

APA PIECE: JOSEF STERN'S METAPHOR IN CONTEXT

THE RETURN OF METAPHORICAL SEMANTICS

Analytic philosophical work on metaphor has been dominated by four basic styles of account.

Comparativist accounts such as Fogelin's hold that a metaphor is an elliptically stated figurative comparison or simile, true if its primary subject (e.g. Juliet) is enough like its secondary subject (e.g. the sun) in respects made freshly salient by the production of this very comparison, false otherwise.

Semantic twist accounts (Richards, Black, Beardsley, and so on) hold that a metaphor is a sentence in which there is some kind of tension among the relevant ordinary meanings of its constituent words and phrases, a tension which is relieved only one or more of these meanings (those of the focus: e.g. *sun*) change so as to be brought into harmony with the others (those of the frame, e.g. *Juliet is the _____*).

Conversational twist accounts (Grice, Searle, Sperber and Wilson) hold that when I indulge in metaphor, I use words and phrases with their standard literal meanings to literally say one thing, but I am taken to *mean* (taken as intending to communicate) something other than what I literally say. My sentence as used by me means one thing, I in using it mean and am taken to mean something else. Only by attributing this other meaning to *me* can my listener portray *my utterance* as an intelligible and cooperative contribution to a shared conversational enterprise.

Brute force accounts (Davidson, White and others) hold that in a metaphor no words go missing, and neither words nor speakers are induced to mean anything out of the ordinary. Instead, an utterance that would otherwise be idle or pointless earns its conversational keep by producing something Richard Moran calls a "framing effect": listeners are induced to consider or experience the primary subject (e.g. Juliet) in a new and special light made possible by its juxtaposition with the secondary subject (e.g. the sun).

In his book Josef mounts objections to each of these familiar styles of account, objections that strike me as novel, powerful, and for the most part decisive.

Comparativism can't accommodate the fact that a metaphor like Romeo's uses familiar thoughts about the sun to offer a characterization of Juliet that would depend for its truth or falsity in a given circumstance only on what *she* is like there, not at all on what *the sun* is like there.

Semantic and conversational twist accounts falsely portray metaphoric reconstrual as an hermeneutic last resort, coming into play only when and only because a conversationally appropriate, fully literal construal of the speaker's language proves to be unavailable.

Brute-force and conversational twist accounts don't allow for metaphorically determined contributions to truth conditions for utterances. So they can't accommodate examples in which resort to metaphor is confined to some small part of a sentence, makes us reinterpret a still smaller part of the sentence, and passes the results of our reinterpretation on up the tree of grammar, thereby equipping a mostly literal utterance with a new and partly non-literal way of coming out true or false. They have no resources for coping with what I call *contracted* (as opposed to *extended*) metaphor.

Brute-force accounts in particular are ill-placed to cope with the fact that sentence metaphors can come in every available mood, and when they do, the interrogative ones often sound for all the world as if they asked genuine questions; the imperative ones, as if they issued genuine commands; the optative ones, as if they expressed genuine wishes; the subjunctive ones, as if they formulated genuine counterfactual conditions.

This beautifully articulated barrage of criticisms sends Josef in search of a novel account of metaphor that would be *semantic*, in that it would explain how particular terms in a sentence can undergo a distinctively metaphorical process of reinterpretation, as a result of which they make new and distinctively metaphorical contributions to a proposition, the proposition the sentence in question. serves to express when interpreted as a metaphor. The account he offers turns out to be a semantic one *in the additional sense* that it turns on the identification and articulation of a distinctively metaphorical component of human linguistic competence.

I share Josef's desire to rehabilitate metaphorical truth, metaphorical propositional content, and kindred notions, and I've learned an immense amount from his efforts to do so. Yet I think he's overestimated the rehabilitative potential of some of the philosophical raw materials his account puts to work. These are, in order of their appearance in what I have to say,

- (a) Stalnaker's work on pragmatic presupposition,
- (b) The two-pass, content-and-character semantics Kaplan developed for his work on indexicals and demonstratives, and
- (c) Goodman's work on the difference between verbal and pictorial signs.

EXEMPLIFICATION, ASSOCIATION, AND PRE-SEMANTICS

Josef holds that in many of the most poetically interesting cases, the properties a metaphorically reinterpreted term contributes to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it figures are those *exemplified* in the utterance's conversational setting by familiar things to which the term in question *literally* applies. A particular X *exemplifies* property Q in a given concrete conversational setting if and only if X

possesses, seems to possess, or is reputed to possess Q there *and does so in a manner that renders Q sufficiently salient*. The main sources of salience for an exemplified property Q are *related items with contrasting or connected properties*, where the items and properties in question are ones that get explicitly mentioned in the relevant concrete conversational setting. To find out what it takes for Juliet to count as the sun, metaphorically speaking, in the concrete setting Romeo provides for these words when he speaks them, ask yourself which real, apparent, or merely reputed properties of the actual sun he renders suitably salient there. And to determine which properties these are, notice how and in what particular respects he contrasts the sun with the moon, connects the sun with the east, etc. at various points in the surrounding discourse. In calling Juliet the sun in a spirit of metaphor, Romeo attributes to her such properties as:

an unsurpassed *beauty* (a power to call on and reward the sense of sight),
 an unsurpassed and indeed unapproached *warmth* (a power to sustain vital function),
 a power to turn night (inactivity) into day (activity) and to organize the day into its principal parts by her sheer presence on the scene, and
 a presence in Romeo's life that has just begun and is just about to consolidate itself, since it is in the east that she is said to appear.

In short, Josef says about *metaphors like Romeo's* the sort of thing label-and schema theorists like Goodman and semantic field theorists like Eva Kittay have wanted to say about *metaphor in general*.

Now I happen to think Josef is wrong about the example at hand: he doesn't assign Romeo's metaphor nearly as much content as I find in it, and he makes the content he does assign much too dependent on explicit verbal prompting provided by Romeo later on in the balcony scene itself. I'll return to this concern below.

Be that as it may, Josef insists that despite its interest, despite its explanatory power *and despite its correctness*, his exemplification-based account of how we interpret metaphors like Romeo's can't be viewed as a contribution to the *semantics* of metaphor as he understands it, for two very different reasons.

For one thing, the story isn't sufficiently general to apply to all metaphors. If Romeo's metaphor relies on locally improvised connectings and contrastings, other metaphors rely on globally entrenched cultural stereotypes (*man is wolf to man*); still others may rely on still other mechanisms. Critical as he is of other aspects of Searle's work on metaphor, Josef agrees wholeheartedly with what I'm tempted to call Searle's *associationism*:

The question, “How do metaphors work?” is a bit like the question, “How does one thing remind us of another thing?” There is no single answer to either question...¹

What Josef calls the *grounds* of metaphor are in his opinion unmanageably diverse — as diverse as the explanations of why particular *properties* are called to mind when particular *terms* are deployed in particular *concrete conversational settings*.

For another thing, the exemplification-based reading of *Juliet is the sun* drew heavily on everyday empirical knowledge concerning what the sun is like and how the sun is commonly thought of in our culture (or in Shakespeare’s). Such knowledge is no part of the general linguistic competence we possess in virtue of being speakers of English, nor is it part of the more specialized linguistic competence we possess in virtue of having the word *sun* in our active vocabularies. *Semantics proper* should concern itself exclusively with the contribution *linguistic competence proper* makes to the assignment of truth-conditional content to verbal utterances. Romeo’s successful effort to call various properties to mind by getting the sun to exemplify them is a non-semantic maneuver with a semantic effect — in this sense, the maneuver belongs to pre-semantics.

A couple quick comments here, first on associationism, then on the very idea of a pre-semantic stage in metaphoric interpretation.

We might venture to state the associationism Josef shares with Searle like this:

- (a) A metaphoric reconstrual of a term is built in a uniform manner from the properties that are readily and reliably *called to mind* by its deployment in a concrete conversational setting of some particular kind.
- (b) There are an indefinite number of different mechanisms, any of which can call properties to mind in the ready and reliable manner required for metaphor.
- (c) If the properties called to mind by any such mechanism are incorporated into an interpretation of the containing sentence in the manner required for metaphor, this is enough to make the use of the term in question a *metaphorical* use.

I have a couple worries about associationism.

One is that it appears to abolish an interesting distinction between metaphor and other self-explanatory nonce uses of terms. In *Remembrance of Things Past*, Odette wore

¹ John Searle, “Metaphor,” in his *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 76-116; quotation is from 104.

a certain kind of lilac, a cattleya, on the occasion she and Swann first make love together. As a result of this, and in memory of it, Swann and Odette use *do a cattleya* as a private codeword for making love, a codeword whose private meaning never needed to be stipulated or explained. Proust's narrator calls this an instance of metaphor, *but I take it he's mistaken when he does so.*²

A second is that properties can figure in metaphoric reinterpretations of terms without ever coming to mind, at least as explicit objects of conscious attention. Much of what goes on when we understand and appreciate a metaphor takes place behind the back of consciousness; this is one reason why it can sometimes be maddeningly difficult to *paraphrase* a metaphor we already fully understand. When the properties figuring a metaphor's interpretation *are* rendered salient, *do* come to mind readily and reliably, it is often because they already figure in an appropriate metaphorical construal of the relevant term; it's their place in such an interpretation that explains their salience, not vice versa.

As for the idea that we are dealing at this stage in things with *pre-semantics*, the label needs to be handled with great care. We often assign an appropriate *metaphorical* interpretation to a phrase we've never encountered before, and when we do, it's in virtue of our grasp of our grasp on the phrase's *literal* syntax and semantics, thanks to which we already know how to assign it an appropriate *literal* content:

It [Life]

*Is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.*³

The face-value *literal* content of Macbeth's famous phrase obviously plays a controlling role in the *subsequent* assignment to it of an appropriate *metaphorical* content. But this literal content must be worked out on the spot, by means of some prior application of appropriate semantic principles, since the phrase is one a listener encounters for the first time when she hears Macbeth utter it in a spirit of metaphor. Can Josef allow this? And if so, *how* can he allow it?

² See *Remembrance of Things Past*, trans. C.K. Scott-Moncrieff & Terence Killmartin (New York: Random House, 1981), vol. 1, 253-55. I am relieved to find that native French speakers find Marcel's terminology as peculiar as I do. Cf. Genette, "Rhetoric Restrained," 113.

³ *Macbeth*, V, v, 26-28.

PRESUPPOSITION AND ACCOMMODATION

The contribution a metaphorically employed general term Φ ends up making to a metaphorical truth conditions for the sentence in which it figures is determined, in a way we'll be examining shortly, by the set of properties the employment of Φ in a particular concrete conversational setting *properly calls to mind* for metaphor-interpreting purposes. These are the properties that are *m-associated* with Φ for the particular concrete conversational setting we're looking at. Φ 's *m*-associates are in turn determined by something Josef calls the *I-presuppositions* active in that setting, things *properly taken for granted* there for present metaphor-interpreting purposes. Occasionally he speaks of *I-presuppositions* as dividing into productive or *p-presuppositions* and filtering of *f-presuppositions*, with producers associated with terms we metaphorically (re)interpret and filterers associated with their literally interpreted verbal surroundings. A property *P* is *m-associated* with Φ if active *p-presuppositions* nominate it for the status of *m-associate* and active *f-presuppositions* don't veto its admission to this status. In other words,

m-associates of Φ = produced (or nominated) properties – filtered (or vetoed) properties.

Now certain things Josef says indicate that *I-presuppositions* are supposed to be metalinguistic in subject matter — that they are about the very terms whose interpretation they help to govern, rather than being about the properties these terms serve to express or the concrete worldly particulars to which they apply. Yet he never gives explicit examples of *I-presuppositions*. Nor does he offer a general rule for getting from sets of active *I-presuppositions* to sets of *m-associates* for an arbitrary general term Φ .

The notions of presupposition, production, and filtering here derive from proposals made in the early days of analytic philosophy of metaphor by Max Black. Black proposed that when a word like *wolf* is employed metaphorically, out of a clear blue sky, as it were — when, for instance, it is maintained that *men* are wolves in the midst of what had till then been a conversation solely about men — we consult familiar and readily evoked commonplaces belonging to our shared public folklore about wolves to come up with a list of readily elicited properties:

wolves are *fierce*,
carnivorous,
given to ganging up on their victims,
engaged in constant struggle,
proper objects of hate and alarm, and so on;

and ask ourselves which of these properties could be ascribed to men without flying in the face of anything taken for granted about men for present assertion-interpreting purposes, The surviving properties then go together to determine:

- (a) a conversationally appropriate metaphoric reconstrual of the term *wolf* and, as a result,
- (b) a conversationally appropriate metaphoric truth condition for the sentence *men are wolves*.

Of course, we *don't* always liken things or people to wolves out of a clear blue sky, and *when* we don't, the interpretation of metaphorical employments of the term *wolf* escapes the control of permanent publicly shared commonplaces, falling instead under the control of what's recently been said and accepted about wolves over the course of this particular conversation.

On the understanding of Black's account that Josef's remarks suggest, what's currently taken for granted *in one sense* about *wolves* (roughly, what we've tacitly agreed to pretend about them for current metaphor-making and metaphor-interpreting purposes) serves to produce properties; what's currently taken for granted *in another sense* about *men* (roughly, what we presuppose about them in Stalnaker's *pragmatic* sense, what we all tacitly represent ourselves as believing for present assertion-making and assertion-interpreting purposes) serves to rule some of them out part of what one could seriously intend to assert about men under current conversational circumstances. But here the-taken-for granted principles doing the generating and filtering in Black himself are straightforwardly about things and their properties, not about words. And the relation between presuppositions and the m-associations they determine is specific to what Josef himself regards as but one way among many of eliciting properties for incorporation into metaphorical reconstruals. It isn't obvious that every such way of eliciting properties will involve a natural division of labor between nominating principles and vetoing principles, producers and filters.

If Josef says little about what I-presuppositions *are*, he says a good deal about how they *change*. the main thing he says is something Stalnaker taught us about *pragmatic* presuppositions and *their* changes — that they obey what David Lewis calls a *rule of accommodation*.⁴ There may be other, more conspicuous ways of changing what's presupposed at a given stage in a given conversation — in the case of pragmatic

⁴ "Scorekeeping in a Language-Game," in his *Philosophical Papers*, vol. I (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 233-49.

presuppositions, one obvious way is by successfully making an explicit and uncontested assertion. But

If a new utterance U is such that:

- (a) U *wouldn't* be a suitably cooperative conversational move against the background of what's been presupposed up to now (and everyone can be expected to appreciate this);
 - (b) there is a unique suitably small, easy, obvious change in what's presupposed such that U *would* be a suitably cooperative move after this change, against the background of the resulting new presupposition set (and everyone can be expected to appreciate this as well);
- then the change in question actually takes place forthwith, U is interpreted against the background of the resulting changed presupposition set, and U thereby attains the status of a suitably cooperative conversational move.

But I don't really see why *properties that are readily and reliably rendered salient* need grounding in *assumptions that are readily and reliably shared*. Granted, language use depends utterly on what we can and do safely take for granted, both about the world *and* about one another. Yet there's no general need to explain coherently shifting *practices that go without stipulating* in terms of a more fundamental set of coherently shifting *attitudes that go without saying*. Explanation might sometimes go in the other direction instead, from reliably shared interpretive practices (and the reliably shared impulses that shape these practices) to reliably shared attitudes, including attitudes of taking for granted for particular conversational purposes.

Moreover Lewis convincingly argued that pragmatic presuppositions are *but one of many* parameters relevant to the interpretation of utterances whose changes over conversational time seem to be governed by a rule of accommodation. His examples include

- (a) the scope of what an authority figure currently permits those over whom he has authority,
- (b) the currently active denotations of incomplete definite descriptions, and
- (c) the currently active precisifications of vague general terms.

None of these parameters lend themselves to representation as sets of propositions to which parties to a conversation have adopted some appropriate attitude. I therefore conjecture that what Josef really wants out of the idea of I-presupposition is merely the claim that *like ordinary pragmatic presuppositions, m-association relations between predicates and the properties they stand ready to elicit evolve over conversational time in a manner governed to a substantial extent by some appropriate*

rule of accommodation. Perhaps there are other, more conspicuous ways of changing which properties are m-associated with which terms for present conversational purposes— what might they be? But

If a new utterance U is such that:

- (a) U *wouldn't* be a suitably cooperative conversational move against the background of what's been m-associated with what up to now (and everyone can be expected to appreciate this);
 - (b) there is a unique suitably small, easy, obvious change in what's m-associated with what such that U *would* be a suitably cooperative move after this change, against the background of the resulting new set of m-association relations (and everyone can be expected to appreciate this as well);
- then the change in question actually takes place forthwith, U is interpreted against the background of the resulting modified m-association relations, and U thereby attains the status of a suitably cooperative move.

M-association relations thus become a component in their own right of what Lewis calls a *linguistic score*, and some such rule of accommodation as the one just stated becomes the chief principle of linguistic scorekeeping relevant to metaphorical interpretation.

Is metaphor governed by a rule of accommodation?

Least action principles, principles to the effect that a construal is constituted as correct by being the easiest one to hit on that adequately compensates the effort required to come up with it in the first place, have had a long and disappointing history in semantic twist and pragmatic twist theories: think of Beardsley, Grice, Sperber and Wilson. Such principles tend to shut down efforts to interpret a metaphor prematurely, before the most rewarding and intuitively appropriate possibilities are considered; indeed, Josef makes this point himself more than once. But the principle of accommodation is *itself* a least action principle, albeit one of a peculiarly kinematic kind.

In *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer complains about the coercive and disappointingly unexplanatory nature of the arguments he encounters in Euclid:

We are forced by the principle of contradiction to admit that everything in Euclid is so, but we do not get to know *why* it is so. [1] We therefore have almost the uncomfortable feeling that we have after all a conjuring trick, and in fact most of Euclid's proofs are remarkably like such a trick. [2] The truth almost always comes in the back **door**, since it follows *per accidens* from some minor circumstance. [3] Frequently an apagogic proof shuts all the **doors** one after the other, and leaves open only one, through which merely for that

reason we must pass. Often, as in the theorem of Pythagoras, lines are drawn without our knowing why. [4] It afterwards appears that they were traps, which shut unexpectedly to capture the assent of the learner, who in astonishment has then to admit what remains wholly unintelligible to him in its inner connection.⁵

What looks at first glance like a single extended metaphor, on all fours to Romeo's extended likening of Juliet to the sun over the course of a longish stretch of the balcony scene, is in fact a succession of *different* sentence-length likenings of proofs to *different* bits of deceitful apparatus. We have a succession of distinct metaphors here, in which proofs and their components take on a succession of different and incompatible metaphoric identities. If mixed metaphor were a crime, Schopenhauer would be guilty of it more than once. Fortunately it isn't a crime at all.

Both sentence [2] and sentence [3] involve metaphoric reconstrual of the general term *door*. But the needed content for the term in [2] is something along the lines of *means whereby a mathematical truth puts in an unexpected appearance* (thanks to the opening of a notional door), whereas the needed content in [3] is something along the line of *means whereby a reader is kept from escaping with his convictions untouched* (thanks to the closing of a notional door). Once we realize that our previous construal of *door* in [2] can't simply be retained without modification as we interpret [3], what happens? Do we look for the smallest modification of the construal we gave in [2] that will make adequate sense of [3]? *Or do we start over again from scratch?*

How if at all does the identification of the properties that are m-associated with Φ in a given concrete conversational setting turn on a prior grasp of what Φ literally means — how (if at all) is metaphoric reconstrual based on prior routine literal construal? And once the right m-associated properties are identified, by whatever means, how are they then woven together into an appropriate metaphorical content for the particular term undergoing metaphoric reconstrual? These questions bring us at last to what Josef sees as the proper province of metaphorical semantics.

MODELING COMPETENCE

Imagine a listener, confronted with an otherwise literal utterance U in which a simple unstructured general term Φ is employed metaphorically. What Φ contributes to the content of the proposition expressed by U is a conjunction of properties, the properties Φ properly calls to mind, given its place or places in U and given U 's own place in its concrete conversational setting. For the listener to work out which

⁵ *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1966), vol. 1, §15, 70.

proposition *U* expresses as an exercise of her linguistic competence, she must possess and deploy three jointly sufficient individually necessary pieces of knowledge:

(V) The standing knowledge that constitutes her mastery of the *vocabulary* appearing in *U*, including the knowledge that constitutes her mastery of Φ 's literal employment.

(M) The standing knowledge that constitutes her mastery of the verbal device known as *metaphor*, her *general* appreciation of how to take *any* term in her language metaphorically.

(K) Finally, whatever setting-specific knowledge, whatever knowledge of the current state of play in this particular conversational exchange, she must add to (V) and (M) in order to deduce which particular proposition *U* expresses there.

Only (V) and (M) belong to linguistic competence, hence to semantics as Josef wants to construe it. (K) consists of whatever generally funded knowledge of the state of conversational play, whatever knowledge of "where *U* is coming from, for metaphor-interpreting purposes," she must call upon in order to employ her competence successfully in the case at hand. Josef calls it *knowledge of context*.

When it comes to (V), Josef holds that to have a simple unstructured general term Φ in one's vocabulary, it suffices to be a master of its *literal* use, and to be a master of that use, it suffices to know which fixed *property* *Q* the term in question (always) expresses *when used literally*.

When it comes to (M), Josef hopes to represent our general capacity to take terms metaphorically as our mastery of a single, very special, ordinarily unpronounced vocabulary item, a *metaphorically speaking* operator, spelled 'mthat'. He then hopes to represent our mastery of this item as knowledge of a rule indicating how the content of phrases in which it silently figures depends jointly

on (V), since what it takes to be a metaphorical sun depends on what it takes to be a literal sun, and

on (K), since what it takes to be a metaphorical sun also "depends on context."

This brings us to (K), to "knowing where *U* is coming from for metaphor-interpreting purposes." In view of Josef's associationism, (K) typically takes the form of a justifiably self-confident knack for being reminded of the right properties in the right concrete conversational setting, for finding the right properties sufficiently salient there, *where whatever seems right to all concerned thereby counts as right*.

We must tread carefully here, however. As Davidson insisted in his critique of accounts of metaphor in the semantic twist tradition, there is an important respect in

which a term's literal meaning "remains active" in and through and despite our metaphorical reconstrual of it. If terms were allowed to suggest their metaphoric reconstruals any old way, knowledge of their literal meanings would be only contingently and intermittently relevant to understanding their metaphorical redeployments.

LESSONS FROM DEMONSTRATIVES

Josef thinks the appropriate setting in which to develop the semantics of a *metaphorically speaking* operator is the content and character framework David Kaplan devised for his work on indexicals and demonstratives.

A metaphor shows more than it says, it shows what it does by saying what it does in an appropriate concrete conversational setting toward which it gestures in a manner we listeners are called upon to grasp and exploit if we are to understand what the metaphor has to tell us.

Josef thinks this dictum is *true twice over*, on two different ways of distinguishing a said and a shown, ways he associates with Kaplan's content and character respectively.

On the first interpretation of the dictum, a metaphorically interpreted general term has a distinctively metaphorical content it contributes to a distinctively metaphorical truth condition for its surrounding sentence, a metaphorically expressed proposition. But with the help of a concrete conversational setting, our grasp of the term's ordinary literal meaning serves to point out this special content to us.

On the second interpretation of it, what it takes to make an utterance metaphorically true is at best a small and literally reformulable part of what it metaphorically conveys. But with the help of a concrete conversational setting, our grasp of the term's metaphorical content serves to point out this special cognitive value to us. This cognitive value is often such as to be available in language *only* via resort to metaphor.

So: in a given metaphor we get two quasi-demonstrative pointings-out, (first) the pointing-out of a metaphorical content for a term by means of a prior literal interpretation of it, and (then) the pointing out of a rich and perhaps literally ineffable cognitive value by means of this literally paraphrasable metaphorical content.

FROM LITERAL MEANING TO METAPHORICAL CONTENT: MTHAT

Like an indexical or a demonstrative, a metaphorically deployable term stands ready to pick out different conjunctions of properties in different concrete conversational settings as a result of a single standing metaphoric potential, a potential that is rooted somehow in the term's prior standing literal meaning. What it takes to count as *the*

sun (or more simply as *a* sun), metaphorically speaking, varies from setting to setting in ways competent listeners manage to keep up with, somehow. Metaphorical picking out is a *context sensitive* affair.

Like an indexical or a demonstrative, a metaphorically deployable term loads the property it picks out into the proposition it helps to express, takes what it picks out here and now as its content, with the result that it enables us to talk from here, in the circumstances of the concrete conversational setting, about how that very “thing” —that very *property* — fares in past, future, or counterfactual circumstances where the term would pick out something else. Metaphorical picking out is a form of *rigid designation*.

Finally, like an indexical or a demonstrative, a metaphorically deployable term loads what it does into the proposition it helps to express without the mediation of a verbally formulated condition, satisfaction of which serves to determine what it picks out. Metaphorical picking out is thus a form of *direct reference*, responsive to the active set of m-association relations between terms and properties.

All of which prompts Josef to model his account of the *metaphorically speaking* operator on Kaplan’s rigidifying *demonstratively speaking* operator, the famous ‘dthat’.

(Dthat) If α is a singular term, then for a given context c , ‘dthat [α]’ has as its content, hence picks out in any circumstance, the individual (if any) that α itself denotes in the circumstance of c .

Now Josef makes two changes to Kaplan’s framework as laid out in *Demonstratives*.

The first change is:

- (a) to move to a two-sorted language with simple and complex general terms (and counterpart *predicate* variables) alongside simple and complex singular terms (and their counterpart *individual* variables);
- (b) to move to a conception on which a general term picks out such and such a property in such and such a circumstance, for such and such a context; and
- (c) to compute the truth value of simple predications by asking whether the picked-out individuals possess the picked-out properties.

This allows him to give an account of demonstrative general terms, *predicate* demonstratives, parallel to the account Kaplan himself gave of *subject* demonstratives, demonstrative singular terms.

The second is to add a new contextual parameter to those already recognized by Kaplan, an I-presupposition parameter that determines which properties are to be understood as m-associated with which general terms for present metaphor-interpreting purposes. A parameter that changes from setting to setting in ways

governed by rules of linguistic scorekeeping. Think of it as a specification of “where the utterance is to be understood as coming from” in the sense I invoked earlier.

Is this new *contextual* parameter also a *circumstantial* parameter? Apparently not, in view of Josef’s talk of the actual context constraint he uses as to explain why modal and tensed claims involving metaphors always involve bringing canons of metaphorical interpretation appropriate to the context of utterance to bear on other times, other worlds, what have you. But there are object-language constructions that *sound* to my ear as if they quantify over standards of metaphoric interpretation in much the way counterfactual constructions quantify over worlds:

*In no remotely conceivable way am I a rose!*⁶

And all one really needs to explain the data Josef cites is the weaker assumption that modal and tense constructions are allowed look *only* at how things fare at various different values of time and world, *not* at how things fare at various different values of Stern’s new parameter.

The characterization of Mthat that Josef himself gives, nearly enough, is the following (115):

(Mthat) If Φ is a general term, then for a given context c , ‘mthat [Φ]’ has as its content the conjunction of all the properties (if any) that are m-associated with Φ in context c ; for that context, it picks out this conjunction of properties in any circumstance s . This set of properties is in turn settled by the set of I-presuppositions that is one of the contextual parameters definitive of context c .

⁶ cp. this late and relatively insubstantial poem by Robert Frost:

The Rose Family
 The rose is a rose,
 And was always a rose.
 But the theory now goes
 That the apple’s a rose,
 And the pear is, and so’s
 The plum, I suppose.
 The dear only knows
 What will next prove a rose.
 You, of course, are a rose —
 But were always a rose.

Now as it stands, this characterization fails to meet two natural criteria of adequacy, one laid down by Josef himself and one laid down by Kaplan. On the one hand, it *can't constitute a complete articulation of metaphorical competence* [(M)-type knowledge], since it doesn't tell us how the referent (and content) of a metaphorically interpreted term depends *jointly* on what Josef calls knowledge of context [(K-)type knowledge] *and knowledge of what the term in question literally means* [(V)-type knowledge]. On the other hand, it doesn't constitute a rule of character in Kaplan's sense, since it doesn't specify the character of the compound 'mthat [Φ]' in terms of the character of Φ itself.

In a review of Josef's book, I tried to close both these gaps with a formulation that at the same time tightened the parallel between (Mthat) and (Dthat). My thought was that the properties m-associated with a *term* in a context could be viewed as more immediately called to mind ("metaphorically evoked" in my jargon) by the *property* the term literally stands for in the circumstance of the context; we'd interpret a term metaphorically in a context by *first working out the property it literally stands for there, then waiting to see what other properties this one readily and reliably calls to mind there*. The result:

(Mthat*) If Φ is a general term, then for a given context c , 'mthat [Φ]' has as its content, hence picks out in any circumstance, the conjunction of all the properties (if any) that are metaphorically evoked by the property Φ itself (literally) picks out in the circumstance of c .

What I took at the time to be a small bit of expository tidying up, Josef regards as an unfriendly amendment to his actual views. I'm sorry I inadvertently misrepresented him in this respect, but I'm not sure how he himself would prefer to close the gaps left open by his own rule (Mthat). Indeed I'm inclined to think that given his commitment to Kaplan's framework, he really can't avoid commitment to my (Mthat*).

The Kaplan of *Demonstratives* seems to me to be deeply committed to the following principles:

F1: The character of a whole depends only on the characters of the parts and their mode of combination.

F2: The content of a whole for a given context c depends only on the contents of the parts in c and their mode of combination.

E: The referent, truth value, or other item picked out by a whole for a given context c and in a given circumstance s depends only on the items picked out by the parts in s , for c , and their mode of combination.

E is a principle of extensional interchange (in Carnap's sense); F1 and F2 are in effect the two principles of intensional interchange that Kaplan gives on p. 507 of *Demonstratives*.

F1 says that a rule of character for a term-taking, term-making operator like 'mthat' must specify how the character of 'mthat [Φ]' is determined by the character of Φ . In effect, we need an association of properties with *characters* (for a context c) that is prior to and explanatory of the association of properties with *general terms* (m-association) mentioned in Josef's rule. What could such a prior association be like? We can take the matter in two stages:

(a) *On what about the character of Φ can its m-associates in a given context c depend?* In view of F2, only on the content Φ takes on for c itself.

(b) *On what about the content Φ takes on for context c can Φ 's m-associates in context c depend?* In general, the content of Φ in c may be such that Φ picks out different properties in different circumstances for context c . But let P be the property Φ picks out in the circumstances of c itself, and let Ψ be a term whose denotation at every combination of context and circumstance is this same property P . For context c , in the circumstance of c , Φ and Ψ both pick out P . So for context c , in the circumstance of c , 'mthat [Φ]' and 'mthat [Ψ]' both pick out one and the same conjunction of properties, whatever it may be, by principle E. But then in view of Josef's own stipulation (Mthat), it follows that for context c and in any circumstance, 'mthat [Φ]' and 'mthat [Ψ]' denote the same property. In other words, the only thing about the content Φ takes on in c that Φ 's m-associates in c can depend on is the property that Φ picks out in the circumstances of c itself.

Combining (a) and (b), it follows from the three interchange principles that the only thing about the character of Φ that Φ 's m-associates can depend on is the property Φ picks out in the circumstance of the context. And this is what my principle (Mthat*) says. I'd be quick to admit that (Mthat*) has counterintuitive consequences, consequences I read as evidence that Kaplan's framework isn't roomy enough to contain a *metaphorically speaking* operator with semantic behavior of an appropriate kind.

Of the three principles on which this little argument of mine turns, the only one Josef might want to repudiate is F2. But: suppose you think the proposition expressed in a given conversational setting by utterance U of a sentence S can be viewed as structured out of contributions made by each of S 's smallest separately meaningful parts, combined in the manner dictated by some appropriate parsing of S . Then if you speak of the proposition expressed by a sentence in a conversational setting as the content of the sentence there, and speak of the contribution made by a given sentence constituent (e.g. a singular or general term) as the content of that constituent there, the content of a *propositional* whole in a given setting depends only on the contents taken on there by its various constituent parts (and the particular step-by-step

manner in which an appropriate parsing of U calls on us to combine them). And what goes for propositional wholes must go for subpropositional ones as well.

In other words, the very idea of particular propositional contributions made by particular sentence constituents stands or falls with F2. This was one reason for Kaplan's repudiation of older two-dimensional index-theoretic approaches to indexicals and demonstratives that had been developed by Dana Scott and others. And Kaplan has a striking metaphorical name for operators whose defining rules would end up falsifying F2. He calls them *monsters begat by elegance*.

FROM CONTENT TO COGNITIVE VALUE: PARAPHRASE AND PARAPHRASABILITY

Josef motivates his *distinction* between metaphorical content and metaphorical cognitive value by considering a familiar dilemma about *paraphrase*. If we consider an exegetically ambitious paraphrase of a poetically ambitious metaphor, such as Cavell's of *Juliet is the sun*,

[I understand by Romeo's words] that Juliet is the warmth of his world; that his day begins with her; that only in her nourishment can he grow; [...] that the moon, which other lovers use as an emblem of their love, is merely her reflected light, and dead in comparison; and so on.⁷

it's tempting to think of such a paraphrase as naturally beginning with *i.e.* and naturally ending with *etc.* But the *i.e.* suggests one account of what we're doing in offering such an explanation and the *etc.* suggests quite another.

The *i.e.* with which paraphrase so often *begins* suggests that what we are offering when we offer a paraphrase is some kind of equivalent for the language we're explaining, even if it's only a partial and approximate equivalent — a word or phrase or sentence with nearly enough the same meaning or content as the word or phrase or sentence we're out to explain. When the metaphor in question is a declarative sentence like *Juliet is the sun*, the equivalent in question takes the form of a (partial and approximate) restatement. When the metaphor in question is only a part of a sentence, a single word or phrase or clause, the equivalent in question takes the form of a (partial and approximate) reformulation. So: *i.e.* suggests that understanding a metaphor is a matter of *knowledge that* — the metaphorically presented meaning or content is (more or less) thus and such.

⁷ Stanley Cavell, "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy," in *Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 73-96. The quotation is from 78-79.

The *etc.* with which it so often closes, however, suggests that understanding a given metaphor is a kind of *knowledge how*, a grasp of a procedure, a skill or knack for allowing the metaphor inspire in us thoughts that prove to be worth thinking, a skill or knack that may be exercised in any number of different ways on any number of different occasions. We can attempt to demonstrate that skill or knack to a teacher or convey it to a pupil by exemplifying its exercise in our own conduct, much as we might attempt to display or convey an ability to add whole numbers by doing particular sums on a blackboard. But if we're simply exemplifying a skill or knack in paraphrasing a metaphor as we do, the language we produce won't be the *equivalent* of the language we're trying to explain, any more than a particular computed sum is the *equivalent* of a general formula, algorithm, or procedure for adding whole numbers.

Insist that paraphrase is open-ended and approximate restatement, the verbal counterpart of an infinite decimal expansion of an irrational number, and you confront further problems, only one of which is making disciplined formal sense of *approximate equivalence*, *approximate truth*, and kindred notions:

[(a) The multiplicity of acceptable nonsynonymous paraphrases of the same metaphor suggests that if paraphrases really gave metaphorical meanings or contents, metaphors would be far more ambiguous than we ordinarily suppose them to be.

(b) The fact that paraphrases are often open-ended suggests that if paraphrases really gave metaphorical meanings or contents, metaphors would never be more than partially and imperfectly understood.

(c) What plausibly turns up in a paraphrase of *Juliet is the sun* can vastly outrun anything Romeo was plausibly in a position to intend by his words in advance, hence (?) vastly outrun anything that Romeo's words as used by him plausibly could have meant. The thought that what our words mean is a matter of what we inferably intend to accomplish by means of them seems to be under threat hereabouts. The approximate restatement view of paraphrase can seem to involve us in a rejection of Grice and communication-centered, inferable-intention accounts of verbal meaning.

(d) Truth conditions owe much of their prominence in modern semantic thinking to the thought that it doesn't take inarticulate tact of any kind to work out the truth condition for a novel utterance; it can always be predicted from the syntax of the utterance and meanings already permanently associated with its constituent words and constructions. Yet it takes plenty of inarticulate tact to accurately paraphrase a metaphor like Romeo's. The approximate restatement view of paraphrase can seem to involve us in a rejection of Frege, Tarski, and the compositionality of meaning.]

Josef's strategy for dealing with such problems is to propose that there are really two kinds of paraphrase with different explanatory aims — i.e. paraphrase and *etc.* paraphrase.

I.e. paraphrase: If we confine ourselves to what the user of a metaphor is genuinely committed to (as opposed to any further things she may suggest) and confine ourselves to what it takes to make a metaphor true (as opposed to any further things that may help to make it apt), paraphrase is an eminently possible and eminently completable task, but its results will often be disappointingly banal. We'll be justifiably reluctant to think that the metaphor earns its linguistic keep by communicating *that*.

Etc. paraphrase: If, on the other hand, we ask of a paraphrase that it exhaust what the metaphor *communicates* or *suggests*, what we learn in the course of fully grasping it... the exercise will be as endless and as merely approximate in its results as Cavell and others have suggested.

I.e. paraphrase is an attempt to get at what's metaphorically said, a metaphorically conveyed content. *Etc. paraphrase*, by contrast, is an attempt to get at what's metaphorically shown. And although the precise mechanisms will be different, the difference between the (exhaustible) metaphorically said and the (inexhaustible) metaphorically shown will be rather like that between what's literally said (sentence meaning) and what's meant (speaker's meaning) in classical Gricean discussions of conversational implicature. In each case, the richer *meant* or *shown* proposition(s) get to figure in an utterance's interpretation as part of what it takes to fully motivate and then fully vindicate a particular identification of what's *said*. A metaphor shows more than it says, in that what we stand to learn from an effort to identify the right metaphorical content is indefinite in extent and of profound interest, even if the content lying at the end of the cognitive road is a finite and humdrum affair. I am reminded of what O.K. Bouwsma said about the outcome of a different but similarly structured search:

And this now is the kitten in whose interests we made so much fuss about the bag. The kitten has, I think, turned out to be a scrawny little creature, not worth much. *But the bag was worth it.*⁸

If we could go on to explain why *etc.* paraphrase tends to be open-ended, why metaphorical *cognitive value* tends to be immune to complete literal restatement, we'd be well on the way to a vindication of metaphor's cognitive indispensability. This is an extremely ingenious and resourceful proposal. If it were right, it would make the

⁸ "The Expression Theory of Art," in *Philosophical Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 21-50. Quotation is from 50.

vindication of metaphorical meaning and metaphorical truth a much more straightforward affair.

I wish I could believe it. But I'm not sure I can bring myself to believe it, for at least three reasons.

First, in particular cases I find it hard to motivate the identification of any particular humdrum subset of the (supposed) metaphorically shown as what is (supposedly) metaphorically said. How would we draw such a line in Romeo's case, for instance? How do we produce a *mere* i.e. paraphrase and know when to stop once we're finished?

Second, paraphrase of a puzzlingly open-ended kind can occur in connection with the explanation of literal language. In *The Philadelphia Story*, Tracy Lord (Katherine Hepburn) has occasion to say of a boat called *The True Love*, *My she was yare*. (*Yare* being one of those nautical terms.) Asked what this means, she responds:

What does it mean? — Oh, easy to handle, quick to the helm, fast, bright ... everything a boat should be ... until she develops dry rot.

This paraphrase strikes me beginning with an inaudible *i.e.* and ending with an inaudible *etc.*, despite the fact that the language being paraphrased is *entirely literal*.

Third, there is a rough-and-ready test for belonging to what's strictly speaking said, a test which does pretty well at distinguishing what's strictly speaking said from what's merely implicated in classical Gricean cases, that the open-ended contents of an open-ended paraphrase like Cavell's appear to *pass with flying colors*:

When Romeo says, *Juliet is the sun*, do the propositions in question figure in:
 What we'd be affirming if we said, *Yes she is*?
 What we'd be denying if we said, *No she isn't*?
 What we'd be questioning if we said, *Is she now*?

I take it the answer is yes — or at least, that it *would* be yes if one found Cavell's paraphrase persuasive in the first place.

SAYING, SHOWING, AND COGNITIVE INDISPENSABILITY: THE ESSENTIAL METAPHORICAL

We'd have an account of both the open-endedness of paraphrase and the cognitive indispensability of metaphor if we could portray the process of identifying and confirming a suitably finite metaphorical content as committing us to a suitably open-ended scrutiny of a suitably complex object. This is what Josef tries to do in the culminating episode of his theory. It involves activating a comparatively forgotten

aspect of Kaplan's work, *the Fregean Theory of Demonstrations*. [Kaplan said of it in a note:

The Fregean Theory of Demonstrations is not a part of my obvious and uncontroversial theory of indexicals. On the contrary, it has the fascination of the speculative. (516n)]

According to *The Fregean Theory of Demonstrations*, demonstratives such as *this* and *that* owe the things they pick out, the things they contribute to the propositional content of the sentence in which they reside, to the workings of an auxiliary nonverbal representational system, a system of redeployable, conventionally meaningful *ways of picking things out*, with the following features:

- (a) A given way of picking a thing out can in fact pick out different things (or nothing at all) on different occasions of use.
- (b) A concrete employment of a way of picking a thing out that in fact picks out one thing could have picked out another thing instead (or nothing at all), had things been different on the relevant occasion.
- (c) The syntax of a way of picking a thing out can be identified with some suitable part or aspect of how things are made to look and sound for the audience each time it is resorted to. The semantically pertinent syntax of a Fregean demonstration is *phenomenal*. The syntax of a particular way of picking a thing out may include the familiar repeatable sound of a word like *this* or *that*, the familiar repeatable sight of various accompanying gestures, and various other conventionally pertinent sights and sounds. An audience member understands a demonstration if she knows how to investigate the concrete conversational setting in the light of what she has just now seen and heard so as to (i) identify the thing the demonstration conventionally picks out there and (ii) load that thing into the proposition she takes the speaker to be conventionally expressing by the sentence he utters, *with the help of this auxiliary representational system*.

We can attempt to represent the workings of this auxiliary extra-linguistic representational system *within* language by associating with each way of picking out E a definite description E* such that what it would take for E to nonverbally pick out x on an occasion of use = what it would take for E* to denote x on that same occasion. In which case the complete demonstrative [referring expression + accompanying demonstration] has as a purely verbal "synonym" the expression

dthat [E*].

Of course, this maneuver succeeds only up to a point if there is no way to convey in words *all* the discriminations in sight and sound our auxiliary representational system is ready to exploit in picking out the things it does. If there isn't, then some demonstratives and their accompanying demonstrations serve to equip sentences with proposition-expressing powers otherwise out of language's reach; they'd be *essential demonstratives*, in a sense reminiscent of Perry's *essential indexical*.⁹

Josef proposes to connect this up with the familiar impulse to think of *metaphors* as possessing a discursive inexhaustibility akin to that of *pictures*. As Davidson puts it:

When we try to say what a metaphor "means," we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention. If someone draws his finger along a coastline on a map, or mentions the beauty and deftness of a line in a Picasso etching, how many things are drawn to your attention? You might list a great many, but you could not finish because the idea of finishing would have no clear application. How many facts are conveyed by a photograph? None, an infinity, or one great unstatable fact? Bad question. A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture.¹⁰

One way to make sense of Davidson's analogy is by suggesting that a metaphor induces in us a special experience, a seeing of one thing in terms of another or in light of another, that admits of and rewards the same kind of open-ended and infinitely detailed scrutiny pictures do. But such a suggestion won't apply to metaphors that don't admit of visualization, of which there are many. (The blind Borges made much of a metaphor he first encountered in Pascal: *the universe is a sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere*. Picture that one!) Nor would it relate a metaphor's scrawny and exhaustible content to its rich and open-ended suggestiveness in the cat-and-bag manner called for by Josef's reflections on paraphrase.

A more promising way to make sense of it, Josef thinks, is to compare the infinitely detailed syntax of pictures with the infinitely detailed syntax of the referent-

⁹ But with this vital difference: the understanding of a sentence involving an essential indexical can be complete in the absence of any ability on the part of its user to identify the thing picked out in non-indexical terms. So when a sentence involves an essential indexical, understanding it needn't involve identifying the proposition expressed.

¹⁰ "What Metaphors Mean," *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 245-64. Quotation is from 263.

and-content-determining auxiliary representational system provided for metaphorical utterances by their concrete conversational settings.

Josef takes over from Goodman an account of the syntax and semantics of pictures along some such lines as these:

(a) There is no difference of an in-principle perceivable kind in how the relevant region of a picture's surface might be marked about which we can say in advance that such a difference in marking simply can't matter to what a surface so marked is properly taken to depict.

(b) This represents a decisive difference between literal, context-insensitive discursive verbal constructions that describe (say) and pictures that depict (show). For it is only a small subset of a written or spoken message's perceivable features that can matter even in principle to the message's context-insensitive literal meaning. And these features assign messages to message-types in such a way that there's an inherent limit to how like one another in relevant features tokens of distinct verbal types can ever get. By contrast, an open-ended, comprehensive, indefinitely close scrutiny of a picture is required if we are to fully identify what it depicts.

(c) This makes pictures an appropriate medium for the conveyance of a kind of infinitely detailed information that is inherently immune to comprehensive context-insensitive literal verbal formulation, *analog* information.

He proposes a parallel account of the syntax of an auxiliary representational system, constituted out of the repeatable looks and sounds of metaphorical utterances and their concrete conversational settings:

(a) There is no difference of an in-principle perceivable kind in either the wording a metaphor might employ or the concrete conversational setting in which it might be used about which we can say in advance that such a difference in wording or setting simply can't matter to the property (conjunction) a metaphor so worded and so situated is properly taken to express.


(b) This represents a decisive difference between literal context-insensitive verbal constructions that merely say something and metaphorical, context-sensitive constructions that can say what they do only by *showing* something else, a difference which mandates an open-ended, comprehensive, and indefinitely close scrutiny of metaphorical wordings on the one hand and concrete conversational settings on the other if we are to so much as *conclusively* identify *what's being metaphorically said*.

(c) This makes metaphor an appropriate medium for the conveyance (as part of what's shown) of information that's inherently immune to comprehensive context-insensitive literal verbal formulation, *analog* information.


If all of this were right, we'd have an intriguing basis for understanding metaphor's felt inexhaustibility that assimilated it closely to the felt inexhaustibility of pictures. But I'm afraid it isn't right.

For one thing, Goodman overstates the differences between pictures and context-insensitive verbal signs in both directions. *Verbal* signs can call for an indefinitely close scrutiny of sights and sounds — think of making out a voice through static or making out a written-over text in a palimpsest. And *pictorial* signs needn't call for indefinitely close scrutiny of the sights of which they are composed — manifestly digital pictures manifestly don't, and manifestly digital pictures are no further away than the nearest major league scoreboard.

I append here two notorious messages from intelligent earthlings to intelligent extraterrestrials. Each is a mixture of descriptive and depictive elements. One arguably does invite indefinitely close scrutiny; it's an assemblage of analog signs inscribed on a plaque. The other forbids such scrutiny, since it is sent out in the first place as a bald and eminently finite string of o's and r's. These messages may never tell extraterrestrials very much, but they can make us think twice about the supposed peculiarities of pictorial syntax:



The Pioneer Plaque



The Aricebo Message, composed by Francis Drake and Carl Sagan

Josef's claims about the infinitely detailed scrutiny demanded by metaphors strike me as open to parallel objections.

Recent work on depiction has moved away from Goodman's ideas about pictorial syntax. At the same time, recent work on demonstratives, including Kaplan's own work, has moved away from the Fregean Theory of Demonstrations.

After he wrote *Demonstratives*, Kaplan broke with the very idea of a conventional auxiliary representational system with a syntax and semantics of its own. In his *Afterthoughts*, for example, he introduces the notion of a *directive intention*. On the new conception, a complete demonstrative picks out and loads into a proposition whatever

the speaker intended it to pick out, if and insofar as he has succeeded in rendering his intended referent inferable by his intended audience.

At about the same time, the theory of depiction took a turn away from the very idea of pictorial syntax and toward a *more purely Gricean* or at least, a *more purely conversational* conception of how pictures depict what they do. In Wollheim's work, depiction is a matter of what we can spontaneously see in the picture's marked surface, insofar as we are inferably intended to see it there. In Walton's work, depiction is a matter of what we are instructed to imagine about what is in fact our own seeing of the picture's marked surface, where the instruction in question belongs to a visual game of make-believe — a game parties sharing the right cultural background can play together spontaneously and effortlessly without ever explicitly representing its rules, guided mainly by a shared desire to imagine along mutually rewarding lines and a shared desire to stay in imaginative step with one another.

This fragment of recent intellectual history suggests that if metaphors and pictures do owe their felt open-endedness and felt inexhaustibility to the same source, it won't be a syntactic or semantic source. Instead it will be one having to do with the open-ended nature of a communicator's inferable intentions, the open-ended nature of the norms governing spontaneous pick-up games of make-believe, or both — so that an audience can always *look further into* even the most impoverished pictorial stimulus, even the most impoverished conversational setting.

I hope Josef himself has occasion to look into these matters further.