

## EXPOSITION OF THE TASK OF A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS OF DASEIN

### ¶ 9. *The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein*

WE are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine.<sup>1</sup> These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being.<sup>2</sup> Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.<sup>3</sup> This way of characterizing Dasein has a double consequence:

42

1. The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (*essentia*) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (*existentia*). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "*existentia*"; ontologically, *existentia* is tantamount to *Being-present-at-hand*, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression "*presence-at-hand*" for the term "*existentia*", while the term "existence", as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.

*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence.* Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.

2. That Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an

<sup>1</sup> 'Das Seiende, dessen Analyse zur Aufgabe steht, sind wir je selbst. Das Sein dieses Seienden ist je meines.' The reader must not get the impression that there is anything solipsistic about the second of these sentences. The point is merely that the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is of a sort which any of us may call his own.

<sup>2</sup> 'Als Seiendes dieses Seins ist es seinem eigenen Sein überantwortet.' The earlier editions read '. . . seinem eigenen Zu-sein . . .'

<sup>3</sup> See note 2, p. 28, H. 8 above.

instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand.<sup>1</sup> To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference';<sup>2</sup> or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case *mineness* [*Jemeinigkeit*], one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'.

43 Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [*je meines*]. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property [*eigenschaftlich*], as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be *authentic*—that is, something of its own<sup>3</sup>—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.<sup>4</sup> But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity—when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.

The two characteristics of Dasein, which we have sketched—the priority of '*existentia*' over '*essentia*', and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [*die Jemeinigkeit*]<sup>4</sup>—have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain. Dasein does not have the kind of Being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it. So neither is it to be presented thematically as something we come across in the same way as

<sup>1</sup> '... als Vorhandenem'. The earlier editions have the adjective 'vorhandenem' instead of the substantive.

<sup>2</sup> 'gleichgültig'. This adjective must be distinguished from the German adjective 'indifferent', though they might both ordinarily be translated by the English 'indifferent', which we shall reserve exclusively for the former. In most passages, the latter is best translated by 'undifferentiated' or 'without further differentiation'; occasionally, however, it seems preferable to translate it by 'Indifferent' with an initial capital. We shall follow similar conventions with the nouns 'Gleichgültigkeit' and 'Indifferenz'.

<sup>3</sup> 'Und weil Dasein wesentlich je seine Möglichkeit ist, kann dieses Seiende in seinem Sein sich selbst "wählen", gewinnen, es kann sich verlieren, bzw. nie und nur "scheinbar" gewinnen. Verloren haben kann es sich nur und noch nicht sich gewonnen haben kann es nur, sofern es seinem Wesen nach mögliches *eigentliches*, das heisst sich zueigen ist.' Older editions have 'je wesentlich' and 'zueigenes'. The connection between 'eigentlich' ('authentic', 'real') and 'eigen' ('own') is lost in translation.

<sup>4</sup> '... dass Dasein überhaupt durch Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist.'

we come across what is present-at-hand. The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly.

In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it *is* itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity *ontologically*, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that "Dasein" is to be construed in terms of some concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be Interpreted with the differentiated character [*Differenz*] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered [*aufgedeckt*] in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is *not nothing*, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being—and back into it again—is all existing, such as it is.<sup>1</sup> We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "*averageness*" [*Durchschnittlichkeit*].

44 And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been *passed over* in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked. When Augustine asks: "*Quid autem propinquius meipso mihi?*" and must answer: "*ego certe laboro hic et laboro in meipso: factus sum mihi terra difficultatis et sudoris nimii*",<sup>1</sup> this applies not only to the ontical and pre-ontological opaqueness of Dasein but even more to the ontological task which lies ahead; for not only must this entity not be missed in that kind of Being in which it is phenomenally closest, but it must be made accessible by a positive characterization.

Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies *a priori*. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Aus dieser Seinsart heraus und in sie zurück ist alles Existieren, wie es ist.'

<sup>2</sup> 'Auch in ihr geht es dem Dasein in bestimmter Weise um sein Sein, zu dem es sich im Modus der durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit verhält und sei es auch nur im Modus der Flucht davor und des Vergessens seiner.' For further discussion, see Section 40 below.

When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its "involvement". With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is *ontologically* definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the "for-which" of usability.<sup>1</sup> With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement: *with* this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein—that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being. Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, *what* involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements. In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is 'earlier' than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is *no* further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary "towards-which" is not just another "towards-this" as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary 'towards-which' is a "for-the-sake-of-which".<sup>2</sup> But the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of

... bei ...' soll durch den Terminus Verweisung angezeigt werden.' Here the point seems to be that if something *has* an 'involvement' in the sense of 'Bewandtnis' (or rather, if there is such an involvement 'with' it), the thing which has this involvement has been 'assigned' or 'referred' for a certain activity or purpose 'in' which it may be said to be involved.

<sup>1</sup> 'Bewandtnis ist das Sein des innerweltlichen Seienden, darauf es je schon zunächst freigegeben ist. Mit ihm als Seiendem hat es je eine Bewandtnis. Dieses, dass es eine Bewandtnis hat, ist die *ontologische* Bestimmung des Seins dieses Seienden, nicht eine ontische Aussage über das Seiende. Das Wobei es die Bewandtnis hat, ist das Wozu der Dienlichkeit, das Wofür der Verwendbarkeit.' This passage and those which follow are hard to translate because Heidegger is using three carefully differentiated prepositions ('zu', 'für', and 'auf') where English idiom needs only 'for'. We can say that something is serviceable, usable, or applicable 'for' a purpose. and that it may be freed or given free rein 'for' some kind of activity. In German, however, it will be said to have 'Dienlichkeit zu ...', 'Verwendbarkeit für ...'; and it will be 'freigegeben auf ...'. In the remainder of this section we shall use 'for' both for 'für' and for 'auf' as they occur in these expressions; we shall, however, continue to use 'towards-which' for the 'Wozu' of 'Dienlichkeit'. See note 1, p. 109, H. 78 above.

<sup>2</sup> 'Dieses primäre Wozu ist kein Dazu als mögliches Wobei einer Bewandtnis. Das primäre "Wozu" ist ein Worum-willen.'

*Dasein*, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an *issus*. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein's very Being as the sole authentic "for-the-sake-of-which"; for the present, however, we shall pursue this no further. 'Letting something be involved' must first be clarified enough to give the phenomenon of worldhood the kind of definiteness which makes it possible to formulate any problems about it.

Ontically, "letting something be involved" signifies that within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand *be so-and-so as* it is already and *in order that* it be such.<sup>1</sup> The way we take this ontical sense of 'letting be' is, in principle, ontological. And therewith we Interpret the meaning of previously freeing what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world. Previously letting something 'be' does not mean that we must first bring it into its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an 'entity' must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has this Being be encountered. This '*a priori*' letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand, so that Dasein, in its ontical dealings with the entity thus encountered, can thereby let it be involved in the ontical sense.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, if letting something be involved is understood ontologically, what is then pertinent is the freeing of *everything* ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, no matter whether, taken ontically, it is involved thereby, or whether it is rather an entity of precisely such a sort that ontically it is *not* involved thereby. Such entities are, proximally and for the most part, those with which we concern ourselves when we do not let them 'be' as we have discovered that they are, but work upon them, make improvements in them, or smash them to pieces.

When we speak of having already let something be involved, so that it has been freed for that involvement, we are using a *perfect tense a priori* which characterizes the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself.<sup>3</sup> Letting an entity be involved, if we understand this ontologically, consists in previously freeing it for [auf] its readiness-to-hand within the environment. When we let something be involved, it must be involved in something; and in terms of this "in-which", the "with-which" of this involvement

<sup>1</sup> 'Bewendenlassen bedeutet ontisch; innerhalb eines faktischen Besorgens ein Zuhandenes so und so *sein* lassen, *wie* es nunmehr ist und *damit* es so ist.'

<sup>2</sup> '... es im ontischen Sinne dabei bewenden lassen kann.' While we have translated 'dabei' simply as 'thereby' in this context, it is possible that it should have been construed rather as an instance of the special use of 'bei' with 'bewenden lassen'. A similar ambiguity occurs in the following sentence.

<sup>3</sup> 'Das auf Bewandtnis hin freigebende Je-schon-haben-bewenden-lassen ist ein apriorisches Perfekt, das die Seinsart des Daseins selbst charakterisiert.'

is freed.<sup>1</sup> Our concern encounters it as this thing that is ready-to-hand. To the extent that any *entity* shows itself to concern<sup>2</sup>—that is, to the extent that it is discovered in its Being—it is already something ready-to-hand environmentally; it just is not 'proximally' a 'world-stuff' that is merely present-at-hand.

As the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements. So in any involvement that has been discovered (that is, in anything ready-to-hand which we encounter), what we have called the "worldly character" of the ready-to-hand has been discovered beforehand. In this totality of involvements which has been discovered beforehand, there lurks an ontological relationship to the world. In letting entities be involved so that they are freed for a totality of involvements, one must have disclosed already that for which [woraufhin] they have been freed. But that for which something environmentally ready-to-hand has thus been freed (and indeed in such a manner that it becomes accessible *as* an entity within-the-world first of all), cannot itself be conceived as an entity with this discovered kind of Being. It is essentially not discoverable, if we henceforth reserve "discoveredness" as a term for a possibility of Being which every entity *without* the character of Dasein may possess.

But what does it mean to say that that for which<sup>3</sup> entities within-the-world are proximally freed must have been previously disclosed? To Dasein's Being, an understanding of Being belongs. Any understanding [Verständnis] has its Being in an act of understanding [Verstehen]. If Being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being. The previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed,<sup>4</sup> amounts to nothing else than understanding the world—that world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself.

Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the "with-which" and the "in-which" of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else

<sup>1</sup> 'Aus dem Wobei des Bewendenlassens her ist das Womit der Bewandnis freigegeben.'

<sup>2</sup> Here we follow the newer editions in reading: 'Sofern sich ihm überhaupt ein Seiendes zeigt . . .'. The older editions read 'Sofern sich mit ihm . . .', which is somewhat ambiguous but suggests that we should write: 'To the extent that with what is ready-to-hand any entity shows itself . . .'.

<sup>3</sup> 'worauf'. The older editions have 'woraufhin'.

<sup>4</sup> 'Das vorgängige Erschliessen dessen, woraufhin die Freigabe des innerweltlichen Begegnenden erfolgt . . .'

that is basic for it, such as the "towards-this" as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the "for-the-sake-of-which" to which every "towards-which" ultimately goes back<sup>1</sup>—all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility [Verständlichkeit]. And what is that wherein Dasein as Being-in-the-world understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an "in-order-to" [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is—one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This "in-order-to" prescribes a "towards-this" as a possible "in-which" for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement which something *has*—an involvement which is *with* something. Dasein always assigns itself from a "for-the-sake-of-which" to the "with-which" of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand.<sup>2</sup> *That wherein* [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is *that for which* [das Woraufhin] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. *The "wherein" of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this "wherein" is the phenomenon of the world.*<sup>3</sup> And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the *worldhood* of the world.

That wherein Dasein already understands itself in this way is always something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. However, the possibility of giving these relations an explicit ontologico-existential Interpretation, is grounded in this familiarity with the world; and this familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for Dasein, and goes to make up Dasein's understanding of Being. This possibility is one which can be seized upon explicitly in so far as Dasein has set itself the task of giving a primordial Interpretation for its own Being and for the possibilities of that Being, or indeed for the meaning of Being in general.

<sup>1</sup> ' . . . wie das Dazu, als wobei es die Bewandnis hat, das Worum-willen, darauf letztlich alles Wozu zurückgeht.' The older editions have ' . . . als wobei es je die Bewandnis hat . . .' and omit the hyphen in 'Worum-willen'.

<sup>2</sup> 'Dieses zeichnet ein Dazu vor, als mögliches Wobei eines Bewendenlassens, das strukturmässig mit etwas bewenden lässt. Dasein verweist sich je schon immer aus einem Worum-willen her an das Womit einer Bewandnis, d. h. es lässt je immer schon, sofern es ist, Seiendes als Zuhandenes begegnen.'

<sup>3</sup> 'Das Worin des sicherweisenden Verstehens als Woraufhin des Begegnenlassens von Seiendem in der Seinsart der Bewandnis ist das Phänomen der Welt.'