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1	**Lehman Brothers**
2	**Securitized Products**
3	**August 2008**
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6	***Overall Comments***
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12	***Market***
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14	**Notable Events**
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25	**Weekly Recap**
26	**8/27/2008**
28	**8/22/2008**
30	**8/15/2008**

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35	Of Special Interest:
36	- Fannie/Fredie
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38	*Background:*
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40	*The Deal:*
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42	*Effect on Market:*
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44	*The Future:*
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46	***Methodology/Conclusions***
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48	Cash Bonds
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50	Synthetics
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52	Residuals/NIMS
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54	Whole Loans
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56	**Servicing**
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58	***Outlook***
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15	8/5 Oil futures fall to $120/barrel and Fed leaves interest rates unchanged at 2%
16	8/7 pending home sales rise 5.3% in June
17	8/8 dollar rallies significantly on signs of weakness in the euro zone
18	8/8 earnings news from the GSEs pushes agency spreads wider
19	8/11 Fed senior loan officer survey shows banks continued to tighten lending standards
20	8/13 Retail sales fall 0.1% in July despite fiscal stimulus
21	8/14 Consumer prices come in at 0.8%, double consensus expectations
22	8/19 PPI ex food and energy comes out at 0.7% much higher than expectations
23	8/19 Housing starts fall 11%, permits fell 17.7% in July
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26	- REOs are being liquidated at a faster pace, but they still do not match the speed of foreclosure additions. CA and FL account for 75% of the total foreclosure inventory in the U.S.
28	- Demand technical's remain weak for the agency MBS sector. Seasoned valuations suggest that the market is missing out on deteriorating fundamentals in premiums. The spread differential between hybrids and fixed rates has compressed recently. As in fixed rates, Ginnies are likely to represent the bulk of supply in hybrids. Ginnie hybrid valuations seem to be in line w/ fixed rates. Year over year consumer credit has slowed. Recent vintage auto voluntary prepayments have fallen, prime-down 30-35%, subprime-down 40%. - Price action was mixed across the ABX tranches, as most AAAs rallied 0.5 to 1.5 points, while the remaining tranches were flat to slightly negative. The market-implied risk premium compressed about 35 bp while the market implied cum losses increased 0.1 to 0.4 points.
30	- FLHB's added a total of $15 billion in agency assets over the 2nd quarter while their non agency assets declined marginal. They have been among the biggest buyers of agency CMOs in recent quarters. - Severity sensitivity drops from 0.3% to 0.5% per PA decline as we go into negative HPA which is likely explained by a composition shift toward higher REO sales as a fraction of the total. Lower loan balance in MI/OH explains higher severities on account of fixed costs and higher REO discount on lower home values. Composition shift of home sales towards foreclosed homes can result in headline HPA even for smaller declines in actual reo sales prices. Subprime severities are about 10-15% higher than Alt A, likely explained by about 100-150k lower loan size and 3-5% higher LTVs. - The ABX sold off by 1-3 points across the top of the capital structure, while the bottom tranches remained largely unchanged. The market-implied risk premium increased by 35 bp and the market-implied cumulative losses increased by 0.1-0.7 points.

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32	- Agency MBS spreads continued to leak wider over the past week amid continued concerns about the bid for the sector and a decrease in demand. - Implied volatilities posted a sharp decline, while realized volatilities remained high. IOs hedged with collateral posted strong returns. - A rally in short rates has reduced payment shocks on ABX 06-1 loans by 6%-8% since the start of the year, leading to a 30-40 bp drop in the current to 30 day delinquent transition rates. - The ABX rallied at the top of the capital structure by 0.5-4.5 points, while the IO tranches remained flat over the week. Over the past week, the market implied risk premium compressed by 100 bp. The market implied cumulative loss increased slightly for the 06-1 index, while it decreased for the 06-2 to 07-2 indices.
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38	The current MBS industry has gone through a tremendous amount of turmoil over the past 14 months. The foreclosure and delinquency rate have sky rocketed, in turn MBS spreads have widened and prices have fallen. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, two US Mortgage giants have experienced significant write downs and combined losses of about $14 billion over the past 4 quarters.
39	
40	On Sunday, September 7, 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced a plan for the US government to take control of 2 the nation's largest financial companies, Fannie and Freddy. These 2 firms provide funds for about 75% of new home mortgages. In the deal, the treasury will acquire $1 billion in preferred stock and has agreed to pledge as much as $200 billion to Freddy and Fannie. Treasury also received warrants amounting to 79.9% of existing common shares. Management control was placed under the FHFA as part of the deal. To bolster the mortgage market, the Treasury will buy up to $5 billion in Fannie and Freddy newly issued MBS. This government intervention will cost tax payers, but as of now it is unclear how much.
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42	This was interpreted as a favorable move by the market place. Expect the MBS and ABS spreads to tighten and demand to improve. Stocks surged as investors believed this would increase confidence in the damaged housing market and economy as a whole. The move was welcomed by global markets as investors hope it will restore confidence in the Mortgage industry. Economists and analysts believe this was the right move as they do not see the private markets able to raise enough capital to sustain future write downs. It is believed with out government intervention home prices would fall much further.
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44	Paulson has hinted at future plans to get rid of the "flawed business model" of government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie and Freddy. The Treasury plan limits the size of each company's mortgage portfolios to a maximum of $850 million at the end of 2009. After that, the Treasury intends for the mortgage holdings to shrink about 10% a year until they reach $250 billion at each company.
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48	**In addition to testing individual bond prices on a cusip level, the cash bond positions were also tested using an average price method. Actual trade data was compared to the average marks. Overall the portfolio as a whole was reasonably marked.**
49	
50	**ABX, CMBX and TABX were marked to Markit published Mid prices. ABCDS was marked $78.5M conservative across all desks when compared to Fitch/Markit published consensus. CDS on CDO was marked $5.1M conservative across all desks. Published data available for testing risky duration and consensus spread are from Markit Partner and Fitch to test the CDS on CDO population. For positions without consensus coverage, PC interpolates generic spreads using the ABX index to obtain market spread information. PC views the overall variances to be acceptable.**
51	
52	**Residuals are price tested using the closest thing to market consensus assumptions PC can obtain, and then in the assessment of the trader's mark PC allows for individual performance differences between issuances and issuers. This is done by looking at the deal's modeled cumulative losses and prepayment rate compared to the deal's historical performance. An analysis is performed to determine if the actual deal performance of each position is justified by the pricing. In some cases the valuation could be off from the inventory valuation. This could be the result of Product Control (PC) projecting losses on a deal which has had no losses recorded yet. It could also be attributed to the timing of when losses are projected in the assumptions used by PC. The combined variance for Residuals, ReCon Nims and Nims was (10mm MV) when compared with a total desk MV of $285 million.**
53	
54	**Price transparency does not exist for whole loans. The exit strategy of the whole loans purchased by Lehman is primarily securitization, agency deliveries, sales and market benchmarking. Stemming from this concept, the whole loans in inventory are price verified using a few different methodologies which include Mock Securitization, Agency Conforming, recent sales prices and market benchmarking. Based on the approach used PC views the overall aggressive variance of ($21.8 million).**
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56	The servicing portfolio is marked to model based on the prices calculated in RAMP or using the Bid Multiples Price Matrix . Those positions not priced in RAMP with no market related bid multiples available will not be tested unless the balance becomes material.
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60	Working with the Traders to participate in the Markit Partners consensus pricing for ALT A cash bonds.
61	
62	RAMP data automaton project completed with Mortgage Analytics team. The project should further enhance our existing relationship with Markit for a stronger partnership in derivative pricing. Successfully delivered the daily automation feed from RAMP to Markit's server.
63	
64	MSR valuation models used in RAMP were updated to reflect slower prepayment speeds as experienced in the market. PC to meet with research to get an understanding of the how the model was changed and to get details around model validation and control. Working with Research to benchmark against other servicers. Obtained trial subscription on MIAC GSA pricing.
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66	Transactions data will be further refined to develop a balance sheet roll forward process. Price testing will continue to utilize buy/sell data as a bench mark.
67	
68	Testing of SPIRE model was resumed for the prime whole loan population.
69	
70	A work flow for CDX and Corp CDS price testing was developed. The SP positions are included in the price testing that is performed by the Credit Valuations Team.
71	
72	NCF positions will continue to be researched in order to identify an appropriate price testing methodology.
73	
74	Automation of the FAS157 template is being developed in order to reduce the time needed to prepare the data.
75	
76	First draft of new price testing results package was developed.
77	
78	Automation of RAMP synthetics file.
79	
80	Conducting Due Diligence meetings with third party pricing vendors prior to the end of the third quarter and quarterly thereafter.

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1			**Lehman Brothers**			
2			**Mortgage Trading Securities Price Verification**			
3			***Extract Control Summary***			
4			*As of 08/29/2008*			
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7			**Cash Positions**			
8			**Collateral Type/Business Line**	**Current Face (mm)**	**Absolute Current Face (mm)**	**Market Value (mm)**
9						
10			Passthroughs	2,017	23,296	1,991
12			Agency CMO	13,346	15,357	4,194
14			ABS Real Estate	860	860	399
16			Prime	27,717	29,529	2,640
18			Non Prime	2,521	2,521	498
20			Net Interest Margin	3,279	3,279	88
22			Residuals	303,615	303,615	235
24			Treasury	(859)	4,563	(3,583)
26			Futures	(0.01)	0.081	(1,237)
28			Whole Loans	7,099	7,321	4,083
29			REO	368	368	145
30			Pipeline	-	-	-
32			Servicing Rights	148,591	148,591	1,678
33						
34			**Subtotal**	**$508,555**	**$539,300**	**$11,130**
35						
36						
37			**Out of Scope**			
38			Below Scope			150
39			PFR Equity			-
40			When Issue			34
41			**Subtotal - Below Scope**			**184**
42						
43			**MTG GRAND TOTAL**			**11,314**
44			**ABS Secondary TOTAL**			**4,466**
45						
46			**Securitized Products TOTAL**			**15,780**
47						
48						
49			**QUEST (Download Tab)**			**$15,780**
50						
51			**Difference**			**$0**
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63				44,444,392		

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7						NPA	Fail	Resolved	%
8	**Absolute Market Value (mm)**		**Variance (mm)**		**Assets #**	**Items #**	**Items #**	**Items #**	**Completed**
9									
10	23,199		1.4		249	1	0	22	98%
12	4,537		(13.4)		709	3	2	200	99%
14	399		1.2		109	1	0	53	100%
16	2,732		14		1349	6	60	1017	100%
18	498		(6.5)		150	9	0	88	82%
20	88		1.1		248	0	233	0	100%
22	235		(10)		1134	0	1081	0	100%
24	8,243		0.9		95	N/A	N/A	N/A	100%
26	19,459		0.0		170	N/A	N/A	N/A	100%
28	4,187		(51.91)		814	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
29	145		NA		16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
30	-		NA		0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
32	1,678		149		834	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
33									
34	**$65,399**		**$86.0**		**5877**	**20**	**1376**	**1380**	**76.59%**
35									
36									
37									
38	269				1859				
39	-				0				
40	34				16				
41	**303**				**1875**				
42									
43	**65,702**				7752				
44	**4,603**				418				
45									
46	**70,305**				8170				
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49	**$70,305**				8170				
50									
51	**$0**				**0**				
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1	Whole Loan Testing	29-Aug-08							
2									
3	DELQ_STATUS	Collateral Type	CurBal	MTM		Avg. Price	PC Price	PC MTM	Variance
4	Performing								
5		Capital Crossing	832,990,657	651,397,392		78.20	78.21	651,481,992.88	-
6		FHA/VA	48,644,227	46,571,730		95.74	95.74	46,571,730.00	(0.36)
7		High LTV	14,930,664	15,204,055		101.83	66.31	9,900,523.46	(5,303,531.40)
8		HOME EXPRESS	1,253,687	859,853		68.59	66.31	831,319.94	(28,533.12)
9		Neg Am	220,449,738	159,819,347		72.50	66.31	146,180,221.32	(13,639,125.98)
10		PRIME FIXED	365,621,435	253,393,137		69.30	66.31	242,443,573.73	(10,949,563.58)
11		Prime Hybrid Arms	654,558,530	402,167,481		61.44	66.31	434,037,761.05	31,870,280.28
12		Reverse Mortgages	664,614,308	648,314,615		97.55	97.55	648,314,615.00	0.05
13		SBF	839,478,642	733,402,279		87.36	84.10	706,001,537.82	(27,400,741.19)
14		Scratch & Dent	220,784,285	90,142,670		40.83	50.25	110,944,103.22	20,801,433.27
15		Subprime	137,957,098	56,627,784		41.05	50.25	69,323,441.71	12,695,658.18
16		Subprime 2nds	810,849,877	382,920,071		47.22	50.25	407,452,063.29	24,531,991.89
17		International Resort Home Lending	7,725,397	7,689,612		99.54	80.00	6,180,317.89	(1,509,293.97)
18	Performing Total		4,819,858,547	3,448,510,027				3,479,663,201.32	31,068,574.08
19									
20	Non-Performing								
21		FHA/VA	71,696,033	70,835,419		98.80	95.74	68,641,782.11	(2,193,636.72)
22		High LTV	133,969	134,795		100.62	50.25	67,319.25	(67,475.37)
23		HOME EXPRESS	231,517	220,374		95.19	50.25	116,337.20	(104,036.42)
24		Neg Am	39,749,412	27,894,489		70.18	50.25	19,974,079.63	(7,920,409.28)
25		PRIME FIXED	102,415,131	71,987,226		70.29	50.25	51,463,603.37	(20,523,623.08)
26		Prime Hybrid Arms	416,845,660	261,247,198		62.67	50.25	209,464,943.94	(51,782,253.69)
27		SBF	1,034,407	445,770		43.09	50.25	519,789.36	74,019.56
28		Scratch & Dent	350,032,526	141,278,269		40.36	50.25	175,891,344.53	34,613,075.79
29		Subprime	139,450,601	52,251,513		37.47	50.25	70,073,927.03	17,822,413.58
30		Subprime 2nds	381,295,996	114,441,227		30.01	30.00	114,388,798.94	(52,428.19)
31	Non-Performing Total		1,502,885,252	740,736,279		49.29		710,601,925.35	(30,134,353.83)
32									
33	Grand Total		6,322,743,799	4,189,246,306		66.26		4,190,265,126.67	934,220.25
34									
35		Campus Door	577,497,799	516,723,730		89.476	85.54	493,991,617.26	(22,732,112.74)

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38	**Total Whole Loans**		**6,900,241,598**	**4,705,970,036**				**4,684,256,744**	**(21,797,892)**

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3	Comments
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6	Guarantee of FHA for a price of 99
7	Avg price of prime whole loan sales
8	Avg price of prime whole loan sales
9	Avg price of prime whole loan sales
10	Avg price of prime whole loan sales
11	Avg price of prime whole loan sales
12	Avg price of purchases of reverse mtgs 102.31
13	Avg price of SBF whole loan sales
14	FASTHOLD 2008-1 sale of Scratch and Dent whole loans
15	FASTHOLD 2008-1 sale of Scratch and Dent whole loans
16	FASTHOLD 2008-1 sale of Scratch and Dent whole loans
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21	Guarantee of FHA for a price of 99
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30	FASTHOLD 2008-1 sale of Scratch and Dent whole loans
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Lehman Brothers

Synthetics - ABX

As of August 28 2008

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
6						Ramp	Markit	
7	Cusip	Index	Notional Amt (Protection)	Sum ABS Notional Amt	MTM	Avg Mark	Avg Markit Price	Difference
8	0A08AFAA7	ABX-HE-A 06-1	(327,542,300)	8,936,263,700	(305,514,678)	19.09	19.09	0
9	0A08AFAB2	ABX-HE-A 06-2	676,100,001	8,502,670,215	628,492,044	7.00	7.00	-
10	0A08AFAC0	ABX-HE-A 07-1	207,950,000	4,888,410,000	195,160,151	6.09	6.09	(0)
11	0A08AFAD8	ABX-HE-A 07-2	67,000,000	1,010,824,000	61,091,605	8.47	8.47	0
12	0A08AGAA9	ABX-HE-AA 06-1	(468,000,000)	4,082,584,000	(224,132,260)	53.64	53.64	-
13	0A08AGAB0	ABX-HE-AA 06-2	(148,698,220)	4,709,108,220	(62,678,706)	19.43	19.43	-
14	0A08AGAC8	ABX-HE-AA 07-1	599,800,000	5,211,894,000	542,734,028	9.50	9.50	-
15	0A08AGAD6	ABX-HE-AA 07-2	208,000,000	2,557,000,000	186,594,027	10.11	10.11	-
16	0A08AHAA1	ABX-HE-AAA 06-1	133,700,000	6,311,910,000	13,954,693	89.25	89.25	-
17	0A08AHAB8	ABX-HE-AAA 06-2	(351,280,000)	7,797,580,000	(132,156,792)	66.05	66.05	(0)
18	0A08AHAC6	ABX-HE-AAA 07-1	(59,750,000)	6,201,802,000	(30,574,971)	48.82	48.82	(0)
19	0A08AHAD4	ABX-HE-AAA 07-2	50,475,000	4,214,689,000	13,664,740	45.37	45.36	0
20	0A08AIAA4	ABX-HE-BBB 06-1	432,350,000	7,506,875,650	391,599,091	9.28	9.28	0
21	0A08AIAB6	ABX-HE-BBB 06-2	246,752,501	11,300,212,763	234,583,427	4.98	4.98	0
22	0A08AIAC4	ABX-HE-BBB 07-1	58,465,000	2,364,657,000	55,501,220	4.98	4.98	0
23	0A08AIAD2	ABX-HE-BBB 07-2	127,500,000	467,200,000	119,885,417	5.50	5.50	-
24	0A08AOAA2	ABX-HE-BBB- 06-1	238,100,000	10,250,346,000	215,927,731	9.06	9.06	(0)
25	0A08AOAB3	ABX-HE-BBB- 06-2	780,912,500	12,841,885,524	699,125,641	4.95	4.95	0
26	0A08AOAC1	ABX-HE-BBB- 07-1	(109,455,000)	4,303,557,000	(98,761,321)	4.94	4.94	0
27	0A08AOAD9	ABX-HE-BBB- 07-2	117,000,000	478,876,000	110,012,500	5.50	5.50	-
28	0A08AWAB5	ABX-HE-PENAAA 06-2	(14,100,000)	599,548,000	(1,828,405)	85.68	85.68	0
29	0A08AWAD1	ABX-HE-PENAAA 07-2	60,000,000	1,010,000,000	28,156,933	53.00	53.00	-
30	0A08AWAC3	ABX-HE-PENAAA 07-1	(4,000,000)	554,000,000	(5,424,235)	61.24	61.24	-
31	0A08AWAA7	ABX-HE-PENAAA 06-1	(5,000,000)	235,000,000	(89,833)	96.04	96.04	-
32	Grand Total		2,516,279,482	116,336,893,072	2,635,322,045			

	A	B	C	D	E
39	Sum of Notional Amt (Protection)				
40	category	Rating	Total	ABS Notional	% of Total
41	ABS	A	(123,492,299)	123,492,299	1.8%
42		AA	(858,898,220)	858,898,220	12.5%
43		AAA	(339,955,000)	339,955,000	4.9%
44		BBB	(170,932,499)	170,932,499	2.5%
45		BBB-	105,557,500	105,557,500	1.5%
46	ABS Total		(1,387,720,518)	1,387,720,518	20.2%
47	HOUSE	A	(450,000,000)	450,000,000	6.5%
48		AA	(25,000,000)	25,000,000	0.4%

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
49		BBB	(65,000,000)	65,000,000	0.9%			
50		BBB-	(250,000,000)	250000000	3.6%			
51	HOUSE Total		(790,000,000)	790,000,000	11.5%			
52	NON PRIME	A	1,197,000,000	1,197,000,000	17.4%			
53		AA	1,050,000,000	1,050,000,000	15.3%			
54		AAA	75,000,000	75,000,000	1.1%			
55		BBB	1,089,000,000	1,089,000,000	15.8%			
56		BBB-	1,109,000,000	1,109,000,000	16.1%			
57	NON PRIME Total		4,520,000,000	4,520,000,000	65.8%			
58	PRIME	A	-	-	0.0%			
59		AA	25,000,000	25,000,000	0.4%			
60		AAA	75,000,000	75,000,000	1.1%			
61		BBB	12,000,000	12,000,000	0.2%			
62		BBB-	62,000,000	62,000,000	0.9%			
63	PRIME Total		174,000,000	174,000,000	2.5%			
64	(blank)	(blank)						
65	(blank) Total							
66	**Grand Total**		**2,516,279,482**	**6,871,720,518**	**100%**			

Lehman Brothers

Synthetics - CMBX and TABX

August-08

Date: 8/29/2008

CMBX SUMMARY*					
cusip	origAmount (mm)	MTM(QUEST)	MTM(w/o fee)	PC MTM	variance
137BEKAA0	-	0	0	-	(0)
137BEKAC6	(20.0)	3,088,412	3,088,412	3,088,412	0
137BEKAD4	-	(0)	(0)	-	-
137BENAA4	-	0	0	(0)	(0)
137BENAB2	-	(0)	(0)	(0)	0
137BENAC0	-	0	0	0	(0)
137BENAD8	-	(0)	(0)	0	0
137BEOAA2	-	0	0	(0)	(0)
137BEOAB0	(40.0)	15,459,384	15,459,384	15,459,384	(0)
137BEOAC8	(74.0)	39,423,855	39,423,855	39,423,855	0
137BEOAD6	(85.0)	33,355,608	33,355,608	33,355,608	0
137BEPAA9	-	-	-	-	-
137BEPAB7	-	-	-	-	-
137BEPAC5	(20.0)	7,963,087	7,963,087	7,963,087	-
137BEPAD3	(10.0)	3,256,111	3,256,111	3,256,111	(0)
137BERAA5	(70.0)	37,943,788	37,943,788	37,943,788	(0)
137BERAB3	(70.0)	47,198,938	47,198,938	47,198,938	0
137BERAC1	(10.0)	6,688,377	6,688,377	6,688,377	0
137BERAD9	(30.0)	18,452,468	18,452,468	18,452,468	0
137BESAA3	(20.0)	9,071,654	9,071,654	9,071,654	(0)
137BESAB1	(55.0)	32,985,166	32,985,166	32,985,166	0
137BESAC9	(25.0)	15,864,535	15,864,535	15,864,535	0
137BESAD7	(10.0)	5,309,802	5,309,802	5,309,802	0
(blank)					
Grand Total	(539.0)	276,061,185	276,061,185	276,061,185	0

* CMBX SUMMARY - Includes LBSF Ledgers M3Z, M7Y, MMN only

TABX SUMMARY					
cusip	origAmount	MTM(QUEST)	MTM(w/o fee)	PC MTM	variance
8F936LAA9	-	-	-	0	0
8F936MAA7	(40.0)	37,905,556	37,905,556	37,905,556	0
8F936OAA3	-	0	0	0	(0)
8F936QAA8	(8.9)	8,545,408	8,545,408	8,545,408	0
8F936RAA6	40.0	(37,873,556)	(37,873,556)	(37,873,556)	0
8F936YAA1	(0.0)	0	0	0	(0)
TABX713BM	100.0	(89,902,778)	(89,902,778)	(92,835,278)	(2,932,500)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
48		(blank)					
49		Grand Total	91.1	(31,325,369)	(31,325,369)	(34,257,869)	(2,932,500)

	H	I
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7	Average of Mark Px	
8	75.88	
9	84.55	
10	80.06	
11	94.44	
12	92.76	
13	89.60	
14	91.05	
15	70.82	
16	61.35	
17	46.72	
18	60.72	
19	80.81	
20	71.18	
21	60.18	
22	67.42	
23	45.78	
24	32.56	
25	33.08	
26	38.44	
27	54.63	
28	40.02	
29	36.52	
30	46.85	
31		
32	[illegible]	
33		
34		
35		
36		
37		
38		
39		
40	Average of Mark Px	Average of Mark1 Px
41	2.67	2.67
42	4.75	4.75
43	4.58	4.58
44	4.25	4.25
45	4.83	4.83
46	4.17	4.17
47	-	92.93

	H	I
48		
49	4.02	3.74

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
1												
2												
3	**DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS**										LEHMAN BROTHERS	
4	**Review Date:**		8/29/2008									
6												
7	**USD LIBOR Swap Rates**			USD ('000s)								
8												
9			LBSF	LBSF	LBSF		Broker	Broker	Broker		Variance	Variance
10	Curve Point		Yield	Spreads	Rate		Spread	Rate	Spreads		Spread	Rate
11												
12	2y		2.359	96.25	3.3213			3.32234	34.75			0.10
13	3y		2.604	105.00	3.6540			3.65214	38.75			-0.19
14	4y		2.849	102.75	3.8767			3.87373	40.75			-0.30
15	5y		3.094	93.50	4.0294			4.02620	42.75			-0.32
16	7y		3.383	88.75	4.2702			4.26586	42.75			-0.43
17	10y		3.815	67.75	4.4928			4.49331	41.75			0.05
18	12y		3.815	77.50	4.5903			4.59089	49.25			0.06
19	15y		3.964	72.25	4.6866			4.68988	51.50			0.33
20	20y		4.113	65.75	4.7704			4.77260	53.00			0.22
21	25y		4.262	54.00	4.8017			4.80508	49.50			0.34
22	30y		4.411	40.25	4.8130			4.81722	44.25			0.42
23	40y		4.411	40.50	4.8155			4.81982	45.38			0.43
24												
25												
26												
27												
28			7.385									
29												
30	ALL IN SWAP RATE ANALYSIS											
31												
32	5y		4.566									4.989
33	7y		4.613									5.064
34	10y		4.682									5.177
35	12y		4.682									5.239
36	15y		4.733									5.314
37	20y		4.784									5.373
38	30y		4.886									5.397
39	40y		#REF!									N/A
40												
41												
42	*Comments:*											
43			Used Markit Consensus Curve									
44			Spreads from Bloomberg									
45												
46												
47												
48												

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
49												
50	**Source:**	Bloomberg										
51	**Method:**	Close price										*For Internal Distribution Only*
52												

	M	N	O	P	Q
1					
2					
3					
4					
6					
7					
8					
9	**Variance**	**Variance**		**Exposure**	**P/L Impact**
10	**Spreads**	**Total**			
11					
12	(61.50)	(61.40)			-
13	(66.25)	(66.44)		(65)	12
14	(62.00)	(62.30)		(6)	2
15	(50.75)	(51.07)		60	(19)
16	(46.00)	(46.43)		(227)	98
17	(26.00)	(25.95)		(22)	(1)
18	(28.25)	(28.19)		5	0
19	(20.75)	(20.42)		0	0
20	(12.75)	(12.53)		0	0
21	(4.50)	(4.16)		(0)	(0)
22	4.00	4.42		(0)	(0)
23	4.88	5.31		0	0
24					
25					
26				**(255)**	**92**
27					
28		(738.5)			
29					
30		Variance		Delta	Exposure
31					
32		42.3		60.08	2,542.76
33		45.1		(226.81)	(10,234.19)
34		49.4		(21.71)	(1,073.06)
35		55.7		4.96	276.48
36		58.0		0.01	0.35
37		58.8		0.02	1.00
38		51.1		(0.12)	(6.13)
39				#REF!	#REF!
40					**#REF!**
41					
42					
43					
44					
45					
46					
47					
48					