Gabriel Carroll's website


Oh, hey there, what's up.  I'm an assistant associate professor in the economics department at Stanford University.  I work on microeconomic theory, with a particular interest in robustness and other modeling issues in mechanism design.


Click a thing to jump to it: [ CV | Refereed publications | Surveys and expository writing | Working papers | Classes | Other things | How to find me ]


CV

    There is a PDF here


Refereed publications

    Strategic Communication with Minimal Verification (with Georgy Egorov) [ more extensive earlier version ]
      Econometrica 87 (6), 2019, 1867-1892

    Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition
      Journal of Economic Theory 181, 2019, 382-420

    Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities (with Ilya Segal) [ online appendix ]
      Review of Economic Studies 86 (4), 2019, 1527-1555

    On Mechanisms Eliciting Ordinal Preferences
      Theoretical Economics 13 (3), 2018, 1275-1318

    Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening [ online appendix ]
      Econometrica 85 (2), 2017, 453-488

    Robust Contracting with Additive Noise (with Delong Meng)
      Journal of Economic Theory 166, 2016, 586-604

    Informationally Robust Trade and Limits to Contagion
      Journal of Economic Theory 166, 2016, 334-361
      Formerly titled "Informationally Robust Trade Under Adverse Selection"

    Locally Robust Contracts for Moral Hazard (with Delong Meng)
      Journal of Mathematical Economics 62, 2016, 36-51

    Robustness and Linear Contracts
      American Economic Review 105 (2), 2015, 536-563

    A General Equivalence Theorem for Allocation of Indivisible Objects
      Journal of Mathematical Economics 51, 2014, 163-177

    When are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient? [ online appendix ]
      Econometrica 80 (2), 2012, 661-686

    An Efficiency Theorem for Incompletely Known Preferences
      Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6), 2010, 2463-2470

    Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions (with James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick) [ online appendix ]
      Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4), 2009, 1639-1674


Surveys and expository writing

    Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting
      Annual Review of Economics 11, 2019, 139-166

    Design for Weakly Structured Environments
      In The Future of Economic Design (eds. Jean-François Laslier, Hervé Moulin, M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker), Springer, 2019, 27-33

    Robust Incentives for Effort
      SIGecom Exchanges 12 (2), 2013, 32-35


Working papers

    Robust Contracting under Double Moral Hazard (with Lukas Bolte)

    Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments

    When are Robust Contracts Linear? (with Daniel Walton)

    Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms

    A Complexity Result for Undominated-Strategy Implementation

    A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules [ online appendices ]

    The Efficiency-Incentive Tradeoff in Double Auction Environments

    Efficient Random Assignment with Constrained Rankings 


Classes

2020-2021

Autumn 2020:

   Econ 286: Game Theory (graduate) [ syllabus | Canvas site ]

   Econ 50: Economic Analysis I (undergraduate, with Christopher Makler and Matthew O. Jackson) [ syllabus | Canvas site ]

Past years

   Econ 180: Honors Game Theory (undergraduate)
      Autumn 2016 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Spring 2016 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Autumn 2014 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]

   Econ 220: Political Economy I (graduate)
      Spring 2016 (with James Fearon) [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Winter 2015 (with Fuhito Kojima) [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Winter 2014 (with Fuhito Kojima) [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]

    Econ 221: Political Economy II (graduate)
      Winter 2020 (with James Fearon) [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Winter 2019 (with James Fearon) [ syllabus | Canvas site ]

    Econ 286: Game Theory (graduate)
      Autumn 2019 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Autumn 2018 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Autumn 2017 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Autumn 2016 [ syllabus | Canvas site ]
      Autumn 2015 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Autumn 2014 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]
      Spring 2014 [ syllabus | CourseWork site ]


Other things

    Author ordering statement

    Reading list on modeling in mechanism design
      (Mostly, but not entirely, superseded by the Annual Reviews survey)


How to find me



Fingertips: gdc@stanford.edu
(Most effective by far, during COVID-19 shelter-in-place order)

Feet: Landau Economics Building, room 245

Ears: +1 650-725-8703
Snails:

Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305