Philosophy of Mind - Phil 132

Philosophy 132
UC Berkeley Philosophy Department
Professor: Paul Skokowski
Summer Semester, 2013
MThF, 10am-12:30 pm
Room TBA
Office: Moses 144
Office Hours: TBA

Caitlin Dolan -- cedolan {AT} berkeley{D0T}edu
Jackson Kernion -- jacksonkernion {AT} berkeley{D0T}edu

Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
(Chapter references below are to Chalmers unless otherwise noted.)

This is a preliminary schedule and will change.

Introduction, Dualism and Epiphenomenalism

Week 1, Thursday May 30th:
Overview of Course Content, Schedule, Assignments and Grading
Descartes, Meditations, Ch. 1
Descartes, Passions of the Soul, Ch. 2
Skokowski, One Philosopher is Correct (Maybe). Australasian Journal of Logic, 2010, 9(1).

Week 1, Fri May 31st:
Malebranche, The Search for Truth
Leibniz, The Nature and Communication of Substances (from: New System, and Explanation of the New System)
Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, Ch. 3
Smullyan, The Unfortunate Dualist, Ch. 4

Logical Positivism and Behaviorism

Week 2, Monday June 3rd:
Schlick, Positivism and Realism
Ryle, Descartes' Myth, Ch. 5

Week 2, Thursday June 6th:
Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, Ch. 6
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293

Mind-Brain Identity Theories

Week 2, Friday June 7th:
Hobbes, Of Sense
Putnam, Brains and Behavior, Ch. 7
Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, Ch. 8

Week 3, Monday June 10th:
Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, Ch. 9
Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, Ch. 10


Week 3, Thursday June 13th:
Putnam, The Nature of Mental States, Ch. 11
Review for Mid-Term

Week 3, Friday June 14th:
* * Mid-Term Exam -- In Class * *

Week 4, Monday June 17th:
Armstrong, The Causal Theory of the Mind, Ch. 12

Week 4, Thursday June 20th:
Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs
Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Ch. 13
Block, Troubles with Functionalism, Ch. 14

Mental Content, Intentionality and Propositional Attitudes

Week 4, Friday June 21st:
Brentano, The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena, Ch. 44
Dretske, A Recipe for Thought, Ch. 46
Dennett, True Believers, Ch. 52

Week 5, Monday June 24th:
Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Ch. 53
Paul and Patricia Churchland, Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide
Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning", Ch. 54


Week 5, Thursday June 27th:
Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat?, Ch. 25
Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, Ch. 28
Block, Concepts of Consciousness, Ch. 24

Week 5, Friday June 28th:
Chalmers, Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3): 35-40, 1995.
Tye, M., Colors and other "Secondary Qualities"
Skokowski, I, Zombie

Week 6, Monday July 1st:
* * FINAL EXAM -- In Class* *

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