DURING the past decade, two facts about the U.S. labor market became more apparent than ever before: the large magnitude of fluctuations in employment and the lack of any strong response of wages to these fluctuations. The year 1975 saw the most striking manifestations of these features. Total labor input to the private economy fell by 6 percent from a year earlier (relative to trend growth), while wage inflation continued at close to its rate in the preceding boom. Although macroeconomists have puzzled over these characteristics ever since the discipline came into being, efforts redoubled in the 1970s to provide a solid economic rationale for the insensitivity of wages to current economic conditions and for the conspicuous deviations of employment from the smooth trend predicted by simple theories of economic growth.

Ten years ago macroeconomists were satisfied with a simple idea that had become virtually the ruling doctrine after Keynes—money wages are predetermined, or at least are quite unresponsive to current economic conditions. Firms set employment unilaterally by hiring up to the point where the marginal revenue product of labor equals the sticky wage. If nominal aggregate demand falls, employment falls. This idea inhabits every textbook in intermediate macroeconomics and underlies much professional analysis. But a defect in this line of thought has been apparent for many years, and has become more of an embarrassment to macro-
economics as the field has drawn closer to microeconomics: whenever inadequate demand pushes employment below its market-clearing level, economic inefficiency results. If workers and employers could get together and agree on the level of employment, they would equate the marginal revenue product of labor not with the wage but with the marginal value of workers' time. Employment would not be distorted by a sticky money wage. Demand and supply would have equal roles in employment determination, instead of the predominance of demand as in traditional macro theory.

Serious investigation of the idea that there are better ways for workers and employers to deal with each other as aggregate demand varies has led in a number of directions. In order to understand most of the new ideas, it is important to keep in mind another fact about the U.S. labor market—most workers hold jobs for quite a few years. Employers and workers typically have long-term relations with each other. One of the most significant lines of recent thought pursues the implications of this important fact. Wages are insensitive to current economic conditions because they are effectively installment payments on the employer's obligation to transfer a certain amount of wealth to the worker over the duration of the employment arrangement. A major corollary is the limited allocational role of the wage payment for employment. The rule of the open market—set the value of the marginal product of labor equal to the current wage—no longer has meaning when the current wage is a more or less arbitrary payment on a long-term obligation. Instead, the more fundamental principle of equating the marginal revenue product to the marginal value of labor's time should govern. This basic condition of economic efficiency is the starting point for recent thought on employment fluctuations within long-term employment arrangements.

In this paper much of the discussion is devoted to the issue of employment efficiency. It is one thing to argue that employment arrangements at the level of the individual firm result in an efficient flow of labor services from one worker to that firm, and quite another to argue that the total flow of labor services from all workers to the aggregate economy is efficient. What I call the micro efficiency condition requires that the employment level equates the marginal product of labor with the marginal value of time; it seems to explain a lot about the institutional arrangements for employment determination. The macro efficiency condition is much more
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ambitious, requiring that every worker be in a job that makes the best use of the worker's time. Macro efficiency is refuted every few years by recessions, when total labor input falls and numerous workers spend weeks or months out of work. Macro efficiency is promised by the theory of competitive markets, but free economies periodically fall a little short of the theoretical ideal. Much remains to be understood about the failure of macro efficiency in an economy in which individual agents try hard to achieve micro efficiency in their own employment arrangements.

The relative importance of on-the-job adjustments in labor input compared to adjustments from movements among jobs is revealed in the data on output and employment. The paths of these variables have been anything but smooth, especially during the past decade. Fluctuations in output have been larger proportionally than fluctuations in the total volume of work, measured as employee hours. Within the theory of long-term employment arrangements, this reflects the operation of an implicit or explicit agreement that employees work harder when there is more work to do. Similarly, there are important cyclical fluctuations in annual hours of work and, again, these are interpreted as the working of the micro efficiency principle. On the other hand, data on wage movements show relatively little variation over time even though important variations in the demand for labor seem to have taken place. The theory of long-term employment arrangements points to the installment-payment nature of wages to explain their unresponsiveness.

Although the micro efficiency principle appears to be helpful in understanding some of the cyclical movements of employment, the macro efficiency hypothesis is an untenable generalization for the U.S. economy. In the aggregate, efficiency requires the equality of the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation between goods and working. What is lacking is a convincing explanation for sharp cyclical contractions in output that is consistent with this efficiency condition. Neither the public's preferences about work and consumption nor the productive technology shift suddenly, as far as can be determined. Economists may acknowledge that people work harder when there is more work to do, but the macro efficiency principle does not explain why there is sometimes distinctly less work to do in the whole U.S. economy.

A second and closely related defect of the macro efficiency hypothesis is the apparent vulnerability of aggregate output to purely monetary
shocks. The efficiency conditions that ought to determine employment are exclusively real and should be unaffected by shifts in the money stock. This proposition is unambiguously refuted by data for the United States.

Third, theories based on long-term employment arrangements and the efficient use of workers' time leave much unexplained about the level of and changes in unemployment in the U.S. economy. Although the definition of unemployment used in the United States classifies permanent job-holders on temporary layoff as unemployed, they form only a tiny fraction of total unemployment except in times of rapid contraction of the economy. In normal times, the most unemployment seems to occur among groups who work relatively little; if the level is efficient, it means that their time is better spent at home and in other activities outside the labor market. Even in recessions, most of the increase in unemployment is among workers who have unambiguously lost jobs and are looking for new ones.

Cyclical Movements of Output, Employment, and Wages

Table 1 shows some basic puzzles in the data on the aggregate labor market. Column 1 indicates that total labor input (measured as total hours of work) grew at an average of 1.5 percent a year, but the growth was far from smooth. In both recessions of the decade, labor input fell dramatically, by 5.2 percent below trend in 1970-71 and by 6.6 percent below trend in 1974-75. In the other years, especially 1973, 1977, and 1978, labor input grew much faster than trend. The total amount of work done by a typical member of the working-age population fluctuated greatly. Part of these fluctuations show up as complementary movements of the unemployment rate, as shown in column 2 of the table. Column 3 displays another major puzzle—the almost complete absence of market-clearing movements of wages. Wages continued to rise smoothly during the decade. The two recessions, each having large reductions in labor input and increases in unemployment, were accompanied by only slight moderations in wage inflation.

One of the major points of this paper is the importance of long-term jobs in understanding the puzzles of the behavior of employment and wages. Table 2 elaborates on the labor input part of table 1 by showing the movements of its various components. Both columns 2 and 3 reflect the extra work done by employees when there is more work to do. The well-known cyclical behavior of productivity, shown in column 2, is an
Table 1. Labor Input, Unemployment, and Wage Inflation, 1970–79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate of change of total hours of work (1)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (2)</th>
<th>Rate of change of wages (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. Total hours of work are measured by an index of the hours of all persons in the private business sector. The unemployment rate is the percent of the civilian labor force that is unemployed. Wages are measured by annual averages of compensation per hour in the private business sector.

important element of the total pattern of movement in labor input. Workers put in extra effort during booms and take it easy during slumps. The sum of the declines in productivity in 1974 and 1975 is 3.5 percentage points, a third of the total decline in output of 10.5 percentage points.

The other element of cyclical change in work arrangements that occurs within existing jobs is variation in hours per worker, shown in column 3 of table 2. Both recessions of the 1970s saw pronounced reductions in average hours of work: 2.4 percentage points in 1970–71 and 2.8 points in 1974–75.

Cyclical variations in the employment rate are shown in column 4. Most of these are variations in the number of jobholders and so are outside long-term employment arrangements. The decrease in employment rates characteristic of every recession is only about one-third of the total variation in effective labor input (output); this is a restatement of Okun’s Law; namely, a 3 percent variation in real output implies a 1 percentage point change in the unemployment rate.

The last column shows small cyclical variations in the labor force participation rate that represent the other way that labor input can vary during the cycle. The labor force declined by 1 percentage point in the 1970–71 recession and by one-half a point in 1974–75. These variations outside long-term arrangements are quantitatively less important than changes in unemployment.
These findings can be summarized in terms of average percentage point deviations from trend for the two contractions of the 1970s (1970–71 and 1974–75), as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Output (1)</th>
<th>Output per hour (2)</th>
<th>Hours per worker (3)</th>
<th>Employment rate (4)</th>
<th>Participation rate (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Same as Table 1.

a. All data are deviations of annual percentage changes from decade averages. Output is gross domestic product originating in the private business sector at constant prices. Hours are measured by an index of the hours of all persons in the private business sector. The number of workers is civilian employment. The employment rate is the percent of the civilian labor force that is employed. The participation rate is the percent of the population in the civilian labor force.
The Duration of Jobs in the U.S. Economy

Perhaps the single most distinctive contribution of thinking on macro-labor issues over the past decade has been the investigation of permanent relations between workers and employers. Coexisting, however, has been a body of thought that emphasizes rapid turnover of workers among jobs. High turnover suggests a reasonably fluid market that can be understood in simple market-clearing terms. In particular, the idea that wage payments are installment payments on a long-term financial obligation cannot hold up in a market in which jobs are not of long duration. An obvious starting point in settling the relative importance of the two approaches is an examination of the duration of jobs in the U.S. economy. Oddly enough, I have been unable to find any published studies on this point, so I will present some results derived from a survey by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on job tenure.

Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show the distributions of time spent on the current job for workers in two groups, aged thirty to thirty-four and fifty to fifty-four. These numbers come directly from the January 1973 Current Population Survey, which included a question about the date when work-


Table 3. Duration of Jobs among Workers, January 1973

Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of job (years)</th>
<th>Workers whose jobs have lasted this long</th>
<th>Jobs that last this long</th>
<th>Workers whose jobs are expected to last this long</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½ or less</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½–1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–10</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–15</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–25</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–30</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 or more</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. This refers to the age of workers at the beginning of jobs.

ers began their current jobs. From these observed distributions and others like them for different age groups I computed two other ways of looking at the lengths of jobs.4 Column 3 of table 3 answers the question: what is the probability that a worker sampled at random from those who have just started new jobs will stay on that job for a particular length of time? The worker considered here is thirty to thirty-four years old. From the results of the computation, it is clear that most jobs are brief. About one-half of all jobs last less than nine months, and three-quarters last less than three years. A few jobs have a long duration—about 9 percent exceed ten years. The average length of a job is just under four years.5

From this distribution, one infers that jobs are typically brief just as


5. Clark and Summers infer the average length of jobs by a completely different procedure based on the frequency of job changes in panel surveys. They conclude that the average is quite a bit lower than the figure reported here. Part of the discrepancy can be explained by a bias toward overstatement of turnover in surveys through random response errors; the rest will require further investigation.
one infers from the corresponding distribution of the length of completed spells of unemployment that they, too, are very brief. However, the brevity of a typical job does not establish that long-term relations between workers and employers are quantitatively unimportant. Exactly because they are brief, short jobs contribute very little to the total volume of work in the economy. The fact that a great many jobs last only a few months does not mean that a large fraction of workers will be employed at brief jobs at any one time. The distribution across workers is obtained from the distribution of job lengths by reweighting by the length of job. The resulting distribution of workers by job length is given in column 4 of table 3. The relative importance of very long jobs then becomes apparent. Half of all workers are in jobs that will last fifteen years or more. About 6 percent of the labor force holds jobs that last nine months or less.

From the perspective of the debates about wage and employment determination, the facts in table 3 can be stated in two relevant ways. First, at any one moment, the majority of workers have not changed jobs in the previous few years. Among workers aged thirty to thirty-four, 54 percent have been employed at their current jobs for three years or more (sum of the last seven figures in column 1 of table 3), and whatever adjustments have been made recently in their earnings and levels of effort have occurred within existing employment arrangements and not as part of initial negotiations. The corresponding figure for workers aged fifty to fifty-four is 78 percent. In any given year, only 23 percent of the younger part of the labor force and only 10 percent of workers aged fifty to fifty-four change jobs. Second, most workers and employers can look forward to continuing relations for quite a few years. Half of all work is done in the course of jobs lasting fifteen years or more (the corresponding figure for men is an astonishing twenty-five years). Any adjustments made currently are likely to be influenced strongly by the prospect of the match continuing for quite a few more years.¹

6. The distribution used in these computations is from column 3 and so refers to workers who are aged thirty to thirty-four when they start their jobs. In the economy as a whole, of course, there are some workers of all ages who have just begun jobs. Those who are under age thirty typically hold jobs for shorter periods than those shown in column 3 and those who are over age thirty-four for longer periods. These two influences should very nearly cancel, as the median age of recent job starters (those who have taken new jobs in the past six months) is twenty-five years.

7. The empirical relevance of the literature on career labor markets is even greater than many of its contributors may have realized. See Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (Heath, 1971).
The data on job durations also show that job turnover is a distinct feature of the labor market, even though it affects only a small number of persons in the labor force. The unemployment resulting from the turnover comes almost entirely from the minority of the labor force that has not settled into jobs lasting three years or more (some temporary layoffs among permanent jobholders contribute to unemployment, as spells of thirty days or less are not counted as job breaks in the data on tenure). The story about short jobs and frequent unemployment told in my 1970 paper is fully supported by these new data on the duration of jobs.8

Long-Term Employment and the Meaning of Wage Payments

Recent thinking about relations between workers and employers has emphasized two basic economic motives. First, employers should provide a steady stream of income to workers and let profits absorb temporary fluctuations in demand (income smoothing). Second, the marginal value of work should equal the marginal value of time or, more precisely, the marginal rate of transformation between time and goods should equal the marginal rate of substitution between the two (efficiency). Some authors have focused on just one or the other, while a few more recent papers have studied the two motives together.

Martin Baily's pioneering paper argued the case for income smoothing persuasively and with considerable generality.9 Under the reasonable assumptions that firms can borrow and lend and deal with uncertainty more effectively than can individual workers, it makes good economic sense for firms to be financial intermediaries for their employees, spreading total compensation over the duration of the labor contract in a smooth, predictable way. The point is clearest under the following sharply delineated conditions: jobs last, say, ten years, and neither employer nor worker ever breaks the employment contract before it expires. All that matters to the firm is the present value of the total amount of compensation to be paid to the worker. One possible way to schedule compensation would be to pay it in a lump sum at the beginning of the job. Then the worker would be responsible for spreading it over the ten-year span of work to finance a stream of consumption. Another would be to pay it at

8. Hall, "Why Is the Unemployment Rate So High?"
9. Baily, "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand."
the conclusion of the ten years, which would require the worker to borrow to finance consumption in the interim. It is more convenient for both employer and worker if compensation is a stream over the course of the job, as this arrangement limits the worker's need to make large asset transactions. Further, issues of reliability and trust make it desirable that neither party be heavily in debt to the other. Where compensation is paid as a stream, it should be viewed as an installment payment on the firm's long-term obligation to the worker.

Home mortgages provide an interesting analogy to long-term labor contracts under the extreme assumptions of inviolable long-term employment commitments. It is generally convenient to the home owner to spread payments over a long period rather than making a single payment either at the time of purchase or at some later date. The choice of schedule for the payment is almost purely a question of the convenience for the home owner—the bank cares only about the present value of the payments. The terms of the mortgage are settled when the contract is signed; they may be contingent on outside variables, as in a variable rate mortgage, but there is no good reason for them to respond to the current state of the housing market. One way of putting the basic argument for sticky wages under labor contracts is that there is equally little reason to expect the current flow of compensation under a wage contract to reflect the current state of the labor market. To see what is happening in today's housing market, one looks at current prices being paid for houses, not at average mortgage payments of home owners. Similarly, to see what is happening today in the labor market, one should look at the implicit asset prices of labor contracts recently negotiated, not at the average rate of compensation paid to all workers. This point is familiar in interpreting wages in organized industries with three-year formal contracts, but is much more thoroughgoing in an economy in which most workers have jobs that will last more than fifteen years. Even in organized industries, it would be farfetched to suggest that everything starts again each time a new formal contract is negotiated.

The fact that most workers remain on their jobs for long periods does not itself establish that long-term employment arrangements differ from those in a completely open spot market. One would not want to argue that the stockholders in IBM had special long-term associations with their individual shares just because they typically own them for fifteen years.10

10. Martin Feldstein pointed out this false analogy.
There must be some economic glue in the form of specific human capital binding workers to jobs for the long-term arrangement to have the implications discussed here. Without the glue, credible threats of workers to quit and employers to lay off workers would push current compensation to the point where it reflected the current marginal product of labor and current marginal value of workers' time. The firm's ability to act as a financial intermediary to smooth compensation may provide some of the glue if independent intermediaries do not function in the labor market. I assume for the remainder of this section that the glue is sufficiently strong that employment arrangements are effectively full bilateral commitments for quite a few years.

At the simplest level, the schedule of wage payments for the duration of an unbreakable employment contract is a matter of indifference. Evidence recently assembled by James Medoff suggests that large U.S. corporations tend to use contracts with rather extreme back-loading—older workers are generally paid more than younger ones until retirement age even though productivity tends to decline in later years. For a considerable period after the beginning of the typical employment arrangement, the firm accumulates a growing debt to the worker. Later in the worker's career, this debt is partly drawn down by higher wages. The rest is paid off in the form of retirement benefits. Edward Lazear argues that mandatory retirement is an essential feature of employment contracts with this kind of back-loading. Various explanations of back-loading of employment contracts have been offered, based on problems in supervising workers, reducing incentives to quit, and the like. What is important for macroeconomics, though, is simply the existence of long-term employment contracts and the unresponsiveness of wage payments under them to current economic conditions.

The desirability of efficient labor contracts has become a prominent


Every labor contract must provide a rule by which the level of effort of the worker is determined. In the earliest models the choice was binary—the worker was either at the job full time or not at all. A more elaborate contract can specify variations in daily or weekly hours. In all cases, the natural economic assumption is that the rule comes as close as it can to an efficient outcome. Under the contract, the level of employment has the property that no other level could make both the firm and its workers better off. Another way to put it is: employment determination is a bargaining problem between them. An efficient level of employment is a point on the contract curve of that bargaining problem, and sensible bargainers ought to be on the contract curve.  

From the private points of view of the employer and the worker participating in a labor contract, efficiency requires that the value of the gains to the employer from additional employment equal the value of whatever the worker has to give up in order to supply the additional work. What the employer gains is the marginal revenue product of labor. What the worker gives up is more complicated. A worker may have to reduce hours on a second job, in which case it is easy to estimate a dollar value for what is given up. In most cases, though, the worker sacrifices nonmarket activities, and it is more difficult for the analyst to put a value on them. The duration of an increase in time spent at work is an important consideration —workers are probably much more willing to work long hours for a few weeks or months than for several years.

The same considerations apply when the firm contemplates a reduction in employment—the forgone revenue should equal the value to the worker
of spending more time in other activities. Again, it seems likely that workers can make much better use of temporary increases in time at their disposal than permanent ones: a brief spell away from work is a good time to go on vacation or to repair the house, but these opportunities are exhausted in a few weeks or months. The evidence on the labor supply of adult males seems to indicate that small permanent variations in hours of work cause very large variations in the marginal value of time. Low compensated wage elasticities of labor supply mean that workers feel they give up a lot if they work more than normal full time and derive very little personal benefit from working less than full time. Efficient contracts for them would promise that they work almost exactly full time on the average.

Private considerations of efficiency may not coincide with social considerations if the tax system drives wedges into private calculations. Taxation of business and wage income reduces the private return to employment below the social return and pushes private labor contracts to levels of employment that are socially inefficiently low. Another tax consideration has been prominent in the discussion of labor contracts: workers are paid unemployment compensation during periods of layoff, and much of this is not recovered from their own employer through insurance premiums, but is paid from taxes levied on employers in general. This tax wedge pushes employment contracts in the direction of accommodating decreases in demand with temporary periods of nonwork. Workers perceive these temporary layoffs as privately valuable because of the unemployment compensation they receive, but there is no corresponding social value to the resulting unemployment. Feldstein gives a complete mathematical statement of the private efficiency condition for setting employment in the face of an unemployment insurance system that pays benefits during periods of temporary layoffs. He argues persuasively that such a system raises the natural rate of unemployment, but the effect cannot be large because temporary layoffs are a small part of full-employment unemployment.

In one form of employment contract, the employment rule is completely separate from the compensation rule. Compensation is a lump

16. Feldstein, "Temporary Layoffs."
sum paid by the employer to the worker in exchange for the agreement to supply effort according to an implicit employment agreement. The employer informs the worker each week about that week's efficient level of effort, or, for more responsible workers, the decision may be joint or even unilateral by the worker. In unusually busy weeks, longer hours are set and workers may also accomplish more in each hour. In slack weeks, hours are set at lower levels and the intensity of work may fall as well. The general flavor of the arrangement is that employees work harder if there is more work to do. I think this is a reasonable summary of the employment bargain for many salaried white-collar workers (who now constitute about half the total labor force). Employers have the right to request intense effort for a few weeks or months, but not permanently. Periods of extraordinary effort must be counterbalanced by restful periods. For salaried workers, arrangements of this kind develop by custom and are rarely spelled out in formal contracts. The absence of a relationship between weekly effort and weekly compensation is virtually the definition of a salaried job.

Another form of employment contract is studied in my paper with David Lilien. The problem again is to create a workable mechanism for determining employment in a way that respects the value of labor's time. We ask if labor can set up economic inducements for management to adopt an efficient level of employment; we have in mind explicit bargaining between blue-collar industrial workers and management in a collective bargaining setting. The union does not trust management with the unfettered unilateral power to set employment and hours because it fears it will be asked to work systematically too hard. Nonetheless, it recognizes the mutual benefits of working harder when there is more work to do. The contract we suggest requires management to compensate labor for the marginal opportunity cost of the hours that labor is required to supply. Under the right compensation formula, management fully internalizes labor's interests, and so makes an efficient decision unilaterally.

Contracts of this kind have the attractive feature of accommodating large shifts in the demand for output without renegotiation. In a situation in which management is likely to have better information about the current state of demand for products than does labor, it is sensible for management to make a unilateral decision about employment. The alternative is to make the employment contract contingent on some measurement of

17. Hall and Lilien, "Efficient Wage Bargains."
demand, but such contingencies have problems of moral hazard and verifiability that have been pointed out by a number of authors. To induce the efficient response of employment to a shift in demand, the compensation formula must embody labor's views about the opportunity costs of brief variations in work schedules in contrast to long-term variations. For example, compensation could drop sharply for a brief layoff because unemployment compensation was available at no cost to either employer or worker or because workers can make good private use of a few weeks off the job. On the other hand, firms would be given much less opportunity to lower compensation costs through permanent reductions in hours of work. In periods of strong demand, extra hours could be obtained temporarily at modest increases in compensation, but again, permanent increases would be penalized. If the long-run supply of labor is as inelastic as the evidence suggests, the efficient contract would effectively prohibit permanent changes in hours, so the contract might simply state this as a rule rather than imposing severe economic penalties. In fact, collective bargaining agreements typically contain many pages describing the provisions for varying hours, putting workers on temporary layoff, promoting and demoting workers (thereby changing their compensation), and so forth. A key notion is that management's unilateral role in setting the volume of work is carried out within carefully specified provisions of a contract.

I argue that the collective bargaining agreements found in the contemporary United States fit in quite well with this prescription. Financial disincentives for excessive weekly hours of work (in the form of overtime premiums) do protect workers against being told to work hard every week. Limitations on the number of consecutive weeks of overtime have the same effect. On the other hand, many contract provisions limit the cost savings from reducing labor input below normal. In a number of major industries, firms are committed to keeping workers' incomes at normal levels, even during temporary layoffs, through supplemental unemployment benefits. Another widespread provision of collective bargaining agreements requires concentration of layoffs among the lowest-paid workers, again limiting the cost savings from layoffs. As a general matter,

agreements contain a great variety of incentives and rules for stabilizing employment to respect the value of workers' time.

A limitation of contracts of this kind is their inability to make employment respond efficiently to shifts in the opportunity costs of labor. A contract cannot be written that will make management internalize unexpected shifts in the value of labor's time without introducing contingencies. One contingency—changes in the cost of living—is present in many collective bargaining agreements, but I am not aware of any other formal contingencies. Again, there are important practical obstacles to contingent contracts. In our joint paper, Lilien and I suggest that periodic renegotiation of agreements occurs for the specific purpose of taking account of inefficiencies that enter on the supply side.

Contracts that grant management the unilateral right to set the volume of work will create changes that are viewed by the workers themselves and by observers as involuntary. Workers do not consider the current values of the relevant variables and then decide how much to work. They will simply do what they are told by management, relying on the accuracy of management's computations of the efficient, profit-maximizing level of employment. Fluctuations in employment could be efficient even though they are involuntary—their involuntary nature is not by itself a conclusive case for inefficiency.19

Job Termination

Long-term employment contracts cannot provide complete stability of employment, nor would it usually be desirable for them to do so. Forward commitments by workers are almost invariably unenforceable legally. Commitments to provide employment in future years are enforceable, but

19. This distinction is not widely appreciated. The presidential addresses of James Tobin, Franco Modigliani, and Robert Solow before the American Economic Association point to the involuntary nature of layoffs as evidence against the hypothesis that fluctuations in employment are efficient. See James Tobin, "Inflation and Unemployment," *American Economic Review*, vol. 62 (March 1972), pp. 1-18; Franco Modigliani, "The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We Forsake Stabilization Policies?" *American Economic Review*, vol. 67 (March 1977), pp. 1-19; and Robert M. Solow, "On Theories of Unemployment," *American Economic Review*, vol. 70 (March 1980), pp. 1-11. All three have many other arguments against the hypothesis as well. Solow has written to me in defense, "An old non-com like me knows perfectly well that efficient decisions can be handed down against the will of the deciders—and inefficient ones too."
indefinite employment may not be efficient. If there is a permanent fall in the demand for a firm's products, it is probably efficient to reduce the total labor force and have the remaining workers put in full-time hours rather than maintaining the labor force at its earlier level with shorter hours. Efficient contracts need to provide a way to terminate jobs as well as a way to vary total labor input.\textsuperscript{20}

For jobs with an important component of specific human capital, the open market cannot support efficient job termination through unilateral decisions made by workers and employers: if wages include the full return to the specific capital, workers have the appropriate incentives about quitting, but employers have no incentive to preserve the specific capital by holding back on layoffs; if employers receive the return, then workers are too likely to quit. One way to achieve efficiency is to require the worker and the employer to compensate the other for breaking the job match.\textsuperscript{21} A more realistic approach is for rules to evolve that limit layoffs and quits and permit them to occur only when they are efficient. Layoffs should be allowed only under conditions of genuine permanent reduction in demand and not just when it is privately beneficial to the firm. Further, layoffs ought to be concentrated among junior workers whose specific capital is smaller and whose costs of finding new work are probably lower. For workers, quits should occur only for good personal reasons—a distinctly better job elsewhere, an opportunity to acquire additional education, and the like—not merely because of a modest increase in wages in a different job. The practices and implicit contractual provisions supporting these limitations are likely to assign the employer the responsibility for terminations made efficient by declines in demand and the worker the responsibility for quits made efficient by superior alternatives elsewhere. Thus layoffs and quits have distinct economic meanings.\textsuperscript{22}

Economists have only just begun to examine the issues in the efficient movement of workers among firms. The obstacles to efficiency here are

\textsuperscript{20} In the abstract, these are really the same issue because permanently working zero hours at a job is about the same as not having the job.


\textsuperscript{22} In Becker, Landes, and Michael's arrangement based on individual bargaining between workers and employers, there is no meaningful distinction between layoffs and quits. In practice, the classification is often ambiguous; the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics tends to classify all ambiguous job terminations as layoffs.
much greater than in the case of a permanent match between worker and employer. When a worker is about to move from one firm to another, there are three participants in the implicit bargain: the worker, the current employer, and the future employer. Institutions like unilateral permanent layoffs that work reasonably well in normal times when the departing worker has a good chance of lining up a new job quickly may not be efficient in times of recession. The failure of macro efficiency over the business cycle may be attributable in part to the inability to create the rather complex institutions necessary to deal with movements of workers among firms.

Short-Run Sensitivity of Marginal Value of Time to Hours of Work

In order for the theory of efficient employment determination to explain fluctuations in hours of work and other dimensions of labor input, the marginal value of time cannot be too sensitive to the volume of work. The principle that employees work harder when there is more work to do fails if the marginal valuation of the additional work is enormous. The issue here is the short-run labor supply function of the typical worker in the following sense: the labor supply function shows the individual's offer of work to the labor market under the assumption that the market will absorb any amount of that work at the prevailing wage. Under these conditions, the labor supply schedule traces out exactly the worker's marginal valuation of time. Fluctuations in the level of work will occur, then, if the short-run labor supply schedule is somewhat responsive to the wage. However, a central feature of the theory of employment determination under long-term arrangements is the very different institutional procedure for setting employment compared to an open labor market. Few workers carry out an explicit labor supply calculation every month or year. Instead, they just work as much as they are told. But the labor supply issue arises just as importantly in the following way: when an employer unilaterally imposes an increase in hours, what is the dollar value of the monetary and psychic costs to the worker?

One body of research with a claim to answering this question is standard econometric studies of labor supply. But these studies give seriously misleading answers if applied to workers under long-term employment arrangements. They universally assume workers are free to vary their hours unilaterally and receive the same wage for each extra hour. For
example, if some workers in a sample hold jobs with heavily back-loaded compensation arrangements, the assumptions of standard labor supply studies would let them raise hours in the later years of high compensation. In fact, they do not have this opportunity, so the results underestimate the amount people would vary their hours if presented with a genuine opportunity to do so in the short run. Econometric work on labor supply has been criticized by institutional labor economists on exactly these grounds since the earliest studies. Recent thinking on long-term employment arrangements clearly supports this criticism.

Another body of research is based on the negative income tax experiments. Workers were given substantial cash grants at the same time that their wages were taxed at 30, 50, or 70 percent. Again, one could argue that their labor supply responses were attenuated by contractual provisions in which employers had the unilateral right to set hours of work. But this point has much less force in a low-income population, where turnover is high and long-term employment arrangements are rare. Labor supply responses to the taxes and transfers in the experiments have been strong—about 14 percent reduction in hours for men and 75 percent for women. If all of this is attributed to the temporary reduction in after-tax wages (on the ground that temporary increases in income should have little effect on labor supply), elasticities of short-run labor supply of 0.2 to 2.0 emerge. But investigators have reached differing conclusions about the strength of the effect of the income transfer. The most that can be said at this point is that hours of work do respond sharply to temporary changes in economic circumstances.

Still another approach is direct measurement of the opportunity cost of work. Martin Feldstein estimated that forgone unemployment benefits are 40 to 50 percent of regular compensation for the typical eligible worker. Although unemployment benefits are paid in most states only for full weeks of unemployment, they effectively create a marginal op-


portunity cost of raising year-long weeks of work, up to the point of no temporary layoffs throughout the year. With respect to the value of activities that must be given up in order to work more, estimates of for-gone job search reported by Robert Gordon are small.\textsuperscript{25} So far as I am aware, nothing is known about temporary jobs taken by workers on temporary layoff. And finally, no direct evidence is available about the value of nonmarket activities of workers undergoing temporary reductions in market work.

In summary, there is relatively little good evidence on workers’ valuation of short-run variations in hours of work. Except for the purely financial rewards from unemployment compensation, analysts must rely on introspection to decide if the typical worker makes good use of temporary spells away from his job.

### Wage Payments and Wage Inflation under Long-Term Contracts

Under a long-term contract the current rate of hourly compensation has little relation to the current marginal product of labor or the current marginal value of time. The separation of wage payments from current economic conditions is most extreme if wages are purely installment payments on long-term obligations. In long-term salary contracts, the current wage has no allocational role. The labor market is effectively an asset market, and the implicit present value of future salary payments has to be observed to measure the price that is clearing the market.

Under the contracts discussed in my paper with Lilien, which we argue are representative of arrangements for blue-collar workers under collective bargaining, marginal compensation is set up to guide employment decisions and does have an allocational function. In principle, information could be derived from the joint variation of hours and compensation under this type of contract.\textsuperscript{26} But contract provisions should make average compensation fairly insensitive to the level of employment, even if


\textsuperscript{26} A related idea was developed in my "The Process of Inflation in the Labor Market," \textit{BPEA}, 2:1974, pp. 343–93. There I looked for marginal compensation in excess of average compensation. But a more complicated relation is suggested by my work with Lilien: marginal above average for more hours than normal and marginal below average for fewer hours than normal. See Hall and Lilien, "Efficient Wage Bargains."
marginal compensation is quite sensitive. Again, the current hourly wage is not the quantity guiding the employment decision of the firm.

How does the Phillips curve showing the trade-off between inflation and unemployment fit into the new ideas and facts about long-term employment arrangements? The notion of a stable relation between unemployment and inflation fared poorly in the past decade. Of course, few economists ever said that price changes would fit a simple Phillips curve when the world prices of raw materials gyrated. But even wage inflation had a life of its own relative to unemployment during the decade, and the upward shift of the Phillips curve associated with rising inflationary expectations contributes relatively little toward understanding the movements of wages in the 1970s. The single largest disappointment for the idea that demand affects wage inflation was the persistence of high wage inflation in the year of the deepest postwar recession, 1975.

In an economy in which most compensation is paid under long-term employment arrangements, the insulation of wages from the current state of demand is not too great a surprise. The wage does not clear the market; the employment provisions of contracts do that, if indeed the market is clearing. Wages are installment payments on long-term financial obligations. As William Nordhaus has put it, "... contracts are written over what might be called the economic climate rather than the economic weather." However, the magnitudes of the obligations cannot be set unambiguously in advance, if only because of uncertainty about the future value of the dollar. Adjustments need to take place to accommodate surprises in monetary and fiscal policy, shifts in the relative prices of food and oil, and many other unforeseen developments. Annual rates of wage inflation will reflect whatever changes have been made in long-term obligations, changes that were planned in advance, changes that have occurred in contracts with compensation formulas linked to current employment, and full market-clearing movements among the minority of workers in the open labor markets with short-term employment arrangements. Plainly, such a hodgepodge of sources of wage movements will not have a simple relation to a single measure of the state of demand.

The wage equations fit by Robert J. Gordon reflect the diversity of considerations entering wage determination. The recent behavior of

consumer prices, the price of domestic value-added, payroll and income
taxes, federal intervention through guideposts and controls, and real out-
put all have important roles in addition to a variety of measures of unem-
ployment. Even though Gordon is particularly concerned with careful
measurement of the effect of demand, he finds an extremely flat Phillips
curve. His results suggest that an increase of 1 percentage point in the
unemployment rate sustained for a full year would depress wage inflation
by one-quarter to one-half a percentage point. When combined with
traditional theories of employment determination in which the marginal
product of labor is equated with the current wage, these results give a
terribly pessimistic prediction about the ability of the economy to restore
full employment after a negative shock, without government intervention.

Because the current rate of compensation is not directly related to em-
ployment determination, the Phillips curve is off center stage in an econ-
omy in which long-term employment arrangements achieve macro effi-
ciency. In such an economy, the Phillips curve deals with the distribution
of income but not with the allocation of resources. Rather than study the
observed flow of compensation to workers, economists should be looking
at the longer-run terms offered to workers taking new jobs.

But before consigning the Phillips curve to the scrap heap, the failure
of the efficiency principle at the macro level should be noted. In the next
section of the paper I discuss how implausible it is to assert that the
labor market is fully successful in allocating labor efficiently over the
business cycle. The longer-run terms offered to new workers may not ad-
just to clear the labor market, but instead may follow something like the
Phillips curve. Since new thinking about long-term employment arrange-
ments has not reached the point of explaining the observed fluctuations
in aggregate employment and unemployment, economists should not be
too hasty in discarding the old theory in which the nominal wage as de-
termined by the Phillips curve has an important allocational role.

The Failure of Macro Efficiency

Theories of efficient, long-term employment arrangements have made
an impressive contribution to understanding the labor market, but they
are far from closing the debates about the nature of the business cycle
and employment fluctuations. There are three ways in which the evidence
does not sustain the efficiency of cyclical fluctuations in employment and unemployment.

First, the proposition that employment arrangements are efficient explains a lot about fluctuations in employment in individual firms, industries, and sectors; but in the aggregate it is unclear what economic forces can create efficient fluctuations in the amount of work there is to do. Simple ideas of efficiency seem to suggest highly stable employment at the macro level.

Second, the efficient level of employment is a real economic quantity and should be unaffected by purely nominal influences. But ample evidence suggests that changes in the stock of money have a lingering effect on employment.

Third, efficient employment arrangements create chronically positive levels of unemployment, as micro fluctuations will continually cause workers to be put on temporary layoff or to find work in other firms or sectors. However, the data suggest that relatively little of the overall level of unemployment can be explained in this way.

Are Fluctuations in Aggregate Employment Efficient?

Up to this point, I have discussed the problem of efficient employment determination at the level of the firm. Variations in product demand could be local to the firm, industry-wide, or part of an economy-wide contraction. The ideas reviewed seem incapable of explaining fluctuations in a simple aggregate economy. The reason is shown in the diagram below. At full employment, the efficient allocation of time to the production of goods is the point of tangency of the production possibility frontier to the indifference curve, at point $E$. During a recession, the economy moves to a point like $R$, with less labor input and less production of goods. In order to interpret this as a new efficient point, either the production possibility frontier must have twisted counterclockwise (a sudden decline in the productivity of labor) or the indifference curves must have twisted clockwise (a downward shift in labor supply). Neither seems to be a good description of a recession. If a second productive factor is introduced into the analysis, say oil, a temporary increase in its price might have effects similar to those of a decline in productivity. But recessions have occurred many times without oil price increases, and there have not
been any temporary oil price increases yet. Twisting of the indifference curve seems equally implausible—an explanation of recessions based on temporary shifts of labor supply functions (not movements along them) seems completely empty.  

29. Recent work by Ben Bernanke investigates explanations of aggregate fluctuations within theories of efficient employment arrangements. His economy has two sectors, durable and nondurable goods. For good economic reasons, the economy undergoes a pause in its efficient rate of accumulation of durable goods. Workers do not shift costlessly to the nondurable sector for the usual reasons of specific human capital and the like. Instead, they work short hours and enjoy some time off the job until the demand for durable goods picks up. All this rests on the idea of efficient employment arrangements in the durable goods sector and an elasticity of the marginal value of time with respect to the level of work that is not too high. Although this seems a fruitful line of research at this point, it would take me too far from the topic of the paper to appraise its empirical success. See Ben S. Bernanke, "Long-Term Commitments, Dynamic Optimization, and Business Cycles" (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979).
Monetary Influences on Employment

The efficient level of employment, at which the value of time equals the marginal product of labor, does not depend on the stock of money or any other nominal quantity; it is exclusively real. This implication is flatly contradicted by a large body of evidence on the positive correlation between money and real output and employment. Moreover, movements of the money stock often precede changes in employment, so it is implausible that money is responding to influences from the real economy.

More than any other evidence, the vulnerability of employment to nominal shocks supports the traditional theory of employment determination and makes the relevance of models based on efficiency questionable. If, as the traditional theory asserts, the nominal wage is predetermined and employers are free to treat it as the marginal cost of raising or lowering employment, explaining the response of employment to movements of the money stock is a simple textbook exercise. A decade of research by macroeconomists who are dissatisfied with the absence of a microeconomic foundation for the traditional theory has not produced a workable alternative based on realistic assumptions.

Unemployment

Under efficient employment arrangements with unilateral decision-making by employers, unemployment ought to have two components: workers on temporary layoff who will be recalled fairly soon, and workers who have been discharged permanently because they belong in other jobs. A more fully developed theory of efficient labor markets would con-
Table 4. Unemployment by Reason, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for unemployment</th>
<th>Number of unemployed (thousands)</th>
<th>Percent of total unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On layoff</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost job</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left job</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted temporary work</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left school</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,855</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. The categories "wanted temporary work," "left school," and "other" are alternatives to the published breakdown into entrants and reentrants. "Wanted temporary work" is one of the possible answers to the question on the survey on why an individual became unemployed. It is unclear how a worker is categorized who becomes unemployed by losing or leaving a temporary job. Presumably most people in this category have entered the labor force to look for temporary work. Figures are rounded.

sider a small amount of unemployment from people looking for their first jobs or for new jobs after a period outside the labor force and also would consider job quitters, some of whom would become unemployed. The actual composition and volume of unemployment in 1977 is shown in table 4. The overall level of unemployment was 7.0 percent, a little above the average for the decade of 6.2 percent and somewhat above most estimates of the natural or equilibrium rate for the 1970s.

The first row of the table shows the number of workers who are classified as "on layoff," meaning that they still have jobs but are on furlough. This group, which figures prominently in most discussions of efficient employment arrangements, especially in an economy with generous unemployment compensation, actually accounts for only 12 percent of the unemployed. Of these, about a quarter are expecting recall within thirty days (the temporary category) and the other three-quarters expect to return to work eventually but not within thirty days (the indefinite category). In a nonrecessionary year like 1977, temporary layoffs from permanent jobs are not a major component of total unemployment. The fourth row of table 4 shows that job losers form a much larger group; these are workers who are looking for new jobs and do not have any reason to expect to return to jobs that have ended. Many people in this category have been laid off in the conventional sense that their employers have unexpectedly told them to stop work. But it also includes large
numbers whose jobs were explicitly temporary and have simply come to an end. The job losers fit the standard picture of the unemployed: they have lost jobs and are looking for new ones.

The next group in table 4 is the unemployed quitters, who make up only 13 percent of total unemployment. Quitting is a common way for people to leave jobs, but generally they do not become unemployed subsequently. Instead, they move directly to new jobs or out of the labor force. Another 13 percent of the unemployed associate their joblessness with an interest in temporary work, though the question on the unemployment survey that elicits this response is so vague that interpretation is difficult. Next, people just out of school make up 7 percent of the unemployed. This is a dramatic illustration of one of the central themes of recent findings on unemployment: net flows, like the movement from school to work, are tiny compared to the gross flows from job to unemployment to job or into and out of the labor force. Finally, the category “other” comprises primarily people who have been out of the labor force, usually for no more than a few weeks or months.

Nothing in table 4 refutes the idea that efficient employment arrangements lie behind the rather high level of unemployment that is characteristic of the U.S. labor market in many years, but it would also be hard to say that they support the hypothesis. The type of unemployment that is most closely identified with the hypothesis of efficient use of workers’ time, namely temporary layoffs, is a very small part of total unemployment. A more detailed analysis of the other components of unemployment yields the following: a substantial amount of unemployment comes not from workers who occasionally spend a few weeks away from their jobs because there is no work to do, but from people who occasionally spend a few months working but are looking for work or are out of the labor force most of the time. Although this assertion was made by a number of earlier authors, Kim Clark and Lawrence Summers found the most dramatic ways of expressing it. Only 28 percent of total unemployment in 1974 was contributed by spells of two months or less that ended by finding work. Almost half (47 percent) of all unemployment comes from spells that ultimately end in withdrawal from the labor force. Almost half (45 percent) of all unemployment comes from spells lasting five months or more. Clark and Summers also document the concentra-

Table 5. Unemployment in Tight and Slack Markets, by Reason, 1974 and 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for unemployment</th>
<th>Tight market, 1974</th>
<th>Slack market, 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On layoff</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost job</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left job</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted temporary work</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left school</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as table 4.

The facts about episodic employment reveal how incomplete research has been to date on the nature of employment. The tendency to think of workers as spending most of the year at work is appropriate for most of the labor force; but for the type of worker who dominates unemployment, that tendency is quite inappropriate. No research has established that episodic work is an inefficient use of time; rather, the subject has been almost completely overlooked by research. For now, all we can say is that it is an important phenomenon of the labor market that we do not understand.

Theories of long-term employment arrangements are somewhat more successful in explaining the cyclical behavior of unemployment than they are in explaining the level of unemployment. Table 5 shows the changes in the composition and the level of unemployment brought about by a recession. The table breaks down unemployment into the same categories as in table 4 for a year of tight labor markets, 1974, and a year of deep recession, 1975. Of the increase in total unemployment of 2.9 percentage points, 1.0 occurred for workers on layoff and 1.3 percentage points for those who lost jobs. The other 0.6 point is spread among those who left jobs, wanted temporary work, left school, or were in the "other" category. About 35 percent of the increase in unemployment during a
contraction occurs among workers who have not definitely lost their jobs, which is in accordance with the ideas of long-term employment arrangements. However, the fraction of unemployed workers who are on layoff declines dramatically by the beginning of the expansion, long before total unemployment returns to normal.

Conclusions

It is clear why employees in one firm work harder when there is more work to do in that firm, but not why there is more total work to do in the aggregate economy in some years than in others. Institutional arrangements in the labor market like temporary and permanent layoffs and unresponsive wages make good economic sense for individual firms dealing with their own fluctuations in demand, but it is not known why they sometimes operate in unison to depress employment throughout the economy.

The greatest recent progress in understanding the labor market comes from the study of long-term employment arrangements. There is no point any longer in pretending that the labor market is an auction market cleared by the observed average hourly wage. In an extreme case, wages are just installment payments on a long-term debt and reveal essentially nothing about the current state of the market. Because wages are not necessarily the appropriate guide to employment decisions under long-term employment arrangements, analysis has turned to employment determination as an important issue in its own right. But the simple microeconomic idea of efficient levels of employment does not seem to be able to explain the large observed fluctuations in the level of employment over the business cycle. The traditional idea of sticky nominal wages and unilateral profit maximization by employers has hardly been overturned by the new ideas. It seems safe to predict that a good deal of additional effort will be expended in the forthcoming decade in trying to improve microeconomic understanding of cyclical variations in employment and the unresponsiveness of wages.
APPENDIX

Computation of Distributions of Job Duration

The computations start from the published distributions of job tenure.\(^3\)

Let

\[ f(x, a) = \text{fraction of the working population of age } a \text{ who took their present jobs } x \text{ years ago, as published.} \]

The first step is to calculate

\[ G(x, a) = \text{fraction of jobs taken by workers of age } a \text{ that last no more than } x \text{ years.} \]

Now the fraction of the population of age \(a + x\) who took their present jobs \(x\) years ago is

\[ f(x, x + a) = \text{the probability of taking a job } x \text{ years ago at age } a \text{ times the probability that the job lasted until now} \]

\[ = f(0, a) [1 - G(x, a)]. \]

Solve for \(G(x, a)\):

\[ G(x, a) = 1 - \frac{f(x, x + a)}{f(0, a)}. \]

Then let

\[ g(x, a) = \text{fraction of jobs taken by workers of age } a \text{ that last } x \text{ years} \]

\[ = G(x, a) - G(x - 1, a). \]

Consider a worker with a typical work history. The task is to measure

\[ h(x) = \text{fraction of a career spent in jobs lasting } x \text{ years.} \]

The typical worker will hold a number of jobs. If \(N\) is the total number of jobs, \(N\)g(1) will last one year, \(N\)g(2) will last two years, and so on. The length of the career will be

\[ N \sum_{i=1}^{n} ig(i) = T, \]

Table A-1. Computation of Distributions of Jobs by Duration, Workers Aged 30–34 at Beginning of Jobs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years in current job and corresponding age</th>
<th>Proportion of age group in jobs of this duration (I)</th>
<th>Interpolated density, ( f ) (2)</th>
<th>Cumulative distribution of jobs, ( G ) (3)</th>
<th>Distribution of jobs, ( g ) (4)</th>
<th>Proportion of career spent in jobs of this duration, ( h ) (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½ or less</td>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½–1</td>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2</td>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–3</td>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–5</td>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
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<td>5–10</td>
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<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–15</td>
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<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–25</td>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>0.149</td>
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<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–30</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 35</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. Column 2 is computed from the published numbers in column 1 by linear interpolation. The density at zero is 0.377. Column 3 is computed from column 2 as \( G_i = 1 - f_i / f_o \). Column 4 is computed from column 3 as \( g_i = G_i - G_{i-1} \). This appears in table 3, column 3. Column 5 is computed by interpolating column 3 to form two values of the density corresponding to \( g \), computing the mean duration (3.8 years), dividing the product of the duration and the density by the mean, and adding together to obtain \( h \). This appears in table 3, column 4. Figures are rounded.
where $T$ is the number of years in a working lifetime. Thus

$$N = \frac{T}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} ig(i)}$$

the number of jobs in a typical career is the length of the career divided by the mean length of jobs.

Now $Ng(x)$ of the jobs last $x$ years, so the fraction of the career in jobs of length $x$ is

$$h(x) = \frac{xNg(x)}{T}$$

$$= \frac{xg(x)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} ig(i)}$$

The details of the computations are given in table A-1.