THE 2000 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
CAN RETROSPECTIVE VOTING BE SAVED?

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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, John Zaller (1998) suggested that the movement of President’s Clinton’s job approval ratings during and after the scandal posed a serious challenge to a major line of political science research. After plunging when the scandal broke, Clinton’s job ratings recovered, then rose to a level higher than before the scandal, where they held to the end of his term. The American public seemingly resisted every attempt by the media or Republicans to frame the president’s behavior as anything other than a personal sexual impropriety. According to Zaller,

The tradition of studies on economic and retrospective voting, which maintains that the public responds to the substance of party performance, seems strengthened by the Lewinsky matter. On the other hand, the tradition of studies that focuses on the mass media, political psychology, and elite influence ... seems somewhat weaker… However poorly informed, psychologically driven, and “mass mediated” public opinion may be, it is capable of recognizing and focusing on its own conception of what matters. (1998: 186).
In Zaller’s view the apparent autonomy of public opinion during the media frenzy about the scandal supported those who view public opinion and electoral politics as driven by the “bottom line”—especially peace and prosperity—the so-called “fundamentals” of common political parlance. Zaller approvingly cites Key, Kramer, Mueller, Fiorina, Rosenstone and Brody (1998: 185).

“Bottom line” scholars of our acquaintance read Zaller’s article with some satisfaction—but not for long. In November 2000, for the fifth time in a decade, an American election jolted prevailing scholarly interpretations. For “bottom line” scholars the 2000 election should have been a lay-down slam for Al Gore. Indeed, a panel of seven election forecasters at the 2000 American Political Science Association meetings gave Gore from 53 to 60 percent of the two-party popular vote, with an average prediction of 56 percent (Wlezien, 2001: 27). But one hardly needed a statistical forecasting model to predict a Gore victory in 2000. The country had enjoyed a lengthy economic boom that had seen unemployment fall to levels previously considered impossible without sparking inflation, and burgeoning budget surpluses had replaced “two hundred billion dollar deficits as far as the eye can see.”

Elections are about more than economics of course, but the picture was equally positive on other fronts. The crime rate had been falling for several years, welfare reform was an apparent success, and American soldiers were not in harm’s way. Moreover, there was no significant divergence between traditional objective indicators and

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1 The 1992 elections brought unified Democratic control in the year that Fiorina (1992: 2) characterized Republican-headed divided government as the normal state of affairs in contemporary American politics. The Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 upset long-standing interpretations of congressional elections that presumed a more-or-less permanent Democratic congressional majority. The “status quo” election of 1996 (Ladd, 1997:1) produced an unprecedented pattern of divided government—the first Democratic president ever elected with Republican congressional majorities, contradicting arguments like Jacobson’s (1991) that voters naturally preferred Republican-headed divided control over the opposite. The Republican loss of House seats in 1998 undercut one of the hoariest generalization in American politics—that the party of the president loses seats in the mid-term election. The past decade has been quite hard on empirical generalizations about American elections.
subjective perceptions as there had been in 1992; presidential approval hovered around 60 percent, economic confidence was at 70 percent, and satisfaction with the state of the country as a whole was above 60 percent (Gallup, 2000). Nor, despite the subsequent economic slowdown, did any of these indicators begin to decline until after the election (Public Perspective November/December 2000: 40-42). Under such conditions the election was a foregone conclusion, or so the portrait of elections painted by "bottom line" scholars would have suggested.

But somehow Al Gore failed to receive the full benefit of these favorable circumstances. To be sure, he won the popular vote by a tiny margin, but his share of the two-party vote (~50.2 percent) was 3-9 points lower than forecast, making the election a cliff-hanger when many forecasters and pundits expected a landslide.

According to Hibbs’ (2000) “Bread and Peace Model” the probability that Gore’s popular vote would be this low or lower was less than .05.

Thus, whether the standard is sophisticated statistics or common sense, the puzzle is why Al Gore was not swept into the White House by a wave of approving retrospective voters who expected more of the same. This paper attempts to account for Gore’s under-performance. In the next section of the paper we discuss various explanations that have been offered. Some of these are consistent with the continued occurrence of economic, retrospective or “bottom line” voting, while others suggest reasons why such behavior did not occur or occurred less commonly or strongly than in

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3 Bartels and Zaller (2000) make the unique argument that the average of 48 forecasting models was reasonably accurate in 2000. They reach this conclusion by constructing a class of models that predict a Gore loss of 2-4 points under the conditions prevailing in 2000. These models that predict a Gore defeat partly balance out the models that predict a comfortable Gore victory. Given that their argument does not pass the straight face test, we can only surmise that the Bartels and Zaller piece is a brilliantly executed spoof of election forecasting.
the past. In the third section of the paper we bring as much data as we can muster to bear on the hypotheses. Some can be evaluated directly, others only indirectly, but the data support three hypotheses about Gore’s underperformance: (1) his failure to receive a historically typical allotment of credit for the performance of the Clinton administration; (2) voter disapproval of Bill Clinton as a person; (3) Gore’s puzzling decision to wage a neo-populist campaign. In the conclusion we discuss the possibility that these hypotheses are logically connected. Interestingly, we find little indication that the personalities of the candidates played any important role in the outcome.

WHY DID AL GORE FALL SHORT OF EXPECTATIONS?

For ease of exposition we divide the hypotheses offered for Gore’s electoral under-performance into three categories. (Table 1) Loosely speaking those in the first category grant that traditional “bottom line” considerations operated in Gore’s favor as usual, but suggest that these so-called fundamentals were overwhelmed by anti-Gore considerations that are not included in standard forecasting models. The allegedly unattractive personality of Al Gore is the most common suggestion. Hypotheses in the second category hold that the 2000 election was different in some important respect that weakened the impact of traditional “bottom line” considerations. Failure of voters to credit Gore with the performance of the administration is a common suggestion. Finally, in an argument that overlaps the preceding two categories, some have suggested that a one-off factor peculiar to 2000 --“Clinton fatigue” or “moral retrospective voting”— either overwhelmed the fundamentals, weakened their impact, or both.

*Overriding Hypothesis 1: Gore the Person*
During the campaign there was much discussion of Gore’s unattractive personal characteristics and mannerisms. He was depicted as arrogant and a know-it-all. He continually reinvented himself. He was the kind of boy who reminded the teacher she had not assigned homework. And he was a “serial exaggerator.” So widespread were these negative characterizations that Gore’s persona in the first debate was the subject of a famous *Saturday Night Live* skit that his own campaign advisers made him watch before the second debate—apparently with counter-productive consequences.\(^4\) In sharp contrast George Bush was portrayed as a likeable fellow whose comfort in his own skin made Gore’s unnaturalness all the more striking. Thus, a common explanation for Gore’s poor electoral showing is that a significant portion of the electorate just didn’t like him, bottom line considerations notwithstanding.

Most forecasting models contain no candidate variables,\(^5\) and some elections scholars believe the importance of candidate personality to be exaggerated. After all, the country did elect Richard Nixon twice, as well as George Bush the father. These presidents had various strengths but few would argue that their personalities were among the more noteworthy.\(^6\) Still, survey studies of voting behavior show candidate evaluations to be an important determinant of voting decisions, as well as a major source of change across elections (Stokes, 1966). To be sure, candidate evaluations incorporate experience, policy stands, and personal capabilities as well as personal attractiveness, but with a little effort we can construct reasonable measures of the latter.

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\(^4\) The popular consensus was that Gore overreacted to critical reviews of his behavior in the first debate and behaved too passively in the second.

\(^5\) An exception is Campbell’s (1996) model, which includes the Gallup Poll trial heat available at Labor Day.

\(^6\) In fact, the country came within an eyelash of electing Richard Nixon in 1960 when he ran against the far more personable John F. Kennedy.
from the American National Elections Studies (ANES). We will use these to determine whether voter evaluations of Gore the person were abnormally low.

Whatever the electorate’s evaluation of Gore’s personality there is the additional possibility that the effect of personality is stronger today than in the past. One line of argument holds that the candidates’ appearances on TV talk shows like Oprah, Leno, and Letterman, and non-traditional cable networks like MTV are recognition that American politics has entered a new era where the candidates are being evaluated more as entertainers than as executives. This line of argument suggests that even if evaluations of Gore are not unusually low, voters are weighting them more heavily when deciding how to vote. Such a change in voting behavior should show up in unusually large coefficients for candidate characteristics in voting models estimated with 2000 data as compared to those for earlier elections.

Finally, some Democrats contend that the media were unfairly hard on Gore, dwelling almost obsessively on his perceived personal shortcomings, particularly his exaggerations. Indeed, a preliminary study of media coverage during October found that Gore received more negative coverage than Bush, although other studies dispute this finding.\(^7\) This media hypothesis gains additional credence from suggestions that forecasting models went awry when the senior Bush was defeated in 1992 in part because the media created a perceptual picture of the economy that was significantly at odds with the real economy (Hetherington, 1996). The media variant of the Gore

\(^7\) The Project for Excellence in Journalism monitored 1,149 stories from seventeen news publications, television programs, and websites, reporting that 24 percent of Bush stories were positive compared to 13 percent of Gore stories. Conversely, fifty-six percent of Gore stories were negative, compared to 49 percent of Bush stories. See (www.journalism.org/publ_research/campaign1.html) (accessed July 10, 2001). In partial contrast, Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson (2001: Figure 11) report that Gore was treated more positively than Bush on the evening news shows from the Democratic convention until the beginning of October, but coverage was balanced thereafter.
personality hypothesis suggests that support for Gore should have been lower among avid consumers of the media, other things equal.

**Overriding Hypothesis 2: Campaign Positions**

Largely overlooked in discussions of Gore’s under-performance are the policies and programs advocated by the candidates. The reason probably lies in the common survey finding that voters tended to agree more with Gore than with Bush on the issues—education, health care, the environment, and so forth, which were generally those on which the Democrats have an advantage in public opinion. Thus, taking account of the candidates’ issue positions apparently only adds to the puzzle of Gore’s under-performance.

However natural, the preceding interpretation may be a misreading of the perceptions of the electorate. Many scholars and pundits think that Bill Clinton’s signal political contribution was to bring the Democratic party back to the center—to convince traditionally-oriented middle-class voters they had nothing to fear from electing a Democratic president. In contrast, many commentators saw Gore as running farther to the left than had Clinton. Particularly in view of Zaller’s (1998: 185-86) finding that ideological moderation is an important correlate of post-war presidential vote, we think it worthwhile to take a close look at voter perceptions of the candidates in 2000. Perhaps Al Gore lost support because of his ideological positioning. In the VNS exit poll, for example, more voters opined that Gore was “too liberal” (43 percent) than that Bush was “too conservative” (34 percent).

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8 Eg. Kinsley (2000). In part this may have been a response to Bradley’s challenge from the left in the primaries, but Gore seemed to make less of an effort to return to the center than did Bush after he lurched to the right to fight off the McCain challenge.
One reason that voters might view one candidate as more distant than another ideologically even though the former appears closer on a larger number of specific issues is that voters differ greatly in the intensity they feel about different issues. For example, the Gore campaign jettisoned its early embrace of strong gun control measures as the campaign increasingly focused on battleground states where Charlton Heston’s NRA rallies were drawing as many people as Gore’s campaign appearances—many in union jackets and caps. One can imagine a voter thinking “I agree with Gore on social security, health care and taxes, but I won’t vote for any bleeding-heart liberal who wants to take my gun away.” Similarly, Gore’s strong pro-choice stand may have distanced him from working class ethnic Democrats presumably most sensitive to traditional “bottom line” considerations. In sum, voters may judge a candidate’s liberalism or conservatism largely on the basis of one issue of intense concern to them.

**Difference Hypothesis 1: Vice-presidents Do Not Get Credit**

There are numerous suggestions as to why the electorate in 2000 might have failed to reward Al Gore for the performance of the Administration as much as the electorates of earlier elections have done in comparable circumstances. The simplest is that Gore was only the Vice-President. If Clinton had been able to run for reelection, he would have won easily, according to this hypothesis, but as the Vice-President, Gore was not able to claim credit to the same extent as a president. Consistent with this hypothesis, Lewis-Beck and Tien (2001) report a significant improvement in their 2001 forecast (after the fact) from incorporating an interaction between economic conditions and the absence of an incumbent (elected) president in the race.\(^9\) Other forecasters, however, report negative results (Hibbs, 2000; Lockerbie, 2001).\(^{10}\)

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\(^9\) The “elected” qualification assigns Gerald Ford to the non-incumbent candidate category in 1976.
Of course, a vice-president running in 1988 did not make that election look
different from others. Incumbent Vice-President George Bush did succeed a popular
president. Forecasting models based on the “fundamentals” (eg. Fair, 1988) were not
far off the mark, and detailed survey analyses concluded that Bush won largely on the
strength of voter evaluations of the Reagan administration (Abramson, Aldrich and
Rohde, 1990: 193-7; Shanks and Miller, 1991). Given that Clinton and Gore
emphasized the team notion heavily for most of their administration, why would “bottom
line” voting be weaker in 2000? Some hypotheses that follow provide potential answers.
But whatever the reason, this hypothesis suggests that the effects of presidential
approval and other retrospective evaluations on the vote should be weaker when the
vice-president seeks to succeed a president than when the president seeks reelection.

*Difference Hypothesis 2: “What have you done for me lately?”*

During the campaign, various commentators wondered whether the good
economic times had gone on so long that voters were taking them for granted. Many
studies suggest that voters are myopic (cf. Hibbs, 2000), and there are suggestions in
the economic voting literature that voters are more sensitive to changes than to levels.
Thus, the very fact of sustained prosperity may have worked against the Democratic
candidate—too many voters remembered nothing but the present good times and

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10 Re-estimation of Hibbs’ Model with the 2000 results included still does not find a significant
effect for vice-presidents. Personal communication from Jeremy Pope and Shawn Treier,
Stanford University, June 2001.

11 Indeed, it is the senior author’s recollection that forecasting models gained prominence
precisely because they predicted a Bush win during the spring of 1988 while Dukakis maintained
a lead in the trial heats until after the summer nominating conventions.
consequently discounted them.\footnote{12} This hypothesis suggests that economic retrospective evaluations should be a less important determinant of the vote for Gore than for previous vice-presidents.

\textit{Difference Hypothesis 3: Bill Gates and Alan Greenspan Did It}

In early 1999 a Rasmussen poll (\textit{Public Perspective}, 1999: 39) asked, “Who is most responsible for the strong economy, American businesses, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, President Clinton, Congressional Republicans, or Congressional Democrats?” Forty percent of the respondents credited business and 22 percent Greenspan, compared to 12 percent for Clinton, and a total of 25 percent for Clinton or either Congressional party. Thus, Americans in 2000 may simply have believed that a good economy was not contingent on who held the presidency. Such perceptions are reasonable enough. The country has been going through a transition to a more global, information-based economy, and the political system appears to be mostly in a reactive mode. Fiscal policy has ceased to be an important tool for managing the economy, and monetary policy czar Greenspan has received a great deal of positive press.

Unfortunately, there is no long time series of identical survey questions about responsibility for the economy. Lacking these we cannot directly test the hypothesis that Americans today believe that politicians affect the bottom line less than Americans of earlier eras believed. But there are some shorter time series that provide some support for the hypothesis.\footnote{13} The indirect implication of this hypothesis, of course, is that

\footnote{12} Consistent with this suggestion, an August Gallup poll (Moore, 2000) reported that 52 percent of Americans remembered 1992 economic conditions as excellent or good, whereas on average only 12 percent of Americans queried in 1992 actually reported such positive views.

\footnote{13} One ANES item reads “Would you say that the economic policies of the federal government have made the economy better, worse, or haven’t they made much difference either way.” The
economic evaluations were less important in the decisions of voters in 2000 than in earlier elections.

_Difference Hypothesis 4: Al Gore didn’t try to take credit_

Given that forecasting models do not include campaign variables, forecasters often are accused of claiming that “campaigns don’t matter.” On the contrary, most forecasters as well as proponents of “bottom-line” politics more generally hold a more complex view in which the campaigns are themselves dependent variables (Fiorina and Peterson, 2000: 305-306). At least at the presidential level both candidates have access to plenty of money and talent; thus, they will run campaigns as good as the background conditions permit. Running a good campaign is easy when you have peace and prosperity behind you as did Ronald Reagan in 1984 and Bill Clinton in 1996. But even with talent and money, running a good campaign is far more difficult if the opposition has peace and prosperity on their side, a predicament that faced Walter Mondale in 1984 and Robert Dole in 1996. Popular accounts often assume that the quality of the campaign is purely a function of the brilliance of the candidate and the quality of his personality. Thus, Republicans charge that Dole lost the 1996 election because he ran a terrible campaign. No doubt Dole should bear some of the blame, but the reverse causal argument is probably equally true: his campaign was terrible because he had no chance to win.

Some attribute Gore’s under-performance in 2000 squarely to a poor campaign. In particular, until late in the campaign Gore did little to claim credit for the successes of the Clinton administration. Given the objective conditions that prevailed in the country one would have expected a campaign organized around classic retrospective themes

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percentage answering “haven’t made much difference” is 41%, 57%, 53% and 60% for the elections of 1984-1996. Unfortunately, the item was not included in the 2000 study.
like “you’ve never had it so good!” “8 more years!” and “are you better off today than you were eight years ago?” Instead Gore asserted that “this is an election about the future not the past,” in effect throwing away his trump cards. Thus, voters may not have given him credit for peace and prosperity because—unusually and surprisingly—he made little attempt to claim credit.¹⁴

By content analysis it should be possible to test whether Gore in fact placed significantly less emphasis on the record of the Clinton Administration than did other incumbent party candidates running during good times, especially George Bush the elder in 1988. While such an enterprise is beyond the scope of this paper, like the preceding three hypotheses the poor campaign hypothesis predicts that the impact of retrospective evaluations on the 2000 vote was smaller than in the past, but the analyses to follow cannot tell us whether smaller coefficients stem from voters’ failure to give credit or Gore’s to take it.

2000 is an Anomaly Hypothesis: Moral Retrospective Voting

Why might Gore have decided not to claim credit for the performance of the Clinton administration? During the campaign there were suggestions in the media that psychological factors were at work. Gore wanted to be his own man (recall his widely-noted assertion to that effect in his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention), and win or lose on his own with no help from Clinton (eg. Brownstein, 2000), perhaps

¹⁴ True, divided control might have weakened the credibility of such a claim, but a majority of the thirteen elections used by the forecasters were instances of divided control, and Norpoth (2001) concludes that the president’s party bears responsibility for economic conditions whatever the pattern of institutional control. Generally, the tendency among scholars who study economic voting has been to assume that responsibility falls more or less automatically on the party of the executive and therefore is constant from election to election. The latter assumption is implicit, of course, in time series models that estimate a time-invariant coefficient for economic conditions.
because Clinton had displaced Al Gore Sr. as the object of Gore’s resentment. Psychologists are better equipped to evaluate such hypotheses, but interpretations like these run counter to the common perception that Gore would do anything to be president (Ceaser and Busch, 2001: 118-119).

A more political explanation is the belief in Democratic campaign circles that disapproval of President Clinton’s personal behavior was a serious drag on the vice-president. Going into the election the one negative in the public’s perception of the state of the nation was the belief that the country was morally on the wrong track, whatever the state of the economy or world affairs. According to some insiders, anything done to raise the association between Gore and Clinton would have produced a net loss of support—the impact of Clinton’s personal negatives would outweigh the positive impact of his job performance on support for Gore.

This argument holds that a previously unexamined variable played a major role in 2000—the retiring president’s personal approval. Analyses of presidential voting customarily include the job approval of the president, but personal variables typically are limited to those of the contending candidates. So, when the president is not himself a candidate, his personal approval is not included in the analysis.

One reason why analysts may not think to include such a variable is that personal and job approval for most presidents are closely related so that job ratings stand in for personal ratings as well. But a high correlation is not invariably the case. Jimmy Carter’s 1980 ratings were the converse of Clinton’s 2000 ratings: high personal

15 Such suggestions crossed the boundary into silliness at times. For example, “At some level I think he’s very angry about the way he was raised. This Oedipal dynamic lies at the heart of the campaign he has run. With big Albert dead, Gore has made Bill Clinton into a father figure, one who while ostensibly wishing him well is also causing him damage.” (Weisberg, 2000).

16 In the VNS Exit Poll 57 percent of the respondents said that the country was on the wrong track in terms of its moral climate.

17 Personal conversation with Sam Popkin, public opinion analyst for the Gore campaign.
and low job ratings. Reflecting these observations we will estimate 2000 voting models that include President Clinton’s personal standing as well as his job approval. If the former is a significant determinant of the vote, it may have overridden the traditional performance variables. In addition, if coefficients on the performance variables are lower than in past elections, that may have been the price of the Gore campaign’s attempt to minimize the negative coefficient on Clinton’s personal ratings.

ANALYSIS: THE 2000 ELECTION IN CONTEXT

The analyses that follow utilize data from the American National Election Studies (http://www.umich.edu/~nes/). This compilation of academic surveys contains a wealth of data on the past 13 presidential elections (1952-2000). The surveys are far more detailed than most commercial surveys and many important variables are measured in the same way over time, permitting temporal comparisons that are impossible when using commercial surveys and exit polls.

The Fundamentals

We begin with a brief consideration of whether the “fundamentals” have declined as factors in presidential voting. Table 2 reports statistical associations between voters’ perceptions of national economic performance and their evaluations of the president’s job performance. Since economic performance is perceived and not objectively measured, we include the voter’s partisan inclinations to control for rationalization and

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18 We begin in 1972 because that is the first year that the ANES includes the standard presidential performance item.
subjective perception. Finally, because the tables to come would grow increasingly unwieldy, for ease of comprehension we report only the statistically significant coefficients of the variables of interest. Complete statistics as well as data descriptions, variable definitions and estimation details are contained in Appendix 2 at http://www.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/.

Perceptions of economic conditions are associated with presidential performance judgements in each of the elections, with negative perceptions somewhat more consistently important than positive ones. While the 2000 coefficients are a bit smaller than earlier ones in the eight election series, the probabilities derived from them do not suggest a noticeably smaller association between economic conditions and presidential performance ratings in 2000. For example, the third column of the table shows the estimated difference in the probability that an independent voter approves of the president’s performance depending on whether she thought that national economic policies had made the economy better or worse. In 2000 the estimated impact of “better” versus “worse” economic perceptions on presidential performance ratings is .22; the average of the preceding five estimates using the same item is .26.

19 Voter partisanship has a strong and statistically significant impact in all models estimated in this paper; thus, we say no more about it. No one should be surprised that people who say they are Democrats (Republicans) are very likely to report that they approve the performance of a Democratic (Republican) president and generally vote for Democratic (Republican) candidates. As reported in the text, however, even with a control for voter partisanship, factors like performance ratings, candidate evaluations, and ideology have a significant impact on the vote.

20 Given obvious expectations about the signs of the coefficients, one-tailed tests are appropriate. Thus, the tables include probit coefficients with z values greater than 1.6, approximately the .05 significance level. All equations were estimated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), with missing date imputed by AMELIA (King, et. al. 2001).

21 From 1972-1980 the economic performance item referred to the trend in business conditions during the past year. From 1980 to the present the economic performance item asks whether the economic policies of the federal government have made the economy better or worse in the past year. Both items were included in 1980 and as the table shows the later item seems somewhat more strongly related to presidential performance judgments. Given the near decade-long length of the U.S. expansion, the references to “during the last year” seems less than optimal, but the item continues to have considerable explanatory power, even controlling for partisanship.
While the link between evaluations of economic performance and presidential performance largely held up in 2000, the link between presidential performance and the vote did not. Table 3 reports the individual-level relationship over time, based on our extended models that also include variables to measure voter partisanship, voter ideology, candidate ideological distance, candidate personal characteristics, and candidate records (all of which are described at greater length below). Even with myriad control variables, the association between presidential performance ratings and the vote is quite large and highly significant, but the coefficient in 2000 is lower than in the other seven elections. In this case the smaller coefficient does translate into a clearly lower probability impact. Of particular interest, simulations based on the comprehensive analyses reported in Table 4-6 ahead indicate that had Gore gotten the same boost from the fundamentals in 2000 as the senior Bush did in 1988, he would have received about nine percent more of the vote.

Thus, the fundamentals still mattered a great deal in 2000, but not as much as in earlier elections, whether because of Gore’s particular campaign decisions or some other reason(s). Although Clinton’s job ratings reflected the state of the economy to about the same degree as the ratings of previous presidents, his job ratings affected the vote less than job ratings did in all the earlier elections. Here alone is a sufficient explanation for the forecasters’ Waterloo in 2000: their longitudinal models assume the

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22 To some extent so did the direct effect of the economic variables on the vote. (Their indirect effect through presidential performance ratings did not decline, as noted above in the text). This decline is statistically much less noticeable than the weaker link between presidential performance and the vote, however, although it makes some contribution to the weaker impact of the fundamentals in our concluding calculations.

23 The 2000 coefficient is significantly smaller than the coefficients for the three elections in which an incumbent won a landslide reelection (1972, 1984, 1996), but the 95 percent confidence intervals for the elections of 1976, 1980, 1988 and 1992 overlap that for 2000.
fundamentals exert a constant effect over time, an assumption that apparently failed in 2000.

We now consider the effects of ideology, candidate personalities and Bill Clinton on the 2000 voting. We will not discuss the fundamentals again until the final section of this report.

Did Gore Run Too Far Left?

We constructed a general measure of voter distance from the candidates on the standard liberal-conservative scale. Figure 1 plots the comparative closeness of the in- and out-party nominees to the voting public, where a positive number indicates that the average voter places herself farther from the in-party than the out-party. In 2000 the average voter saw Gore as .7 of a scale position more distant than Bush. While this may not seem like a large number in absolute terms, it is the largest ideological disadvantage any candidate has registered in the eight elections in the series, larger even than Dukakis suffered in 1988 at the hands of the Bush Sr. campaign or McGovern suffered in 1972 at the hands of the Nixon campaign.

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24 Proximity measures are calculated in the usual way from seven point liberal-conservative scales on which respondents place themselves and the candidates. To calculate a score take the absolute value of the voter’s distance from the incumbent party candidate and subtract the absolute value of the voter’s distance from the out-party candidate (a positive value indicates the voter is closer to the out-party). These proximity measures can be questioned on at least two grounds. First, because scores are calculated only for voters who place themselves and both candidates, a significant number of voters must be omitted from the estimations. Second, the questions offer an incentive for the voter to rationalize her answer: if she likes Al Gore and intends to vote for him, is she not tempted to place him closer to herself than Bush whatever the reality? In recognition of these problems we estimated two sets of alternative models, one using voter self-placements alone instead of proximities, and a second omitting ideology entirely. These alternative analyses result in less missing data and one would presume less rationalization, but our conclusions about the relative importance of variables do not vary significantly with the measure used.

25 In 2000 an ANES question format experiment resulted in less than half the sample having ideology and proximity scores comparable to those in previous years. The sub-samples were randomly selected, but the smaller n (approximately 425 in the estimations that include the proximity measure) results in noisier data for 2000.
The statistical analyses reported ahead in Table 4 estimate the weight voters give to each point of relative ideological distance to be small, but significant. The coefficients are generally similar from election to election, but the 2000 coefficient is the smallest in the series. Thus, while Gore’s distance from the average voter is the largest in the series, the weight voters attached to it is the smallest, resulting in less electoral damage than otherwise would have occurred. Still, simulations based on our equations suggest that had Gore been as close to the average voter in 2000 as Clinton was in 1996, his vote would have increased by approximately 4 percent, all else being equal. He still would have under-performed, but almost certainly he would have won the Presidency.

Candidates

Estimating the independent impact of the candidates themselves is the most difficult task in this analysis. The reason is that the candidates at least in part are empty vessels into which voters can pour their hopes and fears. That is particularly true of newcomers to the national scene like George W. Bush. Moreover, voters’ judgments of the candidates are functions of the positions the candidates adopt and the records they have compiled. But since most of the critical commentary on Al Gore focused on his personality, or more broadly, on a set of personal attributes independent of his government experience and his policy stands, we need valid measures of the

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26 The exception is 1972. Not only was McGovern perceived as much farther from the public than was Nixon, voters appear to have given that perception exceptionally heavy weight. This finding is somewhat at odds with Popkin, Gorman, Phillips and Smith (1976) who argue that McGovern’s liberalism hurt him much less than the perception that he was not up to the job. Our results below (Tables 4-5) suggest that McGovern’s liberalism and Nixon’s record and experience were key. Unfortunately, however, in 1972 a split-half sample design in the ANES study halved the number of useable observations. For some reason voters with data on all variables are disproportionately pro-Nixon, so their weights may not be representative of the entire electorate.

27 We obtain this estimate by substituting the means of the 1996 candidate proximity values within each of the seven party ID categories for the actual 2000 values.
candidates’ personal attributes in order to investigate this explanation for Gore’s sub-par showing in 2000.

To compile such measures we turned to a set of open-ended questions about what voters like and dislike about the candidates. The ANES series includes these questions for every election since 1952. Voters answer in their own words and their responses are recorded verbatim, to be coded into broad categories at a later date. We took the list of coding categories (which has grown to more than 700 by 2000) and divided them into two. The first category—personal attributes—includes all comments about the candidates’ inherent characteristics—intelligence/stupidity, arrogance/humility, sincerity/insincerity, honesty/dishonesty, morality/immorality, and so forth. The complementary category is more heterogeneous and includes all the responses that seem in any way acquired—the candidates’ experience, records, issue positions, group allegiances, and so forth. We refer to this dimension simply as “impersonal.” Given our interest in voters’ feelings about the candidates as people, a clean first category is our primary concern.

28 Four questions are asked. The series begins: “Now I’d like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two major candidates for President. Is there anything in particular about (Republican candidate) that might make you want to vote for him?” The interviewer then probes for up to five responses. The negative variant of the question follows next: “Is there anything in particular about (Republican candidate) that might make you want to vote against him?” Analogous questions are asked about the Democratic candidate. While a respondent conceivably might offer a total of 20 (4x5) comments, in practice large majorities confine themselves to one or two comments in response to each question.

29 For the numerical codes placed in the “personal” category see Appendix 1 at http://www.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/.

30 The authors conducted two independent codings, one in early 2001 before the 2000 study was released, and another in the fall of 2001. The agreement was substantial. In the first coding 93 of approximately 700 codes were chosen as personal qualities. In the second coding six months later 97 codes were selected. Eight codes new in 2000 were added, and four general codes selected earlier were discarded (“people have confidence/ don’t have confidence in him,” and “just like/don’t like him.”)
Figures 2-5 summarize a fascinating history of Americans’ judgments of the presidential candidates in the second half of the 20th Century. We briefly discuss the entire sequences both because of their inherent interest and as a way of putting the 2000 race in a broader context.

Figure 2 compares public perceptions of Republicans on the personal and impersonal dimensions. There are two clear patterns. First, on balance voters generally feel positively about Republican candidates: only Goldwater in 1964 and Reagan in 1980 received a net negative rating. Second, in 10 of 13 elections Americans rate Republican candidates less positively on the personal dimension than on the impersonal dimension. In fact, in election after election Americans feel either neutral or conflicted about Republican presidential candidates as people, scoring them very close to zero. Surprisingly, this was true even for Eisenhower in 1956 and Reagan in 1984, both now warmly remembered in personal terms. As those observations indicate, pundits’ judgments after the fact often differ from what Americans felt at election time. In particular, it is striking that aside from Goldwater the Republican viewed most negatively on the personal dimension was Reagan in 1980. Popular history tends to forget that many Americans were quite nervous about entrusting this saber-rattling former movie actor with the presidency.

And what of 2000? Bush’s reputed likeability does show up in the data. On the personal dimension, Bush actually is the highest rated Republican in the half-century—higher than Eisenhower in 1956 and Reagan in 1984. In absolute terms the population

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31 The points in the graphs are the averages across all voters who were asked the questions that year. Each positive comment gets plus one point and each negative comment minus one point. The voter’s score is the sum of the positives and negatives.

32 A zero score for a voter can reflect either no comments at all or an equal number of positives and negatives. Similarly, an average near zero across all voters can reflect any mix of neutral feelings among some voters along with a near balance of voters who like and dislike the candidate.
still rates him very close to neutral, to be sure, but for a Republican he was well-liked. Note however, that on the experience/record/issues/groups/other dimension, Bush is lower than any Republican except Goldwater, although still close to the neutral point.

Figure 3 reports analogous figures for Democrats. Here, patterns are not apparent. On balance Democrats are evaluated negatively about as often as they are evaluated positively, and they are rated more highly as people about as often as they are rated more highly on the impersonal dimension. Overall, McGovern in 1972 was the weakest Democrat in the series, but Bill Clinton in 1996 set the low water mark on the personal dimension. As for Al Gore, he does not particularly stand out. He is rated very near the neutral point in both categories, although on the personal dimension he bests only Clinton in 1996, McGovern in 1972, and Humphrey in 1968. Overall, Gore was not as well-liked personally as most of his Democratic predecessors, but there is little indication in the data that Americans found him particularly unlikeable.

Figure 4 rearranges the data to contrast Republican and Democratic candidates on the personal dimension. Americans tend to like Democrats at least as much as Republicans. The biggest Democratic edge occurred in 1980, but although Americans liked Jimmy Carter considerably more than Ronald Reagan, that was not nearly enough reason to reelect him. Similarly, the largest Republican edge occurred in 1996, but Americans did not dislike Bill Clinton enough to elect Robert Dole, whom they disliked too, just not as much. Such findings should reassure those who fear that presidential politics has degenerated into a personality contest.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} Over the time series there is a dramatic increase in the proportion of responses that fall in the personal category, from less than 15 percent in the 1950s to more than 60 percent in recent elections. At first glance, this appears to be striking evidence in support of those who claim that the modern media, especially TV, have perverted politics. TV covers politics in highly personal terms, and voters apparently have begun to take the cues and do likewise when asked about the candidates. As the examples in the text suggest, however, voters are perfectly willing to defeat candidates whom they like and elect those whom they don’t. Moreover, the statistical analyses reported below show no increase in the weight voters give to personal evaluations when making their choices.
Figure 4 also shows that John Kennedy did not win in 1960 because of his personality—Americans liked Nixon about as much. Nor as is popularly believed, did Dukakis lose in 1988 because voters thought he was a dweeb. Perhaps he was, but Dukakis was rated ever so slightly more positively than George Bush the elder. As for 2000, George Bush the younger does have a slight edge over Al Gore, the first time a Republican was rated both positively and higher than the Democrat since Nixon in 1972.

Figure 5 contrasts Republicans and Democrats on the record/policies/groups dimension. Republican candidates have a clear edge in this category, achieving a higher rating in eight elections, and essentially tying in two more. But Al Gore is one of only three Democrats in a half-century to have an edge in this category and the first since Carter in 1976. Conversely, Bush was the first Republican since Nixon in 1968 to be rated clearly lower on the impersonal dimension.

In sum, Americans in 2000 did not register strong feelings about the candidates, either individually (a majority gave both Bush and Gore neutral ratings) or in the aggregate. Americans did not like Al Gore personally as well as they liked many of his predecessors or, of greater relevance, quite as much as they liked George Bush. But the differences are small, and--unusual for a Democrat--Gore bested Bush on the impersonal dimension. All in all, despite the attention it received in the popular press and the late night TV shows, it appears that the candidate factor in 2000 was a wash.

34 “If the eventual account given by the political histories is that Nixon was a weak candidate in 1960, it will be largely myth.” (Stokes, 1966:22).

35 These findings are consistent with those of Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson (2001: Figure 10) who conclude (using different data and measures) that Bush topped Gore on character whereas Gore topped Bush on competence.

36 Clearly there is much more that can be said about this subject, and one of us currently is investigating the candidate factor more intensively (Abrams, 2002). But our preliminary investigations have found little reflection in the ANES data of various popular claims about the candidate factor in 2000. For example, high media consumers were no more or less likely to focus on candidate personalities than low media consumers—the Oprah hypothesis has little
Comprehensive Analysis

Statistical estimates of the weights voters in each election assigned to presidential performance, ideology, and candidate evaluations appear in Tables 4-6. The tables differ only in their treatment of ideological position. The equations in Table 4 include the calculated proximity measure discussed above and plotted in Figure 1, the equations in Table 5 substitute ideological self-placement for candidate proximity, and the equations in Table 6 omit an ideological variable entirely. Thus, the number of cases underlying the estimates increases from table to table. The Republican candidate variables are marginally weaker statistically when ideology is included in the equations (Tables 4-5), the Democratic candidate variables marginally stronger.

The estimates show no significant trends. In 1972 the coefficients on ideology and candidate characteristics were especially large, but setting aside the possibly unrepresentative 1972 estimates, voters appear to weight ideology and candidate qualities about the same as a generation ago. In particular, the magnitudes of the candidate evaluation coefficients fall in roughly the same range across parties, across time, and across the personal and impersonal dimensions. In some elections candidate personal qualities seem to have mattered more than others. The post-Watergate 1976 election is the best example. Both Carter’s and Ford’s personal support on first inspection. Similarly, people interviewed before the first debate were no more or less likely to focus on candidate personalities than people interviewed after it, suggesting that Gore’s performance probably did not exert a significant direct impact on popular evaluations.

37 Use of self-placements rather than proximities gains an average of about 80 observations per election. Omitting ideology entirely gains an average of about 190 observations relative to self-placements.

38 See footnote 26.

39 This is consistent with Kelly’s and Mirer’s (1974) argument that one can predict the vote reasonably well by simply adding up the positive and negative responses without bothering to weight them.
evaluations mattered and mattered identically, but neither of their experience and other impersonal qualities show up statistically. In other elections personal qualities had no apparent impact. In 1988, for example, voters appear to have elected the senior Bush with little regard to the personalities they were choosing between. Whether the post-scan scandal context is coincidental or not, 2000 somewhat resembles 1976--the effect of ideological proximity was muted in the half sample where the data is available (Table 4), and in the whole sample available when proximity is omitted, the candidates’ personal characteristics had a significant effect on the voters’ choices (Table 6). Experience, record, group affiliations and everything else contained in the less personal dimension do not play a statistically discernible role.

The Clinton Factor

Earlier we noted that Gore did not get as big a boost from Clinton’s high job performance ratings as the senior George Bush did in 1988 from Reagan’s. One interpretation is that Gore ran a less than optimal campaign. But in order to draw such a conclusion, one would need evidence that a closer association with Clinton would have boosted Gore’s showing. There is no way to provide direct evidence—the campaign was what it was, but the indirect evidence suggests that the Gore campaign did have reason to fear that Gore might suffer from a closer association with Clinton.

Our conclusion reflects a closer comparison of the 1988 and 2000 elections. To the equations reported in Tables 4-6 we added another variable—a measure of the personal ratings of the retiring president. Numerous polls have shown that while Clinton’s job approval stayed quite high throughout the two years preceding the election, his personal ratings—never as high to begin with—were much lower. Unfortunately, the ANES studies ask the likes/dislikes questions only about the candidates, not retiring
presidents, so we can not measure how voters evaluated the latter in a manner comparable to how they evaluated the candidates. In fact, our options for rating retiring presidents are quite limited.

Although admittedly imperfect, we have utilized a set of so-called “affect” questions that ask the voter whether the president has ever made her feel angry, hopeful, afraid, or proud—two positive emotions, two negative ones. These items elicit emotional—even visceral—reactions to the president, and tap people’s feelings about the presidents as people.⁴⁰ We combine voter responses to give them net scores for President Reagan in 1988 and President Clinton in 2000.⁴¹ Figure 6 contrasts the two.

A majority of the 1988 sample evaluated Reagan positively on this index, with the most positive rating being the one most commonly observed. In sharp contrast, the 2000 sample rates Clinton much lower—a bit more than a third positive—with the most positive rating being the one least frequently observed. Did such ratings affect the decisions to support the vice-presidents of these presidents? The first two columns of Table 7 show that the answer is a striking yes. Over and above the influences already considered, emotional reactions to the retiring president are highly significant in a statistical sense. The estimated weights that voters attached to Reagan’s and Clinton’s personal ratings are nearly identical, but Reagan’s actual ratings were much more positive. Simulations based on these equations suggest that had Clinton’s personal

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⁴⁰ Evidence that responses to these items tap something beyond voter partisanship and performance evaluations comes from the fact that the coefficients on party ID, presidential approval, and economic condition are only marginally diminished by the addition of this measure to the equation.

⁴¹ The president got plus one point for each positive emotion indicated by a voter, minus one point for each negative emotion. So, each voter’s score lies between –2 and +2 inclusive. Again, zero can reflect either a balance of positive and negative emotions or no emotions.
ratings in 2000 been as positive as Reagan’s in 1988, Al Gore’s vote would have been approximately 3-4 percent higher, all else being equal.  

The third column of Table 7 investigates this matter a bit further. A new item on the 2000 ANES questionnaire asks the respondent whether, since 1992, the moral climate of the country has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same. As shown in Figure 7 the distribution of responses was quite skewed: less than 5 percent of the sample thought it had gotten better and 45 percent thought it had gotten worse. Adding these sentiments to the equation suggest that Bill Clinton’s personal behavior may have exacted a harsh penalty on voter support for Al Gore.

What of the Gore campaign’s contention that had they tried to associate Gore more closely with the economic successes of the Clinton administration, they would have simultaneously linked themselves more closely with the administration’s moral failings? We have no way of estimating what the trade-off might have been, but the implication of Table 5 is that such fears were not imaginary. Disapproval of Bill Clinton’s personal behavior hurt Al Gore. Whether a different campaign might have hurt him even more is one of those questions that will occupy pundits for years to come.

42 This estimate is obtained by substituting the means of 1988 Reagan ratings within the seven party ID categories for the actual 2000 Clinton ratings, reversing the scale so that strong Democrats in 2000 liked Clinton as much on average as strong Republicans in 1988 liked Reagan, and so on for the other categories.

43 Skeptics might object that this item is merely a proxy for whether the voter likes Clinton. Note, however, that the item does not mention the retiring President. Moreover, analysis indicates that the item behaves as one would expect if taken at face value. Controlling for voter partisanship and Clinton job ratings, belief in moral deterioration relates significantly to various indicators of religiosity and moral traditionalism. While Democrats naturally are less likely to believe that the country is going to hell than Republicans and independents, insignificant interactions between party ID and these measures indicate that religion and traditional morality had an across-the-board effect. For details see Appendix 3 at http://www.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/.

44 To be fair, Bill Clinton’s personal transgressions probably were not the only source of beliefs that the moral state of the country was on the decline.

45 In research now underway we are estimating congressional vote models analogous to the presidential models reported in Tables 4-6. If the vote for Democratic House candidates in 2000 reflected the economy and presidential performance to the same degree as in earlier elections,
SUMMARY: AL GORE’S UNDERPERFORMANCE IN 2000

A hirsute Al Gore’s “reemergence” in the summer of 2001 set off a flurry of speculation about his political future. Judgments about his prospects or lack thereof hinged heavily on the pundit’s beliefs about Gore’s loss. Did Gore barely top 50 percent of the two-party vote when a large number of forecasting models had him topping 55 percent because of his wooden personality? His populist campaign? The drag of Bill Clinton’s personal escapades? No one can answer that question with certainty, but the preceding analyses enable us to go beyond punditry and parlor talk. To sum up our results,

Al Gore the person. Of the various explanations for Gore’s poor showing, only the one that focuses on negative voter reaction to his personality finds little support in the data. Although Gore was not particularly popular, that alone hurt him little, if at all. Evaluations of both candidates were largely neutral within the population—both in the aggregate and individually, and there is no indication that voters attached any more weight to personality factors than they usually do.

Ideology. Consistent with the interpretations of the Democratic Leadership Council, Gore’s decision to run from the left exacted a vote penalty. Our estimates suggest that Gore’s decision to abandon Clinton’s centrist approach and campaign as a born-again
populist cost him about four percent of the vote, easily enough to lose the election, all else equal.

**Clinton Fatigue.** Consistent with the views of the Progressive wing of the Democratic Party, the personal transgressions of Bill Clinton finally came home to roost in 2000--but on Al Gore, not on Clinton. Many Americans who judged Clinton’s job performance favorably looked on his personal behavior with distaste, and many of them voted for Bush, perhaps contributing to the weaker relationship than normal between the fundamentals and the vote. Holding everything else constant, Clinton fatigue, broadly defined, probably cost Gore directly 3-4 percent of the vote, easily enough to lose the election.

**The Fundamentals.** Economic judgments and presidential performance operated more weakly in 2000 than in earlier elections. Whether the weaker effects resulted from the length of the good times, credit going to Alan Greenspan and Bill Gates, or the choices of the Gore campaign we can not say. But other things being equal, the weaker relationship made a difference of about nine percent as compared to the 1988 election when another vice-President followed a successful president. The weaker impact of the fundamentals turned a landslide into a defeat.

**Total.** Counter to what actually occurred, we re-run the election statistically correcting all of Gore’s mistakes or misfortunes: *Gore receives the same degree of credit for the economy and the administration’s performance as Bush got in 1988; Clinton’s personal ratings are as high as Reagan’s were in 1988, and Gore is as close to the center as*
Clinton was in 1996. If all these conditions hold, then Gore wins the election in a landslide, with 59 percent of the vote.46

Thus, Political Science forecasting models performed poorly in 2000 because the traditional effects of the fundamentals were muted, because the models omitted an important variable—Bill Clinton’s personal ratings—that worked in opposition to the fundamentals, and because Gore ran a neo-populist campaign that was not optimal given the views of the electorate. From the standpoint of an election forecaster everything that could go wrong, did.

The great question that we cannot answer is why the effects of the fundamentals were muted and why Gore ran the neo-populist campaign (“I will fight for you”) that he did. Quite possibly the answer to both questions is the same: the fundamentals were muted because Gore deliberately declined to claim credit for prosperity and chose instead to campaign in a way that minimized his association with Clinton. If so, and his fears of being tainted by Clinton’s sleazy behavior were justified, then there is little need to revise the forecasting models in any major way. Analysts need only add a presidential personal rating to their models.47

On the other hand, if further research shows that the effects of the fundamentals were muted in 2000 because of a shift in the underlying processes by which voters evaluate the candidates, then the models will continue to go awry.

46 Taken all together the considerations do not predict a historically unprecedented victory for Gore because the effects are not simply additive. Declining marginal impact is inherent in probit and logit models. In particular, in this instance the effect of the fundamentals is so large that the votes of most marginal voters are moved by that factor alone, leaving few additional voters for Clinton personal ratings and Gore’s ideological distance to move.

47 Given the unusual disjunction between the two kinds of ratings for Bill Clinton, a dummy variable for 2000 might work just as well.
REFERENCES


Politics 63: 414-35.


Table 1: Why Did Al Gore Under-Perform?

**Overriding Factors Not Included in Models**

- Hypothesis 1: Al Gore
- Hypothesis 2: Issues

**2000 Differences not Captured by Models**

- Hypothesis 3: Vice President
- Hypothesis 4: What Have You Done for Us Lately?
- Hypothesis 5: Bill Gates and Alan Greenspan
- Hypothesis 6: Wrong Campaign

**Anomalous Factors Important in 2000**

- Hypothesis 7: Moral Retrospective Voting
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Note: 1972 – 1980I equations use “business conditions” as economic measure
1980II – 2000 use “economic policies of the federal government” as economic measure

* Probit of presidential approval on economic perceptions, controlling for party ID. Only coefficients significant at .05 included.

** Difference in probability that an Independent approves of the president’s performance as a function of perceiving economic conditions to have gotten better or worse.
Table 3: Has the Link Between Presidential Performance and Presidential Vote Weakened?

*Probit of two-party presidential vote on presidential approval, controlling for Party ID, candidate evaluations and economic perceptions.

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Table 4: Voting Models with Candidate Proximities

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* Probits of two-party presidential vote on party ID, economic perceptions, presidential approval, candidate proximity, and four measures of candidate evaluation. Only coefficients significant at .05 included.
Table 5: Voting Models with Ideological Self-Identification

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*Probits of two-party presidential vote on party ID, economic conditions, presidential approval, ideological self-identification, and four measures of candidate evaluations. Only coefficients significant at .05 included.
### Table 6: Voting Models with No Ideology Measure

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*Probits of two-party presidential vote on party ID, economic conditions, presidential approval and four measures of candidate evaluation. Only coefficients significant at .05 included.*
Table 7. Moral Retrospective Voting*

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* Only coefficients significant at .05 included
X indicates variable not included in the equation
Figure 1. In-party Proximity Minus Out-Party Proximity

Source: The American National Election Studies
Figure 2. ANES Likes/Dislikes: Republican Candidates

Figure 3. ANES Likes/Dislikes: Democratic Presidential Candidates
Figure 4. ANES Likes/Dislikes: Personal Qualities

Source: The American National Election Studies

Figure 5. ANES Likes/Dislikes: Experience, Record, Positions

Source: The American National Election Studies
Figure 6. Reagan Had Higher Personal Positives Than Clinton

![Graph showing the Affect Index comparison between Reagan and Clinton](image)

Note: The Affect Index has been calculated from the respondent’s responses to “Does (Reagan/Clinton) make you feel (angry, afraid, hopeful, and proud)?” -2 and 2 are the extreme negative and positive ratings respectively, with zero being a neutral affect rating. Source: American National Election Studies.

Figure 7. Nation’s Moral Climate Since 1992

![Bar chart showing moral climate change](image)

Source: American National Election Studies.