Philosophy of Mind - Phil 132

Philosophy 132
UC Berkeley Philosophy Department
Professor: Paul Skokowski
Summer Semester, 2004
MWF, 2-4:30 pm

GSI: Matthew Baxter-Parrott
Email: mbaxterp {AT} uclink{D0T}berkeley{D0T}edu

Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
Kim, Philosophy of Mind
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Chapter references below are to Chalmers unless otherwise noted.

Introduction, Dualism and Epiphenomenalism

Week 1, Wed July 7th:
Overview of Course Content, Schedule, Assignments and Grading
Descartes, Meditations, Ch. 1
Descartes, Passions of the Soul, Ch. 2

Week 1, Fri July 9th:
Malebranche, The Union of Soul and Body
Leibniz, The Nature and Communication of Substances
Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, Ch. 3
Smullyan, The Unfortunate Dualist, Ch. 4
Kim, Introduction, pp. 1-9.


Week 2, Mon July 12th:
Ryle, Descartes' Myth, Ch. 5
Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, Ch. 6
Kim, Ch. 2, pp. 25-31.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293

Mind-Brain Identity Theories

Week 2, Wed July 14th:
Hobbes, Of Sense
Putnam, Brains and Behavior, Ch. 7
Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, Ch. 8
Kim, Ch. 2, pp. 31-52.

Week 2, Fri July 16th:
Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, Ch. 9
Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, Ch. 10
Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 53-71


Week 3, Mon July 19th:
Review for Mid-Term
Putnam, The Nature of Mental States, Ch. 11
Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 73-85

Week 3, Wed July 21st:
* * Mid-Term Exam * *

Week 3, Fri July 23rd:
Armstrong, The Causal Theory of the Mind, Ch. 11
Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 85-101

Week 4, Mon July 26th:
Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Ch. 11
Block, Troubles with Functionalism, Ch. 11
Kim, Ch. 4, pp. 104-122

Mental Content, Intentionality and Propositional Attitudes

Week 4, Wed July 28th:
Brentano, The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena, Ch. 44
Dretske, A Recipe for Thought, Ch. 46
Kim, Ch. 1, pp. 20-23

Week 4, Fri July 30th:
Dennett, True Believers, Ch. 52
Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Ch. 53

Week 5, Mon August 2nd:
Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning", Ch. 54
Dretske, Seeing, Believing, and Knowing

Machines and Thought

Week 5, Wed August 4th:
Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs


Week 5, Fri August 6th:
Block, Concepts of Consciousness, Ch. 24
Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat?, Ch. 25

Week 6, Mon August 9th:
Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, Ch. 28
Chalmers, Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3): 35-40, 1995.
Tye, M., The Intentionality of Pain

Week 6, Wed August 11th:
Skokowski, I, Zombie
Tye, M., Colors and other "Secondary Qualities"

Week 6, Fri August 13th:
* * FINAL EXAM * *

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