Philosophy of Mind - Phil 132

Philosophy 132 UC Berkeley Philosophy Department Professor: Paul Skokowski Summer Semester, 2004 MWF, 2-4:30 pm GSI: Matthew Baxter-Parrott Email: mbaxterp {AT} uclink{D0T}berkeley{D0T}edu Texts:

Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings Kim, Philosophy of Mind

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Chapter references below are to Chalmers unless otherwise noted.

Introduction, Dualism and Epiphenomenalism Week 1, Wed July 7th:

Overview of Course Content, Schedule, Assignments and Grading Descartes, Meditations, Ch. 1 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, Ch. 2

Week 1, Fri July 9th:

Malebranche, The Union of Soul and Body Leibniz, The Nature and Communication of Substances Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, Ch. 3 Smullyan, The Unfortunate Dualist, Ch. 4 Kim, Introduction, pp. 1-9.

Behaviorism

Week 2, Mon July 12th:

Ryle, Descartes' Myth, Ch. 5 Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, Ch. 6 Kim, Ch. 2, pp. 25-31. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293

Mind-Brain Identity Theories

Week 2, Wed July 14th:

Hobbes, Of Sense Putnam, Brains and Behavior, Ch. 7 Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, Ch. 8 Kim, Ch. 2, pp. 31-52.

Week 2, Fri July 16th:

Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, Ch. 9 Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, Ch. 10 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 53-71

Functionalism

Week 3, Mon July 19th:

Review for Mid-Term Putnam, The Nature of Mental States, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 73-85

Week 3, Wed July 21st:

* * Mid-Term Exam * *

Week 3, Fri July 23rd:

Armstrong, The Causal Theory of the Mind, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 85-101

Week 4, Mon July 26th:

Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Ch. 11 Block, Troubles with Functionalism, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 4, pp. 104-122

Mental Content, Intentionality and Propositional Attitudes

Week 4, Wed July 28th:

Brentano, The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena, Ch. 44 Dretske, A Recipe for Thought, Ch. 46 Kim, Ch. 1, pp. 20-23

Week 4, Fri July 30th:

Dennett, True Believers, Ch. 52 Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Ch. 53

Week 5, Mon August 2nd:

Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning", Ch. 54 Dretske, Seeing, Believing, and Knowing

Machines and Thought

Week 5, Wed August 4th:

Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs

Consciousness

Week 5, Fri August 6th:

Block, Concepts of Consciousness, Ch. 24 Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat?, Ch. 25

Week 6, Mon August 9th:

Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, Ch. 28 Chalmers, Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3): 35-40, 1995. Tye, M., The Intentionality of Pain

Week 6, Wed August 11th:

Skokowski, I, Zombie Tye, M., Colors and other "Secondary Qualities"

Week 6, Fri August 13th:

* * FINAL EXAM * *

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