

Reproduction and Demonstration in Quotations

ELIZABETH WADE AND HERBERT H. CLARK

Stanford University

By traditional theories, direct quotations are attempts to reproduce speech verbatim. By an alternative demonstration theory, they are attempts to depict selective aspects of the original. So according to traditional theories, direct quotations should be used only for verbatim reproduction, but according to the demonstration theory, they can be used for stylistic reasons independent of verbatim accuracy. In a comparison of these theories, people were asked to recount what happened in videotaped dialogues under instructions either to be accurate or to entertain—after one viewing or after memorizing the dialogue. After one viewing, narrators were no more accurate in direct than in indirect quotation, regardless of instruction. After memorization, they produced verbatim quotations when asked to be accurate on the dialogue, but were quite inaccurate when asked to entertain. These and other findings favor the demonstration theory. © 1993 Academic Press, Inc.

Most folk and linguistic theories of quotation assume that when we use a direct quotation (or direct speech) we commit ourselves to reproducing the actual words we heard someone utter. An attorney who asks a witness “Tell us exactly what the defendant said” expects the jury to interpret the witness’s answer as a verbatim reproduction. According to a study by Philips (1985), American trial lawyers “make use of the American cultural notion that speech which a person is willing to quote is remembered better and is more exact than other reported speech” (p. 169). Is this assumption justified? Studies of memory for everyday conversation suggest that it isn’t. People generally cannot recall an utterance verbatim unless it was the last utterance heard, although they do retain its conceptual content, or gist. So there is a gap between theory and evidence. Folk and linguistic theories appear to assume that direct quotations are verbatim reproductions, but the evidence shows that this is generally impossible. How is this issue to be resolved?

We thank Susan E. Brennan and Michael F. Schober for their valuable counsel on this work, and Neil Lloyd and Kenneth Wan for their assistance in data collection and coding. The research was supported in part by Grant BNS 83-20284 from the National Science Foundation.

Quotation—that is, direct quotation or direct speech—is really a special linguistic form for reporting speech and other events. In our use of the term, it is defined by linguistic properties rather than accuracy. The form is generally easy to identify. Compare these two reports by a narrator about what a salesclerk said:

(1) The guy behind the counter said “I’m sure we can have it here by tomorrow morning.”

(2) The guy behind the counter said that he was sure they could have it there by the next morning.

The principal differences in the two forms are these (Banfield, 1973): (a) indirect quotation may be introduced by *that*, whereas direct quotation cannot; (b) the verbs in indirect quotation (here, *was*, *could have*) follow certain rules about the sequence of tenses, whereas the verbs in direct quotation (*am*, *can have*) are unaffected by tense outside the quoted domain; (c) in indirect quotation, pronouns (here, *he*, *they*) have the same person as in the surrounding narrative, whereas in direct quotation, pronouns (*I*, *we*) are consistent with the point of view of the quoted speaker; and (d) in indirect quotation, place and time (here, *there*, *the next morning*) are referred to from the vantage point of the current

speaker, whereas in direct quotation place and time (*here, tomorrow*) are from the vantage point of the original speaker. What these features reflect, in effect, is that in indirect quotation, the referent of the I, here, and now of the speech report is the current speaker's, whereas in direct quotation it is the original speaker's.

These features have led to many *wording theories* of quotation. By these theories, direct quotations are attempts to reproduce the wording of what was said, whereas indirect quotations are attempts to reproduce only the gist or content. Wording theories have taken various forms. In Coulmas's (1986) theory, direct and indirect quotations are two kinds of type-token identities. For direct quotation, the type is defined as the words of the original utterance, although the token repetitions may vary in pitch and intonation. For indirect quotation, the type is the meaning of the original utterance, and token repetitions may contain different words as long as the meaning remains roughly the same. The words that appear in direct quotation "refer to words, not to any arbitrary words, that is, but purportedly to those words that some other speaker uttered at some other time" (p. 12). Although the theories proposed by Davidson (1984), Leech (1974), Li (1986), Partee (1973), Quine (1951, 1969), and Wierzbicka (1974) differ in many ways, they too assume that direct quotations represent the wording of the original speaker.

Most wording theories also claim verbatim reproduction, so we will call them *strong wording theories*. In direct quotation, according to Coulmas (1985), the reporter "commits himself to faithfully rendering form and content of what the original speaker said" (p. 42). In Leech's words, "the reporter commits himself to repeating the actual words spoken" (p. 353). For both Quine and Davidson, a statement containing a direct quotation is true only if the wording of the quotation is identical to the wording of the original utterance. In com-

mon parlance, the very term *quotation* is generally taken to imply verbatim reproduction.

The strong wording theories seem to assume that because direct quotations represent the original speaker's wording, they must be intended to reproduce that wording verbatim. For written language, this assumption may make sense. In references to literature, it is not only possible but expected that quotations will be verbatim. But for spoken language, the assumption is questionable. Speakers are rarely in a position to reproduce the original speaker's words verbatim, and they must know that. Studies of memory for conversation or a single presentation of a text have found that after even a short delay memory for exact words is limited to keywords and phrases (Hjelmquist, 1984; Hjelmquist & Gidlund, 1985; Isaacs, 1989; Sachs, 1967).

For spoken language, a *weak wording theory* is more plausible. It would hold that while direct quotation is meant to reproduce the wording of the original, both speakers and their addressees recognize that verbatim reproduction is unattainable. Speakers believe they are trying only to approximate the original speaker's utterance as best they can. Yet a weak wording theory would maintain the distinction between direct and indirect quotation. Whereas direct quotation is an attempt to reproduce the wording of the original (if imperfectly), indirect quotation represents only the content.

Weak wording theories, however, are still unable to account for a number of documented uses of direct quotation. Direct quotation can be used even where there is no original wording to reproduce, as in these examples (from Clark & Gerrig, 1990; see also Tannen, 1989; Mayes, 1990). Speakers can report nonexistent utterances: "You can't say, 'Well Daddy I didn't hear you.'" They can report unspoken thoughts or reactions: "And I thought 'well a I'm not going to' you know 'produce

any sort of functional gaffes.' ” They can report generic utterances no particular person produced: “Many people have come up to me and said ‘Ed, why don’t you run for the Senate?’ ” They can quote in translation: “ ‘Well met, captain,’ he said, quietly, in German”; or “ ‘Lunch,’ Edwards said to the slender native girl, using his hands [in sign language]. ‘And bring the Thermos.’ ” They can even quote objects in words: “Senatorial hair, flaring over the ears in authoritative gray waves, says, ‘Put me on Nightline.’ ” Weak wording theories would be forced to treat these as exceptions.

The problem with these wording theories is that they assume that form is equivalent to content. Because direct quotations are formulated from the original speaker’s vantage point, they must be attempts to reproduce the original speaker’s actual words. This, of course, doesn’t follow. As Sternberg (1982, p. 68) has argued, “From the premise that direct speech (unlike the indirect and other kinds of quotation, let alone the narrative of events) *can* reproduce the original speaker’s words, it neither follows that it must perforce do so nor that it ought to do so nor, of course, that it actually does so.”

The alternative we will consider is the *demonstration theory* of quotation (Clark & Gerrig, 1990). When a tennis coach demonstrates for a student how she did her last backhand, he is trying to depict her backhand, to get her to see, by watching his actions, how she did it. Yet he demonstrates only selected aspects of it. He may try to depict the swing of her arm but not the twist of her hand. And he may do it in slow motion without even a ball or racket. He intends only some aspects of his demonstration (e.g., the swing of his arm) to be *depictive*. He intends other aspects (e.g., the slow motion, the lack of ball and racket) to be *supportive* of the depiction. He intends still other aspects (e.g., the smirk on his face) to be *annotative* of his depiction.

The remaining aspects (e.g., how he walks, turns his head, rubs his ear) are *incidental*. Demonstrations, then, are communicative acts that work by selective depictions.

The demonstration theory assumes that quotations are a type of demonstration. When the narrator in 1 reports the clerk as saying “I’m sure we can have it here by tomorrow morning,” she is trying to demonstrate what the clerk did, though only selected aspects of it. Perhaps she is trying to depict the assertion he made, his accent, his obsequious tone of voice, but not his wording. If so, the assertion, accent, and tone of voice of her quotation are depictive aspects, whereas its wording and her own female pitch are only supportive aspects. The narrator in 2, in contrast, describes what the clerk did.

The demonstration theory readily accounts for phenomena that are a puzzle for wording theories. Speakers are perfectly capable of depicting selective aspects of events that have not yet occurred, other people’s thoughts, collective utterances, utterances in another language, gestures, and much more. Speakers choose which aspects to depict to suit their purposes. If they have reason to demonstrate a speaker’s exact wording, they can choose to depict that. If they have reason to demonstrate a speaker’s meaning, tone of voice, accent, speech defects, emotion, or gestures, they can do that without reproducing a single word of it, as in quotations in translation (see Clark & Gerrig, 1990; Mayes, 1990; Tannen, 1989).

At the center of the demonstration theory is the idea that depictions are fundamentally different from descriptions (Goodman, 1968; Walton, 1973, 1976). We interpret depictions (photographs, movies, paintings, sound effects, demonstrations) in certain respects as if we were directly perceiving the state, event, object, or process being depicted. We interpret descriptions only by identifying the symbols used and inferring what the speaker meant by them. By the

demonstration theory, then, quotations are intended to give the audience an experience of what it would be like in certain respects to experience the original event. Indirect quotations force the audience to recreate any such experience on their own. So direct quotations should be more useful than indirect quotations for making the original speech events vivid and dramatic.

The wording and demonstration theories contrast, then, in their emphasis on memory versus rhetoric. The wording theories, with their assumption of verbatim (or attempted verbatim) reproduction, predict that people's choice of direct or indirect quotation depends crucially on what they believe they remember of the original wording. Under the strong wording theory, they should choose direct quotations only if they are reasonably certain they can reproduce the original wording. Under the weak wording theory, they needn't be so certain, but if they can indeed remember the exact wording, they should reproduce it verbatim. Not to do so would be considered lying.

By the demonstration theory, a speaker's choice is a matter of rhetorical purpose. Demonstrations can depict aspects of events that descriptions cannot readily capture. If speakers want to make their discourse vivid or dramatic, they should use direct quotations whether or not they remember the original wording. Yet demonstrations can also be used to depict exact wording. Whenever people have reason to depict the original wording, they can use quotations for that too. That is, indeed, the norm for quotation of literary sources. Under the demonstration theory, speakers who remember the exact wording but produce a quotation that is not verbatim aren't lying. They are merely choosing to depict aspects of the original other than its wording.

We report three experiments designed to examine this contrast. In the first we had people describe a videotaped conversation they had just seen. We examined the amount of quotation they used depending

on whether they had been asked to be interesting or to be accurate. In the second experiment we had people recount a movie scene whose dialogue they had memorized to perfect recitation. Again we compared the amount of quotation they used depending on whether they had been asked to be amusing or to be accurate. In the final experiment we examined people's beliefs about the accuracy of quotations.

EXPERIMENT 1

Why should narrators choose direct over indirect quotation? By the demonstration theory one reason is to vivify or enliven their narrative. If so, narrators trying to tell a lively, interesting story should use relatively more quotation than those trying simply to tell an accurate story. And contrary to wording theories, narrators' choice of direct over indirect quotation shouldn't be strongly affected by the accuracy of their memory. They should reproduce about as many words in direct as in indirect quotation once changes in tense, person, and deixis are accounted for. They should also be willing in their direct quotations to depict aspects of the original speech that capture the original speaker's intent without reproducing the words verbatim.

Method

We brought each of 20 pairs of Stanford University students into a room and randomly assigned one of them the role of narrator and the other listener. The listener then left the room while the narrator watched four brief conversational scenes on videotape. The listener returned, and the narrator told what went on in the scenes, retelling two scenes under each of two instructions—to tell an amusing story, or to be as accurate as possible. We will call these the entertainment and accuracy instructions.

The four videotaped conversations were excerpts of less than 3 min each; one was taken from the television show "Who's the Boss," two were from the soap opera "One

Life to Live," and one was from the movie "Breakfast at Tiffany's." They were chosen to be fairly easy to understand without background information, to have only two or three characters, and to focus more on talk than action. They were always presented in the same order. Narrators were told to pay careful attention to be able to talk about the scenes later.

During the retellings, the narrator and listener were seated on opposite sides of an opaque screen so that their communication would be entirely vocal and captured on audiotape. The narrator recounted the first two scenes under entertainment instructions and the second two under accuracy instructions, or vice versa, counterbalanced across narrators. The instructions were given separately for the two groups of two retellings. That is, narrators recounted the first two scenes under one instruction without knowing they would be asked to recount the last two scenes under a different instruction.

The entertainment and accuracy instructions were designed to give narrators different goals in their retellings. Here is the entertainment instruction:

This part of the experiment is concerned with story-telling. I would like you to retell what went on in the conversations to your partner. You should tell your partner what went on, and the goal you should keep in mind is to amuse your listener with the story, as if you were telling an anecdote to a friend.

And this was the accuracy instruction:

This part of the experiment is concerned with accuracy. I would like you to recount what went on in the conversations to your partner. You should tell your partner what went on, and the goal you should keep in mind is to recount the conversations as accurately as possible, as if you were giving an eyewitness account in court.

The listeners were told to pay attention because they would have to answer questions about the retellings later.

The narrators and their listeners were students fulfilling a course requirement in introductory psychology or paid a small sti-

pend for their participation. All but two of the pairs were friends.

We transcribed all 80 retellings, including all repetitions, repairs, word fragments, and major pauses. We marked the transcripts for all direct and indirect quotations. We put quotation marks around all those words (including false starts) that a novelist or copyeditor would have put quotation marks around, and we called these direct quotation. We underscored all reported speech (not including the introductory word *that*) that was subordinated by a verb of communication (like *say* or *ask*) but would not be encased in quotation marks, and we called this indirect quotation. For hard-to-decide cases, we listened to the tape recordings for intonation, changes in voice, and other markers of direct quotation, and that usually resolved the problem. If there was any doubt, we marked the reported speech as indirect. Overall there were 12 (2% of all quotations) of these difficult-to-decide cases.

Results

If direct quotations are used for enlivening stories, they should occur proportionately more often under entertainment instructions than under accuracy instructions. They did. Table 1 lists the average number of words per retelling in direct and indirect quotations. A greater proportion of the speech reports were in direct quotation for entertainment instructions than for accuracy instructions, 65 to 50%, $F(1,17) = 4.65, p < .05$.

What is the source of this effect? As Table 1 shows, the entertainment narrators

TABLE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS IN EACH TYPE OF QUOTATION AND IN THE ACCOUNTS AS A WHOLE IN EXPERIMENT 1

Instructions	Direct quotation	Indirect quotation	Total words per account
Entertainment	48	19	269
Accuracy	51	47	309

didn't use any more *direct* quotations than accuracy narrators. Rather, they used fewer *indirect* quotations. This pattern could be consistent with the wording theories. Suppose that the accuracy narrators felt obliged to report more details, and since they were less sure of these details, they expressed them as indirect quotation. That too would account for the pattern. Indeed, the accuracy narrators did report more details. Their retellings were 309 words long on average, whereas the entertainment retellings were only 269 words long, $F(1,18) = 6.14, p < .05$. So even though there was a greater proportion of direct quotation under the entertainment instructions, the finding isn't decisive in distinguishing the two theories.

Accuracy of quotation should be more decisive. Under the strong wording theories, narrators should never use direct quotations except when they are reasonably sure they are being accurate, so direct quotations should contain a minimum of errors. Under a weak wording theory, narrators ought at least to be more accurate in direct than indirect quotations, because direct quotations are attempts to approximate the wording whereas indirect quotations are not. Both predictions rest on the assumption that narrators can estimate the accuracy of what they are saying. Let us call this the *metamemory assumption*.

To test these predictions, we computed amount of verbatim reproduction for every direct and indirect quotation separately. We counted as intrusions any words in a narrator's direct or indirect quotation that were not in the original scene. We treated common words such as articles and pronouns as verbatim repetitions only if they were in the same grammatical position of a sentence (or clause) of the same gist as in the original. For example, in one of the original scenes a woman named Angela says,

I guess you're not interested in what I got at the market

and one narrator quoted her like this:

and she tells him uh "Well do you want to see uh what I bought at the store?"

For this retelling, "you" would not be counted as a verbatim repetition, since it occurs in a clause of different meaning and structure than the "you" in the original. The words "what," "I," "at," and "the" would be counted as verbatim, since they do belong to a clause of similar meaning and structure as the original. Accuracy was coded similarly for indirect quotation, except that we counted as verbatim repetitions all changes in tense, deixis, and pronoun that were consistent with a standard transformation from direct to indirect quotation, as illustrated in examples 1 and 2. We defined the *percentage of verbatim words* as the number of words that were verbatim repetitions divided by the total number of words in the direct or indirect quotation. In the above example, 4 out of 12, or 33% of the words were verbatim repetitions from the original ("uh" was not counted as a word).

We tested the metamemory assumption first: Can narrators correctly judge whether their speech reports are accurate or inaccurate? We divided all speech reports into two categories: hedged and unhedged. The hedged reports were those introduced by "like," or were within the scope of hedges such as "sort of," "kind of," "something like that," or "whatever." The rest of the reports were categorized as unhedged. If the metamemory assumption is correct, unhedged reports should be more accurate than hedged ones. They were. The percentage of verbatim words in direct and indirect quotations is shown in Table 2. Unhedged

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF VERBATIM WORDS IN HEDGED AND UNHEDGED QUOTATIONS IN EXPERIMENT 1

Status	Form of quotation		Means
	Direct	Indirect	
Hedged	21	22	21
Unhedged	38	35	36
Means	31	32	32

reports were 15% more accurate than hedged reports, 36% verbatim to 21%, $F(1,19) = 9.33, p < .01$. The difference was about the same for direct quotations (17%) as for indirect quotations (13%), $F < 1$. So narrators have some sense of when their speech reports are accurate and when they are not.

By the wording theories, narrators should use indirect quotations, just as they use hedges, to signal lack of accuracy. That is, direct quotations should be more accurate than indirect quotations. They were not. Table 3 shows the percentage of verbatim words in *unhedged* (and therefore presumably unqualified) direct and indirect quotations. Direct quotations were only 3% more accurate than indirect quotations, 38 to 35%, an unreliable difference, $F(1,18) = .60, p > .10$. This 3% difference, which is the average over all narrators, is smaller than the 5% differences each for entertainment and accuracy instructions because seven narrators used no indirect quotations under the entertainment instructions and that boosted the mean overall accuracy for indirect quotations. Yet the 5% differences in accuracy, taken separately, weren't reliable either, $F < 1$.

The important point here is that the 3% (or 5%) difference is small compared to the 15% difference between unhedged and hedged quotations. If our narrators had used indirect quotations to mark lack of accuracy, the difference should have been at least as large. And by the weak wording theories, narrators should have been more accurate on direct quotations when they

were told to be accurate. This wasn't the case either. Accuracy narrators were only 6% more accurate than entertainment narrators, 41% to 35%, also a nonsignificant difference, $F < 1$. And that 6% increase was no larger than the 6% increase for indirect quotations. It should have been significantly larger if accuracy narrators were using indirect quotations to signal lack of accuracy.

The data in Table 3 are especially damaging to strong theories of quotation. The percentage of verbatim words for direct quotations is 38%. This is extraordinarily low for a theory that assumes speakers are committing themselves to verbatim reproduction. These speakers could not have been saving direct quotation for only those utterances they were certain they could reproduce the original verbatim. They didn't even come close.

By the demonstration theory, direct quotations can depict more than simply the words uttered. Quotations can be dramatized; they can be used to portray a speech act, an emotion, or a tone of voice. In order to look at such uses of quotation, we listened to the narratives and coded quotations for intonational markings such as raised pitch or exaggerated pitch contour. Quotations generally seemed to fall into three categories: (a) not intonationally marked; (b) intonationally marked only at the beginning of the quotation; and (c) intonationally dramatized throughout. We listened to both direct and indirect quotations and assigned each to one of these three categories. Initial agreement between the two authors was 81%. We then relistened to each quotation we had disagreed on and discussed it to reconcile our codings.

Figure 1 shows the percentages of direct and indirect quotations that were delivered with a marked intonation either throughout or at the beginning (categories b and c). Dramatization was common for direct quotations: 34% were dramatized throughout and 13% more were marked at the beginning. But it was rare for indirect quotations: only 2% were dramatized throughout and

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF VERBATIM WORDS IN UNHEDGED
DIRECT AND INDIRECT QUOTATION (NUMBER OF
SUBJECTS) IN EXPERIMENT 1

Instructions	Form of quotation		Means
	Direct	Indirect	
Entertainment	35 (18)	30 (13)	33 (19)
Accuracy	41 (17)	36 (17)	39 (18)
Means	38 (19)	35 (20)	36 (20)




FIG. 1. Percentage of direct and indirect quotations under the two instructions that were marked by intonation at the beginning or throughout Experiment 1.

1% more were marked at the beginning. The difference between 47 and 3% is highly reliable, $F(1,19) = 58.3, p < .001$. There was no reliable influence of instructions. So intonational dramatization was a common characteristic of direct quotations, but almost never occurred with indirect quotations. An exaggerated or marked intonation was the hallmark of direct quotations.

Why was dramatized intonation so common? Our narrators weren't simply exaggerating delivery randomly; they were using the intonation to depict annoyance, embarrassment, sarcasm, and so on. These are aspects of the original speech that couldn't be communicated simply by reproducing the original utterance verbatim. The easiest way, and often the only way, to let listeners know of these is to depict them in the delivery. And these depictive aspects are just what one would expect from the demonstration theory.

As illustration, consider how our narrators reported the hesitancy of a customer in the scene from "Breakfast at Tiffany's" who is embarrassed about the origin of the ring he wants Tiffany's to engrave. He says:

No actually it was purchased concurrent with uh (pause) well actually came inside of (pause) well (pause) a box of crackerjacks.

One narrator reported the utterance this way:

The man who pulled it out of his coat said co-kind of uncomfortably "No, we got it in a (pause) a box of" kind of stuttered a bit "box of crackerjacks."

With the aside that the man "kind of stuttered a bit," she indicated that her pauses and repetitions were meant to depict the original character's manner, even though they didn't reproduce the pauses or repetitions in the original. Another student, more fluent in general, depicted the hesitation by exaggerating it:

and the man said "Well no it wasn't. I actually (pause) got it (pause) well (tsk) (long pause) it came in a crackerjack box."

The positions of her pauses were incorrect, and her third pause was much longer than the longest pause in the original. What she seemed to be doing was demonstrating *that* the character had hesitated rather than attempting to reproduce his pauses with any accuracy.

The wording theories claim that anything that occurs in quotation ought to be attempts to reproduce the exact words of the original. But four narrators produced cases of quotations that contained nonsense words like "da da da" or "na na na."

And he says, "Ten dollars at the outside." So the clerk said, "Oh I see, you know, da da da da da."

And they're like, "Oh well that's not too romantic, na na na."

And she's sitting there going, "You'll survive, da da da da da."

And—and Vickey reassures her, you know y'know, "You can call me whenever you want and any problem, da da da da da."

Under the wording theory, these cases ought to be impossible, because they are clearly not attempts to reproduce any original words. But under the demonstration theory they are simply a demonstration of the speaker's manner, illustrating neatly how the speaker went on without saying much.

Finally, consider how our narrators dealt with sarcasm. In a different scene, Angela

is surprised when a drenched Tony comes in the front door. She says "You're all wet!" and he looks down at himself in mock surprise and replies sarcastically, "Holy Mackerel, you're right." His response was variously reported as:

And he says, "Yes, Angela, I am."

And he kind of looks at himself sarcastically and goes, "Oh my God, you're right. I am wet."

And he looks down at himself and he says, "Gee, I didn't notice."

And he's like, "You're very brilliant."

He says something really witty like, uh "Yeah, no kidding, I'm all wet."

And he goes, "Oh my God, no way."

These responses have two properties in common. Not one of them repeats the original words verbatim. And all of them are heavily sarcastic; most of them have a clearly sarcastic intonation as well. Some of them, like "You're very brilliant," don't even capture the gist of the original. To these narrators, the differences in wording and gist didn't seem to matter. They were trying simply to demonstrate the most important feature of Tony's action, that he was making fun of Angela for commenting on the obvious.

Discussion

Whenever narrators report what a character said, they can choose direct quotation, indirect quotation, or still other forms. How do they make that choice? By the wording theories, they can choose direct quotation only if they are willing to commit themselves to its being a verbatim reproduction (the strong theories), or are trying to approximate the exact wording as best they can (the weak theories). Now narrators *are* able to estimate to some degree when they are being accurate. They were 15% more accurate on unhedged than on hedged quotations. Yet they were only 3% more accurate on direct than on indirect quotations and this wasn't reliable. Narrators, then, didn't reserve direct quotation

for those reports that were, in fact, more accurate. Indeed, they were strikingly inaccurate in their direct quotations, averaging only 38% accuracy. These findings argue against the wording theories, both strong and weak.

By the demonstration theory, on the other hand, narrators should choose direct quotation when they want to depict rather than describe aspects of the original conversation. They might choose direct quotation for enlivening stories. Indeed, our narrators used proportionately more quotation in trying to tell amusing stories than in trying merely to be accurate. Also, their quotations depicted everything from pitch and tone of voice to sarcasm and surprise. The hallmark of direct quotations in our study wasn't accuracy, as the strong wording theory would have it, but depictiveness, as demonstration theory claims.

The demonstration theory also makes sense of the findings on hedges. Recall that our narrators hedged both direct and indirect quotations, with about the same decrease (15%) in accuracy. Generally, of course, the further a direct quotation is from the original wording, the more likely it is to express content not found in the original either. So what our narrators were hedging was not the verbatim accuracy of the speech reports—verbatim accuracy isn't relevant in indirect quotations—but the accuracy of content. When they were unsure about the content of the original utterance, they hedged, whether they were demonstrating or describing what was said.

Experiment 1 didn't support either the strong or the weak wording theories, yet it offered only indirect support for the demonstration theory. For Experiment 2, we set up a situation in which the weak wording theories and the demonstration theory predict opposite results.

EXPERIMENT 2

It should come as no surprise that the narrators in Experiment 1 weren't very accurate in their quotations. They saw the

four videotaped conversations only once and weren't expecting to recall them—although this is usual for spontaneous quotation in conversation. Still, our narrators might have been attempting (and not succeeding) to approximate the verbatim wording. What if they *had* been able to recall the original dialogue word for word? Both wording theories predict that they should be word-perfect in their direct quotations because direct quotations are attempts to reproduce the original wording. The demonstration theory predicts that they need not be verbatim. If their goal is to depict exact wording, they should be word perfect. If their goal is to depict other aspects, they can choose whatever wording suits their purposes.

So in Experiment 2 we armed our narrators with perfect memory: we had them memorize the dialogue of a scene word for word. We then asked them to recount the scene. Half of them were under instructions to be amusing, and half to report the dialogue accurately. With the accurate dialogue instructions, narrators have reason to depict exact wording, so by the demonstration theory they should. With the entertainment instructions, narrators may have reason to depict other aspects instead, so by the demonstration theory they will *not* necessarily make their quotations verbatim. Both wording theories, in contrast, predict that narrators should quote verbatim in both conditions. We asked the entertainment narrators to amuse their listeners in order to avoid possible demand characteristics of the situation. If we had asked them merely to retell the scene, they might have assumed, since they had just memorized the dialogue, that they were supposed to be as accurate as possible. We wanted to test the prediction that narrators do not feel compelled to quote verbatim, even when they can.

Method

We had 16 students each memorize the dialogue from a brief videotaped scene.

When they were finished, a second student was brought in and assigned the role of listener. The narrator then recounted the scene under either entertainment or "accurate dialogue" instructions.

In the first part of the session, the narrators memorized the dialogue from a one-and-a-half-minute scene from "Breakfast at Tiffany's." In that scene a penurious young couple (played by Audrey Hepburn and George Peppard) talk to a stuffy older jewelry clerk in Tiffany's about buying an inexpensive piece of jewelry. (This was part of one of the scenes used in Experiment 1.) The narrators had access to both the videotape and a written transcript of the dialogue and were given 45 min to memorize the dialogue as close to word-perfect as possible. The experimenter entered the room every 10 min and asked the narrators to recite the dialogue. When they could recite the lines perfectly, or when the 45 min had passed, they were asked to recite the dialogue once more. We used the last two recitations to assess the accuracy of their final memorization.

In the second part of the session, the narrators recounted the scene to their listeners. Eight of them (chosen at random) were told to try to make their account amusing or interesting. The other eight were told to tell their listeners what went on in the scene, but to report the dialogue as accurately as they possibly could. The listeners were brought into the room after the instructions and were asked simply to pay attention. As in Experiment 1, the narrator and listener were seated on opposite sides of an opaque barrier to make all communication vocal.

We transcribed the final two recitations and the retellings in the same detail as in Experiment 1. We scored the recitations for words omitted and words intruded in order to exclude any narrator with more than 10% of either type of error. We excluded one narrator this way and replaced him with a new narrator. We marked direct and indirect quotations in the retellings as in Experiment 1, but we excluded all quotations of

thoughts or other talk for which there was no counterpart in the original.

Results and Discussion

By both wording theories, our narrators, having memorized the dialogue, should be word-perfect in their direct quotations whether they were trying to be amusing or accurate. But by the demonstration theory, they need be word-perfect only when trying to recite the dialogue accurately. To test these predictions, we scored the verbatim accuracy of all speech reports as in Experiment 1, but with one difference. We compared each report not only against the original dialogue but against the narrator's own final two recitations. We took these recitations to represent how the narrator was remembering the original dialogue. That allowed us to assess how accurately the quotations were reflecting the narrator's actual memory.

The accuracy of our narrators goes directly against both versions of the wording theories. The percentage of verbatim words for the two types of narrators is shown in Table 4. (The accurate dialogue group produced only one indirect quotation, so we couldn't compute the percentage of verbatim words for that cell.) When the narrators were asked to get the dialogue right, their accuracy was 99%. But when they were asked to be amusing, it dropped to 62%. This difference (tested on the cube-root of the raw proportions in order to equate variances) is reliable, $F(1,14) = 88.4, p < .001$. The difference cannot be attributed to a dif-

ference in memory. In the final two recitations, the accurate dialogue and entertainment groups omitted only 2.6 and 2.9% of the 225 words in the original dialogue and produced only 1.8 and 1.3% intrusions. These error rates are low and neither of the differences is reliable, $F < 1$. So even though these narrators had recited the original dialogue nearly perfectly moments earlier, the accuracy of their quotations depended on their purpose. When told to be accurate, they produced nearly flawless verbatim quotations. They were fully capable of verbatim reproductions. Yet when told to be amusing, they apparently saw no reason to produce verbatim quotations. That goes directly against the commitment assumed in the wording theories.

These two groups of narrators also produced very different narrations. The accurate dialogue narrators were more complete than the entertainment narrators. They used many more words in direct quotation on average, 224 to 65 words, $F(1,14) = 347.0, p < .001$ (tested on the cube of the raw numbers to equate variance), and many fewer words in indirect quotation, 1 to 50 words, $F(1,14) = 114.9, p < .001$ (tested on the cube-root). So the accurate dialogue narrators, told to "get the dialogue right," took their charge seriously and tried to recount every line in the original. Note that this charge is different from the charge given to the accuracy narrators in Experiment 1. Those narrators were told merely to be accurate, so they could edit out unimportant and potentially boring elements of the story. The entertainment narrators in Experiment 2 didn't feel obliged to be so complete, so they could be more selective in what they chose to demonstrate (in direct quotation) and what to describe (in indirect quotation).

By both versions of the wording theory, our narrators should at least be more accurate in their direct than in their indirect quotations. The pertinent findings are again in Table 4. For the entertainment narrators, direct quotations were in fact 1% less accu-

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF WORDS THAT WERE VERBATIM
REPETITIONS (AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF WORDS IN
QUOTATION) IN EXPERIMENT 2

Instructions	Form of quotation		Means
	Direct	Indirect	
Accurate dialogue/ memorize	99 (224)	NA (1)	99
Entertainment/ memorize	62 (65)	63 (50)	62

rate than indirect quotations, $F < 1$. (We excluded the accurate dialogue group because they had produced only one indirect quotation.)

What were the entertainment narrators doing when they created quotations that were not verbatim? As in Experiment 1, they seem to have been demonstrating the speech act of the original. For example, in the original scene, which took place in a jewelry store, the customer says, "We can only afford to spend a limited amount," and the salesclerk replies, "May I ask how limited?" The clerk's line was quoted variously as:

And the clerk asks, "What is the limited amount?"

And the clerk says, "Well, how much can you spend?"

And um the clerk said, you know, "Well, I'd like to help you. Can you tell me how limited this amount is?"

These narrators were not making up new dialogue wholesale. They were using it to depict other aspects of the conversation. In the third example, for instance, "Well I'd like to help you" seems meant to demonstrate the clerk's friendly, helpful attitude. But most of the altered quotations were like the first two. While they didn't reproduce the wording and surface structure, they depicted a speech act—here a polite question—whose import was very similar to the original.

Were these entertainment narrators aware that their quotations were not verbatim? In postsession discussion, they showed a variety of levels of awareness of their own inaccuracy. One narrator explained that she had created new dialogue because she didn't like the way the people in the video talked. But another narrator, who had been less accurate, was certain that he had not strayed from the verbatim.

These narrators were questioned several minutes after their narratives and may have forgotten the wording of their own quotations. What if they had been asked immediately after their quotations? In an infor-

mal field experiment, we asked 45 students each to listen to their friends' conversations for three examples of direct quotation. When they heard an example, they were to stop the speakers and ask them how accurate they thought their quotation had been, and what their best guess was of the original wording. Most of the interrupted speakers replied that their quotations were probably *not* verbatim and changed their wording when giving their best guess. So at the moment of quotation, most of these speakers seem to realize they were not reproducing the original speaker's words verbatim. This informal experiment suggests that quoters are aware of their inaccurate wording. In Experiment 3, we investigated whether their addressees, as well, have such awareness.

EXPERIMENT 3

If, as the demonstration theory proposes, direct quotations are meant to depict selective aspects of the original utterance, then both speakers and their addressees ought not to interpret them as representations of verbatim wording. And what is more, both speakers and their addressees ought to acknowledge that quoters often do not even try to reproduce wording. According to the wording theories, however, speakers should at least attempt, and be understood as attempting, to reproduce the wording of the original.

Method

We had 10 students each watch a single videotaped scene, and then retell the scene to another student. We chose the scene from "Who's the Boss" used in Experiment 1 because it tended to elicit plenty of direct quotation and little indirect. These narrators were simply asked to "tell the story of the videotaped scene." After they had finished, the listeners filled out a questionnaire asking how accurate they thought the retelling was in general, and also how accurate they thought the quotations were, and asked the listeners to respond on a 5-point scale. The questions, shown in Ta-

ble 5, were designed to give specific examples of what it meant to misquote. The questions were presented in either of two randomly assigned orders: either the order presented in Table 5 (1, 2, 3, 4) or an order in which the two questions about quotation accuracy came first (3, 4, 1, 2). We transcribed the retellings, marking direct and indirect quotation in the same manner as in Experiment 1.

Results and Discussion

The narrators used a great deal of direct quotation, averaging 60 words, and little indirect quotation, averaging only 5 words. The accuracy rate was 46% verbatim for direct quotations and 58% for indirect quotations—although the second percentage is based on only eight quotations from four speakers. So, as in the previous experiments, many of the words in direct quotation were not from the original dialogue.

The listeners were apparently aware of this fact. When they were asked in the questionnaire, “In general, how accurate do you think the narrator was in the retelling?” (Question 1), the most common responses were evenly split between “very accurate (made no more than one or two very small errors)” and “mostly accurate (may have made errors on small details).” But when asked, “When the narrator quoted what the characters on the videotape said, how closely do you think he or she repeated the exact wording of the original?” (Question 3), the most common response was “not very closely (probably made substantial changes in wording).” Furthermore, every listener but one rated quotation wording (Question 3) as less accurate than the overall narrative (Question 1), by a sign test, $p < .05$. So listeners were willing to say that a narrator had been very accurate, and yet also say that the narrator

TABLE 5
QUESTIONS ASKED IN EXPERIMENT 3

-
1. In general, how accurate do you think the narrator was in the retelling?
 - a. not very accurate (probably made substantial errors)
 - b. fairly accurate (may have made a few substantial errors)
 - c. mostly accurate (may have made errors on small details)
 - d. very accurate (made no more than one or two very small errors)
 - e. completely accurate (made no errors)
 2. In general, do you think the narrator was trying to be accurate in the way he or she told the story?
 - a. not trying to be accurate
 - b. trying somewhat to be accurate
 - c. mostly trying to be accurate
 - d. trying very hard to be accurate
 - e. completely concentrating on accuracy
 3. When the narrator quoted what the characters on the videotape said, how closely do you think he or she repeated the exact wording of the original? (For example, if the character originally said “May I help you” and the narrator said she said “Can I help you,” this would count as a small change in wording. However if the narrator said she said “What can I do for you” this would count as a substantial change in wording.)
 - a. not very closely (probably made substantial changes in wording)
 - b. fairly closely (may have made a few substantial changes in wording)
 - c. mostly closely (may have made small changes in wording)
 - d. very closely (made no more than one or two very small changes in wording)
 - e. completely closely (made no changes in wording)
 4. In general, do you think the narrator was trying to get the exact wording when he or she reported what the characters said?
 - a. not trying to get the exact wording
 - b. trying somewhat to get the exact wording
 - c. mostly trying to get the exact wording
 - d. trying very hard to get the exact wording
 - e. completely concentrating on getting the exact wording
-

probably made substantial changes in the wording of their quotes. That is, they considered "substantial changes in wording" to be consistent with "no more than one or two very small errors." So if they consider nonverbatim quotations to be errors, they consider them to be at most very small errors.

What is more telling, listeners thought that the narrators were trying to be accurate: the most common responses to Question 2 were evenly split between "mostly trying to be accurate" and "trying very hard to be accurate." Yet at the same time they judged that the narrators were not trying to quote verbatim. When listeners were asked, "In general, do you think the narrator was trying to get the exact wording when he or she reported what the characters said?" (Question 4), the most common response was "not trying to get the exact wording." And again, every listener but one rated the attempt at general accuracy (Question 2) as greater than the attempt at wording accuracy (Question 4), by a sign test, $p < .01$. In a similar pattern, 7 out of the 10 narrators rated general accuracy as greater than wording accuracy, a difference that was marginally significant by a sign test, $p < .10$. However, every narrator rated the attempt at general accuracy as greater than the attempt at wording accuracy, by a sign test, $p < .01$.

Consistent with the demonstration theory, then, both speakers and listeners were willing to say that the narrators were trying very hard to be accurate and, at the same time, that they were not trying to reproduce the exact wording of the original in their quotations. This finding is inconsistent with the wording theories, which state that the speaker (especially one who is trying to be accurate) is committed to (and therefore meant to be understood as) attempting to reproduce the wording of the original.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

With quotations we have a paradox of sorts. On the one side, we have the cultural

and legal assumption that quotations are more or less faithful reproductions of the original speaker's words. This assumption is so ingrained that even the commonest theories of quotation—the several versions of the wording theory—take it for granted: speakers who use quotation commit themselves to representing the wording of what the original speaker actually said. On the other side, we have the reality of quotations. In extemporaneous speaking, we found, they are no more accurate than indirect quotations. Even when speakers have memorized another person's words verbatim and can, if they need to, reproduce the words verbatim, they often don't. And they generally recognize their own inaccuracy.

The demonstration theory not only accounts for our findings, but may also help explain this paradox. It claims that speakers use quotations to depict selected aspects of what the original speaker did. For their current purposes, they may not need to depict the original speaker's exact words. They may want instead to demonstrate what question, assertion, or request he or she performed, how he or she spoke—in a high voice, with a drawl, or in a sarcastic tone—or other aspects. For one utterance we noted, our narrators neatly demonstrated the original speaker's sarcasm while ignoring his exact wording. As demonstrations, quotations are an important stylistic device for enlivening stories, and indeed narrators used them proportionately more when they wanted to be entertaining.

Demonstrations are inherently more vivid than descriptions, and that may be the key to the paradox of quotation. As demonstrations, direct quotations are intended to enable listeners to experience what it would be like to hear, see, or feel what the original speaker did. Indirect quotations, which are descriptions, are not. If the depiction of a direct quotation is vivid enough, it is easy to see how listeners might convince themselves that it is as if they

were hearing the original speaker's words. But the veridicality of the depiction, like that of a good realist painting, can be illusory. Quotations are intended to depict only some aspects of the original speaker's utterance, and that usually doesn't include its exact wording.

REFERENCES

- BANFIELD, A. (1973). Narrative style and the grammar of direct and indirect speech. *Foundations of Language*, 10, 1–39.
- CLARK, H. H., & GERRIG, R. J. (1990). Quotations as demonstrations. *Language*, 66, 764–805.
- COULMAS, F. (1985). Direct and indirect speech: General problems and problems of Japanese. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 9, 41–63.
- COULMAS, F. (1986). Reported speech: Some general issues. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), *Direct and indirect speech* (pp. 1–28). Berlin: de Gruyter.
- DAVIDSON, D. (1984). Quotation. In D. Davidson (Ed.), *Inquiries into truth and interpretation* (pp. 79–92). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- GOODMAN, N. (1968). *Languages of art*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- HJELMQUIST, E. (1984). Memory for conversations. *Discourse Processes*, 7, 319–333.
- HJELMQUIST, E., & GIDLUND, A. (1985). Free recall of conversations. *Text*, 5, 169–185.
- ISAACS, E. A. (1989). *Mutual memory for conversation*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.
- LEECH, G. (1974). *Semantics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- LI, C. N. (1986). Direct speech and indirect speech: A functional study. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), *Direct and indirect speech* (pp. 29–45). Berlin: de Gruyter.
- MAYES, P. (1990). Quotation in spoken English. *Studies in Language*, 14, 325–363.
- PARTEE, B. H. (1973). The syntax and semantics of quotation. In S. R. Anderson & P. Kiparsky (Eds.), *A festschrift for Morris Halle* (pp. 410–418). San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- PHILIPS, S. U. (1985). Reported speech as evidence in an American trial. In D. Tannen & J. E. Alatis (Eds.), *Languages and linguistics: The interdependence of theory, data, and application* (pp. 154–170). Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Round Table on Languages and Linguistics.
- QUINE, W. V. O. (1951). *Mathematical logic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- QUINE, W. V. O. (1969). *Word and object*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- SACHS, J. S. (1967). Recognition memory for syntactic and semantic aspects of connected discourse. *Perception & Psychophysics*, 9, 437–442.
- STERNBERG, M. (1982). Point of view and the indirections of direct speech. *Language and Style*, 15, 67–117.
- TANNEN, D. (1986). Introducing constructed dialogue in Greek and American conversation and literary narrative. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), *Direct and indirect speech* (pp. 311–332). New York: de Gruyter.
- TANNEN, D. (1989). *Talking voices*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- WALTON, K. L. (1973). Pictures and make-believe. *Philosophical Review*, 82, 283–319.
- WALTON, K. L. (1976). Points of view in narrative and depictive representation. *Nous*, 10, 49–61.
- WIERZBICKA, A. (1974). The semantics of direct and indirect discourse. *Papers in Linguistics*, 7, 267–307.

(Received November 5, 1992)

(Revision received March 31, 1993)