

### Appendix 3

The moral decline variable included in column 3 of Table 7 is relatively new--ANES first included the item in the 1996 survey. Thus, most readers will be unfamiliar with the variable and its correlates. Table A1 displays a set of ordered probit models where the left hand side variable comes from the question: "Would you say that compared to 1992, the nation's moral climate has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?" Those who found it better or worse then were asked to qualify it as "much" or "somewhat." A higher score indicates that respondents felt the moral climate had declined.

To determine whether this variable is more than a reflection of partisanship or performance evaluations—we modeled perceptions of moral decline as a function of partisanship, presidential approval, and various measures of religiosity and moral traditionalism. The moral traditionalism index consists of four questions that ask whether or not new lifestyles are contributing to social breakdown, whether or not people should adjust their views to or tolerate new morality, and the importance of family ties. To create the religiosity index we used church attendance, a measure of how important religion is in the respondent's life, and how often a person reported praying. We attempted several different specifications of these indexes (including simply employing an array of dummy variables) and did not find our conclusions to vary significantly.

Unsurprisingly, Democrats were less likely than Republicans and independents to judge that the moral climate of the country had declined. Additionally, approval of Clinton's job performance has a negative association with perceptions of moral decline. But both the traditionalism and religiosity indexes contribute significantly to a perception of moral decline, consistent with the idea that people's evaluations of Clinton (and ultimately Gore) were partially rooted in a moral calculus. While we expected to find significant interaction effects between party ID and religion or traditionalism, there is not much evidence of these--religiosity and moral

traditionalism affect Democrats and Republicans more or less the same. Importantly, despite the finding that Democrats were less likely to perceive moral decline, there is not much difference between Republicans and independents, meaning to the degree that a partisan effect existed, it was mostly a function of committed Democrats who claimed that the moral climate either had gotten better or stayed the same.

*Table A1: Moral Climate Ordered Probit Models*

<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>
Democrat	-0.2494	(0.1040)	-0.1656	(0.1192)	-0.2125	(0.2022)
Republican	0.1515	(0.1067)	0.1724	(0.1269)	0.2437	(0.2118)
Presidential Approval	-0.4744	(0.0732)	-0.4533	(0.0738)	-0.4771	(0.0734)
Traditionalism	0.0973	(0.0101)	0.1384	(0.0336)	0.0975	(0.0101)
Religiosity	0.0370	(0.0146)	0.0367	(0.0146)	0.0506	(0.4230)
Dem:Trad.			-0.0628	(0.0354)		
GOP:Trad.			-0.0186	(0.0361)		
Dem:Rel.					-0.0098	(0.0458)
GOP:Rel.					-0.0234	(0.0475)
Intercept	2.3382	(0.1401)	2.2508	(0.1515)	2.2889	(0.2045)