it is difficult for the Indonesian Government to prevent these volunteers from supporting their brothers in liberating Dili from oppression and Fretilin's terror." Dr Malik himself stressed that Indonesia had not intervened in East Timor, but that the fall of Dili was due to "the attack by the UDT and Apodeti, the people and Indonesian volunteers".

Portugal's immediate reaction was to break off all diplomatic relations with Indonesia on Dec. 7, and to announce that it would resort to the United Nations, with the aim of securing the cessation of what it described as Indonesia's military intervention, as well as a peaceful negotiated solution to the conflict and the decolonization process. However, Dr Malik said on Dec. 8 that he considered Portuguese sovereignty over Timor to have ended on Nov. 28 (when Fretilin declared independence), that Dili was now being ruled by a coalition of the four pro-Indonesian parties, and that Fretilin resistance had ceased. He added that Indonesian troops would remain in East Timor only until the territory had decided its own future.

Refugees returning from Timor described massacres of civilians by all the three main parties involved in the conflict.

The Indonesian Minister of Information, Mr Mashuri Saleh, said in a statement at a press conference on Dec. 8 that Indonesia, which had exercised restraint long enough in the face of "provocations" by Fretilin, would now take all necessary measures to protect its interests.

The statement said that Indonesia had "offered its good offices to help Portugal restore security and order for the proper implementation of the decolonization process", but that its "good intention" was "rejected by Portugal". In the meantime, the "Indonesian people's tolerance was tested as they tried to restrain themselves in the face of violations of Indonesian territory by Fretilin gangs, mortar shelling, repeated attacks, plunder, rustling and other provocations which caused losses of life and property".

It continued: "The Government made repeated contact with Apodeti, the UDT, Kota and Tralabista to urge them to hold negotiations as called for by the Rome agreement (see above). Likewise it has repeatedly appealed to Fretilin to respect and be willing to implement the Rome memorandum. During its efforts honestly to implement the Rome memorandum, the Indonesian Government was shocked by Fretilin's unilateral proclamation of independence of Portuguese Timor on Nov. 28, 1975, which was later countered by the issue of a joint proclamation by Apodeti, the UDT, Kota and Tralabista in the name of the people of Portuguese Timor to liberate themselves from colonization and integrate themselves with the Indonesian nation. . . .

"With the existence of these two proclamations, Indonesia is confronted with a situation where, on the one hand, none of the people of Portuguese Timor any longer recognize Portuguese authority, and, on the other, Portugal itself stated at the UN on Nov. 30 that it could no longer control the situation. . . .

"Therefore the presence of Indonesian volunteers in Portuguese Timor is founded on the following considerations:

"(1) The correct attitude of the [Indonesian] Government so far has been misinterpreted by Portugal and abused by Fretilin to create a more difficult situation for the proper, orderly and peaceful exercise of the right of self-determination of the Portuguese Timor people.

"(2) Pressure was exerted by the Indonesian people . . . as reflected in the parliamentary statement dated Dec. 6, 1975, calling on the Government to take firmer and more concrete steps in resolving the Portuguese Timor issue.

"(3) The inability of Portugal to control the situation so that the Rome memorandum could not, as a practical matter, be implemented.

"(4) The request of the four parties—Apodeti, the UDT, Kota and Tralabista [in the Nov. 29 statement] . . .

"(5) [The need] to guarantee the security of refugees who return to their respective villages.

"(6) The Government of Indonesia has the moral responsibility to guarantee the proper, orderly and peaceful decolonization of Portuguese Timor in accordance with the aspirations and desires of all the people in that territory.

"(7) The Government of Indonesia cannot permit the situation in Portuguese Timor to go on indefinitely and to endanger national security and the stability of the South-East Asian region.

"(8) It is necessary to take steps to end these continuing developments and safeguard national territorial integrity, to defend the sovereignty of the state and to protect the Indonesian people from disturbances, attacks, invasion, plunder and other provocative acts by Fretilin."

Indonesia consolidated its hold in East Timor by capturing Maubara on Dec. 7, as well as most of the 50-mile strip of coast between Dili and the Indonesian border. On Dec. 11 the pro-Indonesian forces took Baucau, damaging its airport.

Provisional Government formed by Pro-Indonesian Forces

The UDT, Apodeti, Kota and Tralabista jointly formed a provisional Government in East Timor on Dec. 17, headed by Sr Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo (62), of Apodeti, as its Chief Executive Officer. His tasks would be to determine the organizational structure of the Government and the responsibilities of its officers, and to define its policy, which aimed to restore social normality, integrate the territory into Indonesia, and adopt necessary laws and regulations.

UN Resolutions on East Timor Situation

The UN trusteeship committee on Dec. 11 called on Indonesia in a resolution to withdraw from Portuguese Timor immediately, and urged her to desist from "further violation of the territorial integrity" of Portuguese Timor. The resolution was passed by 69 votes (including Australia, the Soviet Union and China) to 11 (Dahomey, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Thailand), with 38 abstentions (including New Zealand, Singapore, the USA and the EEC countries). Dr Malik said on the same day that Indonesia did not feel bound by the resolution, and repeated that Indonesia had no troops in East Timor except volunteers.

The UN General Assembly on Dec. 12, in a resolution passed by 72 votes to 10 with 48 abstentions, called on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor and enable the people there to decide their own future, and condemned the "military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia".

The Security Council subsequently on Dec. 22 passed a unanimous resolution calling on Indonesia to withdraw her forces from East Timor without delay, and requesting Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations to enable the people of East Timor to exercise their right to self-determination. The resolution was rejected by Indonesia in a government statement on the following day.

Despite the UN resolutions, subsequent reports from East Timor on Dec. 26 said that Indonesian-backed forces had opened a major new offensive in East Timor against Fretilin and were in full control of Dili and Baucau, and that Fretilin troops had again fled to the mountains. On the same day pro-Indonesian troops appealed to Indonesia for help to dispose of "terrorist remnants left by the Portuguese Government".

A communiqué issued on Dec. 28 in Lisbon by supporters of Fretilin claimed that 10,000 people had been killed in the new offensive which, it alleged, involved some 30,000 Indonesian parachutists and marines, 30 warships and several submarines and aircraft.

The Australian Government, which on Dec. 16 had proposed to the Security Council that a UN "presence" should be established in East Timor, on Dec. 29 called on Indonesia to allow resumption of humanitarian aid to East Timor and to admit UN observers to the territory without "delay or prevarication". However, the United Nations was urged in a message from the provisional Government of East Timor to postpone sending its special envoy, Signor Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi (a UN Under-Secretary-General), to East Timor on Jan. 12, 1976, in the interests of safety. The commander of the pro-Indonesian forces in East Timor said on Jan. 2 that the United Nations would be making a "big mistake" if it ignored the provisional Government's warning.

Takeover of Remaining Portuguese Territory

The offshore island of Atauro, from which the Timor Governor and his administration had been evacuated in early December, was occupied by pro-Indonesian forces on Dec. 28 and the Indonesian flag raised, apparently with the consent of the small Portuguese garrison there. The integration of Atauro marked the end of Portuguese control over all land in the area, the Portuguese enclave of Ocuissi Ambeno, in Indonesian Timor, having been officially incorporated into Indonesia on Dec. 13 after Portuguese officials had departed two days earlier and the Indonesian flag had been raised.

On Dec. 29 a Portuguese spokesman in Darwin announced that a Portuguese corvette was being sent to East Timor waters to maintain a presence in the area "even though we no longer appear to have any land".—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Australian Information Service - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Financial Times - Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - La Vanguardia, Barcelona) (Prev. rep. 27266 A)

A. DAHOMEY — Alleged Plot by Former President Uncovered - Ultimatum issued to Exiles - Country's Name changed to Benin

It was announced on Oct. 18, 1975, by Lieutenant Martin Dohou Azonhiho, the Minister of Information and National Guidance, that the National Political Bureau had uncovered "a vast plot organized by Dr Emile Derlin Zinsou [President in 1968-69] with the strong support of powerful financiers". The Minister claimed that the purpose of the plot, planned for that day (Oct. 18), was to "liquidate the revolution" [i.e. of 1972—see 25550 A] and to assassinate its principal leaders "with the criminal support of a horde of foreign mercenaries". Claiming that the plotters had planned to enter Dahomey through Togo, the authorities closed the border with that country.

Dr Zinsou, who had been overthrown as head of state in December 1969 (see 23760 A), had been living in Paris since 1970, and had in absentia been sentenced to death in March 1975 (see 27044 B). The curfew imposed on June 24, 1975, after anti-government strikes and demonstrations (see 27228 B) had been lifted on July 23. Early in August 1975 it was reported that M. Gratien Pognon, Dahomey's ambassador in Belgium and at the European Communities, had decided to relinquish his post and to join the (opposition) *Front de libération du Dahomey*, stating that he wished to help "rid" his country of President Kerekou's "dictatorial" regime.

Dr Zinsou, speaking in Paris on Nov. 4, denied the existence of the alleged plot and claimed that the military regime in Dahomey had arrested hundreds of people, some of whom had been tortured and others beaten to death. President Kerekou's regime, he said, was composed of "murderers, criminals and thieves", and President Kerekou was dominated by "certain young people, both military and civilian, calling themselves Marxist-Leninists". He himself, Dr Zinsou said, remained resolutely opposed to the regime and his great ambition was to take part in the development of his country in any capacity whatsoever.

President Kerekou, in a speech on Oct. 26, appealed to "those of our compatriots who for personal reasons have been in exile since Oct. 30, 1974, to return to the national territory before Nov. 30, 1975", after which date those who "deliberately choose the camp of reaction by remaining abroad" would have their property confiscated.

In a further announcement President Kerekou declared on Nov. 30 that with effect from Dec. 1 the country's name of Dahomey, "imposed upon us by the colonialists", would be changed to "the People's Republic of Benin"; that the country's ruling party would henceforth be known as the Benin People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB); that in future all decisions made by the military Government would be in conformity with those of the party's Central Committee; and that the nation would have a new flag (green with a five-pointed red star).—(Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - West Africa) (Prev. rep. 27228 B)

B. PERU — Designation of Successor to Prime Minister - Cabinet Changes - Devaluation of Sol

The Government announced officially on Nov. 1, 1975, that General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, the Chief of Staff of the Army, would become Prime Minister on Feb. 1, 1976, to replace General Oscar Vargas Prieto, who would then be due for retirement.

In October the retirement at their own request of three air force generals—General César Podestá Jiménez (Minister of the Air Force), General Fernando Miró Quesada Bahamonde (Minister of Health) and General César Yépez Zapatero (Chief of Staff of the Air Force)—brought about a number of cabinet changes on Oct. 20. General Dante Poggi Morán, until then Minister of Labour, and regarded as a supporter of President Morales Bermúdez, was appointed Minister and Chief of Staff of the Air Force; General Luis Galindo Chapman became Minister of Labour, and General Jorge Tamayo de la Flor Minister of Health. In an earlier change General Artemio García Vargas had replaced General Raúl Meneses Arata as Minister of Communications and Transport.

A purge in late October of associates of former President Juan Velasco Alvarado, who was overthrown on Aug. 29, 1975 [see 27341 A], included General Leónidas Rodríguez Figueroa, head of the government information office, and General José Graham Hurtado, head of the President's advisory committee. General Rodríguez Figueroa, who had been appointed to this post after the coup, had been one of the authors of the "Inca Plan" laying down the programme of the 1968 revolution [see 26683 A]. He was replaced by General José Villalobos Vigil, while General Hurtado was replaced by General Oscar Molina Pallochía.

The daily *La Prensa* of Lima reported on Oct. 31 that the former Minister of the Interior, General Enrique León Velarde, and other associates of President Velasco Alvarado had been arrested and that border and airport police were seeking other persons for fraud and monetary malpractices. General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, the former Minister of Fisheries, and General Enrique Váñez Angulo, Minister of Agriculture until November 1974, were reported to be under house arrest.

Several dozen high officials and businessmen were also arrested in late October as part of a campaign to "reinforce the morality of the country".

A unified exchange rate for the sol was introduced on Sept. 26, 1975, at 45 soles to the US dollar. This replaced the certificate rate (applicable to all trade transactions and certain non-trade and capital transactions), which had been kept at 38.70 soles per dollar since October 1967, and the draft or transfer rate (applicable to services and most other non-trade transactions), which had been stabilized at 43.38 soles (buying) and 43.50 soles (selling) in May 1969.—(Le Monde - Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Bank of London and South America Review) (Prev. rep. Coup, 27341 A; Exchange Rates, 25172 A)

C. FRANCE — New Secretary-General of Radical Party - M. Servan-Schreiber elected President of Lorraine Regional Council

The executive committee of the Radical Party, meeting in Paris on Dec. 20, 1975, elected Mme Jacqueline Nebout as secretary-general of the party in succession to Mme Brigitte Gros, who had held the post since July 1975 [see 27473 A]. Mme Nebout (47), a former vice-president of the Radical Party, received 48 votes against 34 cast for M. Marcel Ruby, seven votes being blank. Mme Gros had herself succeeded M. Gabriel Péronnet (Secretary of State for the Civil Service), who had become acting president of the Radical Party on the resignation of M. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and who was subsequently, in November 1975, confirmed in this position [see 27516 B].

Meeting in Metz on Jan. 6, 1976, the Regional Council of Lorraine elected M. Servan-Schreiber as its president by 33 votes out of 65 in the second round, against 26 cast for M. Jean Vilmain (independent), who had held the post since the inaugural meeting of the Council in January 1974 [see page 26333]; M. Jean Bernard (Socialist Party) received six votes. In addition to centrist backing, M. Servan-Schreiber also received support from the Independent Republicans, both in the region and at national level, with the Interior Minister, M. Michel Poniatowski, intervening personally in his favour; M. Vilmain, on the other hand, was again supported by the other main component of the ruling majority, the Gaullist *Union des démocrates pour la république* (UDR), notably by the Prime Minister, M. Jacques Chirac.—(Le Monde - Times - Guardian) (Prev. rep. Radical Party, 27516 B; Regional Councils, 26331 A)