The Structure of Information in
Competitive Bidding
(Ph.D. Dissertation),
Economics, Organization and
Management (with John
Roberts),
Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob
Wilson, edited
volume with coeditors Bengt Holmstrom and Alvin Roth,
Putting Auction Theory to Work,
Robust Comparative
Statics (with Susan
Athey and John Roberts), Princeton University Press (in preparation).
Published Articles
1. On
Understanding the Effects of GAAP Reserve Assumptions, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 27, 1975, 71‑88.
2. Measuring
the Interest‑Rate Risk, Transactions
of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 241-57.
3. Reply
to the Comments on “Measuring the Interest Rate Risk,” Transactions of the Society of Actuaries,
XXXVII, 1985: 297-302.
1. A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential
Information, Econometrica, 47,
1979, 679‑88.
2. Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive
Bidding, Econometrica, 49, 1981,
921‑43.
Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer,
3. The
Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (with Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics,
10, 1982, 105‑14.
Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer,
4. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (with Robert
Weber), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 1089‑1122.
Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein,
Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson,
Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited
by Paul Klemperer,
Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions,”
edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers,
2000.
5. Competitive
Bidding with Proprietary Information (with Richard Engelbrecht‑Wiggans
and Robert Weber), Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 11, 1983, 161‑69.
6. The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey, Social Goals and Social
Organization: A Volume in Honor of Elisha Pazner,
edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and
H. Sonnenschein,
7. Auction
Theory, Advances in Economic Theory:
Fifth World Congress, edited by Truman Bewley,
8. Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, Summer 1989, 3-22.
Reprinted in Readings in Microeconomic Theory, edited by Manfredi
La Manna,
9. Procuring
Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work, in Le Prix Nobel: The Nobel Prizes, 1996, Nobel Foundation, 1997,
382-392.
10. Game
Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, European
Economic Review, 42 (1998), 771-778.
11. Procuring
Universal Telephone Service, in 1997
Industry Economics Conference, Industry Commission (ed.), Conference
Proceedings, 10-11 July 1997, AGPS,
12. Combination
Bidding in Spectrum Auctions, in Competition,
Regulation and Convergence: Current Trends in Telecommunications Research,
Sharon Gillett and Ingo Vogelsang (Eds),
13. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II (with
Robert Weber), in The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul
Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
14. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending
Auction, Journal of Political Economy,
108:2 (April, 2000), 245-272.
15. Package
Bidding: Vickrey vs Ascending Auctions (with
Lawrence M. Ausubel), Revue Economique, vol.
3, no 3, May 2002, 391-402.
16. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (with
17. The
Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial
Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
18. Ascending
Proxy Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions
(Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.
19. The
Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Design
(with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton), in Combinatorial Auctions
(Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds),
MIT Press, 2005.
20. Matching
with Contracts (with John Hatfield), American
Economic Review 95(4), 2005, 913-935.
21. Package
Auctions and Package Exchanges (2004 Fisher-Schultz lecture). Forthcoming in Econometrica.
1. Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An
Equilibrium Analysis (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 443‑59.
Reprinted in Industrial Organization, edited by
Oliver Williamson,
Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by
Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson,
Reprinted in Readings in Industrial
Organization, edited by Luis M.B. Cabral,
2. Predation,
Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (with John Roberts), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 280‑312.
Reprinted in Antitrust and
Competition, edited by Andrew Kleit,
3. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (with John
Roberts), Journal of Political Economy,
94, 1986, 796-821.
Reprinted in Antitrust and
Competition, edited by Andrew Kleit,
Reprinted in The Economics of Marketing, Martin Carter,
edited by Mark Casson and Vivek
Suneja,
Reprinted in Readings in
Industrial Organization, edited by Luis M.B. Cabral,
4. Predatory
Pricing, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic
Theory and Doctrine, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.),
5. Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial
Organization (with John Roberts), AEA
Papers and Proceedings, 77, May 1987, 184-93.
6. An
Essay on Price Discrimination, The
Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond,
edited by George Feiwel,
7. New
Theories of Predatory Pricing (with John Roberts), Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics, Giacomo Bonanno and Dario Brandolini (eds.),
8. Deterring Predation in Telecommunications: Are Line-of-Business
Restraints Needed? (with Susan Gates and
John Roberts), Managerial and Decision
Economics, 16 (July‑August, 1995), 427‑438.
Reprinted in Deregulating Telecommunications: The Baby Bells' Case for
Competition, R.S. Higgins and P.H. Rubin, eds.
1. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (with Bengt Holmstrom), Econometrica, 55(2) March 1987, 303-28.
Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory
of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont,
2. Relying
on the Information of Interested Parties (with John Roberts),
3. Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility
Hypothesis (with Sharon Oster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102,
August 1987, 453-476.
4. Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient
Organization Design, Journal of
Political Economy, 96(1), February 1988, 42-60.
5. An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational
Responses (with John Roberts), American
Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), July 1988, S154-S179.
6. Economic
Theories of Organization: Past, Present and Future (with John Roberts), Canadian Journal of Economics, 21,
August 1988, 444-58.
Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Reader, Peter Buckley and Jonathan Michie,
eds.,
7. The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes
(with John Roberts), American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1990, 154-9.
8. Short
Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships (with Drew Fudenberg and
Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Economic
Theory, 51(1), June 1990, 1-31.
9. Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and
the Organization of Economic Activity (with John Roberts), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy,
edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Reprinted in Transaction Cost
Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten,
Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics,
edited by Claude Ménard,
Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner,
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics,
edited by Claude Ménard,
10. Regulating
Trade Among Agents (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, 146(1), March 1990, 85-105.
Reprinted in The New Institutional Economics, edited by Erik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter,
11. A
Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (with John Geanakoplos), Journal
of Japanese and International Economies, 5, 1991, 205‑225.
12. Multitask Principal-Agent
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design
(with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
VII Sp, 1991, 24‑52.
Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten,
Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory
of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont,
Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics,
edited by Claude Ménard,
Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and
Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
13. Organizational
Prospects, Influence Costs and Ownership Changes (with Margaret Meyer and John
Roberts), Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 1(1), 1992, 9-35.
14. Pay,
Perks and Parachutes: Do They Pay? (with John
Roberts), Stanford Business, 1992.
15. The
Firm as an Incentive System (with Bengt Holmstrom), American Economic Review, 84(4), September 1994, 972-991.
Reprinted in The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives, edited by Nicolai Juul Foss, Routledge, 2000.
Reprinted in
16. The
Internal Politics of the Firm (with John Roberts), The Politics of Exchange and the Economics of Power, Samuel Bowles,
Maurizio Franzini and Ugo Pagano (eds.), Routledge, 1998.
1. Communication
and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production (with John
Roberts), Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 90, 1988, 275-89.
2. The
Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization
(with John Roberts), American Economic
Review, 80(3), June 1990, 511-28.
Reprinted in Vestnik St. Petersburgskogo Universiteta,
Economics seria (the Journal of the Economics
Faculty of St. Petersburg University) 5(2), 1993 (in translation).
Reprinted in Economics of the Firm: Lessons in Business Organization edited by
Andrei Demin and Valery Katkalo,
Reprinted in The Economics of Communications and Information edited by Donald Lamberton,
Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions,”
edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers,
2000.
3. Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of
Modern Manufacturing (with Yingyi Qian and John Roberts), American Economic Association Papers and
Proceedings, May 1991, 85‑89.
4. Johnson Controls, Inc --
Automotive Systems Group: The
5. Complementarities
and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing
(with John Roberts), Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 19(2‑3), March-May, 1995: 179-208.
6.
The
Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization: Reply,
American Economic Review, 85
(September, 1995) 997‑999.
1. Competitive
Effects of Internet Peering Policies (with Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), in The Internet Upheaval,
edited by Ingo Vogelsang and Benjamin Compaine,
2. An
Economist’s Vision of the B-to-B Marketplace.
3. Advances
in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements (with Stan Besen, Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan
Srinagesh), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2001.
1. Complementarities
and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization (with John
Roberts), Estudios Economicos,
9(1), 1994: 3-42.
2. Continuous
Adjustment and Fundamental Change in Business Strategy and Organization
(with John Roberts), Trends in Business Organization:
Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness?, Horst Siebert, ed., Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),
1995.
3. Complementarities in the
Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis (with Susan Gates and John
Roberts), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions, John McMillan and
Barry Naughton (eds),
1. Information,
Trade and Common Knowledge (with Nancy Stokey),
Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 1982,
17‑27.
2. Private Information in an
Auction‑Like Securities Market, Auctions, Bidding and Contracting: Uses and Theory, edited by
R. Engelbrecht‑Wiggans, M. Shubik and
R. Stark,
3. Bid,
Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading
(with Larry Glosten), Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 1985, 71‑100.
Reprinted in Financial Intermediaries, Mervyn Lewis (ed),
Reprinted in Microstructure: The Organization of Trading
and Short Term Price Behavior, edited by Hans R Stoll,
4. The
Real Output of the Stock Exchange (with Timothy F. Bresnahan and Jonathan
Paul), Output Measurement in the Services
Sectors, edited by Zvi Griliches,
1992, 195-216.
1. The
Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant
(with Douglass North and Barry Weingast), Economics and Politics, 2, March 1990,
1-23.
Reprinted in Trade in the Pre-Modern Period: 1400-1700,
edited by Douglas Irwin,
Reprinted
in Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, edited by Daniel B. Klein.
Reprinted in The Political Economy of Institutions, edited by Claude Ménard,
Reprinted in International Institutions in the New Global Economy, edited by
Lisa L Martin,
Reprinted in Anarchy and the Law, edited by Edward Stringham,
Reprinted in Social Norms, Non-Legal Sanctions, and the Law, edited by Eric A Posner,
2. Coordination,
Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (with Avner
Greif and Barry Weingast), Journal of Political
Economy, 102(3), August 1994, 745-776.
Reprinted in Explaining Social Institutions, edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened,
Reprinted in Trust,
edited by Elias Khalil,
Reprinted in The Foundations Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited
by Claude Ménard,
Reprinted in Social Norms, Non-legal Sanctions, and the Law, edited by Eric
Posner,
1. An
Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 219‑22.
2. Good
News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,
3. Topologies on Information and Strategies in Normal‑Form
Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics,
edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke,
4. Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (with David
Kreps, John Roberts and Robert Wilson), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 245‑52.
Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein,
Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias L Khalil,
5. Distributional
Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Mathematics of Operations Research, 10,
1985, 619-32.
6. Rationalizability,
Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic
Complementarities (with John Roberts), Econometrica,
58, 1990, 1255-78.
Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed.,
7. Adaptive
and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, (with John
Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior,
February 1991, 82-100.
Reprinted in Recent Developments
in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed.,
8. Information
and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometrica, 59(6), 1991, 1713‑1733.
9. Monotone
Comparative Statics (with Chris Shannon), Econometrica, 62, 1994, 157-180.
10. Comparing
Equilibria (with John Roberts), American
Economic Review, 84(3), June 1994: 441-459.
Reprinted in Equilibrium, Donald Walker (ed), Edward
Elgar Publishing, March 2000.
11. Comparing
Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?, Journal of Political Economy, 102(3),
June 1994: 607-615.
12. The
LeChatelier Principle (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 86(1), March 1996: 173-179.
Reprinted in Paul Anthony Samuelson, Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists,
John Cunningham Wood and Michael McLure (eds.),
13. Coalition-Proofness
and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (with John
Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior
17, 1996: 113-128.
14. Envelope
Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (with Ilya Segal), Econometrica
70(2), March 2002: 583-601.
15. Multipliers
and the LeChatelier Principle in Samuelsonian Economics
and the Twenty-First Century edited by Michael Stenberg, Lall Ramrattan and Aron Gottesman, Oxford University
Press, 2006.
1. Is
Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics and the
Contingent Valuation Method. Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment.
Elsevier-North Holland, 1993, Jerry Hausman (ed), 417-441.
Axelrod's The Evolution of
Cooperation, Rand Journal of Economics,
15, 1984, 305‑9.