

History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms*

Daron Acemoglu[†] and Matthew O. Jackson[‡]

October, 2011

Abstract

We study the evolution of the social norm of “cooperation” in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior that are stable in part due to agents’ interpretations of private information about the past, which are influenced by occasional past behaviors that are commonly observed. We first characterize the (extreme) cases under which history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. In intermediate cases, the impact of history is potentially countered by occasional “prominent” agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents, and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. We also show that in equilibria not completely driven by history, there is a pattern of “reversion” whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation.

Keywords: cooperation, coordination, expectations, history, leadership, overlapping generations, repeated games, social norms.

JEL classification: C72, C73, D7, P16, Z1.

*We thank David Jimenez-Gomez for excellent research assistance and several useful suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at Berkeley, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Harvard-MIT, Stanford, Northwestern, Penn (PIER), Princeton, Santa Barbara and UC San Diego for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NSF grants SES-0961481 and SES-0729361.

[†]Department of Economics, MIT and CIFAR

[‡]Department of Economics, Stanford University, Santa Fe Institute, and CIFAR

1 Introduction

Many economic, political and social situations are characterized by multiple self-reinforcing (stable) patterns of behavior with sharply different implications. For example, coordination with others' behaviors is a major concern in economic and political problems ranging from product choice or technology adoption to choices of which assets to invest in, as well as which political candidates to support. Coordination is similarly central in social interactions where agents have to engage in collective actions, such as investing in (long-term) public goods or participating in organizations or protests, and those in which they decide whether to cooperate with and trust others. This coordination motive naturally leads to multiple stable patterns of behavior, some involving a high degree of coordination and cooperation, others involving little.¹

The contrast of social and political behaviors between the south and north of Italy pointed out by Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993) provides an exemplar. Banfield's study revealed a pattern of behavior corresponding to lack of "generalized trust" and an "amoral familism". Both Banfield and Putnam argued that because of cultural and historical reasons this pattern of behavior, which is inimical to economic development, emerged in many parts of the south but not in the north, ultimately explaining the divergent economic and political paths of these regions. Banfield, for example, argued that this pattern was an outcome of "the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good." However, in contrast to the emphasis by Banfield and Putnam, these stable patterns do not appear to be cast in stone. Locke (2002) provides examples both from the south of Italy and the northeast of Brazil, where starting from conditions similar to those emphasized by Banfield, trust and cooperation emerged at least in part as a result of "leadership" and certain specific policies (see also Sabetti, 1996). Recent events in the Middle East, where a very long period of lack of collective action appears to have made way to a period of relatively coordinated protests, also illustrate the possibility of significant changes in previously well-established patterns of behavior.

Divergent patterns are often viewed or labeled as different "social norms". Yet social norms designate not only different behaviors but also distinct *frames of reference* that coordinate agents' expectations and shape their interpretations of information they receive. For example, generalized trust can emerge and persist in some societies, in part, because an expectation that others will be honest and trusting makes agents interpret ambiguous signals as still being consistent with honest behavior. In contrast, a social norm of distrust

¹Many static interactions, such as the prisoners' dilemma, which do not involve this type of multiple self-reinforcing patterns also generate them in abundance when cast in a dynamic context.

would lead to a very different interpretation of the *same* signals and a less trusting pattern of behavior. This role of expectations, as well as the historical evidence, suggests that such social norms are completely locked in: frames of reference can change as a result of highly visible (commonly observed) changes in behavior. These changes can be deliberate, as agents who are aware of their prominence can act as leaders, resetting expectations and setting a society on a new path with a new expectations and a new social norm.

We provide a simple model that formalizes this notion of social norms as frames of reference and shows how such social norms emerge and change dynamically. We focus on a coordination game with two actions: “*High*” and “*Low*”. *High* actions can be thought of as more “cooperative”. This base game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and the one involving *High* actions by both players is payoff-dominant. We consider a society consisting of a sequence of players, each corresponding to a specific “generation”.² Each agent’s overall payoff depends on her actions and the actions of the previous and the next generation. Agents only observe a noisy signal of the action by the previous generation and so are unsure of the play in the previous period - and this uncertainty is maintained by the presence of occasionally agents exogenously committed to *High* or *Low* behavior. In addition, a small fraction of agents are *prominent*. Prominent agents are distinguished from the rest by the fact that their actions are observed perfectly by all future generations. This leads to a simple formalization of the notion of shared (common) historical events and enables us to investigate conditions under which prominent agents can play a leadership role in changing social norms.

We study the (perfect) Bayesian equilibria of this game, in particular, focusing on the *greatest* equilibrium, which involves the highest likelihood of all agents choosing *High* behavior. We show that a greatest equilibrium (as well as a least equilibrium) always exist. In fact, for certain parameters this dynamic game of incomplete information has a unique equilibrium, even though the static game and corresponding dynamic game of complete information always have multiple equilibria.³

The (greatest) equilibrium path exhibits the types of behavior we have already hinted at. First, depending on *history* – in particular, the shared (common knowledge) history of play by prominent agents – a social norm involving most players choosing *High*, or a different social norm where most players choose *Low*, could emerge. These social norms shape behaviors

²The assumption that there is a single player within each generation is for simplicity and is relaxed later in the paper.

³We remark that this is different from a “global games” logic, as in our setting the uniqueness can disappear if the probability of exogenous players is small, and the uniqueness is in part due to the prominent agents ability to influence behavior.

precisely because they set the frame of reference: agents expect those in the past to have played, and those in the future to play, according to the prevailing social norm. In particular, because they only receive noisy information about past play, they interpret the information they receive according to the prevailing social norm – which is in turn determined by the shared history in society.⁴ For example, even though the action profile (*High*, *High*) yields higher payoff, a *Low* social norm may be stable, because agents expect others in the past to have played *Low*. In particular, for many settings the first agent following a prominent *Low* play will know that at least one of the two agents she interacts with is playing *Low*, and this may be sufficient to induce her to play *Low*. The next player then knows that with high likelihood the previous player has played *Low* (unless she was exogenously committed to *High*), and so the social norm of *Low* becomes self-perpetuating. Moreover, highlighting the role of the interactions between *history* and *expectations* in the evolution of social norms, in such an equilibrium even if an agent plays *High*, a significant range of signals will be interpreted as coming from *Low* play by the future generation and will thus be followed by a *Low* response. This naturally discourages *High*, making it more likely for a *Low* social norm to arise and persist. When prominent agents are rare (or non-existent), these social norms can last for a very long time (or forever).

Second, except for the extreme settings where historical play completely locks in behavior by all endogenous agents as a function of history, the pattern of behavior fluctuates between *High* or *Low* as a function of the signals agents receive from the previous generation. In such situations, the society tends to a steady-state distribution of actions. Convergence to this steady state exhibits a monotone pattern that we refer to as *reversion*. Starting with a prominent agent who has chosen to play *High*, the likelihood of *High* play is monotonically *decreasing* as a function of the time elapsed since the last prominent agent (and likewise for *Low* play starting with a prominent agent who has chosen *Low*). The intuition for this is as follows. An agent who immediately follows a prominent agent, let us say a period 1 agent, is sure that the previous agent played *High*, and so a period 1 endogenous agent will play *High*.⁵ The period 2 agent then has to sort through signals as it could be that the period 1 agent was exogenous and committed to *Low*. This makes the period 2 endogenous agent’s decision sensitive to the signal that she sees. Then in period 3, an endogenous agent is even more reluctant to play *High*, as now he might have followed an exogenous player who played *Low* or an endogenous agent who played *Low* because of a very negative

⁴History is summarized by the action of the last prominent agent. The analysis will make it clear that any other *shared understanding*, e.g., a common belief that at some point there was a specific action with probability one, could play the same role and represent “history” in variants of our model.

⁵This is true unless all endogenous non-prominent agents playing *Low* is the only equilibrium.

signal. This continues to snowball as each subsequent player then becomes more pessimistic about the likelihood that the previous player has played *High* and so plays *High* with a lower probability. This not only implies that, as the distance to the prominent agent grows, each agent is less confident that their previous neighbor has played *High*, but also makes them rationally expect that their next period neighbor will interpret the signals generated from their own action as more likely to have come from *Low* play, and this reinforces their incentives to play *Low*.

Third, countering the power of history, prominent agents can exploit their greater visibility to change the social norm from *Low* to *High*. In particular, starting from a social norm involving *Low* play, as long as parameters are not so extreme that all *Low* is locked in, prominent agents can (and will) find it beneficial to switch to *High* and create a new social norm involving *High* play. We interpret this as *leadership-driven changes in social norms*. The fact that prominent agents will be perfectly observed – by all those who follow – means that (i) they know that the next agent will be able to react to their change of action, and (ii) the next agent will also have an incentive to play *High* since the prominent action is observed by all future agents, who can then also adjust their expectations to the new norm as well. Both the understanding by all players that others will also have observed the action of the prominent agent (and the feedback effects that this creates) and the anticipation of the prominent agent that she can change the expectations of others are crucial for this type of leadership.

We also note that although there can be switches from both *High* and *Low* play, the pattern of switching is different starting from *High* than *Low*. Breaking away from *High* play takes place because of exogenous prominent agents, whereas breaking *Low* play can take place because of either exogenous or endogenous prominent agents.⁶

We also provide comparative static results showing how the informativeness of signals and the returns to *High* and *Low* play affect the nature of equilibrium, and study a number of extensions of our basic framework. First, we show that similar results obtain when there are multiple agents within each generation. The main additional result in this case is that as the number of agents within a generation increases, history becomes more important in shaping behavior. In particular, *High* play following a prominent *High* play and *Low* play following a prominent *Low* play become more likely both because the signals that individuals receive are less informative about the behavior they would like to match in the past and because

⁶This is not just an artifact of our focus on the greatest equilibrium, as in any equilibrium players have incentives to try to move society from *Low* to *High*, but not in the other direction – unless they are exogenously committed to *Low* or receive signals that the previous generation may have chosen *Low*.

they realize that the signals generated by their action will have less impact on future play. Second, we investigate the implications of the actions of prominent agents being observed imperfectly by all future generations. Third, we allow individuals, at a cost, to change their action, so that they can choose a different action against the past generation than the future generation. In this context, we study the implications of an “amnesty-like” policy change that affects the dependence of future payoffs on past actions, and show how such an amnesty may make the pattern of *High* play more likely to emerge under certain circumstances.

Our paper relates to several literatures. First, it is part of a small but growing literature on formal modeling of culture and social norms. The most closely related research is by Tirole (1996), who develops a model of “collective reputation,” in which an individual’s reputation is tied to her group’s reputation because her past actions are only imperfectly observed. Tirole demonstrates the possibility of multiple steady states and shows that when strategies are not conditioned on the age of players, bad behavior by a single cohort can have long-lasting effects. Tabellini (2008), building on Bisin and Verdier (2001), endogenizes preferences in a prisoners’ dilemma game as choices of partially-altruistic parents. The induced game that parents play has multiple equilibria, leading to very different stable patterns of behavior in terms of cooperation supported by different “preferences.”⁷ Our focus on the dynamics of social norms, as well as leadership and prominence, not to mention many other facets of the setup and analysis here, distinguish our work from this literature.

Second, our model is related to a small literature on repeated games with overlapping generations of players or with asynchronous actions (e.g., Lagunoff and Matsui, 1997, Anderlini, Gerardi and Lagunoff, 2008). That literature, however, does not generally address questions related to the stochastic evolution of social norms or leadership. Third, our work is also related to the literature on learning, reputation, and adaptive dynamics in games.⁸ In contrast to this literature, agents in our model are forward-looking and use both their understanding of the strategies of others and the signals they receive to form expectations about past and future behavior, which is crucial for the roles of both leadership and expectations in the evolution of social norms. Moreover, the issue of prominence and common observability, as well as the emphasis on reversion of social norms, expectations, and leadership, are specific to our approach. And finally, most of the research that generates specific pre-

⁷See also Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) and Galor (2011) for other approaches to endogenous preferences.

⁸See Samuelson (1997) and Fudenberg and Levine (1994) on evolutionary and learning dynamics in games. Young (1993) and Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) investigate stable patterns of behavior as limit points of various adaptive dynamics. Morris (2000), Jackson and Yariv (2007), and Kleinberg (2007) study the dynamics of diffusion of a new practice or technology. See also Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a general discussion of dynamic games of incomplete information.

dictions about the evolutionary dynamics selects “risk dominant” equilibria as those where the society spends disproportionate amounts of time, and does not speak to the question of why different societies develop different stable patterns of behavior and how and when endogenous switches between these patterns take place.⁹

Fourth, our work is more distantly related to the growing literature on equilibrium refinement and in particular to the global games literature, e.g., Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000). That literature does not provide insights into why groups of individuals or societies in similar economic, social and political environments end up with different patterns of behavior and why there are sometimes switches from one pattern of behavior to another.¹⁰ Fifth, a recent literature develops models of leadership, though mostly focusing on leadership in organizations (see, for example, the survey in Hermalin, 2012). Myerson (2011) discusses issues of leadership in a political economy context. The notion of leadership in our model, which builds on prominence and observability, is quite different from – but complementary to – the emphasis in this literature.

Finally, Diamond and Fudenberg (1989), Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991), and Chamley (1999) discuss the roles of history and expectations in dynamic models with potential multiple steady states and multiple equilibria, but neither focus on issues of cooperation or stochastics nor explore when different social norms will emerge or the dynamics of behavior (here cooperation). Moreover, because they do not consider game theoretic models, issues related to endogenous inferences about past patterns of behavior and leadership-type behavior to influence future actions do not emerge in these works.

⁹Certain versions of those models can lead to equilibrium behavior following a Markov chain and thus resulting in switches between patterns of play, but those switches are due to mutations or perturbations rather than endogenous choices of players. An exception is Ellison (1997) who infuses one rational player into a society of fictitious players and shows that the rational agent has an incentive to be forward looking in sufficiently small societies.

¹⁰Argenziano and Gilboa (2010) emphasize the role of history as a coordinating device in equilibrium selection, but relying on beliefs that are formed using a similarity function so that beliefs of others’ behavior is given by a weighted average of recent behavior (see also Steiner and Stewart, 2008). The reason why history matters in their model is also quite different. In ours, history matters by affecting expectations of how others will draw inferences from one’s behavior, while in Argenziano and Gilboa, history affects beliefs through the similarity function. This is also related to some of the “sunspot” literature. For example, Jackson and Peck (1991) discuss the role of the interpretation of signals, history, and expectations, as drivers of price dynamics in an overlapping generations model.

2 The Model

2.1 Actions and Payoffs

Consider an overlapping-generations model where agents live for two periods. We suppose for simplicity that there is a single agent born in each period (generation), and each agent's payoffs are determined by her interaction with agents from the two neighboring generations (older and younger agents). Figure 1 shows the structure of interaction between agents of different generations.




Figure 1: Demographics

The action played by the agent born in period t is denoted $A_t \in \{High, Low\}$. An agent chooses an action only once.¹¹ The stage payoff to an agent playing A when another agent plays A' is denoted $u(A, A')$. The total payoff to the agent born at time t is

$$(1 - \lambda) u(A_t, A_{t-1}) + \lambda u(A_t, A_{t+1}), \quad (1)$$

where A_{t-1} designates the action of the agent in the previous generation and A_{t+1} is the action of the agent in the next generation. Therefore, $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ is a measure of how much an agent weighs the play with the next generation compared to the previous generation. When $\lambda = 1$ an agent cares only about the next generation's behavior, while when $\lambda = 0$ an agent

¹¹We can interpret this as the agent choosing a single pattern of behavior and his or her payoffs depending on the actions of “nearby” agents, or each agent playing explicitly those from the previous and the next generation and choosing the same action in both periods of his or her life. With this latter interpretation, the same action may be chosen because there is a high cost of changing behavior later in life, and we consider the case in which this cost is not prohibitively high later in the paper.

cares only about the previous generation’s actions. The λ parameter captures discounting as well as other aspects of the agent’s life, such as what portion of each period the agent is active (e.g., agents may be relatively active in the latter part of their lives, in which case λ could be greater than $1/2$). We represent the stage payoff function $u(A, A')$ by the following matrix:

$$\begin{array}{cc} & \begin{array}{cc} \textit{High} & \textit{Low} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \textit{High} \\ \textit{Low} \end{array} & \begin{array}{cc} \beta, \beta & -\alpha, 0 \\ 0, -\alpha & 0, 0 \end{array} \end{array}$$

where β and α are both positive. This payoff matrix captures the notion that, from the static point of view, both $(\textit{High}, \textit{High})$ and $(\textit{Low}, \textit{Low})$ are static equilibria given this payoff matrix – and so conceivably both *High* and *Low* play could arise as stable patterns of behavior. $(\textit{High}, \textit{High})$ is clearly the payoff-dominant or Pareto optimal equilibrium.¹²

2.2 Exogenous and Endogenous Agents

There are four types of agents in this society. First, agents are distinguished by whether they choose an action to maximize the utility function given in (1). We refer to those who do so as “endogenous” agents. In addition to these endogenous agents who choose their behavior given their information and expectations, there are also some committed or “exogenous” agents who will choose an exogenously given action. This might be because these “exogenous” agents have different preferences or because of some irrationality or trembles. Any given agent is an “exogenous type” with probability 2π (independently of all past events). Moreover, such an agent is exogenously committed to playing each of the two actions, *High* and *Low*, with probability π . Throughout, we assume that $\pi \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, and in fact, we think of π as small (though this does not play a role in our formal results). With the complementary probability, $1 - 2\pi > 0$, the agent is “endogenous” and chooses whether to play *High* or *Low* when young, and is stuck with the same decision when old.

2.3 Signals, Information and Prominent Agents

In addition, agents can be either “prominent” or “non-prominent” (as well as being either endogenous or exogenous). A noisy signal of an action taken by a non-prominent agent of

¹²Depending on the values of β and α , this equilibrium is also risk dominant, but this feature does not play a major role in our analysis. We also note that the normalization of a payoff of 0 for *Low* is for convenience, and inconsequential. In terms of strategic interaction, it is the difference of payoffs between *High* and *Low* conditional on expectations of what others will do that matter, which is then captured by the parameters α and β .

generation t is observed by the agent in generation $t + 1$. No other agent receives any information about this action. In contrast, the actions taken by prominent agents are perfectly observed by all future generations. We assume that each agent is prominent with probability q (again independently of other events) and non-prominent with the complementarity probability, $1 - q$. This implies that an agent is exogenous prominent with probability $2q\pi$ and endogenous prominent with probability $(1 - 2\pi)q$. The next table summarizes the different types of agents and their probabilities in our model:

	non-prominent	prominent
endogenous	$(1 - 2\pi)(1 - q)$	$(1 - 2\pi)q$
exogenous	$2\pi(1 - q)$	$2\pi q$

Unless otherwise stated, we assume that $0 < q < 1$ so that both prominent and non-prominent agents are possible.

We refer to agents who are endogenous and non-prominent as *regular* agents. We now explain this distinction and the signal structure in more detail. Let h^{t-1} denote the public history at time t , which includes a list of past prominent agents and their actions up to and including time $t - 1$, and let h_{t-1} denote the last entry in that history. In particular, we can represent what was publicly observed in any period as an entry with value in $\{High, Low, N\}$, where *High* indicates that the agent was prominent and played *High*, *Low* indicates that the agent was prominent and played *Low*, and *N* indicates that the agent was not prominent. We denote the set of h^{t-1} histories by \mathcal{H}^{t-1} .

In addition to observing $h^{t-1} \in \mathcal{H}^{t-1}$, an agent of generation t , when born, receives a signal $s_t \in [0, 1]$ about the behavior of the agent of the previous generation, where the restriction to $[0, 1]$ is without loss of any generality (clearly, the signal is irrelevant when the agent of the previous generation is prominent). This signal has a continuous distribution described by a density function $f_H(s)$ if $A_{t-1} = High$ and $f_L(s)$ if $A_{t-1} = Low$. Without loss of generality, we order signals such that higher s has a higher likelihood ratio for *High*; i.e., so that $\frac{f_H(s)}{f_L(s)}$ is non-decreasing in s . To simplify the analysis and avoid indifferences, we maintain the assumption that $\frac{f_H(s)}{f_L(s)}$ is strictly increasing in s , so that the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Principle (MLRP) holds, and we take the densities to be continuous and positive.

Let $\Phi(s, x)$ denote the posterior probability that $A_{t-1} = High$ given $s_t = s$ under the belief that an endogenous agent of generation $t - 1$ plays *High* with probability x . This is:

$$\Phi(s, x) \equiv \frac{f_H(s)x}{f_H(s)x + f_L(s)(1-x)} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1-x)}{x} \frac{f_L(s)}{f_H(s)}}. \quad (2)$$

The game begins with a prominent agent at time $t = 0$ playing action $A_0 \in \{High, Low\}$.

2.4 Strategies, Semi-Markovian Strategies and Equilibrium

We can write the strategy of an endogenous agent of generation t as:

$$\sigma_t : \mathcal{H}^{t-1} \times [0, 1] \times \{P, N\} \rightarrow [0, 1],$$

written as $\sigma_t(h^{t-1}, s_t, T_t)$ where $h^{t-1} \in \mathcal{H}^{t-1}$ is the public history of play, $s_t \in [0, 1]$ is the signal observed by the agent of generation t regarding the previous generation's action, and $T_t \in \{P, N\}$ denotes whether or not the agent of generation t is prominent. The number $\sigma_t(h^{t-1}, s_t, T_t)$ corresponds to the probability that the agent of generation t plays *High*. We denote the strategy profile of all agents by the sequence $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_t, \dots)$.

We show below that the most relevant equilibria for our purposes involve agents ignoring histories that come before the last prominent agent. These histories are not payoff-relevant provided others are following similar strategies. We call these *semi-Markovian* strategies.

Semi-Markovian strategies are specified for endogenous agents as functions $\sigma_\tau^{SM} : \{High, Low\} \times [0, 1] \times \{P, N\} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, written as $\sigma_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T)$ where $\tau \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$ is the number of periods since the last prominent agent, $a \in \{High, Low\}$ is the action of the last prominent agent, $s \in [0, 1]$ is the signal of the previous generation's action, and again $T \in \{P, N\}$ is whether or not the current agent is prominent.

With some abuse of notation, we sometimes write $\sigma_t = High$ or Low to denote a strategy or semi-Markovian strategy that corresponds to playing *High* (*Low*) with probability one.

We analyze Bayesian equilibria, which we simply refer to as equilibria. More specifically, an equilibrium is a profile of endogenous players' strategies together with a specification of beliefs conditional on each history and observed signal such that: the endogenous players' strategies are best responses to the profile of strategies given their beliefs conditional on each possible history and observed signal, and for each prominence type that they may be; and beliefs are derived from the strategies and history according to Bayes' rule. When $0 < q < 1$ (as generally maintained in what follows), all feasible histories and signal combinations are possible (recall that we have assumed $\pi > 0$),¹³ and the sets of Bayesian equilibria, perfect Bayesian equilibria and sequential equilibria coincide.¹⁴

¹³To be precise, any particular signal still has a 0 probability of being observed, but posterior beliefs are well-defined subject to the usual measurability constraints.

¹⁴When $q = 0$ or $\pi = 0$ (contrary to our maintained assumptions), some feasible combinations of histories and signals have zero probability and thus Bayesian and perfect Bayesian equilibria can differ. In that case, it is necessary to carefully specify which beliefs and behaviors off the equilibrium path are permitted as part of an equilibrium. For the sake of completeness, we provide a definition of equilibrium in Appendix A that allows for those corner cases, even though they do not arise in our model.

3 Existence of Equilibria

3.1 Best Responses

We first note that given the utility function (1), an endogenous agent of generation t will have a best response of $A = High$ if and only if

$$(1 - \lambda) \phi_{t-1}^t + \lambda \phi_{t+1}^t \geq \frac{\alpha}{\beta + \alpha} \equiv \gamma, \quad (3)$$

where ϕ_{t-1}^t is the (equilibrium) probability that the agent of generation t assigns to the agent from generation $t - 1$ having chosen $A = High$. ϕ_{t+1}^t is defined similarly, except that it is also conditional on agent t playing $High$. Thus, it is the probability that the agent of generation t assigns to the next generation choosing $High$ conditional on her own choice of $High$. Defining ϕ_{t+1}^t as this conditional probability is useful; since playing Low guarantees a payoff of 0, and the relevant calculation for agent t is the consequence of playing $High$, and will thus depend on ϕ_{t+1}^t .

The parameter γ encapsulates the payoff information of different actions in an economical way. In particular, it is useful to observe that γ is the “size of the basin of attraction” of Low as an equilibrium, or alternatively the weight that needs to be placed on $High$ before an agent finds $High$ a best response. In what follows, γ (rather than α and β separately) will be the main parameter affecting behavior and the structure of equilibria.

We next prove existence of equilibria and characterize their structure.

3.2 Existence of Equilibrium and Monotone Cutoffs

We say that a strategy σ is a *cutoff strategy* if for each t , h^{t-1} such that $h_{t-1} = N$ and $T_t \in \{P, N\}$, there exists $c_t(h^{t-1}, T_t)$ such that $\sigma_t(h^t, s, T_t) = 1$ if $s > c_t(h^{t-1}, T_t)$ and $\sigma_t(h^t, s, T_t) = 0$ if $s < c_t(h^{t-1}, T_t)$.¹⁵ Clearly, setting $\sigma_t(h^t, s, T) = 1$ (or 0) for all s is a special case of a cutoff strategy.¹⁶

We can represent a cutoff strategy profile by the sequence of cutoffs

$$c = (c_1^N(h_0), c_1^P(h_0), \dots, c_t^N(h_{t-1}), c_t^P(h_{t-1}), \dots),$$

where $c_t^T(h_{t-1})$ denotes the cutoff by agent of prominence type $T \in \{P, N\}$ at time t conditional on history h_{t-1} . Finally, because as the next proposition shows all equilibria are in

¹⁵Note that specification of any requirements on strategies when $s = c_t(h^{t-1}, T_t)$ is inconsequential as this is a zero probability event.

¹⁶If $h_{t-1} = P$, there is no signal received by agent of generation t and thus any strategy is a cutoff strategy.

cutoff strategies, whenever we compare strategies (e.g., when defining “greatest equilibria”), we do so using the natural Euclidean partial ordering in terms of their cutoffs.

PROPOSITION 1 *1. All equilibria are in cutoff strategies.*

2. There exists an equilibrium in semi-Markovian cutoff strategies.

3. The set of equilibria and the set of semi-Markovian equilibria form complete lattices, and the greatest (and least) equilibria of the two lattices coincide.

The third part of the proposition immediately implies that the greatest and the least equilibria are semi-Markovian. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on these greatest and least equilibria.

The proof of this proposition relies on an extension of the well-known results for (Bayesian) games of strategic complements to a setting with an infinite number of players, presented in Appendix A. The proof of this proposition, like those of all remaining results in the paper, is also provided in Appendix A.

Given the results in Proposition 1, we focus on extremal equilibria. Since the lattice of equilibria is complete there is a unique maximal (and hence greatest) equilibrium and unique minimal (and hence least) equilibrium. We next proceed to analyze the model.

4 Equilibrium Behavior and the Importance of History

4.1 Overview

In this section we characterize the structure of greatest equilibria as a function of the setting. Any statement for greatest equilibria has a corresponding statement for least equilibria, which we omit to avoid repetition.

The broad outline of equilibrium behavior is fairly straightforward. We begin with a brief summary of equilibrium structure and a roadmap before providing precise formal statements.

Figure 2 describes the basic features of equilibria as a function of the underlying payoffs. We distinguish between the cases where the last prominent agent played *High* and *Low*, since, in the greatest equilibrium, this is sufficient to summarize the impact of history and this aspect of history will indeed have a major influence on current behavior.

First, Figure 2 shows that when $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ and the last prominent play was *High*, all endogenous agents will play of *High*. This behavior is reinforced by the expectation of past behavior being *High* and the anticipation that future (endogenous) agents will also play




Figure 2: A depiction of the play of endogenous players in the greatest equilibrium, as a function of the underlying attractiveness of playing *Low* (γ), broken down as a function of the play of the last prominent player.

High. Conversely, when $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_L$, prominent play of *Low* will be followed by all endogenous agents playing *Low*. This type of “history-driven” behavior is characterized in the next subsection.

Second, we provide a more complete characterization of greatest equilibrium play later in this section.

Third and more importantly, Figure 2 also shows that if $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$, then following a *High* prominent play, endogenous agents will start playing *High*, but behavior will deteriorate over time, in the sense that *High* will become less likely. This is because those playing shortly after a prominent agent are nearly certain that previous players have played *High* and are thus willing to play *High*. But this confidence erodes with the passage of time and so the probability of the play of *High* decreases. Conversely, following a *Low* prominent play, behavior improves towards *High* over time. This is studied in Section 5.

Finally, in Section 6, we examine the role of endogenous prominent agents and their ability to lead a society away from a *Low* social norm, and we also clarify why the two aspects of prominence – more precise signals for the next generation and greater visibility for all future generations – are important for this ability.

4.2 History-Driven Behavior: Emergence of Social Norms

We now describe the conditions under which history completely drives endogenous play. We begin with the conditions under which following a prominent play of *High*, the greatest

equilibrium involves a *High social norm* where all endogenous players play *High*, and the conditions under which following a prominent play of *Low*, the greatest equilibrium involves a *Low social norm* where all endogenous players play *Low*.¹⁷ “History” throughout refers to the public history h^t . In view of Proposition 1, this is summarized simply by the play of the most recent prominent agent, and how much time has elapsed since then.

The extent to which prominent *High* play drives subsequent endogenous play to be *High* depends on a threshold level of γ that is

$$\bar{\gamma}_H \equiv (1 - \lambda) \Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi). \quad (4)$$

(Recall that $\gamma \equiv \alpha / (\beta + \alpha)$ captures the relative attractiveness of *Low* compared to *High*.) This threshold can be understood as the expectation of $(1 - \lambda)\phi_{t-1}^t + \lambda\phi_{t+1}^t$ when all other endogenous agents (are expected to) play *High* and the last prominent agent played *High* and conditional on the lowest potential signal being observed. If γ lies below this level, then it is possible to sustain all *High* play among all endogenous agents following a prominent agent playing *High*. Otherwise, all endogenous agents playing *High* (following a prominent agent playing *Low*) will not be sustainable.

Similarly, there is a threshold such that in the greatest equilibrium, all endogenous agents play *Low* following a prominent agent playing *Low*. This threshold is more difficult to characterize and we therefore begin with a stronger threshold than is necessary. To understand this stronger – sufficient – threshold, γ_L^* , first consider the agent immediately following a prominent agent playing *Low*. This agent knows that the previous generation (the prominent agent) necessarily played *Low* and the most optimistic expectation is that the next generation endogenous agents will play *High*. Thus, for such an endogenous agent following a prominent *Low*, $\gamma > \lambda(1 - \pi)$ is sufficient for *Low* to be a strict best response. What about the next agent? The only difference for this agent is that she may not know for sure that the previous generation played *Low*. If $\gamma > \lambda(1 - \pi)$, then she expects her previous generation agent to have played *Low* unless he was exogenously committed to *High*. This implies that it is sufficient to consider the expectation of ϕ_{t-1}^t under this assumption and ensure that even for the signal most favorable to this previous generation agent having played *High*, *Low* is a best response. The threshold for this is

$$\gamma_L^* \equiv (1 - \lambda) \Phi(1, \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi). \quad (5)$$

¹⁷A situation in which all endogenous agents, or all regular agents, play *High (Low)* following a prominent play of *High (Low)* clearly defines a social norm. Situations, as those described in Proposition 4, where the equilibrium involves changing cutoffs starting with the last prominent agent also define social norms, albeit in a more nuanced fashion, since now an evolving set of expectations determines both the anticipation of future behavior and how signals from the past are interpreted.

Thus if $\gamma > \gamma_L^* > \lambda(1 - \pi)$, this agent will also have a strict best response that is *Low* even in the greatest equilibrium. Now we can proceed inductively and see that this threshold applies to all future agents, since when $\gamma > \gamma_L^*$, all endogenous agents following a prominent *Low* will play *Low*.

In Appendix A, we establish the existence of a threshold $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \gamma_L^*$ for which all endogenous *Low* is the greatest, and thus unique (continuation) equilibrium play following *Low* play by a prominent agent when $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_L$. In fact, we show as part of the proof of Proposition 2 that if $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ (and thus a fortiori if $\gamma_L^* \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$), then $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$.

The proposition is stated verbally here, and in the appendix we also include the statements in terms of the strategy notation.

PROPOSITION 2 *The greatest equilibrium is such that:*

1. *following a prominent play of Low, there is a Low social norm and all endogenous agents play Low if and only if $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma$;¹⁸ and*
2. *following a prominent play of High, there is a High social norm and all endogenous agents play High if and only if $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$.*

Thus, endogenous players always follow the play of the most recent prominent player in the greatest equilibrium if and only if $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$.

This proposition makes the role of history clear: for these parameter values (and in the greatest equilibrium), the social norm is determined by history. In particular, if prominent agents are rare, then society follows a social norm established by the last prominent agent for an extended period of time. Nevertheless, our model also implies that social norms are not everlasting: switches in social norms take place following the arrival of exogenous prominent agents (committed to the opposite action). Thus when q is small, a particular social norm, determined by the play of the last prominent agent, emerges and persists for a long time, disturbed only by the emergence of another (exogenous) prominent agent who chooses the opposite action and initiates a different social norm.

We emphasize that this multiplicity of equilibrium social norms when $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ does not follow from multiple equilibria: it is a feature of a single (the greatest) equilibrium. Here, changes in the social norm of play come only from changes due to exogenous prominent play,

¹⁸Because there can be discontinuities in the equilibrium structure that result in multiple possibilities at precise thresholds, our statements regarding all *Low* play (here and in the sequel) do not necessarily apply to play at $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma$.

and an exogenous prominent play of *High* leads to subsequent endogenous play of *High*, while an exogenous prominent play of *Low* leads to subsequent endogenous play of *Low*.¹⁹

It is also instructive to derive the conditions under which $\bar{\gamma}_L < \bar{\gamma}_H$, so that the parameter configuration $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, and history-driven behavior following both prominent *Low* and *High*, is possible. As noted before the proposition, when $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$. Therefore, $\bar{\gamma}_L < \bar{\gamma}_H$ if and only if $\gamma_L^* < \bar{\gamma}_H$. Provided that $\lambda < 1$ (which is clearly necessary to obtain a strict inequality), the condition that $\gamma_L^* < \bar{\gamma}_H$ can be simply written as $\Phi(0, 1 - \pi) > \Phi(1, \pi)$. Defining the least and greatest likelihood ratios as

$$m \equiv \frac{f_H(0)}{f_L(0)} < 1 \text{ and } M \equiv \frac{f_H(1)}{f_L(1)} > 1.$$

then the (necessary and sufficient) condition for $\gamma_L^* < \bar{\gamma}_H$ is that $\lambda < 1$ and

$$\frac{(1 - \pi)^2}{\pi^2} > \frac{M}{m}. \quad (6)$$

This requires that m is not too small relative to M , so that signals are sufficiently noisy. Intuitively, recall that when the greatest equilibrium involves all endogenous agents playing *Low*, this must be the unique continuation equilibrium (given the play of the last prominent agent). Thus the condition that $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_L$ ensures uniqueness of the continuation equilibrium following a prominent agent playing *Low* – otherwise all *Low* could not be the greatest equilibrium. In this light, it is intuitive that this condition should require signals to be sufficiently noisy. Otherwise, players would react strongly to signals from the previous generation and could change to *High* behavior when they receive a strong signal indicating *High* play in the previous generation and also expecting the next generation to receive accurate informative regarding their own behavior. Noisy signals ensure that each agent has a limited ability to influence the future path of actions and thus prevent multiple equilibria supported by coordinating on past actions that are observed relatively precisely.

It can also be shown that, even though the static game of coordination discussed here exhibits a natural multiplicity of equilibria, under certain parameter restrictions our model generates a unique equilibrium. This is analyzed in Proposition 11 in Appendix B.

4.3 A Characterization of Greatest Equilibrium Play

Proposition 2 characterizes the conditions under which endogenous play is driven by history and social norms of *High* or *Low* play emerge following *High* or *Low* prominent play. In

¹⁹Note that this also distinguishes the analysis from that of (dynamic) global games. Here, play depends on the exogenous prominent players and can change over time within an equilibrium.

the next proposition, we show that when $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$, endogenous agents will play *Low* following some signals even if the last prominent play is *High*—thus following a prominent play of *High*, there will be a distribution of actions by endogenous agents rather than a social norm of *High*. In the process, we will provide a more complete characterization of play in the greatest equilibrium.

Let us define two more thresholds. The first one is the level of γ below which all endogenous agents will play *High* in all circumstances, provided other endogenous agents do the same. In particular, if a regular agent is willing to play *High* following a prominent agent who played *Low*, then all endogenous agents are willing to play *High* in all periods. A regular agent is willing to play *High* following a prominent agent who played *Low* – presuming all future endogenous agents will play *High* – if and only if $\gamma \leq \lambda(1 - \pi)$. The second threshold, $\hat{\gamma}_H$, is such that above it all endogenous agents play *Low*, even following prominent *High*. This threshold is upper bounded by $(1 - \lambda) + \lambda(1 - \pi)$, the level of γ above which no endogenous agent would ever play *High*, even if he follows a prominent agent who has chosen *High* and expected all future endogenous players to play *High*.

Figure 2 depicts these thresholds and shows the corresponding equilibrium behavior. In particular, it highlights that between $\bar{\gamma}_H$ and $\hat{\gamma}_H$ and between $\lambda(1 - \pi)$ and $\bar{\gamma}_L$, behavior immediately following a prominent agent is the same as the action of the prominent agent, but will deviate from this thereafter. The exact pattern of behavior in these regions is characterized in the next section. Proposition 3 summarizes the pattern shown in Figure 2.

The proposition is stated verbally here, and in the appendix we also include the statements in terms of the strategy notation.

PROPOSITION 3 *In the greatest equilibrium:*

1. All endogenous agents play *High* either if $\gamma \leq \lambda(1 - \pi)$ (regardless of the last prominent play), or if $\lambda(1 - \pi) < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ and the last prominent play was *High*.
2. All endogenous agents play *Low* either if $\hat{\gamma}_H < \gamma$ (regardless of the last prominent play), or if $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \hat{\gamma}_H$ and the last prominent play was *Low*.
3. In the remaining regions, the play of endogenous players changes over time:
 - ★ If the last prominent play was *High* and $\bar{\gamma}_H < \gamma \leq \hat{\gamma}_H$, then an endogenous prominent player who immediately follows the last prominent play will play *High*, but some other endogenous players eventually play *Low* for at least some signals.

★ *If the last prominent play was Low and $\lambda(1 - \pi) < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_L$, then a non-prominent player who immediately follows the last prominent play will play Low, but some other endogenous players eventually play High for at least some signals.*

5 The Reversion of Play over Time

As noted in the previous section, outside of the parameter regions discussed in Proposition 2, there is an interesting phenomenon regarding the reversion of the play of regular players—deterioration of *High* play starting from a prominent play of *High*. This is a consequence of a more general monotonicity result, which shows that cutoffs always move in the same direction, that is, either they are monotonically non-increasing or monotonically non-decreasing, so that *High* play either becomes monotonically more likely or monotonically less likely. As a consequence, when greatest equilibrium behavior is not completely driven by the most recent prominent play (as specified in Proposition 2), then *High* and *Low* play deteriorate over time, meaning that as the distance from the last prominent *High* (resp., *Low*) agent increases, the likelihood of *High* (resp., *Low*) behavior decreases and corresponding cutoffs increase (resp., decrease).

Since we are focusing on semi-Markovian equilibria, with a slight abuse of notation, let us denote the cutoffs used by prominent and non-prominent agents τ periods after the last prominent agent by c_τ^P and c_τ^N respectively. We say that *High* play is *non-increasing* over time if $(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N) \leq (c_{\tau+1}^P, c_{\tau+1}^N)$ for each τ . We say that *High* play is *decreasing* over time, if, in addition, we have that when $(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N) \neq (0, 0)$ and $(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N) \neq (1, 1)$, $(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N) \neq (c_{\tau+1}^P, c_{\tau+1}^N)$. The concepts of *High* play being non-decreasing and increasing over time are defined analogously.

The definition of decreasing or increasing play implies that when the cutoffs for endogenous agents are non-degenerate, they must actually strictly increase over time – so unless *High* play completely dominates, then *High* play strictly decreases over time. In particular, when $\gamma \notin (\bar{\gamma}_L, \bar{\gamma}_H]$, as we know from Proposition 3, there are no constant equilibria, so *High* play must be increasing or decreasing.

PROPOSITION 4 1. *In the greatest equilibrium, cutoff sequences (c_τ^P, c_τ^N) are monotone.*

Thus, following a prominent agent choosing High, (c_τ^P, c_τ^N) are non-decreasing and following a prominent agent choosing Low, they are non-increasing.

2. *If $\bar{\gamma}_H < \gamma < \hat{\gamma}_H$, then in the greatest equilibrium, High play is decreasing over time following High play by a prominent agent.*

3. If $\lambda(1 - \pi) < \gamma < \bar{\gamma}_L$, then in the greatest equilibrium, *High* play is increasing over time following *Low* play by a prominent agent.

There is one interesting difference between the ways in which reversion occurs when it happens from *Low* versus *High* play. Endogenous prominent agents are always at least weakly more willing to play *High* than are regular agents, since they will be observed and are thus more likely to have their *High* play reciprocated by the next agent. Thus, their cutoffs are always weakly lower and their corresponding probability of playing *High* is higher. Hence, if play starts at *High*, then it is the regular agents who are reverting more, i.e., playing *Low* with a greater probability. In contrast, if play starts at *Low*, then it is the prominent agents who revert more, i.e., playing *High* with a greater probability (and eventually leading to a new prominent history beginning with a *High* play). It is possible, for some parameter values, that one type of endogenous player sticks with the play of the last prominent agent (prominent endogenous when starting with *High*, and non-prominent endogenous when starting with *Low*), while the other type of endogenous player strictly reverts in play.²⁰

Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of the cutoffs and the corresponding probabilities of *High* play for regular agents following a *High* prominent play. For the reasons explained in the paragraph preceding Proposition 4, prominent endogenous agents will have lower cutoffs and higher probabilities of *High* play than regular agents. Depending on the specific level of γ , it could be that prominent endogenous agents all play *High* for all signals and times, or it could be that their play reverts too.

The intuition for Proposition 4 is interesting. Immediately following a *High* prominent action, an agent knows for sure that she is facing *High* in the previous generation. Two periods after a *High* prominent action, she is playing against an agent from the previous period who knew for sure that he was facing *High* in the previous generation. Thus her opponent was likely to have chosen *High* himself. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that this opponent might have been an exogenous type committed to *Low*, and since $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$, there are some signals for which she will conclude that this opponent is indeed such an exogenous type and choose *Low* instead. Now consider an agent three periods after a *High* prominent action. For this agent, not only is there the possibility that one of the two previous agents were exogenous and committed to *Low* play, but also the possibility that his immediate predecessor received an adverse signal and decided to play *Low* instead. Thus he is even

²⁰Note that the asymmetry between reversion starting from *Low* versus *High* play we are emphasizing here is distinct and independent from the asymmetry that results from our focus on the greatest equilibrium. In particular, this asymmetry is present even if we focus on the least equilibrium.




Figure 3: Reversion of Play from *High* to the highest Steady-State

more likely to interpret adverse signals as coming from *Low* play than was his predecessor. This reasoning highlights the tendency towards higher cutoffs and less *High* play over time. In fact, there is another more subtle force pushing in the same direction. Since $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$, each agent also realizes that even when she chooses *High*, the agent in the next generation may receive an adverse signal, and the farther this agent is from the initial prominent agent, the more likely are the signals resulting from her choice of *High* to be interpreted as coming from a *Low* agent. This anticipation of how her signal will be interpreted – and thus becomes more likely to be countered by a play of *Low* – as the distance to the prominent agent increases creates an additional force towards reversion.

The converse of this intuition explains why there is improvement of *High* play over time starting with a prominent agent choosing *Low*. The likelihood of a given individual encountering *High* play in the previous generation increases as the distance to prominent agent increases as Figure 3 shows.

Proposition 4 also implies that behavior converges to a limiting (steady-state) distribution along sample paths where there are no prominent agents. Two important caveats need to be noted, however. First, this limiting distribution need not be unique and depends on the starting point. In particular, the limiting distribution following a prominent agent playing *Low* may be different from the limiting distribution following a prominent agent playing *High*. This can be seen by considering the case where $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ studied in Proposition 2, where (trivially) the limiting distribution is a function of the action of the last prominent agent. Second, while there is convergence to a limiting distribution along sample paths without prominent agents, there is in general no convergence to a stationary distribution

because of the arrival of exogenous prominent agents. In particular, provided that $q > 0$ (and since $\pi > 0$), the society will necessarily fluctuate between different patterns of behavior. For example, when $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, as already pointed out following Proposition 2, the society will fluctuate between social norms of *High* and *Low* play as exogenous prominent agents arrive and choose different actions (even if this happens quite rarely).

6 Prominent Agents and Leadership

In this section, we show how prominent agents can exploit their greater visibility by future generations in order to play a leadership role and break the *Low* social norm to induce a switch to *High* play.

6.1 Breaking the *Low* Social Norm

Next consider a *Low* social norm where all regular agents play *Low*.²¹ Suppose that at generation t there is an endogenous prominent agent. The key question analyzed in the next proposition is when an endogenous prominent agent would like to switch to *High* play in order to change the existing social norm.

Let $\tilde{\gamma}_L$ denote the threshold such that above this level, in the greatest equilibrium, all regular players choose *Low* following a prominent *Low*. As we show in Appendix A, $0 < \tilde{\gamma}_L < \bar{\gamma}_L$, and so this is below the threshold where all endogenous players choose *Low* (because, as we explained above, prominent endogenous agents are more willing to switch to *High* than regular agents).

PROPOSITION 5 *Consider the greatest equilibrium:*

1. *Suppose that $\tilde{\gamma}_L \leq \gamma < \min\{\gamma_L^*, \bar{\gamma}_H\}$. Suppose also that the last prominent agent has played *Low*. Then there exists a cutoff $\tilde{c} < 1$ such that an endogenous prominent agent playing at least two periods after the last prominent agent and receiving a signal $s > \tilde{c}$ will choose *High* and break the *Low* social norm (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = Low, s, T = P) = High$ if $s > \tilde{c}$ and $\tau > 1$).*
2. *Suppose that $\gamma < \min\{\tilde{\gamma}_L, \bar{\gamma}_H\}$. Suppose that the last prominent agent played *Low*. Then there exists a sequence of decreasing cutoffs $\{\tilde{c}_\tau\}_{\tau=2}^\infty < 1$ such that an endogenous prominent agent playing $\tau \geq 2$ periods after the last prominent agent and receiving*

²¹Note that the social norm in question here involves one in which all regular agents, but not necessarily endogenous prominent agents, play *Low*.

a signal $s > \tilde{c}_\tau$ will choose *High* and switch to play from the path of convergence to steady state to a *High* social norm (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = Low, s, T = P) = High$ if $s > \tilde{c}_\tau$ and $\tau \geq 2$, and \tilde{c}_τ is decreasing in τ with $\tilde{c}_\tau < \tilde{c}$ for all $\tau > 1$).

The results in this proposition are both important and intuitive. Their importance stems from the fact that they show how prominent agents can play a crucial leadership role in society. In particular, the first part shows that starting with the *Low* social norm, a prominent agent who receives a signal from the last generation that is not too adverse (so that there is some positive probability that she is playing an exogenous type committed to *High* play) will find it profitable to choose *High*, and this will switch the entire future path of play, creating a *High* social norm instead. The second part shows that prominent agents can also play a similar role starting from a situation which does not involve a *Low* social norm – instead, starting with *Low* and reverting to a steady state distribution. In this case, the threshold for instigating such a switch depends on how far they are from the last prominent agent who has chosen *Low*.

The intuition for these results is also interesting as it clarifies how history and expectations shape the evolution of cooperation. Prominent agents can play a leadership role because they can exploit their impact on future expectations and their visibility by future generations in order to change a *Low* social norm into a *High* one. In particular, when the society is stuck in a *Low* social norm, regular agents do not wish to deviate from this, because they know that the previous generation has likely chosen *Low* and also that even if they were to choose *High*, the signal generated by this would likely be interpreted by the next generation as coming from a *Low* action. For a prominent agent, the latter is not a concern, since her action is perfectly observed by the next generation. Moreover and perhaps more importantly from an economic point of view, her deviation from the *Low* social norm can influence the expectations of all future generations, reinforcing the incentives of the next generation to also switch their action to *High*.

6.2 Prominence, Expectations and Leadership

In this subsection we highlight the role of prominence in our model, emphasizing that prominence is different (stronger) than simply being observed by the next generation with certainty. In particular, the fact that prominence involves being observed by all subsequent generations with certainty plays a central role in our results. To clarify this, we consider four scenarios.

In each scenario, for simplicity, we assume that there is a starting non-prominent agent at time 0 who plays *High* with probability $x_0 \in (0, 1)$, where x_0 is known to all agents who

follow, and generates a signal for the first agent in the usual way. All agents after time 1 are not prominent. In every case all agents (including time 1 agents) are endogenous with probability $(1 - 2\pi)$.

Scenario 1. The agent at time 1 is not prominent and his or her action is observed with the usual signal structure.

Scenario 2. The agent at time 1's action is observed perfectly by the period 2 agent, but not by future agents.

Scenario 2'. The agent at time 1 is only observed by the next agent according to a signal, but then is subsequently perfectly observed by all agents who follow from time 3 onwards.

Scenario 3. The agent at time 1 is prominent, and all later agents are viewed with the usual signal structure.

Clearly, as we move from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 (or 2') to Scenario 3, we are moving from a non-prominent agent to a prominent one, with Scenarios 2 and 2' being hybrids, where the agent of generation $t = 1$ has greater visibility than a non-prominent agent but is not fully prominent in terms of being observed forever after.

We focus again on the greatest equilibrium and let $c^k(\lambda, \gamma, f_H, f_L, \pi)$ denote the cutoff signal above which the first agent (if endogenous) plays *High* under scenario k as a function of the underlying setting.

PROPOSITION 6 *The cutoffs satisfy $c^2(\cdot) \geq c^3(\cdot)$ and $c^1(\cdot) \geq c^{2'}(\cdot) \geq c^3(\cdot)$, and there are settings $(\lambda, \gamma, f_H, f_L, \pi)$ for which the inequalities are strict.*

The intuition for this result is instructive. First, comparing Scenario 2 to Scenario 3, the former has the same observability of the action by the next generation (the only remaining generation that directly cares about the action of the agent) but not the common knowledge that future generations will also observe this action. This means that future generations will not necessarily coordinate on the basis of a choice of *High* by this agent, and this discourages *High* play by the agent at date $t = 2$, and through this channel, it also discourages *High* play by the agent at date $t = 1$, relative to the case in which there was full prominence. The comparison of Scenario 2' to Scenario 1 is perhaps more surprising. In Scenario 2', the agent at date $t = 1$ knows that her action will be seen by future agents, so if she plays *High*, then this gives agent 3 extra information about the signals that agent 2 is likely to observe. This creates strong feedback effects in turn affecting agent 1. In particular, agent 3 would

choose a lower cutoff for a given cutoff of agent 2 when she sees *High* play by agent 1. But knowing that agent 3 is using a lower cutoff, agent 2 will also find it beneficial to use a lower cutoff. This not only feeds back to agent 3, making her even more aggressive in playing *High*, but also encourages agent 1 to play *High* as she knows that agent 2 is more likely to respond with *High* himself. In fact, these feedback effects continue and affect all future agents in the same manner, and in turn, the expectation that they will play *High* with a higher probability further encourages *High* play by agents 1 and 2. Thus, one can leverage things upwards even through delayed prominence.

Notably, a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 6 shows that the same comparisons hold if we replace “time 3” in Scenarios 2 or 2’ with “time k ” for any $k \geq 3$.

There are two omitted comparisons: between scenarios 2 and 2’ and between scenarios 1 and 2. Both of these are ambiguous. It is clear why the comparison between scenarios 2 and 2’ is ambiguous as those information structures are not nested. The ambiguity between scenarios 1 and 2 is more subtle, as one might have expected that $c^1 \geq c^2$. The reason why this is not always the case is interesting. When signals are sufficiently noisy and x_0 is sufficiently close to 1, under scenario 1 agent 2 would prefer to choose *High* regardless of the signal she receives. This would in turn induce agent 1 to choose *High* for most signals. When the agent 2 instead observes agent 1’s action perfectly as in scenario 2, then (provided that λ is not too high) she will prefer to match this action, i.e., play *High* only when agent 1 plays *High*. The expectation that she will play *Low* in response to *Low* under scenario 2 then leads agents born in periods 3 and later to be more pessimistic about the likelihood of facing *High* and they will thus play *Low* with greater probability than they would do under scenario 1. This then naturally feeds back and affects the tradeoff facing agent 2 and she may even prefer to play *Low* following *High* play; in response the agent born in period 1 may also choose *Low*. All of this ceases to be an issue if the play of the agent born at date 1 is observed by all future generations (as in scenarios 2’ and 3), since in this case the ambiguity about agent 2’s play disappears.

7 Comparative Statics

We now present some comparative static results that show the role of forward versus backward looking behavior and the information structure on the likelihood of different types of social norms.

We first study how changes in λ , which capture how forward-looking the agents are, impact the likelihood of social norms involving *High* and *Low* play. Since we do not have

an explicit expression for $\bar{\gamma}_L$, we focus on the impact of λ on $\bar{\gamma}_H$ and γ_L^* (recall that $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$ when $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$).

PROPOSITION 7 1. $\bar{\gamma}_H$ is increasing in λ ; i.e., all *High* endogenous play following *High* prominent play occurs for a larger set of parameters as agents become more forward-looking.

2. There exists M^* such that γ_L^* is increasing [decreasing] in λ if $M < M^*$ [if $M > M^*$], i.e., *Low* play as the unique equilibrium following *Low* prominent play occurs for a larger set of parameters as agents become more forward-looking provided that signals more likely under *High* are sufficiently distinguishing.

The first result follows because $\bar{\gamma}_H$ is the threshold for the greatest equilibrium to involve *High* following a prominent agent who chooses *High*. A greater λ increases the importance of coordinating with the next generation, and this enables the choice of *High* being sustained by expectations of future agents choosing *High*.

The second part focuses on the effects of λ on γ_L^* . Recall that the greatest equilibrium involves a social norm of *Low* if this is the unique (continuation) equilibrium. As λ increases, more emphasis is placed on expectations of agents' play tomorrow relative to interpreting past signals. Whether this makes it easier or harder to coordinate on a *Low* social norm depends on how accurate the past signals are regarding potential information that might upset the coordination – accurate signals regarding past *High* can upset all *Low* play as an equilibrium. Thus, when past signals are sufficiently accurate, more forward looking preferences (i.e., higher λ) make the *Low* social norm following *Low* prominent play more likely.

The next proposition gives comparative statics with respect to the probability of the exogenous types, π .

PROPOSITION 8 1. $\bar{\gamma}_H$ is decreasing in π ; i.e., exclusively *High* play following *High* prominent play occurs for a smaller set of parameter values as the probability of exogenous types increases.

2. For every λ there is a threshold $\bar{\pi}_\lambda$ such that for $\pi > \bar{\pi}_\lambda$, γ_L^* is decreasing in π , and for $\pi < \bar{\pi}_\lambda$, γ_L^* is increasing in π . Moreover, $\bar{\pi}_\lambda$ is decreasing in λ .

The results in this proposition are again intuitive. A higher π implies that there is a higher likelihood of an exogenous type committed to *Low* and this makes it more difficult to maintain the greatest equilibrium with all endogenous agents playing *High* (following a

prominent agent who has chosen *High*). For the second part, recall that we are trying to maintain an equilibrium in which all endogenous agents playing *Low* following a prominent *Low* is the unique equilibrium. A lower probability of types exogenously committed to *High* makes this more likely provided that agents put sufficient weight on the past, so that the main threat to a *Low* social norm comes from signals indicating that the previous generation has played *High* (and this is captured by the condition that $\pi > \bar{\pi}_\lambda$, where $\bar{\pi}_\lambda$ is decreasing in λ). Otherwise (i.e., if $\pi < \bar{\pi}_\lambda$) the unique equilibrium requires all agents choosing *Low* in order to target payoffs from (Low, Low) when they are matched with an exogenous type committed to *Low* in the next generation. Naturally in this case a higher π makes this more likely.

The next proposition summarizes some implications of the signals structure becoming more informative. Comparing two information settings (f_L, f_H) and (\hat{f}_L, \hat{f}_H) , we say that *signals become more informative* if there exists $\bar{s} \in (0, 1)$ with $\frac{\hat{f}_H(s)}{\hat{f}_L(s)} > \frac{f_H(s)}{f_L(s)}$ for all $s > \bar{s}$ and $\frac{\hat{f}_H(s)}{\hat{f}_L(s)} < \frac{f_H(s)}{f_L(s)}$ for all $s < \bar{s}$.

PROPOSITION 9 *Suppose that signals become more informative from (f_L, f_H) to (\hat{f}_L, \hat{f}_H) , and consider a case such that $\tilde{\gamma}_L \leq \gamma < \min\{\gamma_L^*, \bar{\gamma}_H\}$ both before and after the change in the distribution of signals. If $1 > \tilde{c} > \bar{s}$ (where \tilde{c} is the original threshold as defined in Proposition 5), then the likelihood that a prominent agent will break a *Low* social norm (play *High* if the last prominent play was *Low*) increases in the greatest equilibrium.*

Prominent agents break the *Low* social norm when they believe that there is a sufficient probability that the agent in the previous generation chose *High* (and anticipating that they can switch the play to *High* given their visibility). The proposition follows because when signals become more precise near the threshold \bar{s} where prominent agents are indifferent between sticking with and breaking the *Low* social norm, the probability that they will obtain a signal greater than \bar{s} increases. This increases the likelihood that they would prefer to break the *Low* social norm.

8 Extensions

8.1 Multiple Agents within Generations

Suppose that there are n agents within each generation. If there are no prominent agents in the previous and the next generations, each agent is randomly matched with one of the n agents from the previous and one of the n agents from the next generation, so given

the action profile of the last and the next generations, the expected utility of agent i from generation t is

$$\left[(1 - \lambda) \sum_{j=1}^n u(A_{i,t}, A_{j,t-1}) + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^n u(A_{i,t}, A_{j,t+1}) \right] / n.$$

To maximize the parallel between this extension and our baseline model, we consider a case such that if any agent of a given generation is prominent, then that generation consists of a single agent who matches with each agent of the adjacent generations.²² In a generation of non-prominent agents, each agent is endogenous with an independent probability of $1 - 2\pi$.

The information structure is as follows: each agent of generation t observes a signal s generated from the action of a randomly chosen agent from the previous generation, with the likelihood ratio as described above (the signal does not necessarily come from the action of the agent she will be matched with). Of course, if there is a prominent agent, this is seen by the next and all future generations.

Under these assumptions, the results presented for the baseline model extend relatively straightforwardly. In particular, it is a direct extension to see that greatest and least equilibria are in cutoffs strategies, and the set of equilibria in cutoff strategies form a complete lattice. Moreover, the thresholds characterizing the structure of greatest equilibrium are similar. To economize on space, we only give a few of these thresholds and instead focus on the differences from the baseline model.

The posterior that, after seeing signal s and with a prior belief that the probability that regular agents play *High* is x , the agent will play against a player from the last generation who has chosen *High* is now given by

$$\Phi_n(s, x) = \frac{1}{n} \Phi(s, x) + \frac{n-1}{n} x. \quad (7)$$

Therefore, the threshold for *High* to be a best response when all future regular agents are expected to play *High* (independently of the last prominent play) is again $\gamma \leq \lambda(1 - \pi)$.

The threshold for choosing *High* after seeing the worst signal $s = 0$ (and obviously no prominent agent in the previous generation) and when the last prominent agent has played *High* is

$$\bar{\gamma}_H^n \equiv (1 - \lambda) \left[\frac{1}{n} \Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \frac{n-1}{n} (1 - \pi) \right] + \lambda(1 - \pi). \quad (8)$$

This expression takes into account that signals are less informative about behavior now because they are from a randomly drawn agent who may or may not be the one that the

²²One could also have entire generations be prominent, with some slight modifications to what follows, but with similar insights. Mixing prominent and non-prominent agents within a generation complicates the calculations even more substantially, but again would not change the basic intuitions here.

current player will be matched with. Clearly, $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$ is increasing in n , which implies that the set of parameters under which *High* play will follow *High* prominent play is greater when there are more players within each generation. This is because the signal each one receives becomes less informative about the action that the player they will be matched with is likely to have taken, and thus they put less weight on the signal and more weight on the action of the last prominent agent.

This reasoning enables us to establish an immediate generalizations of Proposition 3, with the only difference that $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$, and similarly $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ and $\hat{\gamma}_H^n$, replace $\bar{\gamma}_H, \bar{\gamma}_L$ and $\hat{\gamma}_H$. The most interesting result here concerns the behavior of $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$ and $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$, which is summarized in the next proposition.

PROPOSITION 10 *In the model with n agents within each generation, there exist greatest and least equilibria. In the greatest equilibrium: following a prominent play of Low, there is a Low social norm and all endogenous agents play Low (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = Low, s, T) = Low$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$) if and only if $\bar{\gamma}_L^n < \gamma$. Following a prominent play of High, there is a High social norm and all endogenous agents play High (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = High, s, T) = High$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$) if and only if $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H^n$.*

The threshold $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$ is increasing in n . If, in addition, $\bar{\gamma}_H^n \geq \bar{\gamma}_L^n$ (which is satisfied when (6) holds), the threshold $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ is also nonincreasing in n , so that both High and Low social norms following, respectively, High and Low prominent play, emerge for a larger set of parameter values. The same result also holds (i.e., the threshold $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ is nonincreasing in n) when $q = 0$ so that there are no prominent agents after the initial period.

The intuition for this result is related to the reason why $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$ is increasing in n discussed above. A similar reasoning also affects $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ because again more agents within a generation, i.e., greater n , implies that the signal that each agent receives is less informative about the action of the individual they will be matched with from the previous generation. In addition, when there are more agents within a generation, the signal that an agent will transmit to the next generation by choosing *High* is less precise (because the probability that the agent they match with will have seen their signal is $1/n$).²³

²³This second effect is present in general, but does not impact the thresholds $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$ and $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$, because when these thresholds apply, next period play is fixed (either *High* or *Low* by all endogenous agents). This effect, however, impacts other cutoffs.

Based on this effect and the lesser informativeness of signals received from the past, one might conjecture a stronger result than Proposition 10, that all cutoffs following *High* will be lower and all cutoffs following *Low* will be higher, thus increasing the power of history in *all* equilibria, not just those that are completely history-driven. However, this stronger conjecture turns out not to be correct because of a countervailing

8.2 Imperfect Prominence

As we have emphasized, prominent agents are different from non-prominent agents on two dimensions: first, their actions are observed perfectly rather than with noise; and second, their actions are observed by all future generations not just the next generation. Proposition 6 unpacked some distinct implications of these two differences. A natural, complementary question is whether our results on history-driven behavior hinge on perfect observation.

To investigate this question, consider a variation where all future generations observe the same imperfect signal concerning the action of past prominent agents. In particular, suppose that they all receive a public signal $r_t \in \{Low, High\}$ (in addition to the private signal s_t from the non-prominent agent in the previous generation) concerning the action of the prominent agent of time t (if there is indeed a prominent agent at time t). We assume that $r_t = a_t$ with probability η , where $a_t \in \{Low, High\}$ is the action of the prominent agent. Clearly, as $\eta \rightarrow 1$, this environment converges to our baseline environment.

An important observation in this case is that the third part of Proposition 1 no longer applies and the greatest and least equilibria are not necessarily semi-Markovian. This is because, given imperfect signals about the actions of prominent agents, the play of previous prominent agents is relevant for beliefs about the play of the last prominent agent. Nevertheless, when η is sufficiently large but still strictly less than 1, the greatest equilibrium is again semi-Markovian and is driven by history; i.e., the common signal generated by the action of the last prominent agent. In particular, it can be shown that following a signal of $r = H$, the probability that a prominent agent has indeed played *High* cannot be lower than

$$\eta' \equiv \frac{\pi\eta}{\pi\eta + (1 - \pi)(1 - \eta)}.$$

This follows because there is always a probability π that the prominent agent in question was exogenously committed to *High*. For η close enough to 1, η' is strictly greater than $\Phi(0, 1 - \pi)$. In that case, whenever $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, where $\bar{\gamma}_H$ is given by (4), the reasoning that established Proposition 2 implies that the greatest equilibrium involves all endogenous agents playing *High* (regardless of their signal) when the signal from the last prominent agent is that she played *High*. A similar analysis also leads to the conclusion that when η is sufficiently large, all endogenous agents playing *Low* following a prominent signal of *Low* is the greatest equilibrium whenever $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_L$. Notably, for these conclusions, η needs to be greater than a certain threshold that is strictly less than 1, and thus history-driven behavior emerges even

force: when there are more agents within a generation, the signals transmitted to the next generation are less informative and this will tend to reduce the probability that agents in the next generation will choose *High* conditional on *High* by the agent in question (i.e., $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau$).

with signals bounded away from being fully precise.

8.3 Implications of a Public Amnesty

Part of the reason that a society gets stuck in *Low* play is that agents are forced to pick actions for two periods and so the incentives to match past actions can drag their play down. If they could adjust to play different actions against different generations, they may prefer to switch to *High* in the second period of their lives and thus break out of *Low* play. Obvious reasons that agents will have “sticky” play relate to various costs of changing actions. Those could be investment costs in choosing *High* (“becoming educated”) or sunk costs of playing *Low* (taking a corrupt or criminal action could lead to possible legal penalties). We now show briefly that in such a situation it may be beneficial to “induce” a switch from *Low* play to *High* by subsidizing future *High* play by an agent (and to let it be known that this was subsidized). Naturally, this could be done directly by providing subsidies to *High* play when this is observable. But also more interestingly, in a situation in which sunk costs of playing *Low* include potential penalties, it can be achieved by forgiving the penalty from past *Low* play, which can be viewed as an *amnesty*, i.e., a period in which an agent is allowed to change strategies from *Low* to *High* at no cost.²⁴

To clarify these ideas, let us briefly consider the following variation on the model. Suppose that underlying payoffs in each interaction are similar to those in a prisoners’ dilemma:

	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>High</i>	β, β	$-\alpha, \kappa$
<i>Low</i>	$\kappa, -\alpha$	κ, κ

In particular, *Low* now has a positive payoff regardless of what the other player does. However, playing *Low* involves a(n expected) cost $C > 0$. In particular, we suppose that *Low* involves corrupt or criminal behavior, and an agent who has made this choice can get caught and punished, so that C is the expected cost of punishment. In addition, we assume that the cost that the individual will incur from choosing *Low* in both periods is the same as choosing *Low* only in the first period of her life, because she can get caught due to her past *Low* action even if she switches to *High* because of her first period behavior and in this case she will receive the same punishment.

Under these conditions, if $\kappa > \beta$, it becomes a dominant strategy to play *Low* in the second period after having played *Low* in the first period of one’s life. It may even be that a player will switch from *High* to *Low* in the second period for some ranges of beliefs and

²⁴Tirole (1996) also discusses the implications of an amnesty.

costs. Focusing on the case where $\kappa > \beta$, the choices in this game are similar to those in the baseline model except with one enrichment. The only strategies that could ever be part of a best response are to choose *Low* in both periods, to choose *High* in both periods, or play *High* and then *Low*. However, if the government legislates an amnesty for a specific generation, whereby agents of that generation who have chosen *Low* in the past will not be punished and only those who choose *Low* in the second period of their lives will receive the punishment (if caught). Such an amnesty may then encourage a switch from *Low* to *High* and can change the equilibrium social norm.

9 Conclusion

In this paper, we studied the emergence and evolution of the social norm of “cooperation”. In our baseline model, each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. If coordination occurs on *High* play, both agents receive higher payoffs. Nevertheless, *Low* is a best response if an agent expects those in the previous and the next generations to have chosen *Low*. Thus, society may coordinate either on a payoff-dominant (*High, High*) or less attractive (*Low, Low*) equilibrium, leading to a *High* or *Low* social norm, whereby *High* (or *Low*) actions persist, and are expected to persist, for a long time.

Social norms defined as “frames of reference,” shape how information from the past is interpreted – because agents only receive noisy information about past play. History – shared, common knowledge past events – anchors these social norms. For example, if history indicates that there is a *Low* social norm (e.g., due to a *Low* prominent play which can then lock-in regular players to uniquely *Low* play), then even moderately favorable signals of past actions will be interpreted as due to noise and agents would be unwilling to switch to *High*. This leads to a form of history-driven social norm, potentially persisting for a long time. The role of social norms as frames of reference is central: *Low* behavior persists partly because, given the social norm, the signals the agents would generate even with a *High* action would be interpreted as if they were coming from a *Low* action, and this discourages *High* actions.

The impact of history is potentially countered by “prominent” agents, whose actions are more visible. In particular, actions by prominent agents are observed by all future agents and this creates the possibility that future generations will coordinate on the action of a prominent agent. Even when history drives behavior, social norms will not be everlasting, because prominent agents exogenously committed to one or the other mode of behavior may arrive and cause a switch in play – and thus in the resulting social norm. More interestingly,

prominent agents can also endogenously leverage their greater visibility and play a leadership role by coordinating the expectations of future generations. In this case, starting from a *Low* social norm, a prominent agent may choose to break the social norm and induce a switch to a *High* social norm in society.

We also showed that in equilibria that are not completely driven by history, there is a pattern of “reversion” whereby play starting with *High* (*Low*) reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation. The reason for this is interesting: an agent immediately following a prominent *High* knows that she is playing against a *High* action in the past. An agent two periods after a prominent *High*, on the other hand, must take into account that there may have been an exogenous non-prominent agent committed to *Low* in the previous period. Three periods after a prominent *High*, the likelihood of an intervening exogenous non-prominent agent committed to *Low* is even higher. But more importantly, there are two additional forces pushing towards reversion: first, these agents will anticipate that even endogenous non-prominent agents now may start choosing *Low* because they are unsure of who they are playing in the previous generation and an adverse signal will make them believe that they are playing an exogenous non-prominent agent committed to *Low*, encouraging them to also do *Low*; and second, they will also understand that the signals that their *High* action will generate may also be interpreted as if they were coming from a *Low* action, further discouraging *High*.

Several areas of future work based on our approach, and more generally based on the interplay between history, social norms and interpretation of past actions, appear promising. First, our analysis can be extended to the case where the stage game is not a coordination game. For example, similar sorts of reasoning will apply when this game takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma and would enable a study of how cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma is affected by interpretation of information and signaling motives of agents taking this into account. Relatedly, it would be useful to extend the analysis of the role of history, expectations and leadership to a model of collective action, in which individuals care about how many people, from the past and future generations, will take part in some collective action, such as an uprising or demonstration against a regime.

Second, it is important to endogenize prominence in the setup, so that individuals can, at a cost, become prominent and change the social norm. Though this introduces some complications (e.g., because such a game is no longer one of strategic complements), several of the general insights presented here should continue to apply in such an extended framework.

Third and relatedly, in some situations non-prominent agents in our model have an incentive to communicate their behavior, since by doing so they can avoid the need to rely on

social norms for forming accurate expectations of past and future play. Another interesting future direction is to study the evolution of social norms in situations where incentives are not fully aligned, so that communication does not fully circumvent the role of social norms in coordinating expectations.

Finally, it is important to introduce an explicit network structure in the pattern of observation and interaction so that agents who occupy a central position in the social network – whose actions are thus known to be more likely to be observed by many others in the future – (endogenously) play the role of prominent agents in our baseline model. This will help us get closer to understanding which types of agents, and under which circumstances, can play a leadership role.

References

- [1] ANDERLINI, L., GERARDI, D., AND LAGUNOFF, R. A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games. *Economic Theory* 37, 3 (2008), 357–394.
- [2] ARGENZIANO, R., AND GILBOA, I. History as a coordination device. Mimeo, 2010.
- [3] BANFIELD, E. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Free Press, New York, 1958.
- [4] BISIN, A., AND VERDIER, T. The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences. *Journal of Economic Theory* 97, 2 (2001), 298–319.
- [5] CARLSSON, H., AND VAN DAMME, E. Global games and equilibrium selection. *Econometrica* 61, 5 (1993), 989–1018.
- [6] CHAMLEY, C. Coordinating regime switches. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114, 3 (1999), 869-905.
- [7] CHASSANG, S. Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts *American Economic Review* 100, 1 (2010), 448 – 465
- [8] CORSETTI, G., DASGUPTA, A., MORRIS, S., AND SHIN, H. S. Does one Soros make a difference? A theory of currency crises with large and small traders. *Review of Economic Studies* 71, 1 (2004), 87–113.
- [9] DIAMOND, P. AND D. FUDENBERG Rational expectations business cycles in search equilibrium. *Journal of Political Economy*, 97, 3 (1989), 606 – 619.

- [10] DOEPKE, M., AND ZILIBOTTI, F. Occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, 2 (2008), 747–793.
- [11] ELLISON, G. Learning from personal experience: one rational guy and the justification of myopia. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 19, 2, (1997), 180 – 210.
- [12] FRANKEL, D. M., AND PAUZNER, A. Resolving indeterminacy in dynamic settings: The role of shocks. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115, 1 (2000), 285–304.
- [13] FUDENBERG, D., AND LEVINE, D. K. *The Theory of Learning in Games*. MIT Press, 1998.
- [14] GALOR, O. *Unified Growth Theory*. Princeton University Press, 2011.
- [15] HERMALIN, B. E. Leadership and corporate culture, forthcoming in R. Gibbons and J. Roberts (editors) *Handbook of Organizations*, Princeton University Press, 2012.
- [16] JACKSON, M. O., AND PECK, J. Speculation and Price Fluctuations with Private, Extrinsic Signals. *Journal of Economic Theory*, (1991), 55, 274-295.
- [17] JACKSON, M. O., AND YARIV, L. Diffusion of behavior and equilibrium properties in network games. *American Economic Review* 97, 2 (2007), 92–98.
- [18] KANDORI, M., MAILATH, G. J., AND ROB, R. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. *Econometrica* 61, 1 (1993), 29–56.
- [19] KLEINBERG, J. Cascading behavior in networks: Algorithmic and economic issues. in *Algorithmic game theory*. Cambridge University Press, 2007, 613–632.
- [20] KRUGMAN, P. History versus expectations. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, 2 (1991), 651–667.
- [21] LAGUNOFF, R., AND MATSUI, A. Asynchronous choice in repeated coordination games. *Econometrica* 65, 6 (1997), 1467–1477.
- [22] LOCKE, R. M. Building trust. in A. Flora (editor) *Mezzogiorno e Politiche di Sviluppo*, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane: 109-133.
- [23] MAILATH, G. J., AND SAMUELSON, L. *Repeated Games and Reputations*. Oxford University Press, 2006.

- [24] MATSUYAMA, K. Increasing returns, industrialization, and indeterminacy of equilibrium. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, 2 (1991), 617–650.
- [25] MILGROM, P., AND SHANNON, C. Monotone comparative statics. *Econometrica* 62, 1 (1994), 157–180.
- [26] MORRIS, S. Contagion. *Review of Economic Studies* 67, 1 (2000), 57–78.
- [27] MORRIS, S., AND SHIN, H. S. Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks. *American Economic Review* 88, 3 (1998), 587–597.
- [28] MYERSON, R. Towards a theory of leadership and state-building. Mimeo. University of Chicago, 2011.
- [29] PUTNAM, R. D. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton University Press, 1993.
- [30] SABETTI, F. Path dependency and civic culture: some lessons from Italy about interpreting social experiments. *Politics and Society*, 24, 1 (1996), 19-44.
- [31] SAMUELSON, L. *Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection*. MIT Press, 1997.
- [32] STEINER, J., AND STEWART, C. Contagion through learning. *Theoretical Economics* 3, 4 (2008), 431–458.
- [33] STRACCIA, U., OJEDA-ACIEGO, M., AND DAMÁSIO, C. V. On fixed-points of multi-valued functions on complete lattices and their application to generalized logic programs. *SIAM Journal on Computing* 38, 5 (2009), 1881–1911.
- [34] TABELLINI, G. The scope of cooperation: Values and incentives. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, 3 (2008), 905–950.
- [35] TARSKI, A. A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications. *Pacific Journal of Mathematics* 5, 2 (1955), 285–309.
- [36] TIROLE, J. A theory of collective repetitions (with applications to the persistence of corruption in the firm quality). *Review of Economic Studies*, 63, 1 (1996), 1-22.
- [37] TOPKIS, D. M. Equilibrium points in nonzero-sum n-person submodular games. *SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization* 17, 6 (1979), 773–787.
- [38] VAN ZANDT, T., AND VIVES, X. Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities. *Journal of Economic Theory* 134, 1 (2007), 339–360.

- [39] VIVES, X. Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities. *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 19, 3 (1990), 305–321.
- [40] YOUNG, H. P. The evolution of conventions. *Econometrica* 61, 1 (1993), 57–84.
- [41] ZHOU, L. The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice. *Games and Economic Behavior* 7, 2 (1994), 295–300.

Appendix A

Equilibrium Definition

Our definition of equilibrium is standard and requires that agents best respond to their beliefs conditional on any history and signal and given the strategies of others.²⁵ The only thing that we need to be careful about is defining those beliefs. In cases where $0 < q < 1$ and $\pi > 0$ those beliefs are easily derived from Bayes’ rule (and an appropriate iterative application of (2)). We provide a careful definition that also allows for $q = 0$ or $\pi = 0$ even though in the text we have assumed $q > 0$ and $\pi > 0$. Essentially, in these corner cases some additional care is necessary since some histories off the equilibrium path may not be reached.²⁶

Consider any $t \geq 1$, any history h^{t-1} , and a strategy profile σ .

Let $\phi_{t+1}^t(\sigma_{t+1}, T_t, h^{t-1})$ be the probability that, given strategy σ_{t+1} , the next agent will play *High* if agent t plays *High* and is of prominence type $T_t \in \{P, N\}$. Note that this is well-defined and is independent of the signal that agent t observes.

Let $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1})$ denote the probability that agent t assigns to the previous agent playing *High* given signal s_t , strategy profile σ , and history h^{t-1} . In particular: if $h_{t-1} = \textit{High}$ then set $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1}) = 1$ and if $h_{t-1} = \textit{Low}$ then set $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1}) = 0$. If $h_{t-1} = N$ then define $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1})$ via an iterative application Bayes’ rule. Specifically, this is done via an application of (2) as follows. Let τ be the largest element of $\{1, \dots, t-1\}$

²⁵Definitions for perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium are messy when working with continua of private signals, and so it is easiest to provide a direct definition of equilibrium here which is relatively straightforward.

²⁶These beliefs can still be consequential. To see an example of why this matters in our context, consider a case where all agents are endogenous and prominent (so $\pi = 0$ and $q = 1$, which is effectively a complete information game). Let an agent be indifferent between *High* and *Low* if both surrounding generations play *Low*, but otherwise strictly prefer *High*. Begin with agent 0 playing *Low*. There is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium where all agents play *Low* regardless of what others do, but it is not perfect (Bayesian). This leads to different minimal equilibria depending on whether one works with Bayesian or perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

such that $h_\tau \neq N$, so the date of the last prominent agent. Then given $\sigma_{\tau+1}(h^\tau, N, s_{\tau+1})$ and π , there is an induced distribution on *High* and *Low* by generation $\tau + 1$ and thus over $s_{\tau+2}$ (and note that $s_{\tau+1}$ is irrelevant since τ is prominent). Then given $\sigma_{\tau+2}(h^\tau, N, s_{\tau+2})$ and π , there is an induced distribution on *High* and *Low* by generation $\tau + 2$, and so forth. By induction, there is an induced distribution on *High* and *Low* at time $t - 1$, which we then denote by x_{t-1} . Then $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1}) = \Phi(s_t, x_{t-1})$ where Φ is defined in (2).

From (3), it is a best response for agent t to play *High* if

$$(1 - \lambda) \phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1}) + \lambda \phi_{t+1}^t(\sigma_{t+1}, T_t, h^{t-1}) > \gamma, \quad (9)$$

to play *Low* if

$$(1 - \lambda) \phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1}) + \lambda \phi_{t+1}^t(\sigma_{t+1}, T_t, h^{t-1}) < \gamma, \quad (10)$$

and either if there is equality.

We say that σ forms an *equilibrium* if for each time $t \geq 1$, history $h^{t-1} \in \mathcal{H}^{t-1}$, signal $s_t \in [0, 1]$, and type $T_t \in \{P, N\}$ $\sigma_t(h^{t-1}, s_t, T_t) = 1$ if (9) holds and $\sigma_t(h^{t-1}, s_t, T_t) = 0$ if (10) holds, where $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s_t, h^{t-1})$ and $\phi_{t+1}^t(\sigma_{t+1}, T_t, h^{t-1})$ are as defined above.

Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities and Infinitely Many Agents

We now establish a theorem that will be used in proving Proposition 1. This theorem is also of potential independent interest for this class of overlapping-generation incomplete information games.

Well-known results for games of strategic complements apply to finite numbers of agents (e.g., see Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Zhou (1994), and van Zandt and Vives (2007)). The next theorem provides an extension for arbitrary sets of agents, including countably and uncountably infinite sets of agents.

Let us say that a game is a game of *weak strategic complements with a possibly infinite number of agents* if the agents are indexed by $i \in I$ and:

- each agent has an action space A_i that is a complete lattice with a partial ordering \geq_i and corresponding \sup_i and \inf_i ;
- for every agent i , and specification of strategies of the other agents, $a_{-i} \in \prod_{j \neq i, j \in I} A_j$, agent i has a nonempty set of best responses $BR_i(a_{-i})$ that is a closed sublattice of A_i (where “closed” here is in the lattice-sense, so that $\sup(BR_i(a_{-i})) \in BR_i(a_{-i})$ and $\inf(BR_i(a_{-i})) \in BR_i(a_{-i})$);

- for every agent i , if $a'_j \geq_j a_j$ for all $j \neq i, j \in I$, then $\sup_i BR_i(a'_{-i}) \geq_i \sup_i BR_i(a_{-i})$ and $\inf_i BR_i(a'_{-i}) \geq_i \inf_i BR_i(a_{-i})$.

For the next theorem, define $\mathbf{a} \geq \mathbf{a}'$ if and only if $a_i \geq_i a'_i$ for all i . The lattice of equilibria on $A = \prod_{i \in I} A_i$ can then be defined with respect to this partial ordering.²⁷

THEOREM 1 *Consider a game of weak strategic complements with a possibly infinite number of agents. A pure strategy equilibrium exists, and the set of pure strategy equilibria form a complete lattice.*

Proof of Theorem 1: Let $A = \prod_{i \in I} A_i$. Note that A is a complete lattice, where we say that $\mathbf{a} \geq \mathbf{a}'$ if and only if $a_i \geq_i a'_i$ for every $i \in I$, and where for any $S \subset A$ we define

$$\sup(S) = (\sup\{a_i : \mathbf{a} \in S\})_{i \in I},$$

and similarly

$$\inf(S) = (\inf\{a_i : \mathbf{a} \in S\})_{i \in I}.$$

Given the lattice A , we define the best response correspondence $f : A \rightarrow 2^A$ by

$$f(\mathbf{a}) = (BR_i\{\mathbf{a}_{-i}\})_{i \in I}$$

By the definition of a game of strategic complements, $BR_i(a_{-i})$ is a nonempty closed sublattice of A_i for each i and a_{-i} , and so it follows directly that $f(a)$ is a nonempty closed sublattice of A for every $a \in A$. Note that by the strategic complementarities f is monotone: if $\mathbf{a} \geq \mathbf{a}'$ then $\sup(f(\mathbf{a})) \geq \sup(f(\mathbf{a}'))$ and $\inf(f(\mathbf{a})) \geq \inf(f(\mathbf{a}'))$. This follows directly from the fact that if $a'_{-i} \geq a_{-i}$, then $\sup BR_i(a'_{-i}) \geq_i \sup BR_i(a_{-i})$ (and $\inf BR_i(a'_{-i}) \geq_i \inf BR_i(a_{-i})$) for each i .

Thus, by an extension of Tarski's (1955) fixed point theorem due to Straccia, Ojeda-Aciego, and Damasio (2009) (see also Zhou (1994)),²⁸ f has a fixed point and its fixed points form a complete lattice (with respect to \geq). Note that a fixed point of f is necessarily a best response to itself, and so is a pure strategy equilibrium, and all pure strategy equilibria are fixed points of f , and so the pure strategy equilibria are exactly the fixed points of f . ■

²⁷Note, however, that the set of equilibria is not necessarily a sublattice of A , as pointed out in Topkis (1979) and in Zhou (1994) for the finite case. That is, the sup in A of a set of equilibria may not be an equilibrium, and so sup and inf have to be appropriately defined over the set of equilibria to ensure that the set is a complete lattice. Nevertheless, the same partial ordering can be used to define the greatest and least equilibria.

²⁸The monotonicity of f here implies the *EM*-monotonicity in Proposition 3.15 of Straccia, Ojeda-Aciego, and Damasio (2009).

Proofs of Propositions 1-9

Proof of Proposition 1:

Part 1: The result follows by showing that for any strategy profile there exists a best response that is in cutoff strategies. To see this, recall from (3) that *High* is a best response if and only if

$$(1 - \lambda) \phi_{t-1}^t + \lambda \phi_{t+1}^t \geq \gamma, \quad (11)$$

and is a unique best response if the inequality is strict. Clearly, $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s, h^{t-1})$ (as defined in our definition of equilibrium) is increasing in s under the MLRP (and given that $\pi > 0$) in any period not following a prominent agent. Moreover, ϕ_{t+1}^t is independent of the signal received by the agent of generation t . Thus, if an agent follows a non-prominent agent, the best responses are in cutoff strategies and are unique except for a signal that leads to exact indifference, i.e., (11) holding exactly as equality, in which case any mixture is a best response. An agent following a prominent agent does not receive a signal s about playing the previous generation, so $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s, h^{t-1})$ is either 0 or 1, and thus trivially in cutoff strategies. This completes the proof of Part 1.

Also, for future reference, we note that in both cases the set of best responses are closed (either 0 or 1, or any mixture thereof).

Part 2: The result that there exists a semi-Markovian equilibrium in cutoff strategies follows from the proof of Part 3, where we show that the set of equilibria in cutoff strategies and semi-Markovian equilibria in cutoff strategies are non-empty and complete lattices.

Part 3: This part of the proof will use Theorem 1 (see Appendix B) applied to cutoff and semi-Markovian cutoff strategies to show that the sets of these equilibria are nonempty and complete lattices. We will then show that greatest and least equilibria are semi-Markovian. We thus first need to show that our game is one of weak strategic complements. We start with the following intermediate result.

CLAIM 1 *The set of cutoff and semi-Markovian cutoff strategies for a given player are complete lattices.*

Proof. The cutoff strategies of a player of generation t can be written as a vector in $[0, 1]^{3^t}$, where this vector specifies a cutoff for every possible history of prominent agents (and there are 3^t of them, including time $t = 0$). This is a complete lattice with the usual Euclidean partial order. Semi-Markovian cutoff strategies, on the other hand, can be simply written as a single cutoff (depending on the player's prominence type and the number of periods τ since the last prominent agent). ■

Next, we verify the strategic complementarities for cutoff strategies. Let $z_{t-1}(\sigma, h^{t-1})$ be the prior probability that this agent assigns to an agent of the previous period playing *High* conditional on h^{t-1} (and before observing s). Fix a cutoff strategy profile $c = (c_1^N(h^0), c_1^P(h^0), \dots, c_t^N(h^{t-1}), c_t^P(h^{t-1}), \dots)$. Suppose that $\sup BR_t^T(c)$ is the greatest best response of agent of generation t of prominence type T to the cutoff strategy profile c (meaning that it is the best response with the lowest cutoffs). Now consider $\tilde{c} = (\tilde{c}_1^N(h^0), \tilde{c}_1^P(h^0), \dots, \tilde{c}_t^N(h^{t-1}), \tilde{c}_t^P(h^{t-1}), \dots)$. We will show that $\sup BR_t^T(c) \geq \sup BR_t^T(\tilde{c})$ (the argument for $\inf BR_t^T(c) \geq \inf BR_t^T(\tilde{c})$ is analogous). First, cutoffs after $t+2$ do not affect $BR_t^T(c)$. Second, suppose that all cutoffs before $t-1$ remain fixed and c_{t+1}^N and c_{t+1}^P decrease (meaning that they are weakly lower for every history and at least one of them is strictly lower for at least one history). This increases $\phi_{t+1}^t(\sigma, T, h^{t-1})$ and thus makes (11) more likely to hold, so $\sup BR_t^T(c) \geq \sup BR_t^T(\tilde{c})$. Third, suppose that all cutoffs before $t-2$ remain fixed, and c_{t-1}^N and c_{t-1}^P decrease. This increases $z_{t-1}(\sigma, h^{t-1})$ and thus $\phi_{t-1}^t(\sigma, s, h^{t-1})$ and thus makes (11) more likely to hold, so again $\sup BR_t^T(c) \geq \sup BR_t^T(\tilde{c})$. Fourth, suppose that all other cutoffs remained fixed and c_{t-k-1}^N and c_{t-k-1}^P (for $k \geq 1$) decrease. By MLRP, this shifts the distribution of signals at time $t-k$ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance and thus given c_{t-k}^N and c_{t-k}^P , it increases $z_{t-k}(\sigma, h^{t-k-1})$, shifting the distribution of signals at time $t-k+1$ in the sense of first-order static dominance. Applying this argument iteratively k times, we conclude that $\sup BR_t^T(c) \geq \sup BR_t^T(\tilde{c})$. This establishes that whenever $c \geq \tilde{c}$, $\sup BR_t^T(c) \geq \sup BR_t^T(\tilde{c})$. The same argument also applies to semi-Markovian cutoffs. Thus from Theorem 1 the set of pure strategy equilibria in cutoff strategies and set of pure strategy semi-Markovian equilibria in cutoff strategies are nonempty complete lattices.

To complete the proof, we next show that greatest and least equilibria are semi-Markovian. We provide the argument for the greatest equilibrium and the argument for the least is analogous. It is clear that the overall greatest equilibrium is at least as high (with cutoffs at least as low) as the greatest semi-Markov equilibrium since it includes such equilibria, so it is sufficient to show that the greatest equilibrium is semi-Markovian. Thus, suppose to the contrary of the claim that the greatest equilibrium, say $c = (c_1^N(h^0), c_1^P(h^0), \dots, c_t^N(h^{t-1}), c_t^P(h^{t-1}), \dots)$, is not semi-Markovian. This implies that there exists some t (and $T \in \{P, N\}$) such that $c_t^T(h^{t-1}) > c_t^T(\tilde{h}^{t-1})$ where h^{t-1} and \tilde{h}^{t-1} have the same last prominent agent, say occurring at time $t-k$. Then consider $\tilde{c} = (c_1^N(h^0), c_1^P(h^0), \dots, c_{t-k+1}^N(h^{t-k}), c_{t-k+1}^P(h^{t-k}), \tilde{c}_{t-k+2}^N(h^{t-k+1}), \tilde{c}_{t-k+2}^P(h^{t-k+1}), \dots, \tilde{c}_t^N(h^{t-1}), \tilde{c}_t^P(h^{t-1}), c_{t+1}^N(h^t), c_{t+1}^P(h^t), \dots)$, where $\tilde{c}_{t-k+j+1}^T(h^{t-k+j}) = \min\{c_{t-k+j+1}^T(h^{t-k+j}), c_{t-k+j+1}^T(\tilde{h}^{t-k+j})\}$ with \tilde{h}^{t-k+j} and h^{t-k+j} are the truncated versions of histories \tilde{h}^{t-1} and h^{t-1} . Next, it is straightforward to see that \tilde{c} is also an equilibrium. In particular, note that following history

\tilde{h}^{t-1} , c is an equilibrium by hypothesis. Since the payoffs of none of the players after $t - k$ directly depend on the action of the prominent agents before the last one, this implies that when all agents after $t - k$ switch their cutoffs after history h^{t-k} as in \tilde{c} , this is still an equilibrium. This shows that \tilde{c} is an equilibrium cutoff profile, but this contradicts that c is the greatest equilibrium. ■

Proof of Proposition 2: First, we state the proposition in terms of strategies. Let us denote the greatest equilibrium (which is necessarily semi-Markovian) by $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T)$ and the least equilibrium by $\underline{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T)$. Then the greatest equilibrium is such that:

1. following a prominent play of *Low*, there is a *Low* social norm and all endogenous agents play *Low* (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = Low, s, T) = Low$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$) if and only if $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma$; and
2. following a prominent play of *High*, there is a *High* social norm and all endogenous agents play *High* (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = High, s, T) = High$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$) if and only if $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$.

Thus, endogenous players always follow the play of the most recent prominent player in the greatest equilibrium if and only if $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$.

We first prove the second part of the proposition, and then return to the first part. And finally, we prove that if $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, then $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$; thus deriving (6) as a necessary and sufficient condition for $\bar{\gamma}_L < \bar{\gamma}_H$.

Part 2: Suppose the last prominent agent has played $a = High$. Let $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau$ and $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau$ be the expectations of an endogenous agent τ periods after the last prominent agent that the previous and next generations will play *High*. Let $z_{\tau-1}(\sigma, High)$ be the prior probability that this agent assigns to an agent of the previous period playing *High* conditional on the last prominent agent having played $a = High$. In an equilibrium where all endogenous agents play *High*, it follows that $z_{\tau-1}(\sigma, High) = 1 - \pi$ (since only exogenous agents committed to *Low* will not do so). Hence, the lowest possible value of $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\sigma, s, High)$ is

$$\min_{s \in [0,1]} \left\{ \frac{z_{\tau-1}(\sigma, High)}{z_{\tau-1}(\sigma, High) + (f_L(s)/f_H(s))(1 - z_{\tau-1}(\sigma, High))} \right\} = \Phi(0, 1 - \pi).$$

Moreover, in an equilibrium where all endogenous agents play *High*, we also have $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau = 1 - \pi$. Then provided that

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi) \geq \gamma,$$

or equivalently, provided that $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, $\sigma_\tau^{SM}(a = High, s, T) = High$ for all s and T is a best response. Conversely, if this condition fails, then all *High* is not a best response. Thus, we have established that if $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, then all endogenous agents playing *High* following a prominent *High* is an equilibrium, and otherwise, it is not an equilibrium.

Part 1: For γ sufficiently large, all endogenous players playing *Low* is clearly the unique equilibrium. In particular, if $\gamma > (1 - \lambda) + \lambda(1 - \pi)$, then even under the most optimistic conceivable beliefs – that the last agent was certain to have played *High* and the next agent will play *High* unless she is exogenously and committed to *Low* – we have $\sigma_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T) = Low$ for all a, s and T . Thus, for sufficiently high (but less than one, since $(1 - \lambda) + \lambda(1 - \pi) < 1$) γ , all *Low* following a prominent *Low* is the unique continuation equilibrium regardless of others actions and history (meaning that all *Low* following a prominent *Low* is part of all equilibria). Conversely, for sufficiently low (e.g., less than $\lambda\pi$) but still positive γ all endogenous agents playing *High* following a prominent *Low* is the unique equilibrium. Next, note that the set of γ for which all endogenous agents playing *Low* following the last prominent agent playing *Low* is the unique equilibrium is an interval. This follows directly from (3), since if *Low* is a best response for some γ for all endogenous agents, then it is also a best response for all endogenous agents for all higher γ . Now consider the interval of γ 's for which all endogenous agents playing *Low* following the last prominent *Low* is the unique continuation equilibrium. The above arguments establish that this interval is strictly between 0 and 1. Define the lowest endpoint of this interval as $\bar{\gamma}_L$. Then, by construction, when $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_L$, the greatest equilibrium involves all endogenous agents playing *Low* following a prominent *Low*, and when $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_L$, all *Low* following a prominent *Low* is not the greatest equilibrium.

Proof that $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ implies $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$. Suppose $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ and consider the case where $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}_L$. Then following a *High* play of a prominent agent, all endogenous agents will play *High*. Therefore, for an endogenous prominent agent to have *Low* as best response for any signal and prior x , it has to be the case that $(1 - \lambda)\Phi(1, x) + \lambda(1 - \pi) \leq \bar{\gamma}_L$. Since $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \gamma_L^*$, this implies

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(1, x) + \lambda(1 - \pi) \leq \bar{\gamma}_L \leq (1 - \lambda)\Phi(1, \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi).$$

Therefore, $\Phi(1, x) \leq \Phi(1, \pi)$, or equivalently $x = \pi$ as π is the lowest possible prior of previous agent playing *High*. Hence $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$.

This immediately implies that when $\gamma_L^* \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$, we also have $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$. Then (6) is obtained by comparing the expressions for $\bar{\gamma}_H$ and γ_L^* . ■

Proof of Proposition 3: We include more formal descriptions of the statement of the proposition. In the greatest equilibrium:

1. All endogenous agents play *High* either if $\gamma \leq \lambda(1-\pi)$ (regardless of the last prominent play; i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T) = High$ for all a, s, T and all $\tau > 0$), or if $\lambda(1-\pi) < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ and the last prominent play was *High* (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(High, s, T) = High$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$).
2. All endogenous agents play *Low* either if $\hat{\gamma}_H < \gamma$ (regardless of the last prominent play; i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T) = Low$ for all a, s, T and all $\tau > 0$), or if $\bar{\gamma}_L < \gamma \leq \hat{\gamma}_H$ and the last prominent play was *Low* (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(Low, s, T) = Low$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$).
3. In the remaining regions, the play of endogenous players changes over time:

★ If the last prominent play was *High* and $\bar{\gamma}_H < \gamma \leq \hat{\gamma}_H$, then an endogenous prominent player who immediately follows the last prominent play will play *High*, but some other endogenous (non-prominent, and possibly also prominent) players eventually play *Low* for at least some signals (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_1^{SM}(High, s, P) = High$ and $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T) = Low$ for some s, T and $\tau > 0$).

★ If the last prominent play was *Low* and $\lambda(1-\pi) < \gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_L$, then a non-prominent player who immediately follows the last prominent play will play *Low*, but some other endogenous (prominent and possibly also non-prominent) players eventually play *High* for at least some signals (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_1^{SM}(Low, s, N) = Low$ and $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a, s, T) = High$ for some s, T and $\tau > 0$).

Part 1: Note that if a regular agent is willing to play *High* following a prominent *Low* when other endogenous agents play *High*, then all endogenous agents are willing to play *High* in all periods. A regular agent is willing to play *High* following a prominent *Low* when other endogenous agents play *High* provided that $\gamma \leq \lambda(1-\pi)$. Thus, below this all playing *High* by all endogenous agents is an equilibrium. Next, note that if $\gamma > \lambda(1-\pi)$, then a regular agent immediately following a prominent *Low* will necessarily have a unique best response of playing *Low* even with the most optimistic beliefs about the future, and so above this level all playing *High* following a prominent *Low* is not an equilibrium.

Part 2: The arguments for establishing that a threshold $\hat{\gamma}_H$, such that above this all endogenous agents play *Low*, and below which some endogenous agents play *High* in some circumstances, is analogous to the proof of the existence of the threshold $\bar{\gamma}_L$ in Proposition 2. In particular, the set of γ 's for which this is true is an interval strictly between 0 and 1, and we define $\hat{\gamma}_H$ as the lowest endpoint of this interval.

Part 3: The fact that play must vary in the remaining regions follows from the proofs above. The rest follows from Proposition 4. ■

Proof of Proposition 4: We prove Parts 2 and 3. Part 1 follows from Parts 2 and 3.

Part 2: Consider play following a prominent *High*, and consider strategies listed as a sequence of cutoff thresholds $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ for prominent and non-prominent players as a function of the number of periods τ since the last prominent agent. We first show that $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ must be non-decreasing. Let us define a new sequence $\{(C_\tau^P, C_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ as follows:

$$C_\tau^T = \min \{c_\tau^T, c_{\tau+1}^T\}$$

for $T \in \{P, N\}$. The sequences $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ and $\{(C_\tau^P, C_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ coincide if and only if $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is non-decreasing. Moreover, since $C_\tau^T \leq c_\tau^T$, if this is not the case, then there exist some τ, T such that $C_\tau^T < c_\tau^T$.

Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there exist some τ, T such that $C_\tau^T < c_\tau^T$ (and for the rest of the proof fix $T \in \{P, N\}$ to be this type). Define $B(\mathbf{C})$ be the lowest best response cutoff (for each τ, T) to the sequence of strategies \mathbf{C} . Since we have a game of weak strategic complements as established in the proof of Proposition 1, B is a nondecreasing function. The key step of the proof will be to show that $B(\mathbf{C})_\tau^T \leq C_\tau^T$ for all τ and T , or that $B(\mathbf{C}) \leq \mathbf{C}$, as we can then establish that there is an equilibrium with cutoffs no higher than \mathbf{C} .

Let $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}, s_i)$ and $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}, s_i)$ denote the beliefs under \mathbf{C} of the last and next period agents, respectively, playing *High* if the agent of generation τ plays *High* conditional upon seeing signal s_i . Similarly, let $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{c}, s_i)$ and $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{c}, s_i)$ denote the corresponding beliefs under \mathbf{c} . If $C_\tau^T = c_\tau^T$, then since $\mathbf{C} \leq \mathbf{c}$ it follows that $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{c})$ and $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{c})$. This implies from (3) that

$$B(\mathbf{C})_\tau^T \leq B(\mathbf{c})_\tau^T = c_\tau^T = C_\tau^T,$$

where the second relation follows from the fact that \mathbf{c} is the cutoff associated with the greatest equilibrium. Thus, $B(\mathbf{c}) = \mathbf{c}$.

So, consider the case where $C_\tau^T = c_{\tau+1}^T < c_\tau^T$. We now show that also in this case $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}, s_i) \geq \phi_{\tau-1}^{\tau+1}(\mathbf{c}, s_i)$ and $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}, s_i) \geq \phi_{\tau+1}^{\tau+1}(\mathbf{c}, s_i)$. First, $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau+1}^{\tau+1}(\mathbf{c})$ follows directly from the fact that $C_{\tau+1}^T \leq c_{\tau+2}^T$. Next to establish that $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau-1}^{\tau+1}(\mathbf{c})$, it is sufficient to show that the prior probability of *High* at time $\tau-1$ under \mathbf{C} , $P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-1} = \text{High})$, is no smaller than the prior probability of *High* at time τ under \mathbf{c} , $P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_\tau = \text{High})$. We next establish this:

CLAIM 2 $P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) \geq P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau} = High)$.

Proof. We prove this inequality by induction. It is clearly true for $\tau = 1$ (since we start with a prominent *High*). Next suppose it holds for $t < \tau$, and we show that it holds for τ . Note that

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) &= (1 - F_H(C_{\tau-1}^N))P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) + (1 - F_L(C_{\tau-1}^N))(1 - P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High)), \\ P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau} = High) &= (1 - F_H(c_{\tau}^N))P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) + (1 - F_L(c_{\tau}^N))(1 - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High)) \end{aligned}$$

Then we need to check that

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - F_H(C_{\tau-1}^N))P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) + (1 - F_L(C_{\tau-1}^N))(1 - P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High)) \\ \geq (1 - F_H(c_{\tau}^N))P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) + (1 - F_L(c_{\tau}^N))(1 - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High)). \end{aligned}$$

By definition $C_{\tau-1}^N \leq c_{\tau}^N$, and therefore $1 - F_H(C_{\tau-1}^N) \geq 1 - F_H(c_{\tau}^N)$ and $1 - F_L(C_{\tau-1}^N) \geq 1 - F_L(c_{\tau}^N)$, so the following is a sufficient condition for the desired inequality:

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - F_H(c_{\tau}^N))P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) + (1 - F_L(c_{\tau}^N))(1 - P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High)) \\ \geq (1 - F_H(c_{\tau}^N))P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) + (1 - F_L(c_{\tau}^N))(1 - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High)). \end{aligned}$$

This in turn is equivalent to

$$(1 - F_H(c_{\tau}^N))[P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High)] \geq (1 - F_L(c_{\tau}^N))[P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High)].$$

Since $P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) \geq 0$ by the induction hypothesis and $F_H(c_{\tau}^N) \leq F_L(c_{\tau}^N)$, this inequality is always satisfied, establishing the claim. ■

This claim thus implies that $\phi_{\tau-1}^{\tau}(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau}^{\tau+1}(\mathbf{c})$. Together with $\phi_{\tau+1}^{\tau}(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau+2}^{\tau+1}(\mathbf{c})$, which we established above, this implies that $B(\mathbf{C})_{\tau}^T \leq B(\mathbf{c})_{\tau+1}^T$. Then

$$B(\mathbf{C})_{\tau}^T \leq B(\mathbf{c})_{\tau+1}^T = c_{\tau+1}^T = C_{\tau}^T,$$

where the second relationship again follows from the fact that \mathbf{c} is an equilibrium and the third one from the hypothesis that $C_{\tau}^T = c_{\tau+1}^T < c_{\tau}^T$. This result completes the proof that $B(\mathbf{C}) \leq \mathbf{C}$. We next prove the existence of an equilibrium $\mathbf{C}' \leq \mathbf{C}$, which will finally enable us to establish the desired contradiction.

CLAIM 3 *There exists an equilibrium \mathbf{C}' such that $\mathbf{C}' \leq \mathbf{C} \leq \mathbf{c}$.*

Proof. Consider the (complete) sublattice of points $\mathbf{C}' \leq \mathbf{C}$. Since B is a nondecreasing function and takes all points of the sublattice into the sublattice (i.e., since $B(\mathbf{C}) \leq \mathbf{C}$),

Tarski's (1955) fixed point theorem implies that B has a fixed point $\mathbf{C}' \leq \mathbf{C}$, which is, by construction, an equilibrium. ■

Now the desired contradiction is obtained by noting that if $\mathbf{C} \neq \mathbf{c}$, then \mathbf{c} is not greater than \mathbf{C}' , contradicting the fact that \mathbf{c} is the greatest equilibrium. This contradiction establishes that $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{c}$, and thus that $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is non-decreasing.

We next show that $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is increasing when $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$. Choose the smallest τ such that $c_\tau^N > 0$. This exists from Proposition 3 in view of the fact that $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$. By definition, and endogenous agent in generation $\tau - 1$ played *High*, whereas the agent in generation $\tau + 1$ knows, again by construction, that the previous generation will choose *Low* for some signals. This implies that $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau > \phi_\tau^{\tau+1}$, and moreover, $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau \geq \phi_{\tau+2}^{\tau+1}$ from the fact that the sequence $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is non-decreasing. This implies that $(c_{\tau+1}^P, c_{\tau+1}^N) > (c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)$ (provided the latter is not already (1,1)). Now repeating this argument for $\tau + 1, \dots$, the result that $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is increasing (for $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_H$) is established, completing the proof of Part 2.

Part 3: In this case, we need to show that the sequence $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is non-increasing starting from a prominent agent choosing *Low*. The proof is analogous, except that we now define the sequence $\{(C_\tau^P, C_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ with

$$C_\tau^T = \min \{c_{\tau-1}^T, c_\tau^T\}.$$

Thus in this case, it follows that $\mathbf{C} \leq \mathbf{c}$, and the two sequences coincide if and only if $\{(c_\tau^P, c_\tau^N)\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$ is non-increasing. We define $B(\mathbf{C})$ analogously. The proof that $B(\mathbf{C}) \leq \mathbf{C}$ is also analogous. In particular, when $C_\tau^T = c_\tau^T$, the same argument establishes that

$$B(\mathbf{C})_\tau^T \leq B(\mathbf{c})_\tau^T = c_\tau^T = C_\tau^T.$$

So consider the case where $C_\tau^T = c_{\tau-1}^T < c_\tau^T$. Then the same argument as above implies that $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_\tau^{\tau-1}(\mathbf{c})$. Next, we can also show that $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(\mathbf{C}) \geq \phi_{\tau-2}^{\tau-1}(\mathbf{c})$ by establishing the analogue of Claim 2.

CLAIM 4 $P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_\tau = High) \geq P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-1} = High)$.

Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Claim 2 and is again by induction. The base step of the induction is true in view of the fact that we now start with a *Low* prominent agent. When it is true for $t < \tau$, a condition sufficient for it to be also true for τ can again be written as

$$(1 - F_H(c_{\tau-1}^N))[P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-2} = High)] \geq (1 - F_L(c_{\tau-1}^N))[P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-2} = High)].$$

Since $P_{\mathbf{C}}(a_{\tau-1} = High) - P_{\mathbf{c}}(a_{\tau-2} = High) \geq 0$ and $F_H(c_{\tau-1}^N) \leq F_L(c_{\tau-1}^N)$, this inequality is satisfied, establishing the claim. ■

This result now implies the desired relationship

$$B(\mathbf{C})_{\tau}^T \leq B(\mathbf{c})_{\tau-1}^T = c_{\tau-1}^T = C_{\tau}^T.$$

Claim 3 still applies and complete the proof of Part 3. ■

Proof of Proposition 5: Part 1: Since $\gamma \geq \tilde{\gamma}_L$, the equilibrium involves all regular agents choosing *Low*. Therefore, the most optimistic expectation would obtain when $s = 1$ and is $\Phi(1, \pi)$. Following the prominent agent choosing *High*, the greatest equilibrium is all subsequent endogenous agents (regular or prominent) choosing *High* (since $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$). Therefore, it is a strict best response for the prominent agent to play *High* if $s = 1$ (since $\gamma < (1 - \lambda)\Phi(1, \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi) \equiv \gamma_L^*$). Therefore, there exists some $\tilde{c} < 1$ such that it is still a strict best response for the prominent agent to choose *High* following $s > \tilde{c}$. The threshold signal \tilde{c} is defined by

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(\tilde{c}, \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi) = \gamma, \quad (12)$$

or 0 if the left hand side is above γ for $s = 0$.

Part 2: This is similar to Part 1, except in this case, since $\gamma < \tilde{\gamma}_L$, the greatest equilibrium involves regular agents eventually choosing *High* at least for some signals following the last prominent agent having chosen *Low*. Thus, instead of using $\Phi(\tilde{s}, \pi)$, the cutoff will be based on $\Phi(\tilde{s}, x_t)$, where $x_t > \pi$ is the probability that the agent of generation t , conditional on being non-prominent, chooses *High*. From Proposition 4, x_t is either increasing with time or sticks at $1 - \pi$. Thus, the prominent agent's cutoffs are decreasing. ■

Proof of Proposition 6: Consider the greatest equilibrium. We let $c_t^k(\lambda, \gamma, f_H, f_L, \pi)$ denote the cutoff signal above which an endogenous agent born at time $t \neq 2$ plays *High* under scenario k in the greatest equilibrium and as a function of the underlying setting. As usual, for players $t > 2$ under scenarios 2' and 3, this is *conditional upon a High play by the first agent*, since that is the relevant situation for determining player 1's decision to play *High* (recall (3)). In scenarios 2 and 3, for agent 2 these will not apply since that agent perfectly observes agent 1's action; and so in those scenarios we explicitly specify the strategy as a function of the observation of the first agent's play.

As the setting $(\lambda, \gamma, f_H, f_L, \pi)$ is generally a given in the analysis below, we omit that notation unless explicitly needed.

Step 1: We show that $c_1^{2'} \leq c_1^1$, with strict inequality for some settings.

Consider the greatest equilibrium under scenario 1, with corresponding cutoffs for each date $t \geq 1$ of c_t^1 . Now, consider beginning with the same profile of strategies under scenario

2' where $\widehat{c}_t^{2'} = c_t^1$ for all t , (where recall that for $t > 2$ these are conditional on *High* play by agent 1, and we leave those conditional upon *Low* play unspecified as they are inconsequential to the proof).

Let $x_\tau \in (0, 1)$ denote the prior probability that an agent born in period $t > \tau$ in scenario 1 assigns to the event that agent $\tau \geq 2$ plays *High*. Let x_τ^H denote the probability than an agent born in period $t > \tau$ under scenario 2' assigns to the event that agent $\tau \geq 2$ plays *High* (presuming cutoffs $\widehat{c}_t^{2'} = c_t^1$) conditional upon agent $t > \tau$ knowing that agent 1 played *High* (but not yet conditional upon t 's signal). It is straightforward to verify that by the strict MLRP $x_\tau^H \geq x_\tau$ for all $\tau \geq 2$, with strict inequality for $\tau = 2$ if $c_2^1 \in (0, 1)$.

Under scenario 1, *High* is a best response to $(c_\tau^1)_\tau$ for agent t conditional upon signal s if and only if

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(s, x_{t-1}) + \lambda\phi_{t+1}^t(c_{t+1}^1) \geq \gamma$$

where $\phi_{t+1}^t(c_{t+1}^1)$ is the expected probability that the next period agent will play *High* conditional upon t doing so, given the specified cutoff strategy. Similarly, under scenario 2', *High* is a best response to $(\widehat{c}_\tau^{2'})_\tau$ for agent t conditional upon signal s if and only if

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(s, x_{t-1}^H) + \lambda\phi_{t+1}^t(\widehat{c}_{t+1}^{2'}) \geq \gamma$$

Given that $x_\tau^H \geq x_\tau$, it follows that under scenario 2', the best response to $\widehat{c}_t^{2'} = c_t^1$ for any agent $t \geq 2$ (conditional on agent 1 choosing *High*) is a weakly lower cutoff than $\widehat{c}_t^{2'}$, and a strictly lower cutoff for agent $t = 3$ if $c_2^1 \in (0, 1)$ and $c_3^1 \in (0, 1)$. Iterating on best responses, as in the argument from Proposition 1, there exists an equilibrium with weakly lower cutoffs for all agents. In the case where there is a strictly lower cutoff for agent 3, then this leads to a strictly higher $\phi_3(c_3^{2'})$ and so a strictly lower cutoff for agent 2 provided $c_2^1 \in (0, 1)$. Iterating on this argument, if $c_1^1 \in (0, 1)$, this then leads to a strictly lower cutoff for agent 1. Thus, the strict inequality for agent 1 for some settings follows from the existence in some settings of an equilibrium in scenario 1 where the first three cutoffs are interior. This will be established in Step 1b.

Step 1b: Under scenarios 1 and 2', there exist settings such that the greatest equilibrium has all agents using interior cutoffs $c_t^1 \in (0, 1)$ for all t .

First note that if

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi) < \gamma$$

then $c_t^1 > 0$ and $c_t^{2'} > 0$ for all t , since even with the most optimistic prior probability of past and future endogenous agents playing *High*, an agent will not want to choose *High* conditional on the lowest signal. Similarly, if

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(1, \pi) + \lambda(\pi) > \gamma$$

then $c_t^1 < 1$ and $c_t^{2'} < 1$ for all t since even with the most pessimistic prior probability of past and future endogenous agents playing *High*, an agent will prefer to choose *High* conditional on the highest signal. Thus it is sufficient that

$$(1 - \lambda)\Phi(1, \pi) + \lambda(\pi) > (1 - \lambda)\Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi)$$

to have a setting where all cutoffs are interior in all equilibria. This corresponds to

$$(1 - \lambda)[\Phi(1, \pi) - \Phi(0, 1 - \pi)] > \lambda(1 - 2\pi).$$

It is thus sufficient to have $\Phi(1, \pi) > \Phi(0, 1 - \pi)$ and a sufficiently small λ . It is straightforward to verify that $\Phi(1, \pi) > \Phi(0, 1 - \pi)$ for some settings: for sufficiently high values of $f_L(0)/f_H(0)$ and low values of $f_L(1)/f_H(1)$, equation (2)) implies that $\Phi(0, 1 - \pi)$ approaches 0 and $\Phi(1, \pi)$ approaches 1.

Step 2: We show that $c_1^3 \leq c_1^2$, with strict inequality for some settings.

Consider the greatest equilibrium under scenario 2, with corresponding cutoffs for each date $t \geq 1$ of c_t^2 . Now, consider a profile of strategies in scenario 3 where $\hat{c}_t^3 = c_t^2$ for all $t \neq 2$ (where recall that this is now the play these agents would choose conditional upon a prominent agent 1 playing *High*). Maintain the same period 2 agent's strategy as a function of the first agent's play of *High* or *Low*. It is clear that in the greatest equilibrium under scenario 2, agent 2's strategy has at least as high an action after *High* than after *Low*, since subsequent agent's strategies do not react and the beliefs on the first period agent are strictly higher. Let us now consider the best responses of all agents to this profile of strategies. The only agents' whose information have changed across the scenarios is agents 3 and above, and are now conditional upon agent 1 playing *High*. This leads to a (weakly) higher prior probability that agent 2 played *High* conditional upon seeing agent 1 playing *High*, than under scenario 2 where agent 1's play was unobserved. This translates into a weakly higher posterior of *High* play for agent 3 for any given signal. This leads to a new best response for player 3 that involves a weakly lower cutoff. Again, the arguments from Proposition 1 extend and there exists an equilibrium with weakly lower cutoffs for all agents (including agent 1), and weakly higher probabilities of *High* for agent 2.

The strict inequality in this case comes from a situation described as follows. Consider a setting such that $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}_H > \bar{\gamma}_L$ (which exist as discussed following Proposition 2), so that the greatest equilibrium is such that all endogenous agents play *High* after a prominent *High* and *Low* after a prominent *Low*. Set $x_0 < 1 - \pi$. Under scenario 3, for large enough x_0 , it follows that c_1^3 satisfies $(1 - \lambda)\Phi(c_1^3, x_0) + \lambda(1 - \pi) = \gamma$. Since $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}_H$, this requires that $\Phi(c_1^3, x_0) = \Phi(0, 1 - \pi)$. It follows that $c_1^3 > 0$ and approaches 0 (and so is strictly interior) as x_0 approaches $1 - \pi$, and approaches 1 for small enough x_0 .

Now consider the greatest equilibrium under scenario 2, and let us argue that $c_1^2 > c_1^3$ for some such settings. We know that $c_1^2 \geq c_1^3$ from the proof above, and so suppose to the contrary that they are equal. Note that the prior probability that an endogenous agent at date 3 has that agent 2 plays *High* under scenario 2 is less than $1 - \pi$, since an endogenous agent 2 plays *High* at most with the probability that agent 1 does, which is less than $1 - \pi$ given that $c_1^2 = c_1^3 > 0$ and can be driven to π for small enough x_0 (as then c_1^3 goes to 1). Given that $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}_H$, it then easily follows that agent 3 must have a cutoff $c_3^2 > 0$ in the greatest equilibrium. Let $x_3^2 < 1 - \pi$ be the corresponding probability that agent 3 will play *High* following a *High* play by agent 2 under the greatest equilibrium in scenario 2. For agent 2 to play *High* following *High* by agent 1, it must be that

$$(1 - \lambda) + \lambda x_3^2 > \gamma.$$

There are settings for which $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}_H > \bar{\gamma}_L$ and yet $(1 - \lambda) + \lambda x_3^2 < \gamma$ when x_3^2 is less than $(1 - \pi)$ (simply taking λ to be large enough, which does not affect sufficient conditions for $\gamma = \bar{\gamma}_H > \bar{\gamma}_L$). This, then means that an endogenous agent 2 must play *Low* even after a *High* play by agent 1. It then follows directly that an endogenous agent 1 will choose to play *Low* regardless of signals, which contradicts the supposition that $c_1^2 \geq c_1^3$.

Step 3: We show that $c_1^3 \leq c_1^{2'}$, with strict inequality for some settings.

This is similar to the cases above, noting that if agent 2 under scenario $2'$ had any probability of playing *High* (so that $c_2^{2'} < 1$, and otherwise the claim is direct), then it is a best response for agent 2 to play *High* conditional upon observing *High* play by the agent 1 under scenario 3 and presuming the other players play their scenario $2'$ strategies. Then iterating on best replies leads to weakly lower cutoffs. Again, the strict conclusion follows whenever the greatest equilibrium under scenario $2'$ was such that $c_1^{2'} \in (0, 1)$ and $c_2^{2'} \in (0, 1)$. The existence of settings where that is true follows from Step 1b which establish sufficient conditions for all cutoffs in all equilibria under scenario $2'$ to be interior. ■

Proof of Proposition 7: From the definition of $\bar{\gamma}_H$,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\gamma}_H}{\partial \lambda} = 1 - \pi - \Phi(0, 1 - \pi).$$

Since $\Phi(0, 1 - \pi) = (1 - \pi) / (1 - \pi + \pi/m) < 1 - \pi$, the first part follows.

For the second part, note that

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_L^*}{\partial \lambda} = 1 - \pi - \Phi(1, \pi) = 1 - \pi - \frac{\pi}{\pi + (1 - \pi)/M}.$$

As $M \rightarrow \infty$, $1 - \pi - \Phi(1, \pi) \rightarrow 1 - 2\pi < 0$, and as $M \rightarrow 0$, $\pi - \Phi(1, \pi) \rightarrow 1 - \pi > 0$.

Therefore, there exists M^* such that $1 - \pi - \Phi(1, \pi) = 0$, and

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_L^*}{\partial \lambda} > 0 \text{ if and only if } M < M^*.$$

■

Proof of Proposition 8: For the first part, just recall that $\bar{\gamma}_H \equiv (1 - \lambda) \Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \lambda(1 - \pi)$, which is decreasing in π . The second part follows as

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_L^*}{\partial \pi} = -\lambda + \frac{(1 - \lambda)/M}{(1/M + \pi(1 - 1/M))^2},$$

which is decreasing in π (for given λ) and decreasing in λ , establishing the desired result. ■

Proof of Proposition 9: Recall that \tilde{c} is defined in the proof of Proposition 5 as

$$(1 - \lambda) \frac{\pi}{\pi + (1 - \pi) \frac{f_L(\tilde{c})}{f_H(\tilde{c})}} + \lambda(1 - \pi) = \gamma.$$

Consider a shift in the likelihood ratio as specified in the proposition, i.e., a change to $\hat{f}_L(s)/\hat{f}_H(s) < f_L(s)/f_H(s)$ (since $\tilde{c} > \bar{s}$) and ensuring that we remain in Part 1 of Proposition 5. Because $\hat{f}_L(s)/\hat{f}_H(s)$ is strictly decreasing by the strict MLRP, the left-hand side increases, and \tilde{c} decreases. This implies that the likelihood that a the prominent agent will break the *Low* social norm increases. ■

Proof of Proposition 10: An identical argument to that in Proposition 1 implies that, under the strict MLRP, all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and greatest and least equilibria exist. The argument in the text establishes that if (and only if) $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma}_H^n$, the greatest equilibrium involves $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = High, s, T) = High$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$, with $\bar{\gamma}_H^n$ given by (8), which also shows that this threshold is increasing in n . Similarly, an argument identical to that in the proof of Proposition 2 establishes that if (and only if) $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}_L^n$, the greatest equilibrium involves $\bar{\sigma}_\tau^{SM}(a = Low, s, T) = Low$ for all s, T and all $\tau > 0$.

We next prove that $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ is decreasing in n when $\bar{\gamma}_H^n \geq \bar{\gamma}_L^n$. Let $\gamma_L^{n,*}$ be the equivalent of the threshold γ_L^* defined in (5) with n agents within a generation:

$$\gamma_L^{n,*} \equiv (1 - \lambda) \left[\frac{1}{n} \Phi(1, \pi) + \frac{n-1}{n} \pi \right] + \lambda(1 - \pi),$$

which is clearly decreasing in n . With the same argument that $\bar{\gamma}_L \leq \bar{\gamma}_H$ implies $\bar{\gamma}_L = \gamma_L^*$ as in the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that when $\bar{\gamma}_H^n \geq \bar{\gamma}_L^n$, $\bar{\gamma}_L^n = \gamma_L^{n,*}$. Thus, when $\bar{\gamma}_H^n \geq \bar{\gamma}_L^n$, $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ is also decreasing in n .

Finally, we prove that $\bar{\gamma}_L^n$ is nonincreasing in the case where there are no prominent agents after the initial period. Suppose the initial prominent agent chose *Low*. Let the greatest

equilibrium cutoff strategy profile with n agents be $\mathbf{c}^n[a] = (c_1^n[a], c_2^n[a], c_3^n[a], \dots)$. Let $B_{Low}^n(\mathbf{c})$ be the smallest cutoffs (thus corresponding to the greatest potential equilibrium) following a prominent $a = Low$ in the initial period that are best responses to the profile \mathbf{c} . We also denote cutoffs corresponding to all Low (following a prominent Low) by $\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]$. We will show that $B_{Low}^n(\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]) \leq \bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low] = B_{Low}^{n+1}(\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low])$. Since B_{Low}^n is monotone, for parameter values for which there is an all Low greatest equilibrium with $n + 1$ agents it must have a fixed point in the sublattice defined as $\mathbf{c} \leq \bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]$. Since $\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]$ is the greatest equilibrium with $n + 1$ agents (following prominent Low in the initial period), this implies that (for parameter values for which there is an all Low greatest equilibrium with $n + 1$ agents) with n agents, there is a greater equilibrium (with no greater cutoffs for non-prominent and prominent agents) following prominent Low , establishing the result.

The following two observations establish that $B_{Low}^n(\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]) \leq B_{Low}^{n+1}(\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low])$ and complete the proof. First, let $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(n, \mathbf{c})$ be the posterior that a random (non-prominent) agent from the next generation plays *High* conditional on the generation τ agent in question playing *High* when cutoffs are given by \mathbf{c} and there are n agents within a generation. Then for any τ and any \mathbf{c} , $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(n, \mathbf{c}) \geq \phi_{\tau+1}^\tau(n + 1, \mathbf{c})$ since a given signal generated by *High* is less likely to be observed with $n + 1$ agents than with n agents (when there is no prominent agent in the current generation, and of course equally likely when there is a prominent agent in the current generation).

Second, let $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(s, n, \bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low])$ be the posterior that a random (non-prominent) agent from the previous generation has played *High* when the current signal is s , the last prominent agent has played *Low* and cutoffs are given by $\bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]$ (i.e., all Low following initial prominent Low). Then $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(s, n, \bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low]) \geq \phi_{\tau-1}^\tau(s, n + 1, \bar{\mathbf{c}}^{n+1}[Low])$. This simply follows since when all endogenous agents are playing *Low*, a less noisy signal will lead to higher posterior that *High* has been played. ■

Appendix B: Additional Results

Uniqueness

To provide conditions for uniqueness, let us define an additional threshold that is the *High* action counterpart of the threshold γ_L^* introduced above:

$$\gamma_H^* \equiv (1 - \lambda)\Phi(0, 1 - \pi) + \lambda\pi.$$

This is the expectation of $(1 - \lambda)\phi_{t-1}^t + \lambda\phi_{t+1}^t$ conditional upon the signal $s = 0$ (most adverse to *High* play) when endogenous agents have played *High* until now and are expected to play

Low from next period onwards. When $\gamma < \gamma_H^*$, regardless of expectations about the future and the signal, *High* play is the unique best response for all endogenous agents following *High* prominent play.

PROPOSITION 11 1. *If $\gamma < \gamma_H^*$, then following a prominent $a = High$, the unique continuation equilibrium involves all (prominent and non-prominent) endogenous agents playing *High*.*

2. *If $\gamma > \gamma_L^*$, then following a prominent $a = Low$, the unique continuation equilibrium involves all (prominent and non-prominent) endogenous agents playing *Low*.*

3. *If $\gamma_L^* < \gamma < \gamma_H^*$, then there is a unique equilibrium driven by the starting condition: all endogenous agents take the same action as the action of the last prominent agent.*

Proof: We only prove the first claim. The proof of the second claim is analogous. Consider $\tau = 1$ (the agent immediately after the prominent agent). For this agent, we have $\phi_0^1 = 1$ and the worst expectations concerning the next agent that he or she can have is $\phi_2^1 = \pi$. Thus from (3) in the text, $\gamma < \gamma_H^*$ is sufficient to ensure $\sigma_1^{SM}(a = High, \cdot, N) = High$. Next consider $\tau = 2$. Given the behavior at $\tau = 1$, $z_1(\sigma, High) = 1 - \pi$, and thus the worst expectations, consistent with equilibrium, are $\phi_1^2 = \frac{1-\pi}{1-\pi+\pi/m}$ and $\phi_3^2 = \pi$. Thus from (3),

$$\frac{(1-\lambda)(1-\pi)}{1-\pi+\pi/m} + \lambda\pi \geq \gamma,$$

or $\gamma < \gamma_H^*$ is sufficient to ensure that the best response is $\sigma_2^{SM}(a = High, \cdot, N) = High$. Applying this argument iteratively, we conclude that the worst expectations are $\phi_{\tau-1}^\tau = \frac{1-\pi}{1-\pi+\pi/m}$ and $\phi_{\tau+1}^\tau = \pi$, and thus $\gamma < \gamma_H^*$ is sufficient to ensure that the best response is $\sigma_\tau^{SM}(a = High, \cdot, N) = High$. ■

The condition that $\gamma_L^* < \gamma < \gamma_H^*$ boils down to

$$\lambda(1-2\pi) < (1-\lambda)[\Phi(0, 1-\pi) - \Phi(1, \pi)],$$

which is naturally stronger than condition (6) in the text which was necessary and sufficient for $\gamma_L^* < \bar{\gamma}_H$. In particular, in addition to (6), this condition also requires that λ be sufficiently small, so that sufficient weight is placed on the past. Without this, behavior would coordinate with future play, which naturally leads to a multiplicity.²⁹

²⁹Note that in parts 1 and 2 of this proposition, with a slight abuse of terminology, a “unique continuation equilibrium” implies that the equilibrium is unique until a new exogenous prominent agent arrives. For example, if $\gamma < \gamma_H^*$ and $\gamma \leq \gamma_L^*$, the play is uniquely pinned down after a prominent *High* only until a prominent *Low*, following which there may be multiple equilibrium strategy profiles.