

# SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

## INTRODUCTION

A professor once declared that I might consider myself to have mastered the discipline of Classical archaeology when I could make sense of Pauly-Wissowa. *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1893-) is a colossal encyclopaedia of *Altertumswissenschaft*, the positive science of antiquity. Closely argued and enormously documented entries fill the pages of its many volumes. There are no plates. It keeps going. It is meant to be complete and definitive. It is a monument to German nineteenth-century scholarship. The point the professor was making is to do with an experience many have upon encountering Classics and Classical archaeology, though less often now in such an extreme form perhaps than in the past. An interest in Classical antiquity may animate you, but the discipline somehow gets in the way and has to be dealt with first. Skills need to be acquired to decipher the very texts which are meant to take you to where your interest lies, The point is not that this is wrong; it is that disciplines are as much about their practices and conventions as they are about their object.

In the last chapter many cases were presented to show that it is important to consider the different types of interest which take people to the Classical Greek past because, understandably, interests condition what is thought and done. So Herzfeld and Bernal have emphasised concepts of identity and Europe. Ideas of art and the quality of ancient art were shown to be vital in understanding Classicism and Hellenism. Then there are root metaphors: the past as a book to be read; the connoisseur as physician performing diagnosis. These profoundly affect the things done with the past and *so* the knowledges that ensue.

It can, in fact, be no other way: without a set *of* preconceptions (for that is what an interest is) there would be no study of the Classical past. The term used in hermeneutics for this, the philosophy of interpretation, is prejudice or judgement. The Classical past is prejudged as we turn to consider it. We are conditioned by what we already know or have heard and that fires a desire to find out more. This does not mean that what is found is what is



*Figure 4. 1 Lekythoi in the National Museum , Athens*

Shorter articles, usually in periodicals, may debate many issues, though most still consider matters related to the projects of classification and synthesis represented by the catalogues and corpora. But whatever the subject matter, there is a format which dominates, and that is the footnoted text. Just as the catalogue multiplies its entries, basing its authority on completeness, so articles multiply references in footnotes. Such references commonly refer the reader to related discussion, previous work and supporting literatures. They are signposts to the discipline. These articles look like scientific articles such as those found in scientific periodicals, and they are meant to. This is the technical literature of the discipline, where its key debates take place. Even the popular art books and exhibition catalogues, defined by selection of choice pieces and sumptuous presentation, defer to an ideal in the background - the sacred autoirity of the articles displayed, their aura. The mode

desired, a past as wished for; the past may surprise. But that possible surprise depends upon a critical and sceptical attitude, being open to possibility and scrutinising the conditions in which knowledges are constructed. This is being self-reflexive, to use the term of critical theory or the sociology of knowledge.

This chapter considers the workings of disciplines and that of Classical archaeology in particular. A thesis to be examined is that disciplines actually construct their object of knowledge.

## TYPES OF TEXT

The aspect of a discipline that is often first encountered is its writings. Some account has already been given of the types of text which went with the study of Corinthian pottery: the handbooks and catalogues, attribution lists and excavation reports, art histories and texts of ancient history. A visit to a research library such as the library of the Faculty of Classics in the University of Cambridge gives an immediate appreciation of the textual character of the discipline. The books are classified and shelved according to artefact type (ceramics, sculpture, metalwork) and period: here are the synthesising catalogues of material, subject matter and iconography. There is the section for the great *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* — catalogues of pots in museums around the world. Another set of shelves deals with sites: multivolume multi-part series of reports of sites and their materials, with the famous names of the big excavations: *Fouilles de Delphes*, *Clara Rhodes*, *Olympische Forschungen*, the *Korinth* volumes, the *Kerameikos* volumes. Periodicals and publications of the academic associations and learned societies are shelved separately, as, interestingly, are books on 'archaeology' which deal with matters of social reconstruction, interpretation and method.

Classical archaeology's pride of scholarship must surely rest on the authority symbolised by such texts. The cataloguing syntheses (Amyx's *Corinthian Vase Painting in the Archaic Period*, Berkeley: three volumes 1988) make every effort to be as complete as possible: all the pots in this class known in the world, with reference to every article written about them. That Cornelius Neef produced an *Addenda et Corrigenda to D.A. Amyx: Corinthian Vase Painting in the Archaic Period* 1991, with further pots, references and some corrections to the list attests to this quest for authority. An excavation report such as *Corinth Volume 7.2: Archaic Corinthian Pottery and the Anaploga Well* by Amyx and Lawrence (1975), published by the American School of Classical studies at Athens, lists pots with descriptions and comparanda - items found elsewhere which look similar; implications for chronology and classification are considered. In the background to these sorts of publications is an ideal of the complete text, the last word (even if only for a moment), the definitive classification to serve as reference point even when superseded by new finds which blur the precision.

of illustration (usually studio photography) seems objective and transparent, a direct medium to the article. But this is a rhetoric of the image, for there is nothing 'natural' about studio photography, with the glare of tungsten lighting (albeit with colour temperature adjusted) illuminating with efficiency every nuance, every mark on the surface. The viewer may well want this clinical gaze, but there are other modes of representation, with which many museums now experiment. The *qualities* of light are so distinctive in Greece, as has been noted by several in this book. Why this should be reduced to a one-dimensional relationship between article and viewer says a great deal about a discourse unwilling to experiment.

Classical archaeology is, of course, saturated in historical texts (ancient histories old and new, and literatures from antiquity), but there is a striking absence of archaeologically derived historical narratives. They are simply not the sort of thing that serious academic Classical archaeologists write. (At least that applies to the majority: there are the mavericks, like Anthony Snodgrass, who has used archaeological materials in constructing narratives which come between archaeology and history.)

To understand this range of texts and its characteristics it is necessary to go back again into the nineteenth century when the paradigm was set. In 1850 Eduard Gerhard, a German Classicist, published a series of archaeological theses in the periodical *Archeologisches Zeitung*. He proposed that archaeology was the twin sister of philology. His desire was to free archaeology from the antiquarian dilettantes, from philosophies of art and from aesthetic appreciation, because these were prescientific. Archaeology needed to be made professional against the amateurs and travellers. Presented is the metaphor of archaeology as a science of nature (separate from the aesthetic humanities). Archaeological materials are like literary sources for developing positive historical knowledge of the ancient world. So archaeology is not as Caylus would have had it, a science of antiquarianism, but rather a science of antiquity: *Altertumswissenschaft*. This position adopted by Gerhard was rooted in the cultural success of philology in the German universities, a success which had led to ten professorial chairs of archaeology in Germany by 1848, while there was none in France or Britain. For Gerhard, archaeology's future lay as a positive science producing concrete results and rooted in critical knowledge of literatures.

Schliemann, the amateur outsider, showed the potential of archaeological excavation in his discovery of Aegean prehistory. But it was his enemy Ernst Curtius who brought together excavation and *Altertumswissenschaft*. The aim of the great excavations of Olympia (from 1874) was not primarily to find sculpture but to uncover the entire precinct and understand the relationships between the buildings. Alexander Conze (an Austrian) had had similar aims on Samothrace in 1873 and 1875. Considerable amounts of material were unearthed and demanded new procedures, narratives, texts and new technical languages. These were to draw more on archaeology than the precepts of Hellenism.

Frank Turner, in his book *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* (1981), remarks that leading English Classicists of the 1870s feared that rigorous, comprehensive and detailed archaeological analysis would generate new ways of looking at the past. Morris sums up the response which was not restricted to Britain:

The solution to the problems which philological-style archaeology might raise was to banish people from its discourse, only to reintroduce them at the end of the story as free Romantic beings who by spontaneous decisions could alter the direction of a passive material culture. The standard text for Greek archaeology was set up as the artefact-centred monograph, describing in great detail the architecture, sculpture, small finds or pottery from a specific site.

Adolf Furtwängler produced a landmark in 1885 with his two-volume catalogue of vases in Berlin. Comprising a list of 4,221 vases according to fabric, period and shape, it was far from a narrative. The analytical text was identified with the scientific text. Olympia provided another model in the five volumes of *Ergebnisse* (1896-7) which reported on the excavations. Narrative writing took second place to non-narrative texts, while narratives dealt with dating and race, ethnicity, and *Zeitgeist* (the Greek spirit). Academic creativity was defined as the list.

In that academic work is part of the biography of academics, this needs to be related to the type and range of interests which take people to the Classical past. Perhaps lists are about the writer wishing to escape into certainties. Whatever, the character structure and subjectivity of the archaeologists is bound up with the work they do. This is the human side of discourse: it is in disciplines that many people become who they are. Hence some theorists, notably Foucault, have linked discourse generally with the creation of particular types of human subject. The implications for educational policy are well known and widely discussed: think only of subject divisions in schooling and how knowledge is distinguished from what is defined as outside the curriculum. Further points will be raised in the final chapter.

Edmund Pottier's *Catalogue des vases antiques de terre cuite* of 1896, was followed by the *Album*, whose 51 large quarto-sized plates illustrated 300 vases in galleries A-E of the Louvre. Further texts and plate volumes followed until the 1920s. The innovation was photographic reproductions, but such work in the Louvre led Pottier in 1919 to develop a plan for the *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum*, a series of catalogues which would gather every antique vase in the world. This was just the latest of many programmes to publish complete corpora of items, great long-term synthesising and systematising projects dealing with Latin and Greek inscriptions, Greek grave reliefs, ancient coins, the *Denkmäler griechischer und römischer Skulptur* and so on. Not only did they cover artefact types, but also iconographic themes: myths and gods and heroes depicted in the arts of the ancient world. These projects are

## SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

monuments to the confidence and ambition of nineteenth-century academic discourse.

Under such programmes the field of debate is extremely limited, basically dealing with categories, chronology, classification, comparanda, and the promotion of new classes of item to discussion, or their demotion to irrelevance. Any further types of question threaten to mark as maverick or outsider whoever is asking them. Thus are found ways of defining insiders and those who are not really part of the discipline.

After the conspicuous success of Beazley in simply gathering a vast amount of material in listings, searching for *the* affiliation of idiosyncrasy of style was, and for some still is, the practice required of the ceramic expert. So consider the specialist ceramic reports to excavations of Korinthus sires such as Perachora (by Dunbabin and others in 1962) and the Potters' Quarter, Korinth (volumes in 1948 and 1984), which focus entirely on the relation of particular pots and fragments to the style Korinthus. To manage the particularity of style in this way is a credential of the discipline; it shows that you are one of the *cognoscenti*. It may even be perceived as required by the discourse — the specialist ceramic report, required of each excavation, necessarily reports (often only) on stylistic affiliation. The newly discovered Korinthusian pot is related to style, and if possible, attributed to painter. This is the metanarrative of the connoisseur, scholarship, and the discipline.

Making these points is not, N must be emphasised, to condemn an interest in careful control of detail. As Morris writes, 'the problem with this archaeology is not the level of detail but the idea that in archaeology mastery of a body of material is all that is required'. An interest in the control afforded by information is intimately related to Modernist projects of surveillance and institutional control, summarised in the panoptic gaze, looking into everything and producing knowledges which allow containment and control

## COMMUNITIES AND INSTITUTIONS

Ian Morris and Stephen Dyson have emphasised the importance of institutions and communities of scholars for understanding the discourse of Classical archaeology. (The relevant works are listed in the Bibliography)

The Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) was founded in 1879 and its journal, the *American Journal of Archaeology*, similarly dedicated to matters of Classical archaeology, began in 1885. So old world Classical remains had their institution before Americanist archaeology. Dyson considers that the constituting ideology (defined as larger justifications) of the AIA was that Classical art and culture represent one of the highest points in human achievement and the task of the archaeologist is to recover and reconstruct as much as possible for the betterment of mankind; this is Hellenism. He goes further with the observation that Classical archaeologists have not, like anthropological archaeologists (with their Society for American Archaeology

## CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY OF GREECE

and American Anthropological Association), been examining the ideological and theoretical basis of their discipline, but have subconsciously accepted the late-nineteenth-century founding ideology of their discipline, while dropping the most imaginative components and not replacing them with any new paradigms.

The first meeting of the AIA was held at New Haven, Connecticut, in 1899. Harvard's Charles Eliot Norton (Lecturer in History of the Fine Arts as Connected with Literature from 1874), who had helped found the Institute and who WAS an active figure in its early development, delivered a speech. There was a strong underlying sense of disciplinary insecurity to his proposal that American archaeologists were making worthwhile contributions to an *international discipline*. (The foundation of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens in 1881 had been backed by Norton, The explicit purpose of this intercollegiate institution was to contest European dominance, and to make a place in Classical archaeology for American interests.) Norton also articulated what he saw to be the inherent worth of studying Greek and Roman civilisation: 'together they represent the full circle of human affairs and interest. To them all the previous life of man contributes, from them as from their head all the varied life currents of modern life derive.' Greece and Rome are familiarly seen as the origins of the west. Dyson comments that in asserting the superiority of the Greek and the Roman, Classical archaeologists like Norton were claiming for themselves a special place as the interpreters of the origins of the west. With Biblical archaeologists they were dealing with a past civilisation in some ways sacred to the west, and involving sacred objects closely associated with sacred texts. Thus the justification for Classical archaeology was *as* much from *what* was being studied as from *how*.

By the 1880s American archaeology was split 'because of a near total acceptance of Hellenism among those working on Greek material'. For Dyson, the split with Americanist and anthropological archaeology had occurred because its colonialist attitudes (in the study of non-western societies) and lack of detail made it unappealing to Hellenists.

Dyson has compared articles in the respective journals of the American Institute of Archaeology and the Society for American Archaeology. He notes no interest in theory, method or new approaches in the pages of the *American Journal of Archaeology*, few changes in types of articles over the last few years as compared with *American Antiquity*. With respect to papers presented at the annual meetings, he found that from the 1930s to the 1960s papers about material culture (sculpture and vase painting) dominated the AIA, nothing being said about method, theory, geoarchaeology, floral or faunal analysis, all of which were figuring significantly in the debates of many other archaeological traditions, including that of the Society for American Archaeology. By the 1980s material culture was still dominating, and the programme of the AIA in 1985 was not that different from 1935.

## SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

Why is there this lack of change, asks Dyson. The Editor of the *American Journal of Archaeology* had never left the east coast of the US and has never moved north of Cambridge or south, of Philadelphia when he was writing: this points to a uniformity of outlook, in contrast with the experience of Americanist anthropological archaeology. Dyson connects this conservatism with control of key power positions in the profession, conservative graduate programmes, the control exerted over graduate and field training. The role of the overseas schools is considered important here, bringing together graduates from various separate parent institutions for access to the sites and materials upon which their careers will be built, ensuring consistent homogeneity in training. So success in the discipline results not only from a mastery of data and the understanding and criticism of theory, but as much from the ability to absorb and articulate the prevalent ideology of the institution to which the academic belongs. This particularly applies to graduates setting out on an academic career, 'In such a system with its strong stress on tradition, innovation is about as likely as in the Chinese bureaucracy in the age of Confucius'; here Dyson is blaming the formalisation of a subdiscipline rather than Classical archaeologists *per se* for the stagnation of the discipline.

Morris too emphasises the importance of hegemonic professionals resistant to change who discipline practitioners and drive out unwanted statements. This is connected to the professionalisation of academic life since the late nineteenth century. The role of journals and academic presses and funding agencies is vital in filtering what gets done and published. He stresses the foreign schools and their role in managing excavations in Greece. Belonging to such a community is often the only sure way to get on in the discipline. A general point is that policing of the discipline and community occurs more through patronage and institutional loyalties than through rational and mutual criticism, just as it is not so much *what is* written that matters, as the *way* it is written.

## MAVERICKS

Some do not fit the discourse but get on without being excluded. Charles Newton, Keeper of Antiquities at the British Museum in the middle of the nineteenth century, may be one of these. In tune with anthropologists, he took an evolutionary view of how art changed through time. This emphasis on change was a potential archaeological critique of Hellenism. He also used the British Museum's collection of ceramics to teach students a new way to explore Athenian society.

Jane Harrison at the beginning of this century used evolutionary anthropology, archaeology and French sociology to argue that Olympian gods rested upon an older stratum of demons and spirits. Drawing on Sir James Fraser's anthropological epic *The Golden Bough* (twelve volumes appearing





*Figure 4.2 The British School at Athens*

between 1890 and 1915), she explored Greek roots in the primitive, something which was covered also in Chapter 3 of the present volume.

Newton, like Schliemann, believed that a collection should be exhibited entire rather than in a selection. And Heinrich Schliemann is the archetypal maverick in Classical archaeology. His life has been a best-seller (with more than forty biographies this century). A successful businessman, he was effectively freed him from the authority structures of academic discourse by his fortune. An outsider to the race of empires for Classical credentials, Schliemann could indulge his dreams. In a series of excavations in the last three decades of the nineteenth century he established the site of Homeric Troy, discovered the wealth of Mycenae and began the investigation of Aegean prehistory.

According to William M. Calder III (in his book on Schliemann edited

## SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

with David Traill, 1986), Schliemann's is a popular story for the following reasons. He was the poor boy who became rich and famous; one who realised his idealistic dreams through hard work and a refusal to be put down by the authorities. He proved all the smart professors wrong by a stubborn and simple faith worth more than their supposed great learning, a faith set in the epic romance of Homer, and wherein Schliemann too had his Odyssey round the Aegean, and a Penelope, his Greek wife Sophie.

In his day Schliemann was opposed by many academic authorities. Ernst Curtius, the German excavator of Olympia, called him a botcher and a conman ('*Pfuscher und Schwindler*'). According to Furtwangler, 'Schliemann is and remains a half-crazy and confused human being, who has no idea whatsoever of the meaning of his excavations... In spite of his passion for Homer, he is at heart a speculator and a businessman.'

What is behind this story? Schliemann's career has been closely examined, and it turns out that not all is as people have been led to think. Eighty-five per cent of the source material about Schliemann's life and discoveries was written by Schliemann himself. On close inspection it is full of fabrication and invention. Schliemann desperately wanted to be accepted as a scholar, but wrote what people wanted to read. His diaries are untrustworthy, yet they are the access to his life and discoveries.

The so-called Priam's treasure was discovered at Troy in May 1873. It came at just the right time at the end of excavation, vindicating Schliemann's theory (that he had found the Troy of Homeric legend) and making a tremendous impact which carried him on to excavation at Mycenae. It became one of the most famous and romantic discoveries of nineteenth-century Classical archaeology and ranks alongside Tutankhamun's treasure of 1922 in the popular imagination. It has been long known that Schliemann got the dates and stratigraphy wrong and that the treasure is far too early for the time of Priam. But there is much more. David Traill made a careful comparison of four reports written by Schliemann and there are telling contradictions. Moreover, a witness to the discovery of the treasure at the end of the last season of excavation also failed to corroborate the diaries. Priam's treasure appears to be a composite of numerous small finds made over the three years of excavation, possibly augmented by purchased items. Further investigations have revealed how much of a fabrication the diaries really are.

In the 1980s there occurred a series of character assassinations of Schliemann. William G. Niederland, a New York psychoanalyst, has interpreted Schliemann's psychopathology, his compulsive need to achieve, and his morbid attraction to the dead, in terms of early familial relationships, including a disgraced clerical father and his being named after a dead brother. Traill has marked off Schliemann against Checkley's symptoms of the psychopath: superficial charm and intelligence; untruthfulness; unreliability; lack of remorse and shame; pathologic egocentricity; general poverty in major



Figure 4.3 Edward Dodwell. *Views and Descriptions of Cyclopien, or Pelasgic. Remains in Greece*  
treasures treasures of Mycenae

affective reactions; unresponsiveness in general interpersonal interrelations. Schliemann fits. He was a lying monster who even manipulated his son's features as an infant so that his profile would be more Classically Greek to match his name. Agamemnon.

Odder reports:

I am not a psychoanalyse, I am an historian, I can show you that Schliemann lied and deceived, that he altered, suppressed, and forged documents to make falsehoods seem truth. that he bought objects and said that he excavated them, that he fabricated a past that had never been, that he bribed and betrayed to gain his ends. I have never published a moral judgement on Schliemann. I have on his biographers. I consider them lazy and incompetent. But Schliemann was ill, like an alcoholic, a child molester, or a dope-fiend.

Yet Schliemann was aware of stratigraphy, limed to test a hypothesis at Mycenae (that Pausanias was right in describing graves inside the entrance of the citadel), and used excavation to decide a debate in ancient history over the site of Troy, digging first (1868) at the site he did *not* consider to be Troy (Bunarbashi). For Hartmut Döhl this is a very early example of realising the scientific potential of excavation and interdisciplinary links between history and archaeology.

## SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

The hagiography and invective is probably not over as Schliemann's life and achievements slip between fact and fiction, discourse and resistance. Here is a reminder that archaeology is not just about the discovery of past things but contains also the romance and realities of disciplinary politics and adventure. The man cannot be separated from the discipline nor from the discoveries, and his writings, as with all others, are conspicuously sources in need of critical interpretation. Schliemann's unremitting persecution of his alms is also a great example or the *will to truth*, the inseparability of knowledge, power and interest.

We are all like Schliemann, after all: imperfect, fudging, human. We should, I believe, beware of the arrogant pomposity of supposed paragons of academic virtue who, with intellects purged of all subjective fillings, claim communion with a higher order of reality.

### DISCOURSE

Various aspects of the discipline of Classical archaeology, its texts and communities have been covered. It is appropriate to step back and make some more general points. I have been considering aspects of the *discourse* of Classical archaeology.

A key concept for understanding the construction of knowledge is discourse. The term is widely used and often in very different ways. I will emphasise what seems to be most useful. The background to the contemporary use of the term is sociologies of knowledge which have investigated the social location of the construction of knowledge. A related, but distinct, term is paradigm, often associated with Thomas Kuhn. This refers to the working assumptions, procedures and findings routinely accepted by a community of scholars and which together define a stable pattern of scientific activity, and that community itself. The unifying stand taken in such sociologies of knowledge, and based on what is now a considerable body of research, is that there is more to knowledge than epistemology in a narrow sense.

In its technical sense, discourse is not simply text or communicative acts. Discourse is a term that summarises a particular ensemble of social practices through which the world is made meaningful and intelligible, embracing narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices and more. There are three things central to discourses. They are embedded in society. They are situated: partial, negotiated and contested. And discourse conditions what is taken for granted.

The concept directs attention not so much to the content, but to the way something is written or told, and the social and historical conditions surrounding writing and telling. Discourses may consist of people, buildings, institutions, rules, values, desires, concepts, machines and instruments... These are combined in heterogeneous networkings - technologies of cultural production which enable and are the conditions within which statements

## CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY OF GREECE

may be made, texts constituted, interpretations made, knowledges developed, even people constituted as subjectivities.

The different elements are arranged according to systems and criteria of inclusion and exclusion, whereby some people are admitted, others excluded; some statements qualified as legitimate candidates for assessment, others judged as not worthy of comment. There are patterns of authority (committees and hierarchies for example) and systems of sanctioning, accreditation and legitimation (degrees, procedures of reference and refereeing, personal experiences, career paths). Discourses include media of dissemination: talk and speeches, books, papers, computer and information systems, galleries, or television and radio programmes. Archives (physical or memory-based) are built up providing reference and precedents. And metanarratives lie in the background, providing general orientation, framework and legitimation.

There is no singular discourse. Pluralism is another key feature of this sociology of knowledge. Discourses may vary and clash in close proximity. In a factory the discourse of the workforce may differ considerably from that of the management. Academic archaeology includes several discourses: neat eastern and Classical archaeology being distinct from Anglo-American Processual archaeology, for example. The discourse of commercial excavation is different again.

### INTERLUDE: CLASSICAL RHETORIC - A THEORY OF DISCOURSE

Rhetoric is a theory of discourse; it is concerned with the design and production of speech, text, and all things that communicate. Rhetoric foregrounds the relation between author and audience: the act, circumstances, technology and techniques of communication. For Aristotle, rhetoric is the art, skill or faculty of establishing the possible means of persuasion with reference to any subject matter.

Key issues are persuasion and power. Persuasion is arguably ubiquitous; it is an aspect *at* perhaps every communicative act. Many statements intend to lead the listener or reader somewhere, and even simply accepting a statement as given in order to move on to another is to be persuaded, however temporarily. A blunt statement of fact intends to be accepted, perhaps through its bluntness. Power is involved because an act of communication is intended to get the listener or reader to believe, think, feel or do something, even just to go on listening or reading, or indeed to give up reading.

Another aspect of communicative acts is related to persuasion. This is that much of communication is wholly or partly pre-symbolic; it is *gestural*. When I say 'How are you?', *Ca va?*, the precise meaning of what I ask is less important than the gesture of attempting to (re)establish a relationship. Many of the gestural dimensions of communication are related to persuasion because the aim of both is to establish and maintain relationships of particular sorts.

Rhetoric reaches out to people; its aim is consubstantiality, building communities.

Rhetoric, being thus about persuasion, includes the construction of arguments and logic and indeed anything else **that** may persuade: reference may be made to emotion and moral character, for example. It is important to recognise the ethical character of rhetoric. In that the intention is to persuade, there is moral responsibility regarding the direction of persuasion and consequences. This is simply to recognise that all relationships (the subject and aim of rhetoric) are of ethics. As Winterowd puts it: 'rhetoric focuses on language as suasion, as an act and as a moral consequence. The rhetorician knows that we can literally talk, ourselves to death.'

The main departments of rhetoric are traditionally *Inventio*, *Dispositio*, *Elocutio*, *Memoria* and *Actio*.

*Inventio*: the discovery of ideas and arguments. This is the process whereby subject matter for discourse is discovered. Here are included modes of creative generation and originality. In terms of Classical archaeology, reference may be made to the history of ideas, historiography, to social contexts, and also to interdisciplinary connections.

An important subject here is the theory of *topoi* or *staseis*. These are the places where can be found material for arguments. They are standard issues by which a problem may be attacked, **and are often questions. Topoi can take any form. They are simply strategies, ways of staking out common ground (topoi also come under the name commonplaces) in the sense of getting your audience to see what you are up to, to have them follow your line of reasoning and sympathise with your purpose. For example, there is the topos of 'more and less': such arguments concern degrees: if a thing cannot be found where it is more likely to exist, you will not find it where it is less likely to exist. Medieval rhetoric produced books filled with thousands of such 'commonplaces'.**

**In science the topoi most often concern observation, prediction, measurement and mathematisation; these are sources for persuading people that your version of reality is die correct one. It will be objected by many that these are not matters of rhetoric, but of theory coming up against the realities of nature. Einstein's theory of general relativity predicted that light would bend in a strong gravitational field. This was confirmed by photographs taken during a solar eclipse. Where is the rhetoric? But raw facts never point unequivocally in a particular theoretical direction. Stellar positions need to be interpreted in the light of theory. Stellar positions are the facts of science only under certain conditions, described in certain ways. They are at other times the material of stories and myths. That there are facts that support a theory, that contact is made in science at some point between prediction and reality is a *rhetorical* conviction. People need to be persuaded of the correspondence. In traditional Classical archaeology the topoi are**

## CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY OF GREECE

prominently about complete and systematic inventory, and genealogy - tracing back arguments and artefacts through citation. Principal questions are: What class? What others? and Who said?

*Dispositio*. the arrangement of ideas into sequences and narratives. Logical and aesthetic links may be considered. For Cicero, the parts of a speech were the opening, narrative outline, statement of case, proof of case, refutation of opposition, epilogue. This legal formula is again clearly one that has had considerable influence upon the sciences. Narrative is an important element which, of course, relates to archaeological and historical materials. But narrative is more than simple descriptive chronicle. There are many factors including plot, agency and viewpoint.

Works constructed under Modernist aesthetics have exhaustively interrogated how media may be manipulated and arranged so as to convey senses of reality; from paintings by Picasso through the writings of Joyce to new-wave French cinema. A key method is that of juxtaposition, collage and montage: something which is used a great deal in archaeological texts (the order of listing, for example). The implications of reflection upon the significance and forms of collage have not been considered at all in archaeology to my knowledge. The technology of cultural production is another essential concern. We are no longer limited to the speech. So film can use close-up, multiple viewpoints, slow motion, montage and cut, and other forms of interruption and juxtaposition. A technology can enable or facilitate views of nature and society which are impossible to realise without that technology. The role of the image in Classical archaeology has already been mentioned.

Narrative and juxtaposition: these are central to archaeology, yet there has been little experiment or reflection. Conventions are adhered to which are stale and worn out in comparison to cultural production elsewhere (and most of all in heritage).

*Elocutio*: forms of expression and figures of speech, stylistic treatment. This may be divided into *aptum* - appropriateness to subject matter and context (for example, whether a line drawing is appropriate); *pursistas* - correctness of expression (according, or not, to rules of discourse and the disciplined *perspicuity* - the comprehensibility of expression (clarity and density): *ornatus*- the adornment of expression. Tropes or figures of speech provide a great insight into varieties of text structure within 'elocutio'. Here are included strategies such as antithesis and irony (figures of contrast), metaphor (identity in difference), metonymy.

The contrast between Aristotle's emphasis upon spare purity of expression and Cicero's florid style embracing all possible tropes has severely hindered considerations of style in those disciplines that see themselves as dealing with fact and reality. As early as 1667 Sprat was proclaiming the importance of lack of adornment *in* science: its communications must 'return back to the

## SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

primitive purity and shortness, when men delivered so many things in an equal number of words. So science, with some archaeology included, does not condone tropes like irony or hyperbole which mock and draw attention away from the rhetorical object - nature, or the past as it was. Metaphor and analogy undercut that semantics of identity between word and thing stressed by Sprat and upheld by science, empiricism and positivism. And viewpoint is to be suppressed. As Gross puts it in his book *The Rhetoric of Science* (1990), 'Regardless of surface features, at its deepest semantic and syntactic levels scientific prose requires an agent passive before the only real agent. nature itself.. .. [its] style creates our sense that science is describing a reality independent of its linguistic formulations'.

Purity of expression and third-person report is identified with freedom from emotional appeal, which is considered to undercut the claims of reason. 'But the disciplined denial of emotion in science is only a tribute to our passionate investment in its methods and goals'. The apparent freedom from emotion is not neutrality but deliberate abstinence, the choice of certain stylistic devices over others. There is also the myth of writing for a universal, non-specific audience. In plain scientific prose there is a non-rational appeal to the authority of reason. It is interesting to contrast the affective appeals of Winckelmann with the spare rhetorical demonstrations of Beazley.

*Logos* and *pathos* (reason and emotion): these are two grounds on which persuasion may be attempted. *Ethos* (character) is another. This may include the persuasive effect of authority and it is prevalent in the sciences and most academic disciplines. Academic papers are embedded in networks of authority: journals, grants and funding, institutions, career positions, citation and referencing. These can have a decisive effect. They may be very apparent in styles of writing. The texts of Classical archaeology make prominent rhetorical appeal in citation to authorities.

*Memoria*. the techniques of storage and the retrieval of speech or text. The scholarly monograph has come to be a standard storage device for the discourse of Classical archaeology. An anecdote will serve to make a point. The excavation of an archaic Greek colonial cemetery recently received long-anticipated publication in Italy, The three pans of Volume I are a testament to the rhetoric of the catalogue format: complete listings with genealogy and comparanda. The price was 2 million Ure (£740 or about \$1,100). It could have been published electronically for a few dollars or pounds. This is about persuasion, yes, but also the definition of communities who have access to the discourse.

*Actio* or *Pronunciatio*; delivery, gestures and setting. Included here are the design and delivery of lectures and TV programmes, books and publishing projects, museum displays.



Rhetoric is fundamentally about the recruitment and mobilisation of allies for your cause. It is about making friends. The main point is that persuasion may be legitimately attempted upon *any* grounds, though some are likely to be more effective than others. There is no necessity to style; there is choice, which is only closed down by structures of discipline and authority. Rhetoric is about courtship. Plato, in the Socratic dialogue *Pbaedrus*, presents sexual love as an allegory of discourse. Both are acts or relationship with consequences and responsibilities,

### IAN MORRIS AND 'POSTMODERNIST CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY'

Ian Morris, as discussed above, has presented an account of the discourse of Classical archaeology which draws on the work of two historians of disciplines, Michel Foucault and Thomas Kuhn. Morns basically makes an equation between Foucault's concept of an *episteme* and Thomas Kuhn's *paradigm* (the latter also introduced above). These refer TO a regime or system of knowledge and its acquisition, and the conditions under which knowledges are constructed: the rules and assumptions of disciplines, the accepted practices, and the communities that support them. They are thus clearly part of that general theorisation of discourse described above. It is not *necessary* to go into detail here about the concepts because the importance of Morris's argument is less to do with the quality of his theoretical definitions and more to do with what use he makes of them in his account of Classical archaeology.

Morris's aim is to relate the history of Greek archaeology to external and infernal factors of discourse (social factors and those to do with the organisation of the discipline). He claims there is a crisis in Classical archaeology as the old ways of carrying out the discipline are coming under increasing challenge because they are not providing what more and more people want - they are not attending to new interests. This crisis in Classical archaeology has occurred, he argues, because of the gradual disappearance of the *social* arrangements, chose of Modernity, which had made Hellenism an important academic discourse (see also previous chapter, this volume). Hellenism and all it stood for made sense to people. In the contemporary Postmodern world of the new Europe and postcolonial international relations, it no longer does. So the Classical disciplines as a whole and Greek archaeology in particular have been left without adequate intellectual justification.

Foucault has outlined historical shifts since the eighteenth century between three epistemes: the Classical, the Modern and the Postmodern, For Morris, the archaeology of Greece has been part of die Modern episteme and is suffering a crisis because of transitions to a Postmodern episteme. This is something which he describes as a 'huge epistemic shift'. The general cultural changes involved in this shift to a Postmodern episteme include a



*Figure 4.4* Caesars Palace, Las Vegas

fragmentation of disciplines coming with a collapse of secure centres. There has been a

decentring of the subject, an approach that rejects the panoptic gaze: the piecemeal use of the past without regard for context; and the refusal to accept any totalising 'metanarrative' which would provide coherent meaning in history. One result has been a rejection of traditional ways of identifying truth and objectivity ... These attitudes are antithetically opposed to the aims of classical scholarship since the late eighteenth century. The central concept of tracing the evolution of the West as the descendants of Greek culture has little relevance to the concerns which are coming to dominate academia.

So Classical archaeology', for Morris, is being marginalised because it is sticking to the authority lent it by its now outdated metanarrative. Hence Classical archaeology needs refiguring.

This is a very interesting comment on contemporary Classical archaeology coming from one of the proponents of new archaeological approaches to the Greek past. A problem that might be raised is that it all appears somewhat too neat and coherent, though Morris does relate and reference much historical detail. More might be made of the tensions and ambiguities discussed in the last chapter. For Foucault, discourse always engenders resistances: they are never total, systematic and without contradiction.

A more serious matter is that of Postmodernism. Morris treats it as a coherent entity, an episteme, the grounds upon which statements are constructed, knowledges established. It is suggested instead that it is best to distinguish *Postmodernity* as an extension of modernity, the cultural condition of late capitalism, from *Postmodernism*, a recent movement in the arts, philosophy, the social sciences, style and popular culture, from a *Postmodern attitude*. These are far from coherent entities but are instead fields of contention: the terms are conceptual tools in the rhetorical postures being adopted in many distinct discourses. They are what people say they want to be of what they don't like. So David Harvey has characterised Postmodernity as a cultural component of a new phase of capitalism, post-Fordist and concerned with strategies of flexible capital accumulation.

The Postmodern condition is characterised as fragmented, dislocated, interested in style, eclectically pillaging the past and other cultures without regard for traditional forms of authenticity, building on the demise of the certainties of old class cultures and institutional *forms of the nation state*. It is variously celebrated and decried (see Chapter 7). Within Postmodernism, architecture has left the international style of Modernism with an attention to the decorative, to variation of facades with pastiche, diversity of colour, design elements and iconography.

Within the humanities, Postmodern method (notably 'deconstruction') is a mode of *interpretation* which aims to elaborate the multiple relations between

culture, class and gender positioning and their effects upon cultural production and consumption, destabilising easy and univocal readings of cultural products. A major criticism here is that the resulting interpretive multiplicity is politically disabling because it challenges single authoritative readings which may provide legitimisation for particular cultural or political strategies (a point to be taken again up in the final chapter). This is allied with the more general criticism that a Postmodernist celebration of pluralism may be relativist. A Postmodern attitude is characterised by a radical scepticism towards the claims of grand theory, towards totalising theoretical schemes produced from single and privileged vantage points (for example the claims of positivist *Alsertumswissenschaft*). Instead an openness to difference is celebrated, with multivocality, experimentation and the empowerment of marginal political and cultural constituencies.

In not taking account of the discursive location of the terms he uses, Morris seems to confuse matters unnecessarily, ironically by polarising the discourse of Classical archaeology into Modernist and Postmodern. But there is considerable debate, and it is not adequate simply to acknowledge this and leave it at that. My preference is to emphasise the postmodern critical attitude. And with respect to the Classical past, Umberto Eco may be quoted: 'the postmodern reply to the modern consists of recognising that the past, since it cannot *fully* be destroyed, because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony, not innocently'.

#### TECHNOLOGIES OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: RHETORIC, WINNING FRIENDS AND TRUST

What is happening in an academic discipline? Is it to do with critical debate and applications of disinterested reason? The answer of sociologies of knowledge is that this is not the case. In fact, it is much more mundane. I will approach the issue via the products of discourse, namely texts. Various kinds of text to be found in Classical archaeology were described above. Why do they take the form they do?

Consider an article by Michael Vickers: 'Artful crafts: the influence of metalwork on Athenian pottery', published in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* in 1985. This was the first major presentation of his thesis about black and red figure Attic pottery (see also Chapter 3, above). It is part of a controversy about the artistic status of Greek ceramics, mainly inspired by the article, but nevertheless anticipated by it.

The article is technical and detailed as all sorts of resources are brought in to back up what Vickers is trying to uphold. References and footnotes are multiplied (they must make up more than half of the paper's length). Evidence is marshalled and displayed. What is the purpose? Is it to reveal the truth that Attic potters copied metal vessels, and that their status as an is a construct of Romantic Hellenists? Awareness of the workings of discourse

leads to the supposition that the purpose is to isolate the reader who dissents; how can they disagree when presented with all the evidence, the logic, the number of others who agree, attested by references to other writings? Twenty-eight academics are named in the acknowledgements alone, including seven professors. Two of them submitted the paper to their classes for criticism. Even if these people disagree with what Vickers has written, he must have benefited from their comments, it may be thought. As Bruno Latour puts it: 'the power of rhetoric is to make the dissenter feel lonely'. The lonely dissenter has no friends or allies.

Matters of logic, reason and objectivity are> it is suggested, secondary to these matters of relationship. The article attempts to persuade the reader of its thesis. The art of persuasion is about providing only one way for the listener or reader to proceed *freely*. When this happens it is in many circumstances described as logical or reasonable. Logic refers to practical schemes which prevent the reader getting out or escaping the conclusions. Connections of evidence and literatures and points of argument are networked around the reader to prevent him or her straying from the desired path forward.

Another aim may be to appear as a spokesperson for all the 'allies' the author has connected together. A common rhetorical strategy is one of demonstration: 'You may disagree, but let me *show you*.' Demonstration *is* about the author taking the position of representative of the facts and issues presented. Vickers makes many mentions of features of ceramic vessels which seem uncontrovertibly in imitation of metal. In his book with David Gill, *Artful Crafts* (1994), there are many pictures of pots with metal vessels right next to them and which are of exactly the same form: a more effective visual rhetoric than the journal article with its three plates. Depending on the outcome of the persuasive effort, objectivity and subjectivity may be decided: spokesmen or women become either objective representatives or subjective individuals. 'Being objective means that no matter how great the effort of the dissenters to sever the links between spokesperson and what they claim to represent, the links resist', writes Latour. Subjectivity is when you claim to speak for others and for the facts, but people only think you speak for yourself.

The power of rhetoric relates to the constituencies claimed to be represented by (he author. In connecting arguments, people (via references) and things (objects 35 evidence), the author spreads himself through time and space; this is one of the premises of power. It is about enrolling in a cause and *translating*. The observation of the shape of a pot becomes; it is translated into a proof of a theory. And persuasion is to a great extent about translating other people's interests into your own. There are many hundreds of references to all sorts of other tests and artefacts in Vickers' article and few of these, if any, make the same argument as he does. Translation is a way of making connection. You get things (to work for you. Rhetoric is about establishing *heterogeneous alliances* of people and things, arguments and emotions, characters and evidences.

## SCHOLARSHIP AND DISCOURSE

This means that a particular response is designed into the technical report which is part of a controversy: this is that it is not meant to be read! Disputes over objectivity lead to the demise of reading. Faced with a dense and technical report most people do not read it; they may or may not believe it but they give up with all the interrelations and networking it presents. Fewer others may be translated and they reference or use the work in the future. The report is made more objective and may aspire to being accepted fact. The movement is nevertheless away from reading the report for what it is, a piece of writing. Very few people check up on the report and go through it all, verifying every reference. This is upheld by sociological research, but another point will be made below. In the first response, the text does not count. In the second, the text is abridged and reduced almost to reference. Footnotes and citation can serve to make the author appear trustworthy: there is then no need to check up on things. In the third response, attention is shifted from the text to libraries (checking references), museums (objects scored), and perhaps even excavation (re-establishing the database). The dissenter is faced with establishing a set of connections to counter that of the report; it can be an enormous and expensive effort.

But at points in the article there are no references to certain issues. The social process of emulation, a central point of theory, is left hardly discussed and is unreferenced. The matter is outside the article's paradigm, and readers can be expected not to notice, or not to mind. Readers often need not check references because they are accepted points. Argument and critical debate come to centre upon relatively minor issues. Not all the footnotes are about empirical and scholarly support, as many take a point from the main text and elaborate - often with comment that displays the author's knowledge of the minutiae of the discourse and its community. Vickers thus establishes his credentials and belonging. The reader may again feel isolated.

This is not to question the validity of the critical attention to sources and debate mounted in footnotes. It is to recognise that casual amateurs are not the only ones to be put off by technical literatures. The rhetoric of the technical article is to make the reader who disagrees feel isolated and intimidated by lining up friends and supporters against them. Hence these articles are to be called technical or scholarly literatures *because* they work in this way.

The rhetoric of the catalogues of Classical archaeology involves completeness, finality and genealogy. If logic is a rhetorical strategy which presents a path to the reader which they freely follow, such texts give clear directions. Responses are conditioned by the rhetoric. As indicated above, an item may be added; an attribution to a class questioned. The trustworthiness of the catalogue or report is guaranteed by the comparanda. They mean that it is more likely to be the case because there are others like it. The catalogue fits; it seems appropriate. Substantial questioning of the rationale of such a text

is almost precluded, because there is likely to be so little ground for debate. The dissenting reader is excluding him or herself from discourse.

If it is accepted that rhetoric is such a feature of these scholarly and empirically rich writings about the Classical past, does this not challenge objectivity? Surely rhetoric, no matter how skilful, can argue away what happened in the past? I have already made some comment pertinent to this question, but let me introduce an example from Classical archaeology to illustrate the point about the social construction of the past.

Sir William Hamilton's Greek pots and those of similar design were thought to be Italian. Wedgwood's factory was named Etruria for this reason in 1769. But by 1819 enough people thought they were Attic for Keats to write in his *Ode to a Grecian Urn*: 'O Attic shape! Fair attitude!'

What had happened in the intervening years? Consider the debates of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries about the origin of black and red figure pottery, now accepted as Attica. A.S. Mazochius had spoken up for the Greek origin of Etruscan vases in 1754. Winckelmann had criticised Caylus for treating all painted terracotta vases as Etruscan in 1758. But the debate was still going on when Hamilton arrived in Naples in 1764. The illustrative plates of the Hamilton collection reached Winckelmann in April 1767 and his first collection was sold in 1772. Giovanni Battista Passeri, in his *Picturae Etruscorum in Vasculis Rome* (1767—75), still insisted on Etruscan origin. As well as Hellenism, the issue was wrapped up in Tuscan patriotism and Etruscophilia, and regional rivalries in Italy. In 1749 the Florentine A.F. Gori, author of *Museum Etruscum*, had to agree with the Sicilians Blasi and Pancrazi who claimed that most of the vases in Sicily were Greek. The matter was not resolved in 1800, when a black figure amphora signed by Taleides a Greek was found in Agrigento. But arguments were further shifting towards the theory of Greek origin when Aubin-Louis Millin published his two volumes *Peintures de vases antiques vulgairement appeles etrusques* in 1808—10.

The centre of the art market remained Naples in the early years of the nineteenth century, but many vases were coming to light in Sicily which continued to resist the Etruscomania of the north. Things were not certain at the time of Keats, and his acclaim may owe as much to Hellenism as scholarly consensus. A significant event was the excavation in the late 1820s of several thousand vases at Vulci. Eduard Gerhard of the new Istituto di Corrispondenza Archeologica in Rome recognised the similarity between the Vulci vases and those from Athens, Aegina, Sicily and Nola; moreover he distinguished them from products of Apulia, Lucania and Campania in southern Italy. Before these pots there had been few known inscriptions, and the pre-Vulci vases were not of sufficient quantity to allow such systematisation. After Gerhard the case was fairly settled. An interesting rhetorical point is made by Gerhard's motto: *Monumentorum qui unum vidit, nullum vidit; qui millia vidit, unum vidit* [To see one monument is to see none; to see a thousand is to see one].




Figure 4,5 Stuart and Revett. *The Antiquities of Athens*, Supplement. London 1830. Frontispiece: Agrigentum



What has happened in these years? Has the truth that pots found in Etruria were made in Attika finally won through? Did Gerhard establish the truth where others had failed to see it? He was right and Hamilton was wrong? Let us turn to the quality called objectivity. What makes a statement objective? The conventional answers are that objectivity is to do with logical coherence, or because the statement corresponds with something out there, external to the statement (here the reality of the past), or because of some inherent quality called objectivity. But who decides on how coherent a statement must be? How exact must correspondence be? It varies. People have to be persuaded that a statement is objective. This explains controversies and debates. Rhetoric, as it has been outlined here, is a way of establishing objectivity,

The archaeological past will not excavate and describe itself but needs to be worked for. If objectivity is an abstract quality or principle held by reality, how does it argue for itself, how does it display its strength? It cannot. People are needed, their projects. Attic pots needed Gerhard. So a statement about the archaeological past is not strong because it is true or objective. However, because it holds together when interrogated, it is described as objective. What then does a statement hold on to, whence does it derive strength, if not from objectivity? There is no necessary answer. It can be many things. An objective statement is one that is connected to anything more solid than itself, so that if it is challenged all that it is connected to threatens also to fall. This is how rhetoric works.

Why do I make this point that objectivity is a social achievement? Why stress that it is not simply a case of people in the past getting it wrong? First, it is perhaps an arrogance to think that what is held now to be the truth has been so for all time, and people were too stupid to know it, or figure it out in the past. Evidences are marshalled by people in particular social and historical circumstances. Classical archaeologists are coming to realise that a lot of pots that are taken to be Greek imports in Italy are, in fact, local copies. This does not necessarily alter the point about Attic wares, but it emphasises the provisionality of knowledge, however certain it may seem. If it is not accepted that the past is a social achievement of the present, the past becomes something that exists for all time, and the Greek becomes a timeless essence separate from us and which we, mere mortals, struggle to get to know. The Greek and material past again slips into that paradox of cultural proximity and distance.

## THE WRITING OF HISTORY

Narrative was introduced in connection with rhetoric. Although eschewed in many of the textual formats of Classical archaeology, versions of historical narrative remain for many the ultimate aim of archaeological work - combining the particulars of the archaeological past into meaningful wholes

with features such as events and plot. Narrative is not just a literary form found in many nineteenth-century novels. A renewed interest in discourse focuses attention on writing and text. There has been some such scrutiny in archaeology already, with discourse analyses, programmatic statements of the form that archaeological writings may take, and some experiment too. Chris Tilley, for example, has presented an account of Scandinavian rock art with multiple interpretive viewpoints (see his book *Material Culture and Text: the Art of Ambiguity* 0991)). Ian Hodder's *Domestication of Europe* (1990) is a monumental effort to write a reflexive narrative, that is, one that is open about the processes of its construction and writing. The account of the origins of farming makes use of structures of meaning (the *agrios* and the *domus*), interpreted in the material, which condition the narrative of history. The subject of the forms and character of narrative in archaeology (actual and potential) is a wide one. Narrative is a basic human means of making sense of the world, and narratives form a basic component of self-identity: stories are told to ourselves and others about who we are and where we have been. Narrative forms accordingly feature prominently in nationalist and heritage appropriations of the archaeological past: Chapter 3 was about ideological metanarratives.

Emplotment is the process by which elements of historical or other data are brought together (the actions of interpreter or 'storyteller' are required) into a sensible and coherent narrative whole, characterised according to narrativist philosophy by various rhetorical modes or devices. Narrativity is a concept associated with this explicit philosophical concern with the writing of historical texts. It is held by some that meaningful history can only be presented in a narrative form characterised, according to Hayden White, by plot, continuity, agency and closure. Opposed to this is, for example, a deductive covering-law approach which, influenced by positivist philosophy of science, concentrates on historical explanation through explicit causal relationships. (An event is explained by relating it to a general process or causal relationship: to hold, perhaps, that Mycenaean society collapsed because, like societies of its type, its economic base was fragile, would qualify as such an explanation) As an ideal form of explanation, this was and still is championed by many Processual archaeologists (see Chapter 2 for deductive strategies; [here will be more of Processual archaeology in the next chapter]).

Art histories of style, of course, take narrative form. Note may be taken of its characteristics: the evolutionary *arrangement*, the *agency* of abstract style and the genius of the exceptional artist, *the focal point* or viewpoint of the sensitive humanist connoisseur. Here is a rhetoric arguing for a particular kind of world. The concept of narrative and philosophies of narrativity emphasise the active character of making sense - constructing meaningful plots out of what was uncertainty, and plots which have or will have meaning and significance for an audience or public.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The question to be asked of a discourse is: Why these statements and not others? Who is allowed to write what and why? Why are some statements and not others candidates for the ascription of (disciplinary) truth? Power is clearly implicated in these questions, as it is in the rhetoric at the heart of discourse: the aim to persuade Adherence to a cause, getting people and things to go along with you. Throughout this chapter it has been a concern to explore the relationships between interests, communities of scholars and the things they produce. I have concentrated on texts rather than excavations because the latter are translated into text, but the concept of discourse has been taken to cover all aspects of the heterogeneous connections which enable the production of knowledge.

As expressed in the Introduction to the book, this focus on construction of knowledge does not question the reality of the Classical past. It does, I suggest, make it more interesting, because the past comes to be about the stories of its 'discovery' and the people who have made it. In this way the past is actually more concrete, attached as it is to those people, with their own histories and societies, who have found it of interest.

Nor does this emphasis on discourse and rhetoric question 'scholarship'. What really is required is more scholarship, because Classical archaeology has not gone far enough in its source criticism, in its close reading of *issues* and in its self-critique - the examination of the concrete practices in which scholars, engage. Critique may be contrasted with scholasticism. The latter involves redundant citation and argument, meaning the elaboration of texts around issues so thoroughly accepted already by the paradigm - the use of technical formats as strategies of inclusion and exclusion. Critique is an attitude of healthy scepticism and suspicion of easy and consoling answers on the grounds that systems of thought are usually inadequate and never complete, that knowledge is an ongoing process, David Clarke in an article of 1973, 'Archaeology: the loss of innocence', plotted the historical course of disciplines and proposed that archaeology was entering a phase of critical self-consciousness, questioning its rationale and practices, not content with easy answers or accepted traditions of working. Classical archaeology is also entering such a phase.

The Classical past does not reveal itself in its essential character but has to be worked for. This leads to the question; what sort of Classical past do we want? One that is consoling, nostalgic, bolstering up notions of cultural excellence? Or different Classical pasts which question and edify? Classical archaeologists need to take responsibility for their choices and not hide behind notions of the past die way it was and is for all time.