What’s in a Name?

I. Lexical Syntax vs Lexical Semantics

Philosophers of language have lavished attention on names and other singular referring expressions. But they have focused primarily on what might be called lexical-semantic character of names and have largely ignored what I call the lexical-syntactic character of names.¹ The contrast between the lexical-syntactic character of names and the lexical-semantic semantic character of names is meant to distinguish lexically governed or constrained word-word relationships, on the one hand, from lexically governed and constrained word-world relationships, on the other. By focussing narrowly and prematurely on word-world rather than word-word relationships, philosophers of language have been led down many mistaken paths. This essay takes some steps toward correcting that lacuna.

I begin by arguing that names are a peculiar sort of anaphoric device. To a first approximation, to be a name is to be an expression type \( N \) such that any two tokens of \( N \) are guaranteed, in virtue of the principles of the language, to be co-referential. I will say that co-typical name tokens are explicitly co-referential. Explicit co-reference must be sharply distinguished from what I call coincidental co-reference. Two name tokens which are not co-typical can refer to the same object, and thus be co-referential, without being explicitly co-referential. For example, tokens of ‘Hesperus’ and tokens of ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer but are not explicitly co-referential. The fact that tokens of ‘Hesperus’ one and all refer to Venus is entirely independent of the fact that tokens of ‘Phosphorus’ one and all refer to Venus. Indeed, I take it to be a correlative truth about names, a truth partly definitive of the lexical-syntactic character of names, that when \( m \) and \( n \) are distinct names, they are referentially independent. Referential independence means, roughly, that no name is subject to the interpretive/referential control of any other name in the sense that no structural or lexical relation between distinct names \( m \) and \( n \) can guarantee that if \( m \) refers to \( o \) then \( n \) refers to \( o \) as well. To say that any distinct names are always interpretationally and

¹ There are exceptions. See, for example, Kaplan (1990) and Fiengo and May (1998) for approaches similar in spirit to my own. Recanati (1993) and Perry (2001) explicitly reject approaches like the one
referentially independent, is not to say that distinct names must fail to co-refer. Indeed, we can directly
show that two names are co-referential via true identity statements. But referential independence does mean
that when two distinct names \( m \) and \( n \) do co-refer, their co-reference is what might be called a coincidence
of usage. That is why I call such co-reference coincidental co-reference.

The referential independence of distinct names and the explicit co-reference of tokens of the same
name type partially defines the lexical-syntactic character of the category \textsc{Name}. Part of what it is to be a
name is to be an expression type such that tokens of that type are explicitly co-referential with one another
and referentially independent of the tokens of any distinct name. If one knows of \( e \) only that it belongs to
the category \textsc{Name} then one knows that, whatever \( e \) refers to, if it refers to anything at all, then tokens of
\( e \) are guaranteed to be co-referential one with another and referentially independent of any distinct name
\( e' \), whatever \( e' \) refers to. A name (type) is, in effect, a set of (actual and possible) name tokens such that all
tokens in the set are guaranteed, in virtue of the rules of the language, to co-refer one with another. Call
such a set a \textit{chain of explicit co-reference}. It is, I suspect, a linguistically universal fact about the lexical
category \textsc{Name} that numerically distinct tokens of the same name will share membership in a chain of
explicit co-reference and numerically distinct tokens of two type distinct names will be members of
disjoint chains of explicit co-reference -- even if the two tokens are coincidentally co-referential.

Qua lexical syntactic relations, referential independence and explicit co-referentiality are entirely
neutral between competing theories of the lexical-semantic character of names. The fact that the category
\textsc{Name} is such that tokens of the same name are explicitly co-referential neither entails either
referentialism or its denial nor entails either Fregeanism or its denial. To be sure, I shall argue that many
phenomena which have been widely thought to motivate Fregean and neo-Fregean theories of the lexical-
semantic character of names really point to facts about the peculiar lexical-syntactic character of names.
Consequently, though my account of the lexical-syntactic character of names does not entail a referentialist
account of the lexical-semantic character of names, it does remove certain obstacles that have widely been
thought to stand in the way of a referentialist account of the lexical-semantic character of names.

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favored here. Recanati thinks of names as indexicals. Perry thinks that names are “nambiguous.” Perry,
though, believes that an approach like mine can probably be accommodated within his framework.
II. An Anaphoric Treatment of Frege’s Puzzle

Frege (1977) wondered how it can be that a statement of the form  \( a = a \) may differ in cognitive value, as he called it, from a true statement of the form  \( a = b \). Statements of the former sort are always trivial, while statements of the latter sort may contain new information. Yet, if  \( a \) is identical with  \( b \), then a statement asserting the identity of  \( a \) with  \( b \) merely asserts the identity of an object with itself. But that, it seems, is precisely what the trivial statement  \( a = a \) asserts. How can the one statement be trivial and the other informative when the two statements seem to assert the very same thing about the very same object? It was partly by way of answering this last question that Frege introduced the notion of sense. He argued that names have two distinguishable, though related, semantic roles. Beside the semantic role of denoting its reference a name also has the semantic role of expressing a sense. A sense was supposed to be or contain a mode of presentation of a reference and to serve as a constituent of the thought or proposition expressed by any sentence in which the relevant name occurred. Because names which share a referent may differ in sense, co-referring names need not make identical contributions to the thoughts expressed by sentences in which they occur. And it is this fact which is supposed to explain the very possibility of informative statements of identity. For once it is allowed that names which share a reference may differ in sense and allowed that thoughts or propositions are composed out of senses and only senses, it is a short step to the conclusion that the thought expressed by a statement of the form  \( a = a \) differs in content from the thought expressed by a statement of the form  \( a = b \) even when  \( a \) just is  \( b \).

Since the crudest forms of referentialism posit only one semantic role for a name -- the role of standing for a referent -- it has been claimed that referentialist approaches are inadequate to solve Frege’s puzzle. But that assessment misconstrues, I believe, the real significance of Frege’s puzzle. Frege’s puzzle is really a direct reflection of the fact that type distinct names are referentially independent, while numerically distinct tokens of the same name are explicitly co-referential. Because the co-reference of type distinct names is not directly guaranteed by the language itself, an identity statement explicitly linking two distinct, and therefore referentially independent names can have an informative feel. By contrast, an identity statement linking numerically distinct tokens of the very same name in effect makes manifest only what is already directly guaranteed by the language itself. The difference in felt significance between
informative and trivial identity statements is due entirely to the fact that when one repeats a name by issuing another token of that very name, one explicitly preserves subject matter.

So, for example, if Jones says “My Hesperus looks lovely this evening!” and Smith wishes to express agreement with Jones, Smith can make her agreement explicit by using again the name that Jones originally used. She can utter a sentence like “Yes, you are right. Hesperus does look lovely this evening!” Suppose, by contrast, that Smith were to use a co-referring, but referentially independent name like ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to Venus. Suppose, for example, she responded to Jones as follows, “Yes you are right. Phosphorus does look lovely this evening!” Though Smith has expressed agreement with Jones, she has not done so explicitly. Indeed, though Smith’s ‘Phosphorus’ co-refers with Jones’s ‘Hesperus’, it is as if Smith has either shifted the subject matter of the conversation or has somehow implicated that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer. At a minimum, by shifting to a referentially independent name, the co-reference of which with ‘Hesperus’ is not explicit, Smith has left open the question whether she has, in fact, preserved the subject matter. She can close that question by stating that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In stating that Hesperus is Phosphorus she puts on display the fact that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are co-referential.

My claim is not that the official propositional content of the assertion that Hesperus is Phosphorus is really the metalinguistic proposition that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer. Frege was surely right to deny that what we officially say when we say that Hesperus is Phosphorus is anything about the signs ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. But Frege drew the further conclusion that the official propositional content of the statement that Hesperus is Phosphorus must be distinct from the official propositional content of the statement that Phosphorus is Phosphorus or the official propositional content of the statement that Hesperus is Hesperus. This conclusion is, I believe, mistaken. One will be tempted by it, I think, only if one commits what John Perry (2001) calls a subject matter fallacy. One commits a subject matter fallacy, roughly, when one supposes that all the information conveyed by an utterance is information about the subject matter of the utterance.

To say that Frege was guilty of a subject matter fallacy is not to deny that he was onto something. But we give due deference, and no more, to Frege by granting that there are many different ways of putting forth the content shared by these statements. In particular, there are many different sentential
vehicles that express that very same content. By putting forth that content in one way rather than another, via one sentential vehicle rather than another, one “puts on display” different facts. When one uses a sentence like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ which contains two referentially independent names to state the identity of Hesperus with itself, one puts on display the coincidental co-reference of two referentially independent expressions. Though this way of looking at matters affords Fregean senses no role in solving Frege’s puzzle, it acknowledges and applauds Frege’s recognition, however dim, of the very possibility of referentially independent but coincidentally co-referential names. He erred only in the ultimate explanation of the possibility. It is not, as he imagined, that each name is associated with a determinate and independent mode of presentation of its referent as part of its sense. Where Frege sees two names which share a reference, but differ in sense in such a way that it cannot be determined a priori that they share a reference, there are really just two names which are referentially independent, but coincidentally co-referential. Where Frege sees a reflection of the lexical-semantic character of names, there is really the influence of the peculiar lexical-syntactic, that is, anaphoric character of names. What Frege failed to see is that from a lexical-syntactic perspective names are quite distinctive referring devices. To repeat a name is *ipso facto* to (purport to) repeat a reference. To refer again to the same object, but using a different name is, in effect, to refer *de novo* to the relevant object, that is, in a way not “anaphorically” linked with the previous act of reference.

I am not claiming that the complete story about Frege’s puzzle begins and ends at the lexical-syntactic level. So far, my arguments are primarily aimed at explaining why informative statements of identity are possible at all and not primarily at explaining the nature and significance of the information carried by such a statement. Though I have said that such statements may put on display reflexive or metalinguistic information, it is not my claim that such reflexive or metalinguistic information exhausts what is potentially conveyed by an informative statement of identity. In Essays II, IV and V, I will embed the story I have been telling about the lexical syntax of names in a larger and more complex story about the semantics of names and about the psychological organization of the referring mind. That story will enable me to show just what sort of psychological impact knowledge of informative identities can have on the referring mind. Though the first beginnings of that larger story gets told below in my discussion of *in-the-head-co-reference*, most of the story comes in the essays just mentioned.
II. Names Contrasted With Deictics

It is worth contrasting names and deictic expressions. Just as it is a defining fact about the linguistic category **NAME** that names are referring expressions such that tokens of the same name are explicitly co-referential, so it is a defining fact about the linguistic category **Deictic** that tokens of the same deictic are referentially independent. When tokens of the same deictic do co-refer the co-reference will be a mere coincidence of usage rather than a direct consequence of the fundamental linguistic character of deictic referring expressions. Because token deictics of the same type are referentially independent, they are also interpretationally independent. From the would be interpreter’s perspective, an episode of deictic reference involves reference *de novo* to the relevant object, as least relative to any numerically distinct deictic. Consequently, each token of a given deictic type must by interpreted by a would-be interpreter “from scratch.” And this is so even when two token deictics turn out to refer to the very same object.²

To say that token deictic reference always involves, relative to any numerically distinct token, reference *de novo* is not to deny the possibility of what we might call discourse deixis. In an episode of discourse deixis, a token deictic refers to an object raised to salience by some earlier chunk of discourse, as in:

Because of that kick a coconut dropped. Because *that nut* dropped *a turtle* got bopped. Because he got bopped *that turtle* named Jake, fell on his back with a splash in the lake.

Nor am I claiming that co-referring and co-typical deictic tokens can never be interpreted as co-referential. There are in fact sentences in which it seems all but mandatory that two co-typical deictic tokens be interpreted as co-referential. But I want to suggest that the source of any such mandate is neither lexical nor structural but purely pragmatic. Consider the following:

(1) Ted saw that man and Bill saw that man too

(1’) Ted saw (that man), and Bill saw him, too

² In Essay V, I put the lexical-syntactic distinction between names and deictics to work in explaining the pragmatics of what I call mode of reference selection.
(2) John hates that man because that man is a cad

(2’) John hates (that man), because he, is a cad.

On the default reading, an utterance of (1) would seem to be roughly equivalent to an utterance of (1’).
Similarly, on the default reading, an utterance of (2) is roughly equivalent to an utterance of (2’). It may be tempting to conclude that there can indeed obtain a relation of anaphoric dependence between subsequent and antecedent deictic tokens of the same type.

But this temptation should be resisted. What we really have here is co-reference through what I call demonstration sharing. Co-reference through demonstration sharing occurs when a speaker intends that the reference fixing demonstration associated with an “antecedent” deictic serve also to fix the reference for a subsequent deictic. When two token deictics share a demonstration, there will obtain a kind of mandatory co-reference between those tokens. But co-reference through demonstration sharing is a purely pragmatic phenomenon which resembles co-incidental co-reference more than it resembles explicit co-reference. Explicit co-reference is lexically or structurally guaranteed co-reference. Coincidental co-reference, by contrast, is neither lexically nor structurally guaranteed but depends entirely on the coincidences of further usage. Since co-reference through demonstration sharing depends precisely on the speaker’s entirely optional intention to, in effect, mount the same demonstration twice, it counts as a species of coincidental co-reference rather than a species of explicit co-reference.

A speaker can convey to the hearer that token deictics are intended to co-refer through demonstration sharing in a number of ways. She can openly fail to mount an independent demonstration for the subsequent deictic. Alternatively, she can select a sentence type which “semantically forces” the relevant deictics to be interpreted as co-referring through demonstration sharing. (1) above involves such semantic forcing. The presence of the ‘too’ in (1) renders incoherent interpretations of (1) on which the deictics do not co-refer though demonstration sharing. On pain of semantic incoherence, the token deictics must be interpreted as co-referring through demonstration sharing. It is striking that the threat of incoherence is absent if the ‘too’ is absent as in:

(1’’) Ted saw that man and Bill saw that man.

To be sure, if the first deictic receives greater stress than the second, then even here the preferred interpretation of (1’’) involves co-reference through demonstration sharing. On the other hand,
if the second deictic receives greater stress than the first then an interpretation on which the deictics do not co-refer through demonstration sharing will be preferred.

Pragmatics also explains the imputation generated by an utterance of (2) that one and the same object is both a cad and is hated by John. In particular, our shared background expectations that, absent special circumstances, people typically do not hate one person because of another person’s character, raises the salience of the interpretation of (2) according to which the deictics co-refer through demonstration sharing. Compare (2) with (3):

(3) John hangs out with that man, because that man is a cad.

In an utterance of (3), the deictics may also co-refer through demonstration sharing, but because it is not unusual for a person to hang out with one person partly in response to a different person’s character, there will be less conversational pressure to interpret the two deictics as co-referring through demonstration sharing. Though it is surely possible for a speaker to convey via an utterance of (3) the proposition that John hangs out with a certain man because that very man is a cad, there is nothing about (3) as a type that renders such an interpretation of any given utterance of (3) more salient or available than an interpretation according to which the two demonstratives do not co-refer through demonstration sharing.

IV. On the Type-Individuation of Names

I will have more to say about the contrast between names and deictics in Essay V. But I want now to return to the main line of argument of the current essay. I have argued that tokens of the same name type are explicitly co-referential. And I have claimed that a name type is determined by a chain of explicit co-reference. But I have not yet said what it takes for two name tokens to be members of the same chain of explicit co-reference and thus to count as tokens of the same name type again. It might be supposed that if \( m \) and \( n \) are merely spelled and/or pronounced in the same manner, then \( n \) is the same name again as \( m \). Sameness of spelling and pronunciation is clearly insufficient to guarantee co-reference, however. So I must deny that names are type-individuated merely by pronunciation and spelling. Some will want to take issue with that denial. And they will want to insist that tokens of the “same name” need not be co-referential at all, let alone explicitly co-referential. (Perry 2001, Recanati 1993).

In the end, there is very little at stake between views like mine and views like those of Perry or Recanati. If one is to do full justice to the peculiar lexical-syntactic character of the category \textsc{name}, one
needs something rather like my notion of disjoint chains of co-reference, whatever story one wants to tell about the type identity of names. If one insists on type individuating names by spelling and pronunciation, then my claims about referential independence and explicit co-reference can simply be read as claims about the lexical-syntactic character of fully disambiguated names. Our current worry about how to segregate name tokens in to chains of co-reference remains. The claim would then be that when names are fully disambiguated tokens of the same name are explicitly co-referential. Precisely what it would be to disambiguate a name would be to segregate tokens of that name into disjoint chains of explicit co-reference such that all the tokens in a given class explicitly co-refer with one another and are at most only coincidentally co-referential with tokens in any distinct class. One way to see this is to see that we might use the same sound pattern twice to refer to the same object, without knowing that we are doing so. Even if there is just one John, we might, for example, mistakenly think that one set of tokenings of ‘John’ co-refer to a different object from that to which a distinct set of tokenings of ‘John’ co-refer. In such a situation despite the co-incidental co-reference of ‘John’ and ‘John’ we would still need to segregate the totality of ‘John’ tokenings into disjoint chances of explicit co-reference. We would thereby have a way of tracking when we are engaged in independent acts of reference to what is coincidentally the same object again and when are engaged in anaphorically linked acts of explicit co-reference.

Since my central claims and arguments will go through on either way of individuating names, I will feel free to assume, for the sake of brevity, that the type individuation of names is not simply a matter of pronunciation and spelling and that a name need not wear its type-identity on its morphological and phonological sleeve. Unfortunately, I do not have a complete and systematic account of just what makes two name tokenings count as co-typical. However, I am prepared to argue that to a rough first approximation, two tokenings count as co-typical just in case the occurrence of a given (or similar or at least systematically connected) shape/sound pattern again is a further episode in connected history of such tokenings. The crucial challenge is, of course, to say just when two tokenings of the same or similar shape/sound pattern does and does not count as a further episode in the same continuing history of tokenings. I will say that two tokenings count as tokenings of the same name again when they are linked via what I call a mechanism of co-reference. A mechanism of co-reference links a system of tokenings
one with another in such a way that the tokens produced are guaranteed to co-refer. Call such a system of referentially linked tokenings a chain of explicit co-reference.

I have so far told you only what a mechanism of co-reference does, not the means by which it does that. And I have not told you just how to build mechanisms of co-reference. Note that there are many ways of marking and displaying co-reference. Explicit anaphora is one way. The identity sign is another. Identity and explicit anaphora are ways of displaying as co-referential expressions which are not directly given, in virtue of their bare type identity, as co-referential. The mechanisms of co-reference which link tokenings of the same name in a chain of explicit co-reference will be of a rather different character from either explicit anaphora or the identity sign. They do not operate locally, sentence by sentence, or discourse by discourse, to link what are by their type-identity, otherwise linguistically unconnected expressions. Name constituting mechanisms of co-reference have a more global, less formal character.

It would not be entirely wrong to think of such mechanisms as being founded on the interlocking and interdependent referential intentions of a community of co-linguals, a community which may be extended in time and spread through space. When I token the sound/shape pattern ‘Cicero’ I typically do not intend to be tokening something brand new under the sun. Rather, I typically intend to be tokening again what others have tokened before. I intend thereby to refer again to what others have referred to before. And I intend that others recognize that I so intend. It is tempting to think that it is just such a budget of co-referential intentions which makes my tokening of the sound/shape pattern ‘Cicero’ count as a retokening of the name ‘Cicero.’ But I will not take a stand on that issue here. Rather, I defend only the more modest claim that absent the intention to either continue or launch a chain of explicit co-reference, a speaker would not even count as using, or even intending to use, a given sound/shape pattern as a name at all. In other words, what it is to intend to use an expression as a name is to use that expressions with the intention of either launching or continue a chain of explicit co-reference.

Though I have suggested that there must be something in our naming practices that makes a tokening of a given sound/shape pattern count as a further episode in this rather than that continuing history of such tokenings, I have not, it must be admitted, offered a positive theory of just what that something is. We should not lose sight, however of the deeper point that the category NAME, together with its defining features of explicit co-referentiality and referential independence, is a linguistic universal, that may be
differently realized in different languages. If that category is to be realized in the language of a speech community, then that community must have some practice or other that serves to bind name tokens together in chains of explicit co-reference. In the absence of any such practice the language of a community would simply contain no instances of the category NAME.

Though it is not part of our current burden to say precisely how the practices of a speech community work to bind name tokens together into chains of explicit co-reference, it is not hard to imagine some ways matters might go. It would be a nice result, for example, if name tokens were bound together into chains of explicit co-reference by some tractable property guaranteed to be epistemically manifest to the merely linguistically competent. A manifest syntactic or formal property would serve nicely in that role. Though natural languages are not so nicely designed, one can easily imagine augmenting our language with a system of co-indexing subscripts to serve as a syntactic marker of explicit co-referentiality. Alternatively, one can imagine a system in which distinct names were never spelled the same. Either system would have the effect of introducing a manifest syntactic marker of explicit co-reference. Some of this already goes on in our language just as it stands. The phenomena of surnames, middle names, the whole system of modifiers like ‘junior’, ‘senior’ ‘the first’ ‘the second’, ‘the elder’ ‘the younger’ are all ways of making it more syntactically manifest when we are given the same name again and when, despite the same or similar spelling and pronunciation, we are given distinct names, and thus distinct chains of explicit co-reference. But because our language as it stands is not fully explicit in this regard, it is not

3 Something similar in spirit is suggested by Fiengo and May (1998) in the guise of what they call the singularity principle: Singularity Principle: If co-spelled expressions are co-valued, they are coindexed.

Fiengo and May presuppose a distinction between names and expressions which can be reconstructed in terms of my distinction between what I call a sound/shape pattern and what I call a chain of explicit co-reference. I disagree with May and Fiengo, however, in thinking that even if two expressions are “co-valued” and are spelled and/or sounded the same, then they are ipso facto explicitly co-referential. Perhaps this is true for a fully disambiguated language, but it is not true for our language as it stands. May and Fiengo seem aware of this worry and attempt to get around it, I think, by appeal to the notion of an assignment. For they allow that co-spelled and co-referring expressions can have different “assignments.” In all frankness, I can’t make out what they mean by an assignment. Clearly, they can’t mean that two expressions have the same assignment just in case they share a reference. They seem -- though this is just a guess -- to be looking for some intermediate, sense-like entity to play the role of assignment. It does occur to me that their notion of assignment might well be assimilated to what I call “in-the-head-co-reference.” This is a kind of “co-reference” that need not track actual co-reference. But again, this is just a guess.
possible to tell by mere inspection which name a given tokening of a certain sound/shape pattern is a tokening of. We typically rely on context to achieve the effect of making explicit co-reference more epistemically manifest. Context provides information which enables the hearer to determine whether the tokening of a given sound/shape pattern is intended as a further episode in this chain of explicit co-reference or that chain of explicit o-reference and thus whether it counts as a further tokening of this or that name.

V. An Anaphoric Treatment of Kripke’s Puzzle.

Things sometimes go wrong. Sometimes, for example, we mistake numerically distinct tokenings of the same name again for tokenings of two distinct name types. That is, we mistake what are really links in the same chain of explicit co-reference for links in disjoint chains of explicit co-reference. Just such a mistake seems to be one source of a well known and philosophically interesting puzzle about belief due to Saul Kripke (1979). Imagine an agent Smith. Suppose that unbeknownst to Smith opinions are divided among his co-linguals about the beauty of London. Some think that London is a city of outstanding beauty; others think that it is horrendously ugly. Imagine that the name ‘London’ is first introduced into Smith’s referential repertoire via interaction with a collection of apparently knowledgeable people, all of whom think that London is one among the more beautiful cities of the world. He acquires the word ‘London’, intending in his use of it to co-refer with his co-linguals. Since Smith is inclined to believe what knowledgeable people say, he comes to believe that London is a city of outstanding beauty. Subsequently, Smith comes in contact with other apparently knowledgeable people. These apparently knowledgeable people believe that London is one of the more ugly cities in the world. Once again, since Smith is inclined to take knowledgeable people at their words, he comes to believe that London is a horrendously ugly. Because Smith mistakenly, but not irrationally, believes that knowledgeable people in a single community are unlikely to hold such divergent opinions about one and the same city, he reasons that the apparently knowledgeable people encountered later and the apparently knowledgeable people encountered earlier are not talking about one and the same city.

Kripke’s puzzle is a puzzle about beliefs in cases like the above. It seems true to say that Smith believes that London is beautiful and not ugly. Yet it seems equally true to say that Smith believes that London is ugly and not beautiful. Moreover, it would seem a mark of incoherence and irrationality to
simultaneously believe and disbelieve the very same proposition, as Smith apparently does. But the story we just told about Smith would seem to support only the conclusion that he is mistaken, and not the conclusion that he is either incoherent or irrational in believing as he does. What, in the end, shall we say about Smith, his beliefs, and his rationality or lack thereof?

We are not yet in a position to answer this question fully, but we can say a bit more about just how Smith’s confusion comes about and what it consists in. Notice, though, that Smith would surely be surprised to learn “London is London,” as he might put it. Of course, he would be no more surprised to learn this fact than the average Babylonian would have been to learn that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Indeed, his surprise would seem to be surprise of the very same character as the surprise of the average Babylonian who learns that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This suggests that part of Smith’s problem is that he treats the sound/shape pattern ‘London’ as if it is associated with two distinct and therefore referentially independent names which just happen to be spelled and sounded the same. If that is right, then at the base of Smith’s confusion about the city London is a confusion about the name ‘London’. Indeed, Smith’s confusion about the name ‘London’ seems deeply implicated in whatever confusion he has about the city London.

Let us look more closely at Smith’s use of the sound/shape pattern ‘London’. It will help to distinguish two (sub)communities of Smith’s co-linguals: the A-community and the B-community. The A-community consists of those who think that London is among the most beautiful cities in the world. The B-community consists of those who think that London is horrendously ugly. Suppose further that we distinguish two sequences of Smith’s tokenings of the sound/shape pattern ‘London’ -- an A-sequence and a B-sequence. A tokening is a member of the A-sequence when Smith produces it intending to conform to the usage of the A community. Now Smith intends, by conforming to the usage of the A community, to be conforming to the usage of the community at large. Similarly, a tokening is a member of the B sequence when Smith produces it intending to conform to the usage of the B community. Again, Smith intends, by conforming to the usage of the B community, to be conforming to the usage of the community at large.

Now each tokening in Smith’s A-sequence is a link in a chain of explicit co-reference that includes tokenings by members of the A-community. In each such tokening, Smith intends to be co-referring with the members of the A community. If we take Smith’s intentions as our guide, it would seem to follow that
Smith’s A-sequence ‘London’ is explicitly co-referential with the ‘London’ of the A-community. Similarly, Smith’s B-sequence tokenings of the pattern ‘London’ would seem to be links in a chain of explicit co-reference that connects them with tokenings of the pattern ‘London’ by the B-community. Again, taking Smith’s immediate intentions as our guide, it would seem to follow that Smith’s B-sequence ‘London’ is explicitly co-referential with the ‘London’ of the B-community. Are Smith’s A-sequence tokens explicitly co-referential with Smith’s B-sequence tokens? On the one hand, we want to say that members of the A and B communities are joint masters of the one word ‘London.’ The members of the A-community and the B-community take themselves to be disagreeing about a common subject and to be engaging in anaphorically linked acts of co-reference, not referentially independent acts of co-reference. And this fact implies that the A-community’s tokenings of ‘London’ and the B-community’s tokening of London are links in a single chain of explicit co-reference. Moreover, each time Smith token the sound/shape pattern ‘London’ he intends merely to be continuing a chain of co-reference already initiated by others. He intends merely to be tokening again what others have tokened before. He thereby intends to assure that what others have referred to before, he refers to again.

Unfortunately for Smith, his usage fails to reflect the explicit co-referentiality of the ‘London’ of the A-community and the ‘London’ of the B-community. We might say that although the ‘London’ of the A-community and the ‘London’ of the B-community are, in fact, explicitly co-referential they are not in-the-head-co-referential for Smith. It is the fact that Smith’s A-sequence ‘London’ and his B-sequence ‘London’ are not in-the-head-co-referential for Smith that makes it plausible to say that Smith does not quite succeed in doing what he originally intended. Though he intends to use ‘London’ in conformity with the usage of his community, he somehow manages to use one name as if it were two. That is, he uses the sound/shape pattern ‘London’ as if the set of tokenings of that pattern formed two disjoint chains of explicit co-reference. Consequently, in Smith’s thought and talk tokening ‘London’ is not simply a way of repeating and co-referring with ‘London’. We shall examine in more detail below some ways in which a mismatch between in-the-head co-reference and real-world-co-reference can wreak havoc with attitude ascriptions.

VI. Empty Names and the Anaphoric Thesis
For all that we have said so far, it may seem to follow that chains of co-reference must be ultimately grounded in an actually existing object. But that is not so. Names as such, whether they succeed in referring or fail to refer, have the lexical-syntactic property that tokens of the same name again are guaranteed to co-refer, if they refer at all. For names which fail to refer, this means that if any token of the name fails to refer, then every token of the name fails to refer. That is, in virtue of their lexical-syntactic property of being explicitly co-referential one with another, tokens of the same name stand or fall together with respect to referential success and failure. Hence the referential success of any given token is the success of all and the referential failure of one is the failure of all. Consequently, even tokenings of an empty name can form chains of explicit co-reference. We might call such a chain a **chain of empty explicit co-reference**. The founding link in a chain of empty explicit co-reference will not have been produced in the course of successful reference to an actual existent. Rather, chains of empty explicit co-reference will typically be rooted in the making of fiction or myth or in failed attempts at reference to putatively existent object.

In the case of myth and fiction, for example, chains of empty explicit co-reference will be sustained by interlocking intentions to carry on a mythical or fictive practice. To be sure, to token again a fictive or mythical name that others have tokened before is not to refer again. But by using the same fictional name again that others have used before, one may make a further move in a “non-veridical” language game that others have played before. By tokening ‘Holmes’ again, for example, I take part in a certain shared imagining -- the shared imagining which gives content to the Holmes stories. Indeed, the fact that my use of ‘Holmes’ is, and is intended to be, just a further episode in a certain chain of empty explicit co-reference is really all there is to the feeling that in imagining Holmes again, I imagine an object that others have imagined before and will imagine again. There is no Holmes to imagine. But by imagining with ‘Holmes’ in accordance with the rules that govern a certain non-veridical language game, I take part in a certain shared imagining.

Since empty names one and all refer to the same object, there is a sense in which all empty names might be said to be co-referential. But even for empty names we must distinguish co-incidental from

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4 For further discussion of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical language games see Essay VI.
explicit co-reference. As with names in general, the tokenings of a given empty name will form a chain of explicit co-reference – what we have called a chain of empty explicit co-reference. Moreover, as with names in general, two type distinct empty names will form disjoint chains of empty explicit co-reference. Consider, for example, ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Pegasus’. Tokenings of ‘Santa Claus’ are linked in a single chain of empty co-reference via a mechanism of co-reference which, in effect, marks them all as sharing a referential aim and fate. The explicit co-referentiality of the tokens of ‘Santa Claus’ makes it the case that the failure of ‘Santa Claus’ to refer is a failure shared by all of tokenings of that name, a failure they share in virtue of the fact that they aim to name together. ‘Pegasus’ too is constituted as the very name type that it is by a mechanism of co-reference, a mechanism of co-reference initiated in a founding act of myth-making, sustained for an historical period by intentions to continue the relevant mythical practice, and sustained to this day by intentions to co-refer which are no longer moored to ancient mythical practice. That mechanism of co-reference links tokenings of ‘Pegasus’ together in a chain of empty explicit co-reference such that the tokenings stand or fall together with respect to referential success and failure. But the ‘Pegasus’ chain of empty explicit co-reference is sustained by a mechanism of co-reference entirely independent of mechanism of co-reference which sustains the ‘Santa’ chain of empty explicit co-reference. Hence the failure of ‘Pegasus’ to refer is a fact entirely independent of the failure of ‘Santa Claus’ to refer. So although ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Santa’ are in a trivial sense coincidentally co-referential, they are not explicitly co-referential.

I said above that the fact the tokens of ‘Holmes’ are explicitly co-referential one with another helps to explain how it is possible for cognizers to engage in certain shared imaginings without there having to be a fictional object Holmes to be the shared object of those shared imaginings. In a similar vein, I claim that the referential independence of ‘Santa’ and ‘Pegasus’ explains all there is there is to the feeling that the Santa Claus myth and the Pegasus myth have different subject matters. Just as we need not posit a fictional Holmes to be the common subject of all Holmes-imaginings, so we need not posit a mythical Santa and a mythical Pegasus to be the distinguishable subjects of Santa and Pegasus imaginings.
The making of myth and fiction may indeed play a role in founding and sustaining chains of empty explicit co-reference, but they do not make mythical or fictional objects to exist.\(^5\)

Sometimes, of course, empty names are tokened not in the making of fiction or myth, but in failed attempts at genuine reference. Here too the relevant name is constituted as the very name that it is by the existence of a chain of explicit co-reference that endows the tokenings of that name with a shared referential aim and fate. Even if there had been no planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, ‘Neptune’ would still have counted as a name. Contrary to Russell, we should not and would not feel any temptation to conclude on the basis of mere referential failure that ‘Neptune’ was not a name at all, but merely a definite description in disguise. Even referentially failed names have the property of aiming to name. Even tokens of such a name aim to name together. When a name (type) fails to refer, the name defining property of explicit co-referentiality guarantees that that failure will be a failure shared by all tokens of the name. So even empty names form chains of explicit co-reference. It is just that the links in chain of co-reference formed from the tokens of an empty name share referential failure rather than referential success. Thus in the case imagined, the existence of a mechanism of co-reference, rooted in a failed attempt to fix a reference for ‘Neptune’, would have endowed tokenings of ‘Neptune’ with a shared referential aim and fate.

**VII. Names and Principle C**

The interaction of names with other referring expressions in the context of more local anaphoric chains bears brief mention. The entire subject of anaphora is, of course, a large and vexed one, involving many subtle and complex phenomena. I do not pretend even to scratch the surface of that complexity and subtlety here. Still, I want to take brief notice of what I take to be a central and characteristic fact about the role of names in sentence and discourse level anaphoric chains. It is characteristic of names that though they may anchor local anaphoric chains, they may never occupy the role of anaphoric dependent within any such chain. For example, although ‘he’ can (but need not) be interpreted as referentially dependent on

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\(^5\) I argue for this claim further in Essay VI.
‘John’ in (4), (5) and (6) below, there is no interpretation of (7) or (8) below in which ‘John’ is bound to share a referent with ‘he:’

(4) John, just arrived at the party and he, is already drunk.

(5) Although he, just arrived at the party, John, is already drunk.

(6) John, just arrived at the party. He, is already drunk. He, had better behave himself.

(7) He, kicked John.

(8) A man, just arrived at the party. He, is already drunk. John, had better behave himself.

Of course, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in either (7) or (8) could turn out to be co-referential. Imagine, for example, that Smith utters (7) while pointing to John but without knowing that it is John to whom she is pointing. Similarly, imagine that the drunk man who just arrived at the party is none other than John himself but that the speaker does not know that John is the drunk man who just arrived at the party. Again the co-reference of ‘he’ with ‘John’ would in that case be at most coincidental. It is simply not permissible for ‘John’ to be explicitly co-referential with any “antecedent” expression except ‘John’ itself.

This last remark will seem to some to need some qualification. For there are well-known cases in which a name is apparently prohibited from taking even itself as an antecedent. Consider, for example:

(9) John, kicked John.

On the default reading of (9), the two occurrences of ‘John’ are not explicitly but at most only coincidentally co-referential. Indeed, Principle C of the principles and parameters binding theory predicts that with the two occurrences of ‘John’ co-indexed (9) is straightforwardly syntactically ill-formed and therefore, presumably, not directly interpretable at all. (Chomsky 1981, 1995, Sag and Wasow 1999)

Since there are contexts in which an utterance of (9) could convey the relevant proposition, Principle C as more or less standardly stated isn’t quite correct. Still, it is true that a speaker who utters (9) would defeasibly be interpreted as referring to two distinct Johns and not to the same John twice. This fact gives rise to a prima facie difficulty for my approach. Since the strong default interpretation has it that the two occurrences of ‘John’ in (9) are referentially independent, it follows, on my approach, that the two occurrences of ‘John’ should count not as the occurrence of the same name twice, but as the occurrence of two distinct, and therefore referentially independent names. But if to repeat a name is to repeat a
reference, why should (9) default to a reading on which the two occurrences of ‘John’ are occurrences of two referentially independent names?

My answer is that the fact that (9) strongly defaults to a reading on which the two occurrences of ‘John’ are referentially independent reflects an independent fact about the means by which the grammar permits a single name to claim simultaneous occupancy, as it were, of the multiple argument places of a single verb. It is evident that the strongly preferred way of saying that John is simultaneously the agent and patient of a single kicking is to deploy the reflexive pronoun as in (10):

(10) John, kicked himself.

Indeed, though a non-reflexive pronoun can often be explicitly co-referential with an antecedent name, explicit co-reference is not possible here. If we substitute such a pronoun for ‘himself’ in (10) we get:

(11) John, kicked him.

As with (9), on the default reading of (11) ‘John’ and ‘him’ are referentially independent. Indeed, Principle B of the binding theory predicts that (11) is syntactically ill-formed when “John’ and ‘him’ are co-indexed and thus explicitly co-referential. (Chomsky 1981, 1995) Again, this constraint does not rule out the possibility that ‘John’ and ‘him’ can co-refer in an utterance of (11), but they can do so only if the co-reference is coincidental rather than explicit. These data strongly suggest that, to a first approximation, a single name can simultaneously “control” multiple argument places of a single verb only through anaphoric dominance of a reflexive pronoun. It is as if a name is defeasibly forbidden from serving as its own referential doppelganger within single argument structure. Within a single argument structure, a name cannot be anaphorically dominated even by itself.

The prohibition against self-domination within a single argument structure is not a general prohibition against explicitly repeating a reference by repeating a name within a single sentence or single discourse. A name may serve as its own referential doppelganger, for example, when it simultaneously occupies distinct argument places of “distinct” verb phrases or when one occurrence of the name is merely a constituent of an argument of a given verb phrase and the other occurrence occupies some other argument place of the very same verb phrase. Consider, for example:

(12) Mary’s kicking of John, upset him,

(13) Mary’s kicking of John, upset John,
Although the relevant names and pronouns in each of (12) - (17) can be interpreted as referentially independent, they need not be. There is nothing like the strong default in favor of interpreting what looks like the same name again in each of (13), (15) and (17) as really referentially independent occurrences of two distinct names. Rather, the default interpretation of each of these sentences involves exactly one John and exactly one Mary. Contrast (12) - (17) with:

(18) Mary’s kicking of Mary upset her

(19) Mary’s kicking of Mary upset Mary.

For both (18) and (19), at least two, and possibly three Mary’s are involved and each sentence is ambiguous as to whether it is the kicking Mary, the kicked Mary or some third person who is upset by the kicking.

Finally, consider (20) - (22) below in which we have explicit co-referentiality across different clauses:

(20) If Bill hopes to finish his dissertation soon, he had better get to work.

(21) If Bill hopes to finish his dissertation soon, Bill had better get to work.

(22) If Bill hopes to finish Bill’s dissertation soon, Bill had better get to work.

(21) strongly -- and (22) less strongly -- defaults to a reading in which one and the same Bill is denoted by each occurrence of ‘Bill.’ On the default reading, (21) and (22) each expresses more or less the same proposition as (20), when it is co-indexed as above. Moreover, for each of (23) - (29) below, where the reflexive occupies object position, the weakly or strongly preferred interpretation involves one Bill, rather than multiple Bills. Correlatively, where either a name or a non-reflexive pronoun occupies the direct object position, there is a default to a two person reading of the sentence:

(23) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then he had better watch himself.

(24) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch himself.

(25) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then he had better watch Bill
(26) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch Bill.
(27) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch him.
(28) If he hopes to earn an A, then he had better watch Bill.
(29) If he hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch himself.

What is the source of the prohibition against a name’s self-domination within a single argument structure? Is it just a brute fact? Is there a deeper reason why this should be so? Such questions are better left to linguists. My approach is consistent with any answer your favorite syntactic theory is likely to have on offer. The mere fact that a name is defeasibly prohibited from functioning as its own referential doppelganger within a single argument structure spells no deep trouble for my central claim that tokens of the same name type are explicitly co-referential. My view neither predicts that such a prohibition should obtain nor predicts that no such prohibition should obtain. But given independent grounds for this prohibition on the repeatability of a name within a single argument structure, my approach does offer a way of saying just what the prohibition comes to and what it entails. From our current perspective the prohibition against self-domination within a single argument structure entails that when what looks like the same name occupies multiple argument places within a single argument structure those apparently identical names will be defeasibly interpreted as referentially independent and thus as distinct and therefore at most coincidentally co-referential names.

VIII. On the Pragmatics of Substitution

My theory of the peculiar anaphoric character of names so far predicts that in general a name cannot be substituted for a merely coincidentally co-referring name in what might be called a dialectical significance preserving manner. By dialectical significance, I mean significance for the progression of a discourse, argument or conversation. The claim is not that substitution of a merely coincidentally co-referring expression fails to preserve truth value. If it is true that Hesperus is rising, it is also true that Phosphorus is rising. The claim is rather that substitution of coincidentally co-referents fails to make it explicit that the subject matter of the relevant sentence discourse or argument has been preserved. It is as if there is a (defeasible) dialectical constraint on the evolution of a discourse, argument, or conversation to make the preservation of subject matter explicit so much so that failure to make the preservation of subject
matter explicit often generates an imputation of distinctness of subject matter. Hence, because ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are referentially independent and therefore at most only coincidentally co-referential it is typically not dialectically permissible to move straightway within a discourse, argument or conversation from a sentence like ‘Hesperus is rising’ to a sentence like ‘Phosphorus is rising’ -- even though the latter is true whenever the former is.

Substitution of coincidental co-referents can, of course, be directly licensed by the use of an explicit identity sign. For the use of the identity sign makes explicit the co-reference of two referentially independent designators and thus renders dialectically permissible the move from a sentence involving the one to a corresponding sentence involving the other within a discourse, argument or conversation. It is tempting to conclude that wherever two referentially independent, but coincidentally co-referential designators are linked within a discourse, conversation, or argument by an explicit identity sign, then one can move from sentences involving the one, to sentences involving the other in a way that preserves dialectical significance. So, for example, if it is part of the common ground of mutual knowledge that Hesperus just is Phosphorus again, then transitions from ‘Hesperus’ involving sentence to ‘Phosphorus’ involving sentences count relative to that common ground as explicitly preserving subject matter.

Unfortunately, this tempting generalization runs immediately afoul of the peculiar behavior of names within propositional attitude contexts. In such contexts, even when referentially independent and coincidentally co-referential designators are linked via an explicit identity sign substitution still does not preserve dialectical significance. The inference from (30) and (31) to (32), below, is not intuitively compelling, despite the fact that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are linked via an explicit identity sign in (30):

(30) Smith believes that Hesperus is rising
(31) Hesperus is Phosphorus
(32) Smith believes that Phosphorus is rising.

Philosophers of language have been widely convinced, partly on the basis of the felt unacceptability of such inferences, that the semantic contribution of an embedded name to the truth conditions of the containing belief ascription cannot be just its referent. Embedding is widely supposed somehow to endow a name with a degree of notional semantic significance in virtue of which an embedded name serves, by some
means or other, to either directly or indirectly semantically specify, intimate, or designate the ascribee’s notions of doxastically implicated objects. To be sure, philosophers have differed widely on just how the mechanism of embedding achieves this effect. Frege, for example, thought that embedded names undergo a reference shift and come thereby to denote the senses they customarily express. On this picture, the customary reference of a name drops out of the picture as not directly semantically implicated in the content of the ascribed belief. Many philosophers rightly find this aspect of Frege’s approach highly counter-intuitive and agree with Davidson’s charge that if we could but regain or pre-Fregean semantic innocence:

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6 An exception is Bach (1997a, 1997b.) Bach and I agree in rejecting what he calls the “specification assumption” -- the assumption, roughly, that that clauses specify what I call notional contents. Bach’s specification assumption is broader than my current target. Anyone who accepts that that clauses either semantically specify or pragmatically implicate notional contents accepts Bach’s specification assumption. Hence, Salmon (1986) too counts as endorsing the specification assumption, since he holds that notional contents are pragmatically implicated rather than semantically specified. Despite rejecting the specification assumption, Bach maintains that ascriptions that differ only by the presence of co-referring names can differ in truth value. This is possible, he claims, because belief sentences are “semantically incomplete.” As he puts it:

If substitution (of co-referring terms) makes no semantic difference, how can it affect the content of a belief report? How can substitution turn a true belief report into a false one? Part of the answer is that the sentences used to make the belief reports, though semantically equivalent, are also semantically incomplete (emphasis his). That is, they do not express complete propositions, and to that extent they are like such sentences as:

(a) Fred is ready
(b) Jerry has finished.

Though syntactically well-formed … these sentences are semantically incomplete because of a missing argument …. However, lacking an argument is not the only way for a sentences to be semantically incomplete…. On the description view, belief sentences are semantically incomplete for different reasons. Like words, such as ‘big’ and ‘short’, a belief-predicate does not have a context-independent condition of satisfaction, so that a sentence containing it does not have a context-independent truth condition. A belief-predicate does not express, independently of context, a unique belief-property. (Bach 1997a. 228)

I reject this last claim. I argue in Essay IX that so-called semantic incompleteness is possible only where there are either suppressed or explicit parameters which demand, by their very nature, the contextual assignment of a value. I call the view there defended parametric minimalism. Bach and I agree, I think, that simple, unmodified belief sentences have no hidden or explicit argument place waiting to be filled by a contextually provided value. Here the two of us part company, I take it, with those who endorse the hidden indexical approach to belief sentences. Unlike Bach, however, I think it follows that therefore no pragmatic mechanism can make a belief sentence strictly literally say now one thing, now another, as a function of context. To reject this last inference is to reject the parametric minimalism defended in Essay IX. To accept this last inference is to accept parametric minimalism. This is not the place to settle the dispute between friend and foe of parametric minimalism. See Bach (1984) and Recanati (1993, 2001) for arguments against parametric minimalism. Recanati rejects minimalism altogether. Bach is a minimalist, but not a parametric minimalist.
it would seem to us plainly incredible that the words ‘The earth moves’ uttered after the words ‘Galileo said that’ mean anything different, or refer to anything else, than is their wont when they come in other environment. (Davidson, 1969)

Still, the view that embedded names serve at least partly to semantically specify how things are by the ascribee’s notions has proven very hard to shake, so much so that a fair number of philosophers have recently tried to have it both ways.⁷ They have labored mightily to preserve both Davidsonian semantic innocence and Fregean notional significance. Such efforts have produced several highly ingenious, but ultimately mistaken accounts of the semantics of belief ascriptions. For philosophers of language, have, in my view, heaped an explanatory burden upon semantic theory that is more properly discharged elsewhere. This is not the place for a full bore defense of this claim, but I will offer a brief preview of an argument developed in more fulsome detail in Essay VII.⁸

    In my view, all such accounts misdiagnose the widely shared intuition that, to put it neutrally, the acceptability of statements like (30) and (31) need not guarantee the acceptability of a statement like (32). Our intuitions of the badness of such inferences are widely taken to be intuitions about truth-value dependence and independence.⁹ I shall argue that such inferences really involve a kind of pragmatic infelicity rooted in facts about what I call dialectical dependence and independence. Facts about dialectical

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⁷ Cases in point are Crimmins (1992), Crimmins and Perry (1989), Recanati (993). Though Richard’s (1990) does not really talk in terms of notions, his contextual restrictions on correlation functions between RAMS are, in effect, backdoor attempts to put notions and their ilk at what I call semantic issue.

⁸ See also, Taylor (2002).

⁹ Soames (1985, 1987a, 1987b, 2001), Salmon (1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1995) and Braun (1998) are the most dogged exceptions. Soames and Salmon apparently believe that ordinary speakers themselves mistake what are really intuitions about pragmatic infelicity for intuitions about truth and falsity. Braun apparently holds that although speakers do have truth value intuitions those intuitions are mistaken. My aim here is to offer a re-diagnosis of our intuitions as intuitions about dialectical dependence/independence. To that extent, I agree with Soames and Salmon and disagree with Braun. On the other hand, although I do think that philosophers of language have by and large misdiagnosed our intuitions, I do not claim to know how “the folk” understand those intuitions. Nor do I think it matters. I am trying to understand the intuitions themselves, and what drives them. I am not trying to explain the folk theory of those intuitions and feel no compulsion to respect that folk theory, whatever it is. The bedrock data before us is that the folk find some ascriptions acceptable in certain contexts, while finding others unacceptable. I am after a theory that explains such patterns of acceptance, not a theory which explains the folk explanation of those patterns of acceptance. Explaining the folk explanations might indeed be a very good thing to do. But it’s not the same thing as explaining the bedrock data themselves.
dependence or independence must be sharply distinguished from facts about truth value dependence and independence. To a first approximation, dialectical dependence and independence may be defined in terms of dialectical permissibility. $S$ is dialectically permissible for a player $p$ in the dialectical setting $D$ at $t$, roughly, if given the “common ground” of $D$ at $t$, the production of $S$ by $p$ in $D$ at $t$ would violate no norms of cooperativeness, perspicuousness, coherence, relevance, or the like which govern $D$ at $t$. I will say that $S$ and $S'$ are dialectically independent just in case for all dialectical settings $D$ and all players $p$, the dialectical permissibility of $S$ in $D$ at $t$ for $p$ neither entails nor is entailed by the dialectical permissibility of $S'$. Even if $S$ and $S'$ are dialectically independent, they may be co-permissible for some player in some dialectical setting $D$. I will say that $S$ dialectically depends on $S'$ just in case for all dialectical settings $D$, the dialectical permissibility of $S$ for a player $p$ in $D$ at $t$ entails the dialectical permissibility of $S'$ for $p$ in $D$ at $t$. Since the dialectical permissibility of the conjunction of (30) and (31) neither entails nor is entailed by the dialectical permissibility of (32), (32) is dialectically independent of (30) and of the conjunction of (31) and (32). But to say this is decidedly not to deny that truth of (30) and (31) entails the truth of (32). Not every truth, and not every way of expressing a given truth, is dialectically permissible in any given dialectical setting at any given time. Indeed, I shall argue that it is possible that when (30) and (31) are both true and dialectically permissible, (32) may be true, but nonetheless, not dialectically permissible.

I begin by introducing the notion of what I call the co-reference set of a given term for a given agent at a given time. If $a$ is an agent, and $n$ is a name with which $a$ is competent at $t$, the co-reference set of $n$ for $a$ at $t$ is the set of expressions in $a$'s referential repertoire such that either: (a) $t$ is explicitly co-

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10 Following Grice, I distinguish violating norms of cooperativeness, perspicuousness, coherence, relevance from the flouting of such norms. Though one who flouts a norm may give the appearance of violating that norm, flouting a norm is not the same as either surreptitiously violating it or openly opting out of it. Flouting is also different from situations in which one must violate one or the other of two conflicting norms. Flouting a norm, according to Grice, is something that one does blatantly, with no intent to mislead, and where there is no apparent clash of conflicting norms. In so doing, one puts one’s audience in the position of having to reconcile the open appearance of a violation with the assumption that one is, in fact, respecting the relevant norm. Conversational implicatures are generated, according to Grice, by the attempted reconciliation what is explicitly said, in apparent violation of the norms of cooperativeness, with the assumption that the cooperative principle is in fact being observed. I am not offering an alternative analysis of how conversational implicatures are generated here. My point is merely to stress that semantically equivalent expressions need not be dialectically equivalent -- perhaps because the utterance of one may, in a given context, generate a conversational implication that an utterance of the other would not generate.
referential with $n$ or (b) if $t$ is referentially independent of $n$, then $t$ is in the co-reference set of $n$ for $a$ just in case $a$ accepts the sentence $t = n$. When two referentially independent expressions $m$ and $n$ are such that $a$ accepts $m = n$ at $t$, I will say that $m$ and $n$ are in-the-head-co-referential for $a$ at $t$. In the head co-reference is distinct from real world co-reference. Expressions may be real world co-referential, without being in the head co-referential. Moreover, expressions may be in-the-head-co-referential, without being real world co-referential. Finally, it is important to stress that co-reference sets are defined agent by agent and moment by moment. In particular, two referring expressions may be in the head co-referential for a given agent at a given time, but not in the head co-referential for either the same agent or some distinct agent at a distinct time.

In the head co-reference is defined in terms of acceptance of identity sentences. Though there is an intimate connection between acceptance and belief, acceptance, qua attitude toward a sentence, must be sharply distinguished from belief, qua toward the proposition expressed by that very sentence. First, to believe the proposition expressed by a sentence is not ipso facto to accept that sentence. One who has no knowledge of English and its sentences can believe the proposition expressed by the English sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ even though she fails to accept that very sentence. Conversely, to accept a sentence is not ipso facto to believe the proposition expressed by that sentence. One can accept a sentence even if one does not know which proposition the sentence expresses. I do not mean to deny that acceptance is itself a kind of belief. To accept a sentence $S$ is to believe of $S$ that it expresses a some true proposition or other. The point is only that one can believe of a sentence that it expresses some true proposition or other without knowing which proposition that sentence expresses. Suppose, for example, that Brown does not know who Smith and Jones are. Suppose further that Black utters the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’. Assume that Brown takes Black at her word. She thereby comes to believe of the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’ that it expresses a truth, but she does not come thereby to believe that Smith loves Jones.

To be sure, if Brown merely recognizes some further grammatical and lexical facts about the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’ and its constituents, then even if she does not know who Smith and Jones are, there may be further propositions, closely connected to the accepted sentence, that Brown does come to believe in coming to accept the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’. For example, if she recognizes that ‘Smith’ and ‘Jones’ are names and knows the meaning of ‘loves’ then in coming to accept the sentence she thereby
comes to believe the further and more articulated proposition that the referent of ‘Smith’ loves the referent of ‘Jones’. But that, again, is still not the proposition expressed by ‘Smith loves Jones’.¹¹ We might say that Black believes that Smith loves Jones via acceptance of the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’ if she accepts ‘Smith loves Jones’ and knows which proposition it expresses. But we will not attempt to spell out at present just what it takes to know what proposition a sentence expresses. I take it to be a plausible (initial) hypothesis about the connection between belief and acceptance for creatures like us that if $P$ is a proposition such that $A$ (explicitly) believes that $P$, there is some sentence $S$ such that $A$ believes $P$ via acceptance of $S$.¹²

Armed with the notion of a co-reference set, we can give an initial statement of what I call the default co-reference constraint on belief ascriptions:

**Default Co-Reference Constraint:** If a sentence of the form:

$$A \text{ believes that } \ldots n \ldots$$

is dialectically permissible for a player $p$ in a dialectical setting $D$ at $t$ and it is common ground between $p$ and her interlocutors that $m$ is in the co-reference set of $n$ for $A$ at $t$, then a sentence of the form:

$$A \text{ believes that } \ldots m \ldots$$

is dialectically permissible for $p$ in $D$ at $t$.

The co-reference constraint says, in effect, that belief ascriptions are defeasibly dialectically sensitive to facts about ascribee co-reference sets, rather than to facts about either ascriber co-reference sets or to facts about real world co-reference. The fact that it is ascribee co-reference sets to which belief ascriptions are defeasibly sensitive explains why it is not in general dialectically permissible to move from (30) and (31) above to (32) above. When attitude ascriptions are sensitive to facts about ascribee co-reference sets, such ascriptions exhibit many of the hallmarks commonly associated with so-called *de dicto* ascriptions. But there are dialectical settings in which the default sensitivity of ascriptions to facts about ascribee co-reference sets is overridden in favor of sensitivity to facts about the co-reference sets which are elements of

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¹¹ It is rather, one form of what Perry (2001) calls reflexive content.

¹² Perry (1981) offers an account of the relationship between belief and acceptance very much in the spirit of the account offered here.
the common ground between speaker and hearer. In such dialectical settings, attitude ascriptions will exhibit many of the hallmarks of what are commonly called *de re* ascriptions. In such dialectical settings, whenever:

\[ m = n \]

is part of the common ground of \( D \) at \( t \) and

\[ A \text{ believes that } \ldots m \ldots \]

is dialectically permissible for \( p \) in \( D \) at \( t \), then:

\[ A \text{ believes that } \ldots n \ldots \]

is dialectically permissible for \( p \) in \( D \) at \( t \).

For illustrative purposes, consider the following scenario. Daniel Taylor, formerly a practicing Christian, decides to convert to Islam. In the course of his conversion, he adopts ‘Haazim Abdullah’ as his legal name. Because he suspects that his devoutly Christian parents, Sam and Seretha, would be distressed by this turn of events, he informs them of neither his change of faith nor his change of name. He does, however, confide in his siblings, Robert and Diane, that he has changed his name, that he has converted to Islam and that Sam and Seretha are unaware of his conversion. Consequently, it becomes mutually manifest to Robert and Diane that they, but not Sam and Seretha, accept the following identity:

\[ (33) \text{ Haazim Abdullah } = \text{ Daniel Taylor}. \]

Suppose that some time goes by. And suppose that Diane wishes to inform Robert that Seretha has still not figured out that Daniel, that is, Haazim, is no longer a practicing Christian. Suppose that it is common ground between Diane and Robert that: (a) (33) holds; (b) that Seretha does not accept (33); and (c) that she does not accept (33) because there is no name \( N \) such that Seretha is competent with respect to \( N \) and ‘Haazim Abdullah’ belongs to the co-reference set of \( N \) for Seretha. In the imagined dialectical setting, the inference from (34) below to (35) seems perfectly acceptable:

\[ (34) \text{ Seretha believes that Daniel is still a Christian} \]

\[ (35) \text{ Seretha believes that Haazim is still a Christian}. \]

Because it is part of the common ground that ‘Haazim Abdullah’ belongs to the co-reference set of no name with which Seretha is competent, the inference from (34) to (35) generates no imputation, in the relevant dialectical setting, that Seretha accepts (33). Because of what is common ground between Robert
and Diane an imputation that might otherwise be generated is simply forestalled. Similarly, because of the common ground of the relevant dialectical setting, the inference from (34) to (35) generates no imputation to the effect that (36) below is true:

(36) Seretha accepts ‘Haazim is still a Christian’.

It is precisely when facts about common ground co-reference relations operate to forestall imputations of acceptance that would otherwise be generated that the occurrence of an utterance like (35) will be dialectically governed by facts about common ground co-reference sets rather than by facts about ascribee co-reference sets.

There are, of course, dialectical settings in which the default sensitivity to ascribee co-reference sets is not overridden by any elements of the common ground. Suppose that Seretha learns, by listening to the news on the radio, of the artistic achievements of one Haazim Abdullah, an Islamic poet of some renown. Suppose that she does so without also coming to accept (33). Indeed, suppose that Seretha would explicitly reject (33). And suppose that Robert and Diane mutually know that Seretha has learned of Haazim Abdullah’s poetic achievements and that she has done so in a way that does not lead her to accept (33). Now consider the following ascriptions as they occur in a dialectical setting with a common ground of the sort just described:

(37) Seretha believes that Haazim is a very fine poet
(37’) Seretha believes that Haazim is not a very fine poet
(38) Seretha believes that Daniel is not a very fine poet
(38’) Seretha believes that Daniel is a very fine poet.

In such a dialectical setting, (37) and (38) can be simultaneously dialectically permissible, while both (37’) and (38’) are dialectically impermissible, despite the fact that it is part of the common ground between Robert and Diane that Daniel Taylor is Haazim Abdullah. In such a dialectical setting, I claim, an occurrence of (37) would generate an imputation to the effect that Seretha accepts ‘Haazim is a very fine poet’ and an occurrence of (38) would generate an imputation that Seretha would accept ‘Daniel is not a very fine poet’. Since Seretha does accept the relevant sentences, (37) and (38) are unproblematic. On the other hand, an occurrence of (37’) would generate the unacceptable imputation that Seretha would accept ‘Haazim is not a very fine poet’. Similarly for (38’). Hence neither (37’) nor (38’) is dialectically
permissible. This is so, I claim, just because in the imagined dialectical setting, the relevant ascriptions are naturally interpreted as being dialectically governed by facts about ascribee co-reference sets rather than by facts about common ground co-reference sets.

Earlier on in this essay, in the course of discussing Kripke’s puzzle about belief, I suggested that a mismatch between real-world-coreference and in-the-head-coreference can wreak havoc on our belief ascriptions. But we were not yet in a position to discuss the nature of that havoc. Now consider a dialectical setting in which although it is common ground between the interlocutors that (a) \(a\) and \(b\) are in-the-head-coreferential for the ascribee and (b) \(a\) and \(b\) are not real-world co-referential. Suppose, for example, that Black recognizes that Jones accepts the identity statement ‘Mars = Venus.’ And suppose that with evident intent of referring to Venus, Jones utters the following:

\[
(39) \text{I see that Venus is visible tonight.}
\]

Black intends to report to Brown the belief expressed by Jones. With the imagined common ground between Black and Brown, (40) is, but (41) is not a permissible way for Black to report Jones’s belief:

\[
(40) \text{Jones believes that Venus is visible tonight}
\]

\[
(41) \text{Jones believes that Mars is visible tonight.}
\]

In particular, the dialectical permissibility of (40) does not license (41) despite the fact that it is common ground that Jones accepts the relevant identity. Suppose, moreover, that Jones utters (42) below rather than (39) above:

\[
(42) \text{I see that Mars is visible tonight.}
\]

But suppose that it is common ground between Black and Brown that Jones intends by her use of ‘Mars’ to refer to Venus rather than to Mars. It still seems impermissible to report the belief expressed by Jones via (41) rather than (40). That is, even if Jones may mistakenly take ‘Mars’ to be a name for Venus, Black can’t make ‘Mars’ so function in her own mouth merely by embedding it within a that clause. And that, I claim, is because contrary to Frege and many others embedding simply has no semantic effect on names or any other singular referring expression.

To be sure, I have argued elsewhere that there is a way to depict, within a belief ascription, the information that Jones uses ‘Mars’ as a name for Venus in a dialectical setting like the one just imagined.
One needs merely to mount what I elsewhere call a fulsomely de re ascription\textsuperscript{13}. An example of such an ascription is the following:

(43) Jones believes of Venus, which she takes to be called ‘Mars,’ that it is visible tonight.

I will not elaborate at length on the nature and significance of fulsomely de re ascriptions here, however. Suffice it to say that such ascriptions are, contrary to much received wisdom, the main device we have for making notionally sensitive, ascribee-centered ascriptions.

Now in the scenario recently imagined, Jones’s confusion can plausibly be viewed as “linguistic” rather than “substantive.” But consider one who is substantively confused about the identity of the planet Mars. Jones is an inept astronomer who fancies herself the first to realize that Mars and Venus are one and the same planet. Before her spurious “discovery” Jones is as linguistically competent as the rest of us in that she uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Venus and ‘Mars’ to refer to Mars. No doubt, her discovery commits her to some serious reconfiguration of her notions of Mars and Venus. But it is not obvious that such reconfigurations would ipso facto cause her no longer to be numbered among the linguistically competent. Indeed, linguistically and cognitively speaking, Jones would appear to be no worse off than someone who believes that Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorous. When Jones makes such bizarre statements as:

(44) Mars is Venus

she is certainly speaking falsely, but she is still speaking competently.

Suppose that Brown recognizes the nature of Jones’s confusion and wants to inform Black of Jones’s beliefs in a dialectical situation in which it is common ground between Black and Brown that Mars is not Venus. Imagine, for example, that Jones has uttered (39) above -- with evident intent, again, to refer to the currently visible Venus rather than to the not yet visible Mars. Jones has, it seems, expressed a belief to the effect that Venus is currently visible. After all, she sees Venus in the evening sky. And she correctly uses the name ‘Venus’ to refer to the very object that she sees. On the other hand, since Jones takes that very object to be Mars as well, it seems right to say that she believes that Mars is visible in the evening star. Jones would, after all, accept both the sentence ‘Venus is visible tonight’ and the sentence

\textsuperscript{13} See Essay VII and also Taylor(2002) for a more fulsome account of fulsomely de re ascriptions and their significance.
'Mars is visible tonight'. Moreover, it seems arguably correct that Jones knows which proposition the relevant accepted sentence expresses. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that both (40) and (41) are dialectically permissible, and even true, in the imagined dialectical setting. Jones total belief state might be represented by (45):

(45) Jones believes that Venus is visible and that Mars is visible.

Unfortunately, (45) does not specify the character of Jones’s confused notions of Mars and Venus. It does not depict, for example, the fact that by Jones’s notional lights Mars and Venus are one and the same planet. One again, if we want our ascription to depict the character of Jones’s confused notions of Mars and Venus it is not the mechanism of embedding that we need to exploit but the mechanism of fulsomely de re ascriptions, as in:

(46) Jones believes of Venus, which she takes to be identical with Mars, that it is visible tonight.

IX Conclusions

The arguments offered in this paper lend weight to a view about the proper explanatory scope and limits of semantic theory generally. I began this essay by suggesting that philosophers of language have paid insufficient attention to the peculiar lexical-syntactic character of names. I argued that a premature and narrow focus on the lexical-semantics of naming has led many to load explanatory burdens onto semantic theory that are better discharged elsewhere. In the case of Frege’s puzzle about the possibility of informative statement identity statements, for example, I argued that the very possibility of such statements is really a straight-forward consequence of the peculiar lexical-syntactic character of the category NAME. If that is right, the possibility of such statements has nothing directly to teach us about the lexical-semantics of that category. If not, it is no part of the burden of a theory of the lexical-semantic character of names to account for the possibility of such statements. The view that philosophers of language have loaded explanatory burdens on semantic theory that properly rest elsewhere also animates my approach to empty names and to explaining the peculiar behavior of names within propositional attitude contexts. Philosophers of language have, I believe, mistakenly attributed failures of substitutivity within propositional attitude contexts to semantic shifts of one sort or another to which embedding somehow is supposed to give rise. With that semantic outlook goes the widely endorsed thought that propositional
attitude statements which differ only by co-referring names may differ in truth value. But I claim to have shown that our intuitions in the problematic cases really concern not matters of truth value dependence and independence, but matters of dialectical dependence and independence and I insist that dialectical dependence and independence must be sharply distinguished from truth value dependence and independence. If my arguments can ultimately be sustained, then, contrary to much received wisdom, the burden of explaining the peculiar behavior of names within proposition attitude contexts falls more heavily to pragmatics and less on semantics than many have imagined.

The arguments of this essay do not, it should be stressed, spell the end of semantic theory. There is, I think, much explanatory work for semantics to do, as the essays that follow will demonstrate. But my arguments do entail that semantics has far fewer explanatory burdens to discharge, and syntax and pragmatics far more burdens to discharge, than philosophers of language have heretofore imagined. Moreover, I believe that once we have a proper appreciation of just what explanatory burdens are proper to semantics, many of the arguments which have been wrongly thought to be obstacles to referentialism simply wither away.