

Economics 220: Political Economy I
Fall 2008-2009

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Overview:

This is part of a two-course sequence (together with Economics 221).

This course examines political processes and the studies how the design of political institutions affect societal welfare and economic outcomes. The course starts by examining the motivations for and challenges of forming political states and institutions, and how the structure and workings of political institutions affect economic outcomes and societal welfare. Topics include: the origins of states, anarchy and the social contract, liberalism, wars and arms races, constitutional design, federalism, models of strategic voting behavior, asymmetries of information and voting behavior, agenda formation and control, logrolling, lobbying, vote-buying and political influence, nomination processes, and the politics of federations of states.

Prerequisite: Microeconomics core (202-204)

Requirements:

Part of the grade will be based on class participation, and part will involve a project. The project should provide the basis for a paper. You will need to turn in a five page proposal at the midpoint of the course and then a more detailed fifteen page writeup at the end of the course. This will involve identifying an area of study and a specific question within that area. You should indicate what aspect of the analysis will be new and not already covered by the previous literature and why this will provide an important contribution. Why is it important to know the answer to the question? Next, if the problem is theoretical, then you should provide the foundations of a model and some preliminary results. If the work is empirical, then you should outline the data source and the methodology that will be used, as well as the hypotheses or theories to be tested. The latter part of the course may include some student presentations related to the projects.

A note on the readings and class discussions:

Reading the papers before class is critical to the course, as much of the emphasis of the course will not only be on “what” the papers tell us, but also on “why” these are interesting issues and “how” the research was conducted. That is, beyond investigating certain lines of research, there will also be an emphasis on methodology and research techniques. The lectures will include some detailed class discussion of papers, with an eye on some of the following questions. Is the approach taken by the authors appropriate? What are the limitations in the conclusions? Why were certain assumptions made? How robust is the analysis to changes in the modeling or formulation or limitations of the data? How might we do things differently? What interesting research questions are left open or suggested by the work?

Course Outline:

The articles and books marked with a “o” are the ones that we will discuss in class, while the others may be mentioned in passing or provide useful background reading. The list of papers is *much* longer than we have time to cover, but this will offer us some collective choices as the course proceeds.

1. The Structure of States and Nations: the Origins of Political Institutions

– Anarchy

o Hobbes, T. (1651) *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*,

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/f_hobbes.html [Focus on Chapters 13, 14, 15, 17-24, 26, 29, (they are short)]

o Jordan, J., (2006) “Pillage and Property”, *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 131, No. 1 , November, pp. 26-44.

Kocherlakota, N.R. (1996) “Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment,” *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 63, No. 4., pp. 595-609.

Piccione, M. and A. Rubinstein (2004) “Equilibrium in the Jungle,” mimeo, London School of Economics and Tel Aviv University.

<http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/ejungle.pdf>

Hurwicz, L. (1972) “On Informationally Decentralized Systems,” in: C.B. McGuire and R. Radner Eds. *Decision and Organization*, North Holland, Amsterdam.

Hurwicz, L. (1973) "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 1-30.

Locke, J. (1672) *The Second Treatise on Government*,
<http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/locke2tr.pdf>

Mill, J.S. (1859) *Liberty*,
<http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/milllib.pdf>

Rousseau, J.-J. *du Contrat Social; ou, Principes du Droit Politique* (1762, reprinted: Paris, Garnier, 1966).
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/Book.php?recordID=0132>

– Tiebout Models

◦ Alesina, A. and E. Spolaore (1997) "On the Number and Size of Nations," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 112 No. 4, 1027-1056.

◦ LeBreton, M. and S. Weber (2003) "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Staff Papers, Vol 50, No. 3, 403-435.
<http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2003/03/pdf/lebreton.pdf>

Greenberg, J. and S. Weber (1986) "Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 101-117.

Kollman, K., J.H. Miller, S.E. Page (1997) "Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 87, No. 5., pp. 977-992.

Tiebout, C.M. (1956) "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp. 416-424.

Wooders, M.H. (1978) "Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good," *Journal of Economic Theory* Vol. 18, No.2, pp. 328-348.

– Comparing Political Structures

◦ Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson (2005) "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Chapter 6 in *The Handbook of Economic Growth 1A*, edited by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, Elsevier.

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson (2001) "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 91, No. 5, pp. 1369-1401.

Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2000) "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 46-79.

Persson, T.(2002) "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?" *Econometrica*, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 883-905.

– Federalism

Hamilton, A., J. Madison, J. Jay (1787-1788) "The Federalist Papers," <http://etext.virginia.edu>.

Palfrey, T.R. and J. Cr mer (2000) "Federal Mandates by Popular Demand," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 108, No. 5, pp. 905–927.

2. Interactions between States

– Strategic Models of Wars

◦ Skaperdas, S. (1992) "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 720-739.

◦ Fearon, J. (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 379-414.

◦ Powell, R. (1993) "Guns, Butter and Anarchy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol.87, No. 1, pp. 115-132.

◦ Jackson, M.O. and M. Morelli (2007) "Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and War between Nations," <http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/gunsbutter.pdf>

Blainey, G. (1973) *The Causes of War*, New York: the Free Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981) *The War Trap*, Yale University Press.

Clausewitz, C. von (1832)[1976] *On War*, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton University Press.

Fearon, J. (1997) "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 68-90.

Fearon, J. (1996) "Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power," mimeo.

Gartzke, E.A. (1999) "War Is in the Error Term," *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp.567-87.

Schelling, T.C. (1963) *The Strategy of Conflict*, London and New York, Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, M.A. (1957) *System and Process in International Relations*, New York: Wiley.

Kirshner, J. (2000) "Rationalist Explanations for War?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No.1, pp.143-50.

Meirowitz, A.H. and A.E. Sartori (2007) "Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private Information?," mimeo, Princeton University.

– Democratic Peace

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., and A. Smith (1999) "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No. 4, pp.791-807.

Doyle, Michael (1986) "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80No.4, pp. 1151-169.

Jackson, M.O. and M. Morelli (2007) "Political Bias and War," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp 1353-1373.

Kant, I. [1795] (1991) "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Reiss, *Kant's Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 93-130.

Lake, D.A. (1992) "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 24-37.

Russett, B. (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Press: Princeton N.J.

Wagner, R. H. (2000) "Bargaining and War," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 469-84.

– Arms Races

Baliga, S. and T. Sjöström (2004) "Arms Races and Negotiations," *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 351-69.

Schelling, T.C. (1966) *Arms and Influence*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

Wagner, R.H. (1986) "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 546-576.

3. Endogenous Political Institutions and Constitutions

- - Maggi, G. and M. Morelli (2006) “Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 96, No.4, pp. 1137-1158.
 - Barbera, S. and M.O. Jackson (2004) “Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 119, No. 3, pp. 1011-1048.
 - Sen, A. (1970) “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,” *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 152-157.
- Aghion, P., Alberto A., and F. Trebbi (2004) “Endogenous Political Institutions,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 119, No. 2, pp. 565-611.
- Arrow, K.J. (1951) *Social Choice and Individual Values*, New York: John Wiley Press (revised 1963, Cowles Foundation Monograph 12).
- Hamilton, A., J. Madison, J. Jay (1787-1788) “The Federalist Papers,” <http://etext.virginia.edu>.
- Badger, W.W. (1972) “Political Individualism, Positional Preferences, and Optimal Decision-Rules,” in *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, edited by R.G. Niemi and H.F. Weisberg, Merrill Publishing: Columbus Ohio.
- Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock (1962) *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.
- Condorcet, Marquis de *Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix*, Paris, 1785.
- Curtis, R.B. (1972) “Decision Rules and Collective Values in Constitutional Choice,” in *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, edited by R.G. Niemi and H.F. Weisberg, Merrill Publishing: Columbus Ohio.
- May, K. (1952) “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision,” *Econometrica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 680-684.
- Rae, D. (1969) “Decision Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 40–56.
- Voigt, S. “Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey,” *Public Choice*, Vol. 90 (1997), pp.11-53.
- Koray, S. (2000) “Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems,” *Econometrica*, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 981–996.

Mailath, G., S. Morris and A. Postlewaite, (2001) “Laws and authority,” <http://www.princeton.edu/%7Esmorris/pdfs/laws&authority.pdf>

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003) *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*, Munich Lectures in Economics.

Polborn, M. and M. Messner (2004) “Voting on Majority Rules,” *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 115-132.

5. Political Decision Making

– Bargaining and Logrolling

◦ Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989) “Bargaining in Legislatures,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1181-1206.

◦ Casella, Alessandra (2005) “Storable Votes,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol 51, No.2, pp.391-419.

◦ Jackson, M.O. and H.F. Sonnenschein (2007) “Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions,” *Econometrica*, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 241-257.

Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan (2000) “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 73-88.

Jackson, M.O. and B. Moselle (2002) “Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 49-87.

Miller, N.R. (1977) “Logrolling, Vote Trading, and the Paradox of Voting: A Game-Theoretical Overview,” *Public Choice*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 51-75.

Tullock, G. (1970) “A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 419-426.

Wilson, R. (1969) “An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 59, No.3, pp. 331-341.

– Voting

* Strategic Voting

Barberá, S.(2001) “An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions,” *Social Choice and Welfare*, Vol. 18, No.4, pp. 619-653.

Barberá, S., H.F. Sonnenschein, and L. Zhou, (1991) “Voting by Committees,” *Econometrica*, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 595-610.

Gibbard, A.(1973) “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result,” *Econometrica*, Vol.41, No.4, pp. 587–601.

Moulin, H. (1980) “On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness,” *Public Choice*, Vol.35, No.4, pp. 437–455.

Satterthwaite, M. (1975) “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’ Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Theorems,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 10187–217.

* Information and Voting

◦ Austen-Smith, D. And J.S. Banks (1996) “Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No.1, pp. 34-45.

◦ Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2006) “Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty and Voting Rules,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 100, No. 2, 209-218.

◦ Jackson, M.O. (2008) “Disclosure, Deliberation, and Voting in Committees,” mimeo.

Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2005) “Deliberation and Voting Rules,” In Austen-Smith, D. and J. Duggan (eds) *Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks*, Berlin: Springer.

Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff (1988) “On 64%-Majority Rule.” *Econometrica*, Vol. 56, pp.787–814.

Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff (1991) “Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem.” *Econometrica*, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 1–23.

Condorcet, Marquis de (1785) *Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix*, Paris.

Curtis, R.B. (1972) “Decision Rules and Collective Values in Constitutional Choice,” in *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, edited by R.G. Niemi and H.F. Weisberg, Merrill Publishing: Columbus Ohio.

- Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1998) "Robustness of Majority Rule," mimeo.
- Feddersen, T.J. and W. Pesendorfer (1996) "The Swing Voter's Curse," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 86, No. 3, pp. 408–424.
- Feddersen, T.J. and W. Pesendorfer (1997) "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," *Econometrica*, Vol. 65, No. 5, pp. 1029–1058.
- Feddersen, T.J. and W. Pesendorfer (1998) "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No.1, pp. 23–36.
- Gerardi, D. and L. Yariv (2007) "Deliberative Voting," *Journal of Economic Theory* Vol. 134, No. 1, pp. 317–338.
- Grandmont, J.M. (1978) "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," *Econometrica*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 317–330.
- Young, H.P. and A. Levenglick (1978) "A Consistent Extension of Condorcet's Election Principle" *SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, Part C*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 283–300.

* Indirect Democracy

- Banzhaf, J.F. (1965) "Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis" *Rutgers Law Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 317–343.
- Barbera, S., and M.O. Jackson (2006) "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol 114, No. 2, pp. 317–339.
- Chambers, C.P. (2005) "Consistent Representative Democracy," <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1217.pdf>
- Penrose, L.S. (1946) "The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 109, No. 1, pp. 53–57.
- Laruelle, A., and M. Widgrén (1998) "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?" *Public Choice*, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 317–39.
- Shapley, L.S. and M. Shubik (1954) "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 787–792.

– The Coase Theorem and Transfers

- Coase, R.H. (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost," *The Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 3, pp. 1–44.

- Dixit, A., G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1986) "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Governmental Policy Making," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 105, No.4, pp. 752–769.
- Guttman, J.M. (1987) "A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action," *Economica*, Vol. 54, No. 213, pp. 1-19.
- Prat, A. and A. Rustichini (2003) "Games Played Through Agents" *Econometrica*, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 989-1026.
- Jackson, M.O. and S. Wilkie (2005) "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms" *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 543-566

6. Influence

- Colonel Blotto Games
 - Gross, O. and R. Wagner (1950) "A Continuous Colonel Blotto Game," Research Memorandum 408, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica.
 - Myerson, R.B. (1993) "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 4, pp. 856-69.
 - Weinstein, J. (2005) "Two Notes on the Blotto Game," mimeo: MIT.
- Laslier, J.F. and N. Picard (2002) "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 103, No.1, pp. 106-30.
- Szentes, B. and R. Rosenthal (2003) "Beyond Chopsticks: Symmetric Equilibria in Majority Auction Games," *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 278-295.
- Vote Buying and Lobbying
 - Groseclose, T. and J.M. Snyder, Jr. (1996) "Buying Supermajorities," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 303-15.
 - Dekel, E., M.O. Jackson, and A. Wolinsky (2008) "Vote Buying: General Elections," *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Anderson, G. and R. Tollison (1990) "Democracy in the Marketplace," in *Predicting Politics*, ed. M. Crain and R. Tollison, 285-303, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan press.
- Baron, D.P. (2006) "Competitive Lobbying in a Majority-Rule Institution," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 108, No. 4, pp. 607-642.

- Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston (1986) "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 1-31.
- Dekel, E., M.O. Jackson, and A. Wolinsky (2007) "Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying," mimeo.
- Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1988) "Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure," *Journal of Financial Economics*, Vol. 20, pp. 55-86.
- Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart (1988) "One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control," *Journal of Financial Economics*, Vol. 20, pp. 175-202.
- Kochin, M.S. and L.A. Kochin (1998) "When is Buying Votes Wrong?" *Public Choice*, Vol. 97, pp.645-62.
- Lindbeck, A.P. and J.W. Weibull (1987) "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition," *Public Choice*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 273-297.
- Philipson, T. and J.M. Snyder, Jr. (1996) "Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market," *Public Choice*, Vol. 89, No. 3-4, pp. 245-65.
- Piketty, T. (1994) "Information Aggregation through Voting and Vote Trading," unpublished mimeo.
- Tobin, J. (1970) "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 13, No.2, pp. 263-77.

– Agenda Manipulation

- McKelvey, R.D. (1976) "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and some Implications for Agenda Control," *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 472-482.
 - Banks, J. (1985) "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," *Social Choice and Welfare*, Vol. 1, pp. 295-306.
 - Ferejohn, J., M. Fiorina, and R.D. McKelvey (1987) "Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, No.1, pp. 169-194.
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- Dutta, B. and P.K. Pattanaik (1978) “On Strategic Manipulation of Issues in Group Decision Making,” in P.K. Pattanaik *Strategy and Group Choice*, Amsterdam: North Holland.
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- McKelvey, R.D. (1986) “Covering, Dominance and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 283–314.
- Miller, N.R. (1980) “A New Solution Set for Tournament and Majority Voting: Further Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 68–96.
- Miller, N.R., B. Grofman, and S.L. Feld (1990b) “Cycle Avoiding Trajectories, Strategic Agendas, and the Duality of Memory and Foresight: An Informal Exposition”, *Public Choice*, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 265–277.
- Palfrey, Thomas R. (1984) “Spatial Equilibrium with Entry,” *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 51, No.1, pp. 139-156.
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– Primaries and Nominations

- Aldrich, J. (1980) “A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination Campaigns,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 651-669.
- Black, D. (1958). *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerber, E. and R. Morton (1998) “Primary Election Systems and Representation,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.

304-324.

Guirán, P. H. (1993) "Candidate Behavior in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: A Dynamic Model," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 115-139.

Hotelling, H. (1929) "Stability in competition," *Economic Journal*, Vol.39, No.153, pp.41-57.

Meiowitz, A. (2005) "Informational Party Primaries and Strategic Ambiguity," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 107-136.

Callander, Steven (2006) "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 653-684.

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Kaufmann, K.M, J.G Gimpel, and A.H Hoffman (2003), "A Promise Fulfilled? Open Primaries and Representation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 65, No.2, pp. 457-476.

Serra, G. (2006) "Primary Divergence: the Effects of Primary Elections on Candidate Strategies in the Downsian Model," mimeo: Harvard University.

Stone, W. and R. Rapoport (1994) "Candidate Perception Among Nomination Activists: A New Look at the Moderation Hypothesis," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 1034-1052.

– Citizen Candidacy

Besley, T. and S. Coate (1997) "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 112, No.1, pp. 85-114.

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Dutta, B., M.O. Jackson and M. Le Breton (2002) "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp.190-218.

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Osborne, M.J. and A. Slivinski (1996) "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen Candidates," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 111, No.1, pp. 65-96.

Tideman, T.N. (1987) "Independence of Clones as a Criterion for Voting Rules," *Social Choice and Welfare*, Vol. 4, No.3, pp. 185-206.