Real Options Signaling Games with Applications to Corporate Finance*

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Abstract

We study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. Signaling incentives distort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision-maker’s utility increases or decreases in the outsiders’ belief about the payoff from exercise. In the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the model’s implications through four corporate finance settings: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash flow diversion, and product market competition.

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1 Introduction

The real options approach to investment and other corporate finance decisions has become an increasingly important area of research in financial economics. The main underlying concept is that an investment opportunity is valuable not only because of associated cash flows but also because the decision to invest can be postponed. As a result, when making the investment decision, one must take into account both the direct costs of investment and the indirect costs of foregoing the option to invest in the future. The applications of the real options framework have become quite broad.¹

One aspect that is typically ignored in standard models is that most real option exercise decisions are made under asymmetric information: the decision-maker is better informed about the value of the option than the outsiders. Given the importance of asymmetric information in corporate finance, it is useful to understand how it affects real option exercise decisions.² In this paper, we explore this issue by incorporating information asymmetry into real options modeling. We consider a setting that is flexible enough to handle a variety of real world examples, characterize the effects of asymmetric information, and then illustrate the model using four specific applications.

In the presence of asymmetric information, the exercise strategy of a real option is an important information transmission mechanism. The outsiders learn information about the decision-maker from observing the exercise (or lack of exercise) of the option, and thereby change their assessment of the decision-maker. In turn, because the decision-maker is aware of this information transmission effect, they rationally shape the option exercise strategy to take advantage of it. In order to provide further motivation for the study, consider two examples of option exercise decisions, where asymmetric information and signaling are likely

¹The early literature, started by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986), is well summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Recently the real options framework has been extended to incorporate competition among several option holders (e.g., Grenadier (2002), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), Novy-Marx (2007)) and agency conflicts (Grenadier and Wang (2005)). Real options models have been applied to study specific industries such as real estate (Titman (1985), Williams (1991)) and natural resources (Brennan and Schwartz (1985)) and other corporate decisions such as defaults (e.g., Leland (1994)) and mergers (Lambrecht (2004), Morellec and Zhidanov (2005), Hackbarth and Morellec (2008), Hackbarth and Miao (2008)). See Leslie and Michaels (1997) for a discussion of how practitioners use real options ideas.

²See Tirole (2006), Chapter 6, for a discussion of asymmetric information in corporate finance.
to be especially important.

**Example 1. Delegated investment decisions in corporations.** In most modern corporations, the owners of the firm delegate investment decisions to managers. There is substantial asymmetric information: managers are typically much better informed about the underlying cash flows of the investment project than the shareholders. In this context, the manager’s decision when to invest transmits information about the project’s net present value. While in some agency settings the manager may want to signal higher project values in order to boost their future compensation, in other agency settings the manager may want to signal a lower project net present value in order to divert more value for their own private consumption. In either setting, however, the manager will take this information transmission effect into account when deciding when to invest.

**Example 2. Exit decisions in the venture capital industry.** In the venture capital industry, there is substantial asymmetric information about the value of the fund’s portfolio companies, since the venture capital firm that manages the fund has a much better information about the fund’s portfolio companies than the fund’s outside investors. In this context, the firm’s decision when to sell a portfolio company transmits information about its value, and hence impacts outsiders’ inferences of the firm’s investment skill. Because investor inferences of the firm’s investment skill impact the firm’s future fund-raising ability, the firm will take this information transmission effect into account when deciding when to sell a portfolio company.

We call such interactions real options signaling games, and study them in detail in this paper. We begin our study with a general model of option exercise under asymmetric information. Specifically, we consider a decision-maker whose payoff from option exercise is comprised of two components. The first component is simply some fraction of the project’s payoff. The second component, which we call the belief component, depends on the outsiders’ assessment of the decision-maker’s type. The decision-maker’s type determines the project’s net present value and is the private information of the decision-maker. Our central interest is in separating equilibria — equilibria in which the decision-maker reveals their type through
the option exercise strategy.\footnote{In fact, as we discuss in Section 3.3, any non-separating equilibrium can be ruled out using the D1 restriction on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the outsiders.} We characterize a separating equilibrium of the general model, and prove that under standard regularity conditions it exists and is unique. The equilibrium is determined by a differential equation given by local incentive compatibility.

We show that the implied option exercise behavior differs significantly from traditional real options models. The first-best (symmetric information) exercise threshold is never an equilibrium outcome, except for the most extreme type: because the decision-maker’s utility depends on the outsiders’ beliefs about the decision-maker’s type, there is an incentive to deviate from the symmetric information threshold in order to mimic a different type and thereby take advantage of the outsiders’ incorrect beliefs. While information asymmetry distorts the timing of option exercise, the direction of the effect is ambiguous and depends on the nature of the interactions between the decision-maker and the outsiders.

The first contribution of our paper is the characterization of the direction of distortion. We show that the direction of distortion depends on a simple and intuitive characteristic, the derivative of the decision-maker’s payoff with respect to the beliefs of the outsiders about the decision-maker’s type. If the decision-maker benefits from outsiders believing that the project’s value is higher than it truly is, then signaling incentives lead to earlier option exercise than in the case of symmetric information. In contrast, if the decision-maker benefits from outsiders believing that the project’s value is lower than it truly is, then the option is exercised later than in the case of symmetric information. The intuition underlying this result comes from the fact that earlier exercise is a signal of a better quality of the project. For example, other things equal, an oil producing firm decides to drill an oil well at a lower oil price threshold when it believes that the quality of the oil well is higher. Because of this, if the decision-maker benefits from outsiders believing that the project’s quality is higher (lower) than it truly is, they have incentives to deviate from the first-best exercise threshold by exercising the option marginally earlier (later) and attempting to fool the market into believing that the project’s quality is higher (lower) than it truly is. In equilibrium, the exercise threshold will be lowered (raised) up to the point at which the decision-maker’s marginal costs of inefficiently early
(late) exercise exactly offset their marginal benefits from fooling the outsiders. Importantly, the outsiders are rational. They are aware that the decision-maker shapes the exercise strategy in order to affect their beliefs. As a result, in equilibrium the outsiders always correctly infer the private information of the agent. However, even though the private information is always revealed in equilibrium, signal-jamming occurs: the exercise thresholds of all types, except for the most extreme type, are different from the first-best case and are such that no type has an incentive to fool the outsiders.

The second contribution of our paper is illustrating the general model with four corporate finance applications that put additional structure on the belief component of the decision-maker’s payoff. The first two settings belong to the case of the decision-maker benefiting more when the outsiders believe that the project’s net present value is higher than it truly is, and thus imply an inefficiently early option exercise. The first application we consider is a timing analog to the myopia model of Stein (1989). We consider a public corporation, in which the investment decision is delegated to the manager, who has superior information about the project’s net present value. As in Stein (1989), the manager is myopic in that they care not only about the long-term performance of the company but also about the short-term stock price. The timing of investment reveals the manager’s private information about the project and thereby affects the stock price. As a result, managers invest inefficiently by exercising their investment option too early in an attempt to fool the market into overestimating the project’s net present value and thereby inflating the current stock price.

The second application deals with the venture capital industry. As discussed in Gompers (1996), younger venture capital firms often take companies public earlier than older venture capital firms in order to establish a reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds. Gompers terms this phenomenon “grandstanding” and suggests that inexperienced venture capital firms employ early timing of IPOs as a signal of their ability to form higher-quality portfolios. We formalize this idea in a two-stage model of venture capital investment. An inexperienced venture capital firm invests limited partners’ money in the first round and then decides when to take its portfolio companies public. Limited partners update their estimate of the general partner’s investment-picking ability by observing when the decision to take the
portfolio companies public is made and use this estimate when deciding how much to invest in the second round. Because the amount of second round financing is positively related to the limited partners’ estimate of the general partner’s ability, the general partner has an incentive to fool the limited partners into believing that their ability is higher. Since an earlier IPO is a signal of better quality of the inexperienced general partner, signaling incentives lead to earlier than optimal exit timing of inexperienced general partners, consistent with the grandstanding phenomenon of Gompers (1996).

The two other corporate finance settings belong to the case of the decision-maker benefiting more when the outsiders believe that the project’s net present value is lower than it truly is, and thus imply an inefficiently delayed option exercise. Similar to the first application, the third application studies a delegated investment decision in a corporation. However, unlike the second application, the nature of the agency conflict is different. Specifically, we consider a setting in which a manager can divert a portion of the project’s cash flows for private consumption, which makes the problem a timing analogue of the literature on agency, asymmetric information, and capital budgeting.4 In this application, the manager has an incentive to delay investment so that the market underestimates the true net present value of the project, which allows the manager to divert more without being caught. This creates incentives to fool the market by investing as if the project was worse than it truly is and thereby leads to later investment. In equilibrium outside shareholders correctly infer the net present value of the project, and diversion does not occur, but still signal-jamming occurs: investment is inefficiently delayed to prevent the incentives of the manager to fool outside shareholders.

Finally, the fourth application we consider is sequential entry into a product market in the duopoly framework outlined in Chapter 9 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The major distinction of our application is that we relax the assumption that both firms observe the potential net present value from launching the new product. Instead, we assume that the two firms are asymmetrically informed: one firm knows the project’s net present value, while the other

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4For example, see Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982), Stulz (1990), Harris and Raviv (1996), and Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001).
learns it from observing the investment (or lack of investment) of the better informed firm. As a result, the better informed firm has an incentive to delay investment in order to signal that the quality of the project is worse than it actually is and thereby delay the entry of its competitor and enjoy monopoly power for a longer period of time. Because of this, the timing of investment is inefficiently delayed. However, the worse informed firm rationally anticipates the delay of investment by the better informed firm, so in equilibrium the timing of investment reveals the net present value of the product truthfully.

Our findings have a number of implications. First, we show that the effect of information asymmetry on corporate investment is far from straightforward. In fact, information asymmetry can both speed up and delay investment, thus leading to overinvestment and underinvestment, respectively. The direction of distortion depends critically on the nature of the agency conflict between the manager and shareholders. For example, both the first and the third applications deal with corporate investment under asymmetric information and agency, but have very different implications for the effect of information asymmetry on investment. If the agency problem is in managerial short-termism, then asymmetric information leads to earlier investment. In contrast, if the agency problem is in the manager's ability to divert cash flows for personal consumption, then asymmetric information leads to later investment. This result is important from the policy perspective. For example, if the agency problem is in the possibility of cash flow diversion, the shareholders can provide the correct timing incentives by linking the manager's compensation to the current stock price, which can be done through stock and options grants. In this case, the diversion and short-termism incentives can cancel each other out providing incentives to time investment efficiently.

Second, because the degree of distortion depends on a simple and intuitive measure, one can evaluate the qualitative effect of asymmetric information on the timing of investment even in complicated settings with multiple agency conflicts of differing natures. Clearly, in the real world, there are many potential agency conflicts, including managerial short-termism and the ability to divert cash flows among others. One can obtain the resulting effect of asymmetric information by looking at the effect on the manager's payoff of a marginal change in the beliefs of the outsiders. This characterization can be important for empirical research.
as it implies a clear-cut relation between investment, on the one hand, and the complicated structure of managerial incentives, on the other hand.

Finally, regarding the last application, our findings demonstrate that competitive effects on investment can be significantly weakened if the competitors are asymmetrically informed about the value of the investment opportunity. A substantial literature on real options (e.g., Williams (1993) and Grenadier (2002)) argues that the fear of being preempted by a rival erodes the value of the option to wait and, as a consequence, speeds up investment. However, when the competitors are asymmetrically informed about the investment opportunity, better informed firms have incentives to fool the uninformed firms into underestimating the investment opportunity and delaying their investment. The better informed firms achieve this by investing later than in the symmetric information case. Thus, signaling incentives imply an additional value of waiting, and therefore greater delay in the firms’ investment decisions.

Our paper combines the traditional literature on real options with the extensive literature on signaling. It is most closely related to real options models with imperfect information. Grenadier (1999), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), and Hsu and Lambrecht (2007) study option exercise games with imperfect information, however, with very different equilibrium structures from that in this paper. In Grenadier (1999), each firm has an imperfect private signal about the true project value, in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) each firm knows its own investment cost but not the investment cost of the competitor, and in Hsu and Lambrecht (2003), an incumbent is uninformed about the challenger’s investment cost. While these papers study option exercise with information imperfections of various forms, the beliefs of outsiders do not enter the payoff function of agents. Therefore, the models in these papers are not examples of real options signaling games: the informed decision-maker has no incentives to manipulate their investment timing so as to alter the beliefs of the outsiders.5

Notably, Morellec and Schürhoff (2010) and Bustamante (2010) develop models that are examples of real options signaling games, and thus can be thought of in the context of our

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5 Our application on cash flow diversion is also related to Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Bouvard (2010), who study investment timing under asymmetric information between the manager and investors, where the timing of investment can be part of the contract between the parties. The major difference between their models and our diversion application is that theirs are screening models, while ours is a signaling model.
general model. Specifically, in Morellec and Schürhoff (2010), an informed firm, seeking external resources to finance an investment project, can choose both the timing of investment and the means of financing (debt or equity) of the project. In Bustamante (2010), an informed firm can decide on both the timing of investment and whether to finance its investment project through an IPO or through more costly private capital. Morellec and Schürhoff (2010) and Bustamante (2010) find that asymmetric information speeds up investment as the firm attempts to signal better quality and thereby secure cheaper financing. Our contribution relative to these papers is the characterization of the distortion of investment in a general setting of real options signaling games, which allows for a wide range of environments where real options are common, such as public corporations, venture capital industry, or entrepreneurial firms. First, we show that whether asymmetric information speeds up or delays investment depends critically on the nature of interactions between the decision-maker and the outsiders. In fact, as we show in the applications, signaling incentives can often delay investment, unlike in Morellec and Schürhoff (2010) and Bustamante (2010) where signaling incentives always speed up investment because of the specific nature of interactions between the manager and the outsiders. Second, we characterize the exact conditions when each of the two distortions is in place. This gives specific predictions for each particular institutional setting and shows when a distortion induced by one type of agency conflict (e.g., possibility of cash flow diversion) can be overturned by the presence of another agency conflict (e.g., managerial short-termism). Finally, Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010) consider a dynamic model of investment with asymmetric information between the manager and the outsiders and show that in the presence of stock-based compensation, asymmetric information creates incentives to conceal bad news about growth options. Unlike our paper, they focus on a specific setting and do not model investment as a real option.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the general model of option exercise in a signaling equilibrium and considers the special case of symmetric information. Section 3 solves for the separating equilibrium of the model, proves its existence and uniqueness, and determines when asymmetric information leads to earlier or later option exercise. Section 4 considers two examples of real options signaling games in which signaling
incentives speed up option exercise: investment in the presence of managerial myopia and venture capital grandstanding. Section 5 studies two examples of real options signaling games in which signaling incentives delay option exercise: investment under the opportunity to divert cash flows and strategic entry in the product market. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Model Setup

In this section we present a general model of a real options signaling game. Then, as a useful benchmark, we provide the solution to the first-best case of symmetric information. For the ease of exposition, we discuss the model as if the real option is an option to invest. However, this is without loss of generality – for example, the real option can also be an option to penetrate a new market, make an acquisition, or sell a business.

2.1 The real option

The firm possesses a real option of the standard form: at any time $t$, the firm can spend a cost $\theta > 0$ to install an investment project. The project has a present value $P(t)$, representing the discounted expected cash flows from the project. Following the standard real options framework (e.g., McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), we assume that $P(t)$ evolves as a geometric Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure:

$$dP(t) = \mu P(t) dt + \sigma P(t) dB(t),$$

where $\sigma > 0$, $\mu < r$, where $r$ is the risk-free rate, and $dB(t)$ is the increment of a standard Brownian motion.\(^6\) If the firm invests at time $t$, it gets the value of

$$P(t) - \theta + \varepsilon,$$

\(^6\)The assumption $\mu < r$ is necessary to ensure finite values.
where $\varepsilon$ is a zero-mean noise term reflecting the difference between the realized value of the project and its expected value upon investment. It reflects uncertainty over the value of the project at the time of investment, which can stem from random realized cash flows or random installation costs.

The investment decision is made by the agent, who has superior information about the net present value of the project. Specifically, $P(t)$ is publicly observable and known to both the agent and outsiders. In contrast, $\theta$ is the private information of the agent, which we refer to as the agent’s (or project’s) type. Because the payoff of the project depends on $\theta$ negatively, higher types correspond to worse projects. The outsiders do not have any information about $\theta$ except for its ex-ante distribution, which is given by the cumulative distribution function $\Phi(\cdot)$ with positive density function $\phi(\cdot)$ defined on $[\tilde{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$, where $\tilde{\theta} > \theta > 0$.\footnote{The assumption that the privately observable component of the project is the investment cost is without loss of generality. The model can also be formulated when the privately observable component $\theta$ corresponds to part of the project’s cash flows rather than the investment cost (as in Grenadier and Wang (2005)) or when it affects the present value of the project multiplicatively (as in Bustamante (2010) and Morelec and Schürhoff (2010)).}

To sum up, the payoff from investment is comprised of three components: the publicly observable component $P(t)$, the privately observable component $\theta$, and the noise term $\varepsilon$. The outsiders will update their beliefs about the type of the agent by observing the timing of investment and its proceeds. The noise term $\varepsilon$ ensures that proceeds from investment provide only an imperfect signal of the agent’s private information.\footnote{We introduce the noise term to make the timing of exercise a meaningful signal of the agent’s private information. If $\varepsilon$ were always equal to zero, then the outsiders would be able to learn the exact value of $\theta$ from observing the realized value of the project. As a consequence, the timing of exercise would have no information role. Because of risk neutrality, as long as there is some noise, its distribution is not important for our results with the exception of the model in Section 5.1, where its distribution impacts the underlying costly state verification model.}

### 2.2 The agent’s utility from exercise

Having characterized the project payoff, we move on to the utility that the agent receives from exercise. We assume that the agent’s utility from exercise is the sum of two components. The first component is the direct effect of the proceeds from the project on the agent’s compensation. This effect can be explicit, such as through the agent’s stock ownership in the
firm, or implicit, such as through future changes in the agent’s compensation. For tractability reasons, we abstain from solving the optimal contracting problem, and instead simply assume that the agent receives a positive share $\alpha$ of the total payoff from the investment project. The second component is the indirect effect of investment on the agent’s utility due to its effect on the outsiders’ beliefs about the agent’s type. Intuitively, the timing of investment can reveal information about the agent, such as their ability to generate profitable investment projects. Letting $\hat{\theta}$ denote the outsiders’ inference about the type of the agent after the investment, the agent’s utility from the option exercise is

$$\text{Agent’s utility from exercise} = \text{share of project} + \text{belief component} \quad (3)$$

$$= \alpha (P(\tau) - \theta + \varepsilon) + W(\hat{\theta}, \theta).$$

While standard real options models typically assume that the agent’s utility is solely a function of the option payoff, in this case the agent also cares about the beliefs of outsiders, in that $\hat{\theta}$ explicitly enters into the agent’s payoff function. The form of the utility function is general enough to accommodate a variety of settings in which a real option is exercised by a better informed party who cares about the beliefs of less informed outsiders.10

Following Mailath (1987), we impose the following regularity conditions on $W(\hat{\theta}, \theta)$:

**Assumption 1.** $W(\hat{\theta}, \theta)$ is $C^2$ on $[\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]^2$;

**Assumption 2.** $W(\hat{\theta}, \theta) < \alpha \theta$;

**Assumption 3.** $W_\hat{\theta}(\hat{\theta}, \theta)$ never equals zero on $[\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]^2$, and so is either positive or negative;

**Assumption 4.** $W(\hat{\theta}, \theta)$ is such that $W_\theta(\hat{\theta}, \theta) < \alpha \forall (\hat{\theta}, \theta) \in [\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]^2$ and $W_\hat{\theta}(\theta, \theta) + W_\theta(\theta, \theta) < \alpha \forall \theta \in [\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$;


10The form of the utility function from exercise in (3) is chosen in order to both keep the model tractable and sufficiently general. The authors have also solved the model for an even more general utility function, $\alpha (F(P(\tau)) - \theta + \varepsilon) + W(P(\tau), \hat{\theta}, \theta)$. The results are very similar, as long as the utility function satisfies the regularity conditions in Mailath (1987).
Assumption 5. Agent’s utility from exercise satisfies the single-crossing condition, defined in Appendix A.

These conditions allow us to establish existence and uniqueness of the separating equilibrium derived in the following section. Assumption 1 is a standard smoothness restriction. Assumption 2 states that the effect of the belief component does not exceed the direct effect of $\theta$. This ensures that the exercise decision is non-trivial, because otherwise the optimal exercise decision would be to invest immediately for the project’s present value $P(t)$. Assumption 3 is the belief monotonicity condition, which requires the agent’s payoff to be monotone in the outsiders’ belief about the type of the agent. This defines two cases to be analyzed. If $W_\tilde{\theta} < 0$, then the agent benefits when the outsiders believe that the project has lower investment costs. Conversely, if $W_\tilde{\theta} > 0$, then the agent gains from beliefs of outsiders that the project has higher investment costs. Assumption 4 intuitively means that the agent is better off from having a better project. $W_\tilde{\theta} (\tilde{\theta}, \theta) < \alpha$ implies that the agent’s utility from exercise is decreasing in $\theta$ for any fixed level of the outsiders’ beliefs. Similarly, $W_\theta (\theta, \theta) + W_\theta (\theta, \theta) < \alpha$ implies that the agent’s utility from exercise is decreasing in $\theta$ in a world of full-information in which both the agent and the outsiders know $\theta$. Finally, Assumption 5 ensures that if the agent does not make extra gains by misrepresenting $\theta$ slightly, then they cannot make extra gains from a large misrepresentation. It allows us to find the separating equilibrium by considering only the first-order conditions.

2.3 Symmetric information benchmark

As a benchmark, we consider the case in which information is symmetric. Specifically, assume that both the agent and the outsiders observe $\theta$.\textsuperscript{11} Let $V^* (P, \theta)$ denote the value of the investment option to the agent, if the type of the agent is $\theta$ and the current level of $P(t)$ is $P$. Using standard arguments (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), in the range prior to investment\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}If neither the agent nor the outsiders observe $\theta$, then the model is the same as in this section with the only difference that the expectation of the payoff function is taken with respect to $\theta$. The resulting investment threshold is $\frac{\beta}{\alpha \gamma} E \left[ \theta - \frac{W(\theta, \theta)}{\alpha} \right]$, which is analogous to (9).
V^*(P, \theta) must solve the differential equation

\[ 0 = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 P^2 V_{PP}^* + \mu PV_P^* - r V^*. \tag{4} \]

Suppose that the agent of type \( \theta \) invests when \( P(t) \) crosses threshold \( P^*(\theta) \). Upon investment, the payoff of the agent is specified in (3), implying the boundary condition for the agent’s expected payoff from exercise:

\[ V^* (P^*(\theta), \theta) = \alpha (P^*(\theta) - \theta) + W(\theta, \theta). \tag{5} \]

Solving (4) subject to the boundary condition (5) yields the following option value to the agent:\(^{12}\)

\[ V^*(P, \theta) = \begin{cases} \left( \frac{P}{P^*(\theta)} \right)^\beta (\alpha (P^*(\theta) - \theta) + W(\theta, \theta)), & \text{if } P \leq P^*(\theta) \\ \alpha (P - \theta) + W(\theta, \theta), & \text{if } P > P^*(\theta), \end{cases} \tag{6} \]

where \( \beta \) is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation \( \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \beta (\beta - 1) + \mu \beta - r = 0 \):

\[ \beta = \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \left[ - \left( \mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right) + \sqrt{\left( \mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right)^2 + 2r \sigma^2} \right] > 1. \tag{7} \]

The investment trigger \( P^*(\theta) \) is chosen by the agent so as to maximize their value:

\[ P^*(\theta) = \arg \max_{P \in \mathbb{R}^+} \left\{ \frac{1}{P^\beta} \left( \alpha \left( \frac{P}{P^*(\theta)} - \theta \right) + W(\theta, \theta) \right) \right\}. \tag{8} \]

Taking the first-order condition, we conclude that \( P^*(\theta) \) is given by

\[ P^*(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \left( \theta - \frac{W(\theta, \theta)}{\alpha} \right). \tag{9} \]

In particular, if \( W(\theta, \theta) = 0 \), as in traditional real options models, we get the standard

\(^{12}\)Since \( P = 0 \) is an absorbing barrier, \( V^*(P, \theta) \) must also satisfy the condition \( V^*(0, \theta) = 0 \).
solution (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)): \(P^*(\theta) = \theta \beta / (\beta - 1)\). Because the agent’s utility from exercise is a decreasing function of \(\theta\) by Assumption 4, the investment threshold \(P^*(\theta)\) is an increasing function of \(\theta\), which means that the firm invests earlier when the project is better.

The results of the benchmark case can be summarized in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1** Suppose that \(\theta\) is known both to the agent and to the outsiders. Then, the investment threshold of type \(\theta\), \(P^*(\theta)\), is uniquely defined by (9) and is increasing in \(\theta\).

### 3 Analysis

In this section we provide the solution to the general real options signaling game under asymmetric information between the agent and the outsiders. First, we solve for the agent’s optimal exercise strategy for a given inference function of the outsiders. Then, we apply the rational expectations condition that the inference function must be consistent with the agent’s exercise strategy. This gives us the equilibrium investment threshold. Finally, we analyze properties of the equilibrium, which are studied in more detail in subsequent sections.

#### 3.1 Optimal exercise

In order to solve for the separating equilibrium, consider the agent’s optimal exercise strategy for a given outsiders’ inference function. Specifically, suppose that the outsiders believe that the agent of type \(\theta\) exercises the option at trigger \(\hat{P}(\theta)\), where \(\hat{P}(\theta)\) is a monotonic function of \(\theta\). Thus, if the agent exercises the option at trigger \(\hat{P}\), then upon exercise the outsiders infer that the agent’s type is \(\hat{P}^{-1}(\hat{P})\).\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\)Note that the outsiders also learn from observing that the agent has not yet exercised the option. Specifically, whenever \(P(t)\) hits a new maximum, the outsiders update their belief of the agent’s type. If \(P_M(t) = \max_{s \leq t} P(s)\), the outsiders’ posterior belief is the prior belief truncated at \(\hat{P}^{-1}(P_M(t))\) from below, if \(\hat{P}(\theta)\) is increasing in \(\theta\), and from above, if \(\hat{P}(\theta)\) is decreasing in \(\theta\). Once the agent exercises the option at \(\hat{P}\), the outsiders’ posterior belief jumps to \(\hat{P}^{-1}(\hat{P})\). Because only the outsiders’ belief upon option exercise enters the payoff function of the agent, we can disregard the pre-exercise dynamics of the outsiders’ belief.
Let \( V(P, \tilde{\theta}, \theta) \) denote the value of the option to the agent, where \( P \) is the current value of \( P(t) \), \( \tilde{\theta} \) is the belief of the outsiders about the type of the agent, and \( \theta \) is the agent’s true type. By the standard valuation arguments (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), in the region prior to exercise \( V(P, \tilde{\theta}, \theta) \) must satisfy the differential equation

\[
0 = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 P^2 V_{PP} + \mu PV_P - rV. \tag{10}
\]

Suppose that the agent decides to invest at trigger \( \hat{P} \). Upon investment, the payoff to the agent is equal to (3), implying the boundary condition

\[
V(\hat{P}, \tilde{\theta}, \theta) = \alpha (\hat{P} - \theta) + W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta). \tag{11}
\]

Solving differential equation (10) subject to boundary condition (11) yields the value of the option to the agent for a given investment threshold and the belief of the outsiders:\(^{14}\)

\[
V(P, \tilde{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P}) = P^\beta U(\tilde{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P}), \tag{12}
\]

where

\[
U(\tilde{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P}) = \frac{1}{\hat{P}^\beta} \left[ \alpha (\hat{P} - \theta) + W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta) \right]. \tag{13}
\]

Given solution (12) and the hypothesized outsiders’ inference function \( \hat{P} \), the optimal choice of exercise threshold \( \hat{P} \) solves

\[
\hat{P}(\theta; \hat{P}(\theta)) \in \arg \max_{Y \in \mathbb{R}^+} \left\{ \frac{1}{Y^\beta} (\alpha (Y - \theta) + W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta)) \right\}. \tag{14}
\]

Taking the first-order condition, we arrive at the optimality condition

\[
\beta \left( \alpha (\hat{P} - \theta) + W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta) \right) = \alpha \hat{P} + \hat{P} W_{\theta} (\tilde{\theta}, \theta) \frac{d\tilde{\theta}^{-1}(\hat{P})}{d\hat{P}}. \tag{15}
\]

\(^{14}\)As in the symmetric information case, the option value must satisfy the absorbing barrier condition \( V(0, \tilde{\theta}, \theta) = 0. \)
Eq. (15) illustrates the fundamental trade-off between the costs and benefits of waiting in the model with asymmetric information between the agent and the outsiders. On the one hand, a higher threshold leads to a longer waiting period and, hence, greater discounting of cash flows from the option exercise. This effect is captured by the expression on the left-hand side of (15). On the other hand, a higher threshold leads to greater project net present value at the exercise time and higher beliefs of the outsiders. These effects are captured by the first and the second terms on the right-hand side of (15), respectively.

3.2 Equilibrium

In a separating equilibrium under rational expectations, the inference function $\bar{P}(\theta)$ must be a monotonic function that is perfectly revealing. Thus, $\bar{P}^{-1}(\hat{\theta}) = \theta$. Intuitively, this means that when the agent takes the inference function $\bar{P}(\theta)$ as given, their exercise behavior fully reveals the true type.

Conjecturing that a separating equilibrium exists, we can set $\bar{P}^{-1}(\hat{\theta}) = \theta$ in Eq. (15) and simplify to derive the equilibrium differential equation:

$$
\frac{d\bar{P}(\theta)}{d\theta} = \frac{W_\bar{\theta}(\theta, \theta) \bar{P}(\theta)}{\alpha \left((\beta - 1) \bar{P}(\theta) - \beta \theta\right) + \beta W(\theta, \bar{\theta})}.
$$

The equilibrium differential equation (16) is to be solved subject to the appropriate initial value condition. By Assumption 3, there are two cases to consider.

**Case 1:** $W_{\bar{\theta}} < 0$

For this case, the appropriate initial value condition is that the highest type invests efficiently:

$$
\bar{P}(\bar{\theta}) = P^*(\bar{\theta}).
$$

The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose you are the worst possible type, which is $\bar{\theta}$ for the case in which $W_{\bar{\theta}} < 0$. Then any equilibrium in which (17) did not hold would not be incentive-compatible. This is because type $\bar{\theta}$ could always deviate and choose the first-best
full-information trigger $P^*(\theta)$. Not only would this deviation improve the direct payoff from exercise, but the agent could do no worse in terms of reputation since the current belief is already as bad as possible. Therefore, only when (17) holds does the worst possible type have no incentive to deviate.

**Case 2: $W_\theta > 0$**

For this case, the appropriate initial value condition is that the lowest type invests efficiently:

$$\bar{P}(\theta) = P^*(\theta).$$

The intuition for boundary condition (18) is the same as for (17). However, with $W_\theta > 0$, $\theta$ is now the worst type.

The following proposition shows that under regularity conditions there exists a unique (up to the out-of-equilibrium beliefs) separating equilibrium, and it is given as a solution to Eq. (16) subject to boundary condition (17) or (18). The proof appears in Appendix B.

**Proposition 2** Let $\bar{P}(\theta)$ be the increasing function that solves differential equation (16), subject to the initial value condition (17) if $W_\theta < 0$, or (18) if $W_\theta > 0$, where Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied. Then, $\bar{P}(\theta)$ is the investment trigger of type $\theta$ in the unique (up to the out-of-equilibrium beliefs) separating equilibrium.

### 3.3 Properties of the equilibrium

In order to examine how asymmetric information affects the equilibrium timing of investment, we compare the separating equilibrium derived above with the symmetric information solution established in Section 2.3.

The following proposition shows that asymmetric information between the decision-maker and the outsiders has an important effect on the timing of investment. Importantly, its direction depends on the sign of $W_\theta$. The proof appears in Appendix B.
Proposition 3  Asymmetric information between the decision-maker and the outsiders affects the timing of investment. The direction of the effect depends on the sign of $W_{\tilde{\theta}}$:

(i) If $W_{\tilde{\theta}} < 0$, then the firm invests earlier than in the case of symmetric information:

$\bar{P}(\theta) < P^{*}(\theta)$ for all $\theta < \tilde{\theta}$.

(ii) If $W_{\tilde{\theta}} > 0$, then the firm invests later than in the case of symmetric information:

$\bar{P}(\theta) > P^{*}(\theta)$ for all $\theta > \tilde{\theta}$.

As we can see, information asymmetry has powerful consequences for the timing of investment. It can both increase and decrease the waiting period, and the direction of the effect depends on the sign of $W_{\tilde{\theta}}$. The intuition comes from traditional “signal-jamming” models.\(^{15}\) When $\theta$ is the private information of the agent, outsiders try to infer it from observing when the firm invests. Knowing this, the agent has incentives to manipulate the timing of investment in order to confuse the outsiders. For example, if $W_{\tilde{\theta}} > 0$, the agent has an interest in mimicking the investment strategy of the agent with higher investment costs. Since higher types invest at higher investment thresholds, the agent will try to mimic that by investing later than in the case of complete information. In equilibrium the outsiders correctly infer the type of the agent from observing the timing of investment. However, “signal-jamming” occurs: the outsiders correctly conjecture that investment occurs at a higher threshold than the optimal one. The opposite happens when $W_{\tilde{\theta}} < 0$.

For concreteness, let us consider a particular parameterization of $W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta)$ that permits a simple analytical solution. Specifically, we set $W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta) = w(\tilde{\theta} - \theta)$, for some function $w(\cdot)$ with $w(0)$ being normalized to zero. In this case, the agent’s utility from misspecification of the outsiders’ beliefs about the agent’s private information depends only on the degree of

\(^{15}\)See, e.g., Holmstrom (1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), and Stein (1989).
misspecification, $\tilde{\theta} - \theta$. For this special case, Eq. (16) takes the following form:

$$\frac{d\bar{P}(\theta)}{d\theta} = \frac{\bar{P}(\theta)w'(0)}{\alpha ((\beta - 1)\bar{P}(\theta) - \beta\theta)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

The general solution to this equation is given implicitly by

$$\bar{P}(\theta) + C\bar{P}(\theta)^{-\frac{\beta\alpha}{\omega'(0)}} = \frac{\beta + w'(0) / \alpha}{\beta - 1} \theta,$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

where the constant $C$ is determined by the appropriate boundary condition.

For the case in which $w' < 0$, we apply boundary condition (17) to show that the equilibrium solution $\bar{P}(\theta)$ satisfies

$$\bar{P}(\theta) \left(1 + \frac{w'(0)}{\alpha\beta} \left(\frac{\bar{P}(\theta)}{P^*(\theta)}\right)^{-\frac{\beta\alpha}{\omega'(0)}}\right) = \frac{\beta + w'(0) / \alpha}{\beta - 1} \theta.$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

If the highest type can have unboundedly large costs ($\bar{\theta} \to \infty$), then we have the simple linear solution:\textsuperscript{16}

$$\bar{P}(\theta) = \frac{\beta + w'(0) / \alpha}{\beta - 1} \theta.$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

For the case in which $w' > 0$, we apply boundary condition (18) to show that the equilibrium solution $\bar{P}(\theta)$ satisfies

$$\bar{P}(\theta) \left(1 + \frac{w'(0)}{\alpha\beta} \left(\frac{\bar{P}(\theta)}{P^*(\theta)}\right)^{-\frac{\beta\alpha}{\omega'(0)}}\right) = \frac{\beta + w'(0) / \alpha}{\beta - 1} \theta.$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

If the lowest type can reach infinitesimal costs ($\theta \to 0$), then we again have the simple linear solution (22).

\textsuperscript{16}To see this, note that Assumption 4 and $w'(0) < 0$ imply that $-\frac{\beta\alpha}{\omega'(0)} - 1 > 0$. Therefore, as $\bar{\theta} \to \infty$, the left-hand side converges to $\bar{P}(\theta)$. 

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3.4 Other Equilibria

While our paper focuses on the separating equilibrium, various forms of pooling equilibria are also possible. Here, we present a simple example of an equilibrium in which there is a range of types that pool, and a range of types that separate. Notably, the construction of this equilibrium with pooling requires much of the analysis presented for the construction of the separating equilibrium.

In this simple example, $\theta$ is distributed uniformly over $[\bar{\theta}, \tilde{\theta}]$. We also assume a simple functional form for the belief component: $\lambda(\tilde{\theta} - \theta)$, with $\lambda < 0$, where $\tilde{\theta}$ now refers to the expected type of the agent according to the beliefs of the outsiders.\(^{17}\) Finally, in this simple example, we assume that proceeds from the project are not informative about the agent’s type. Consider type $\hat{\theta} \in (\bar{\theta}, \tilde{\theta})$. We will show that there exists a $P_{\text{pool}}$, with $P_{\text{pool}} \leq P(\hat{\theta}) < P^*(\hat{\theta})$, such that all types in the range $[\theta, \tilde{\theta}]$ pool and exercise together at $P_{\text{pool}}$, while all types in the range $(\tilde{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ separate and exercise at the trigger $P(\theta)$.

Suppose that $P(t) = P_{\text{pool}}$ and consider the decision of the agent whether to exercise the option immediately and pool or wait and exercise the option in the future. For types that exercise immediately and pool, $\hat{\theta} = (\theta + \hat{\theta})/2$. Thus, the immediate payoff from pooling is

$$\alpha(P_{\text{pool}} - \theta) + \lambda\left(\frac{\theta + \hat{\theta}}{2} - \theta\right).$$

For types that wait and separate, their value is

$$\left(\frac{P_{\text{pool}}}{P(\theta)}\right)^{\beta} \alpha(P(\theta) - \theta),$$

where $P(\theta)$ is the threshold of type $\theta$ in the fully separating equilibrium, given by (16).

\(^{17}\)More generally, the belief component can be any function of the distribution of the outsiders’ posterior belief about the agent’s type.
Type $\theta$ is the one that is indifferent between pooling and separating:

$$\alpha \left( P_{pool} - \frac{\theta - \hat{\theta}}{2} \right) + \lambda \left( \frac{\theta - \hat{\theta}}{2} \right) = \left( \frac{P_{pool}}{P(\hat{\theta})} \right)^{\beta} \alpha \left( P(\hat{\theta}) - \frac{\theta - \hat{\theta}}{2} \right),$$

(26)

As shown in the appendix, for any $\hat{\theta}$, (26) determines the unique value of $P_{pool}(\hat{\theta})$. All types $\theta < \hat{\theta}$ find it optimal to exercise at $P_{pool}(\hat{\theta})$, while all types $\theta > \hat{\theta}$ find it optimal to separate and exercise at $P(\theta)$. By varying $\hat{\theta}$, one can obtain a continuum of these equilibria. In addition, there may exist equilibria with higher types pooling and lower types separating, as well as equilibria with multiple pooling groups. In general, it is difficult to say whether the agent’s utility in the separating equilibrium is higher or lower than in other equilibria. As shown in the appendix, in this particular example the agent’s utility in the semi-pooling equilibrium is the same as in the separating equilibria if $\theta \geq \hat{\theta}$ and higher than the utility in the separating equilibrium if $\theta < \hat{\theta}$.

Given multiplicity of equilibria, it is important to select the most reasonable one. A standard approach in signaling games to select between equilibria is to impose additional intuitive restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. One standard restriction is the D1 refinement, which has been applied to a wide range of signaling environments such as security design (e.g., Nachman and Noe (1994), DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005)) and intercorporate asset sales (Hege et al. (2009)). Intuitively, according to the D1 refinement, following an “unexpected” action of the informed party, the uninformed party is restricted to place zero posterior belief on type $\theta$ whenever there is another type $\theta'$ that has a stronger incentive to deviate.\(^{19}\) As Ramey (1996) shows, only separating equilibria can satisfy the D1 refinement. A slight modification of his proof can be applied here in order to establish the same result in our model.\(^{20}\) Thus, the separating equilibrium is in fact the unique equilibrium.

\(^{18}\) This result holds because for any $\hat{\theta}$, the boundary condition is the same and is determined by type $\hat{\theta}$. Note that in the case of $W_{\theta} > 0$, this result does not hold, because the boundary conditions are different: in this semi-separating equilibrium it is determined by type $\theta$, while in the separating equilibrium it is determined by type $\theta$.


\(^{20}\) Namely, unlike in Ramey (1996), the space of actions in our model is bounded from below and the agent’s payoff converges to zero as the action converges to infinity. A modification of his proof that takes these
under the assumption that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs must satisfy the restriction specified by the D1 refinement. In this regard, focusing on separating equilibria is without loss of generality.

4 Applications with Acceleration of Option Exercise

4.1 Managerial myopia

In this section we present an application of the timing signaling equilibrium that is similar in spirit to Stein’s (1989) article on managerial myopia. In Stein (1989), managers care about both the current stock price and long-run earnings. Managers invest inefficiently through earnings manipulation (by boosting current earnings at the expense of future earnings) in order to attempt to fool the stock market into overestimating future earnings in their stock valuation. Even though the equilibrium ensures that the market is not fooled into overestimating the stock value, managers continue to behave myopically and inefficiently sacrifice future earnings for short term profits. Our version is an analog of Stein (1989) that focuses on investment timing, rather than earnings manipulation. Here, managers invest inefficiently by exercising their timing option too early in order to attempt to fool the market into overestimating the project’s net present value.

4.1.1 Manager utility

As in Stein (1989), the manager’s utility comes from a combination of current stock value and long-run earnings value. Specifically, we assume that the manager’s utility comes from holding $\alpha_1$ shares of stock that may be freely sold, plus $\alpha_2$ times the present value of future earnings. As discussed in Stein (1989), this can be viewed as a reduced form utility coming out of a more complicated model of incentive compensation.\(^{21}\) Thus, the manager makes two

\(^{21}\)One might motivate this split between the current and long-term stock price as dealing with option vesting schedules, limits on stock sales of executives (either contractual, or determined by the informational costs of trading), or the expected tenure of the manager’s affiliation with the firm.
decisions: when to invest in the project and when to sell their holdings that may be freely sold.\footnote{We assume that outsiders do not observe whether the manager sells the stock or not. We make this assumption to make the application simple and tractable. One can get qualitatively similar results in a set-up in which the outsiders observe the selling decision by the manager, but each type does not sell their stock with positive probability due to exogenous reasons.}

Let $S(t)$ denote the stock price and $P(t)$ the project value. At a chosen time of exercise $\tau$, if the manager still holds $\alpha_1$ shares of stock, their stock holdings will be worth $\alpha_1 S(\tau)$.\footnote{As we shall see below, managers with sufficiently high $\theta$ will choose to sell all shares prior to investment, in which case the stock component of utility will disappear.} Similarly, their utility from their interest in the present value of all future earnings is $\alpha_2 (P(\tau) - \theta)$. In summary, the manager’s utility from exercise at any time $\tau$ is

$$\text{manager’s utility from exercise} = \alpha_1 S(\tau) + \alpha_2 (P(\tau) - \theta). \quad (27)$$

Importantly, note that if there were no informational asymmetry, there would be no difference between the value of the stock price and the long-run earnings value.

### 4.1.2 The stock price process

Let us now consider the valuation of the stock. The market will infer the value of $\theta$ by observing whether or not the manager has yet invested. We begin by valuing the stock for all moments prior to the investment in the project. During this time period, the market updates its beliefs every time the project value rises to a new historical maximum. Let $\bar{P}(\theta)$ denote the equilibrium investment threshold for type $\theta$, a function increasing in $\theta$ to be determined below. Let $P_M(t)$ denote the historical maximum of $P(t)$ up to time $t$. Then, at any time $t$ prior to investment, the stock price $S(t) = S(P(t), P_M(t))$ is given by

$$S(P(t), P_M(t)) = \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ \left( \frac{P(t)}{\bar{P}(\theta)} \right)^\beta (\bar{P}(\theta) - \theta) | \theta > \bar{P}^{-1}(P_M(t)) \right]. \quad (28)$$

Next, consider the value of the stock when the firm invests at the threshold $\bar{P}$. At this moment, the market observes the investment trigger, and the stock price immediately is set
using the imputed $\tilde{\theta} = \tilde{P}^{-1}(\hat{P})$. Thus, the stock price immediately jumps to the value $\hat{P} - \tilde{P}^{-1}(\hat{P})$.

Finally, after the net proceeds from investment are realized, the stock price moves to $\hat{P} - \theta + \varepsilon$. Recall, however, that the market is unable to disentangle the true cost from $\theta - \varepsilon$, and its expectation of $\theta$ remains $\tilde{\theta}$.

4.1.3 The equilibrium investment decision

Consider the manager’s investment timing decision, conditional on holding $\alpha_1$ shares of tradable stock. Suppose that the manager has not sold the tradable shares prior to the investment date. If the market’s belief about the type of the manager, $\tilde{\theta}$, is below $\theta$, the manager is better off selling their shares immediately upon the investment date and gaining from the market’s optimistic beliefs: they receive $\hat{P} - \tilde{\theta}$ from selling versus (an expected) $\hat{P} - \theta$ from holding. Alternatively, if $\tilde{\theta} \geq \theta$, the manager is better off holding the stock.\(^{24}\) Thus, given the equilibrium threshold function $\bar{P}(\theta)$, the problem of the manager who does not sell the stock before the investment date is

$$
\max_{\hat{P}} \left\{ 1_{\tilde{\theta} < \theta} \left[ \alpha_1 \frac{1}{\bar{P}^\beta} \left( \hat{P} - \tilde{\theta} \right) + \alpha_2 \frac{1}{\bar{P}^\beta} \left( \hat{P} - \theta \right) \right] + 1_{\tilde{\theta} \geq \theta} \left( \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \right) \frac{1}{\bar{P}^\beta} \left( \hat{P} - \theta \right) \right\} \quad (29)
$$

$$
= \max_{\hat{P}} \left\{ (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2) \frac{1}{\bar{P}^\beta} \left( \hat{P} - \theta \right) - \frac{1}{\bar{P}^\beta} \alpha_1 \max\left( \tilde{\theta} - \theta, 0 \right) \right\} .
$$

We can thus see that this problem is a special case of the general model with

$$
W\left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) = -\alpha_1 \max\left( \tilde{\theta} - \theta, 0 \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 . \quad (30)
$$

Moreover, because $W\left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right)$ is a function of $\tilde{\theta} - \theta$, the separating equilibrium function $\bar{P}(\theta)$ is given by (20):

$$
\bar{P}(\theta) + C\bar{P}(\theta)^\frac{\beta(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}{\alpha_1} = \frac{\beta - \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}}{\beta - 1} \theta , \quad (31)
$$

\(^{24}\)After investment, the true net present value of investment is public, and there is no informational reason for selling the stock. We are thus ruling out sales due to liquidity needs, as our focus is on asymmetric information.
The boundary condition for Eq. (31) is determined by noting that the manager may choose to sell their shares prior to investment. In the separating equilibrium with all $\alpha_1$ shares held, information is fully revealed, and thus the manager does not gain from selling overvalued stock at the time of investment. Therefore, the manager sells their shares before investment if and only if they are overvalued by the market. As is apparent from the valuation function in (28), the overvaluation is decreasing over time, and thus the manager will either sell their shares at the initial point, or never. Thus, the appropriate boundary condition is that for the range of $\theta$ for which the stock is initially overvalued, the manager will choose to sell all of their liquid shares. This implies that for this range of $\theta$, $\alpha_1 = 0$ in the timing Eq. (31), which means that $\bar{P}(\theta)$ equals the first-best trigger: $\bar{P}(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\theta$.

All that remains is to determine the range of $\theta$ at which immediate sale of stock is warranted. If the stock is sold immediately, the stock will be priced based on the market’s prior on $\theta$, or $\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \left( \frac{P(0)}{P(\theta)} \right)^\beta (\bar{P}(\theta) - \theta) \phi(\theta) d\theta$. If the stock is held, it is worth $\left( \frac{P(0)}{P(\theta)} \right)^\beta (\bar{P}(\theta) - \theta)$. Therefore, the manager will sell their stock immediately if and only if $\theta$ is above a fixed threshold $\hat{\theta}$, determined by

$$\int_{\theta}^{\hat{\theta}} \frac{\bar{P}(\theta) - \theta}{\bar{P}(\theta)^\beta} \phi(\theta) d\theta = \frac{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta}) - \hat{\theta}}{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta})^\beta}.$$ (32)

We have now fully characterized the solution. For $\theta \in \left[\theta, \hat{\theta}\right]$, the investment threshold $P(\theta)$ is given by (31), where $C$ is given by

$$C = -\left( \frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\hat{\theta} \right)^{-\frac{\beta(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}{\alpha_1}} \frac{\alpha_1}{(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)(\beta-1)} \hat{\theta}.$$ (33)

For $\theta \in (\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta})$, $P(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\theta$.

---

25To ensure that none of the types invest immediately, we assume that $P(0) < \bar{P}(\theta)$. 

25
4.1.4 Discussion

The equilibrium investment strategy is to invest according to strategy $P(\theta)$ in (31), which implies earlier investment than in the case of symmetric information for all types below $\hat{\theta}$. For types above $\hat{\theta}$, however, investment occurs at the full-information threshold. Intuitively, if the private information of the manager is such that the stock is overvalued, then the manager sells the flexible part of their holdings before investment reveals the type of the project. Once the manager sells their tradable stock, the manager does not have any short-term incentives anymore, so they choose the investment threshold to maximize the long-term firm value. On the contrary, if the project is sufficiently good, then the stock of the company is undervalued relative to the private information of the manager, so they do not sell the flexible part of their holdings. As a result, when deciding on the optimal time to invest, the manager cares not only about the long-term firm value but also about the short-term stock price. In an attempt to manipulate the stock price, the manager invests earlier than in the symmetric information case. In equilibrium, the market correctly predicts this myopic behavior of the manager and infers their private information correctly.

The left graph of Fig. 1 shows the equilibrium investment threshold $\bar{P}(\theta)$ as a function of the investment costs $\theta$ for three different values of $\alpha_1 / (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$, the fraction of the manager’s utility that comes from the stock price due to their ability to freely sell a portion of their shares. The equilibrium investment threshold $\bar{P}(\theta)$ has two interesting properties. First, it moves further away from the first-best investment threshold $P^*(\theta)$ as $\alpha_1 / (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$ goes up. Intuitively, if the manager can freely sell a higher portion of their shares, they have a greater incentive to invest earlier in order to fool the market into overestimating the net present value of the project and thereby boost the current stock price. Even though the market correctly infers $\theta$ in equilibrium, the equilibrium investment threshold goes down so that the manager has no incentives to deviate. Second, for each of the curves, the impact of asymmetric information is lower for projects with greater costs (lower types). Intuitively, incentive compatibility requires that the investment threshold of type $\theta$ be sufficiently below that of type $\theta + \varepsilon$ for an infinitesimal positive $\varepsilon$, so that type $\theta + \varepsilon$ has no incentives to mimic.
type $\theta$. However, this lowers not only the investment threshold of type $\theta$, but also investment thresholds of all types below $\theta$, as they must have no incentives to mimic $\theta$. In this way, the distortion accumulates, so the investment threshold of a lower type is closer to the zero net present value rule.

Another implication is that the investment option value can be significantly eroded through information asymmetry.\footnote{Previous research (Grenadier (2002), Williams (1993)) has demonstrated that the value of the option to invest can be significantly eroded because of competitive pressure in the industry. If a portion of the manager’s utility comes from the short-term stock price, then the value of the option to invest can be eroded even in monopolistic industries, as long as the manager is better informed about the investment project than the market.} Analogously to Grenadier (2002), let the option premium define the net present value of investment at the moment of exercise divided by the investment cost:

$$\text{OP} \left( \theta, \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \right) = \frac{\bar{P}(\theta) - \theta}{\theta}. $$ \hfill (34)

The right graph of Fig. 1 quantifies the effect of asymmetric information on the option premium. In the case of symmetric information, equilibrium investment occurs only when the net present value of the project is more than $2.41$ times its investment costs. Asymmetric information reduces the option premium, and the effect is greater for projects with lower investment costs and managers who have greater incentives to boost the short-run stock price. For example, if the manager can freely sell 50% of their shares, the option premium of type $\theta = 1$ is 1.41, a greater than 40% decrease from the symmetric information case. Asymmetric information affects the option premium of the best projects the most and does not affect the option premium of sufficiently bad projects at all.

4.2 Venture capital grandstanding

In this section we consider an application of our real options signaling model to venture capital firms. As shown in Gompers (1996), younger venture capital firms often take companies public earlier in order to establish a reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds. Gompers terms this phenomenon “grandstanding” and suggests that younger venture capital firms employ early timing of IPOs as a signal of their ability to form higher-quality portfolios.
We characterize experienced venture capital firms (the general partners) as those having a performance track record, and inexperienced venture capital firms as having no performance track record. For simplicity, we consider a two-stage model. An inexperienced venture capital firm invests outsiders’ (limited partners) money in the first round. The firm then chooses when to allow its first round portfolio companies to go public. When such an IPO takes place, the firm becomes experienced and raises money for the second round. Notably, its ability to attract outsiders’ funds in the second round will depend on beliefs of outsiders of its skill, as inferred from the results of the first round.

We shall work backwards and initially consider the second round (an experienced venture capital firm), to be followed by the first round (an inexperienced venture capital firm).

4.2.1 The experienced venture capital firm

In the second round of financing, $I_2$ dollars are invested, where $I_2$ is endogenized below. The value of the fund, should it choose to go public at time $t$ is

$$ (P_2(t) - \theta + \varepsilon_2) H(I_2), \tag{35} $$

where $P_2(t)$ is the publicly observable component of value, $\theta$ is the privately observed value of the venture capital firm’s skill, and $\varepsilon_2$ is a zero-mean shock, which corresponds to the contribution of luck. Only the venture capital firm knows the value of its skill $\theta$ (lower $\theta$ means higher skill); the outside investors must use an inferred value of $\tilde{\theta}$.\(^{27}\) While outside investors cannot disentangle the mix of skill and luck, the venture capital firm learns the realization of luck, $\varepsilon_2$, upon investment. Finally, $H(\cdot)$ describes the nature of the returns to scale on investment. In order to account for declining returns to scale (that is, at some point the firm runs out of good project opportunities), we impose the Inada conditions, which are standard assumptions about the shape of production functions: $H(0) = 0$, $H' > 0$, $H'' < 0$, $H'(0) = \infty$, and $H'(\infty) = 0$.

\(^{27}\)The model can be extended to a more realistic, albeit less tractable, setting in which the firm has imperfect knowledge of its ability. This extended model has the same qualitative results and intuition as the present model, as long as the firm is better informed about its ability than the general partners.
We assume that the venture capital firm receives as compensation a fraction $\alpha$ of the proceeds from an IPO (or a similar liquidity event). The venture capital firm decides if and when to allow the portfolio to go public. Thus, the timing of the IPO is a standard option exercise problem where the expected payoff to the venture capital firm upon exercise is

$$\alpha (P_2(t) - \theta) H(I_2).$$

The optimal second round IPO exercise trigger is thus the first-best solution:

$$\tilde{P}_2(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \theta.$$  \hfill (37)

We now endogenize the second round level of investment. At the beginning of the second round, the limited partners decide how much capital to contribute to the fund. We normalize the value of the publicly observable component upon the initiation of the second round, $P_2(0)$, to one, so that $P_2(t)$ represents the value growth over the initial cost. The limited partners choose the level of investment $I_2$ so as to maximize the expected value of their net investment. Because the limited partners do not observe the venture capital firm’s skill $\theta$, they use the inference $\tilde{\theta}$ based on the IPO signal from the first round. For a given $\tilde{\theta}$, the limited partners choose $I_2$ by solving the following optimization problem:

$$\max_{I_2} \left\{ (1 - \alpha) \frac{\tilde{P}_2(\tilde{\theta}) - \tilde{\theta}}{\tilde{P}_2(\tilde{\theta})^\beta H(I_2) - I_2} \right\}.$$  \hfill (38)

The Inada conditions guarantee that the optimal level of investment, $I_2(\tilde{\theta})$, is given by the first-order condition:

$$I_2(\tilde{\theta}) = H^{-1} \left[ \left( \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \frac{\beta - 1 - \theta}{1 - \theta} \right) \right].$$  \hfill (39)

\footnote{For purposes of this application, we take the compensation structure of the general partner as given. This structure is quite similar to the observed industry practice (see, e.g., Metrick and Yasuda (2010)). This compensation form could be justified through a model of incentive provision for the general partner under the assumption of unobservable effort.}
\( I_2(\tilde{\theta}) \) is strictly decreasing in \( \tilde{\theta} \), meaning that the limited partners invest more if they believe that general partner is more skilled.

Thus, for given \( \tilde{\theta} \) and \( \theta \), the value of the second round financing to the venture capital firm is

\[
\alpha \frac{\bar{P}_2(\theta) - \theta}{\bar{P}_2(\theta)^3} H \left( I_2(\tilde{\theta}) \right).
\]

(40)

Importantly, this value is a decreasing function of the inferred type \( \tilde{\theta} \). Hence, the venture capital firm benefits from higher inferred skill.

### 4.2.2 The inexperienced venture capital firm

Now, let us consider the first round.\(^{29}\) The fund has \( I_1 \) invested, and the venture capital firm must choose if and when to allow its portfolio to go public. The payoff to the venture capital firm is the sum of their share of the proceeds from going public and the expected utility of the second round financing. The proceeds from going public at time \( t \) are \((P_1(t) - \theta + \varepsilon_1) H(I_1)\), where \( \varepsilon_1 \) is a zero-mean shock, while the value of the second round financing is given by (40). Thus, for an IPO trigger of \( \hat{P}_1 \), the expected payoff to the venture capital firm is

\[
\alpha \left( \hat{P}_1 - \theta \right) H(I_1) + \alpha \frac{\bar{P}_2(\theta) - \theta}{\bar{P}_2(\theta)^3} H \left( I_2(\tilde{\theta}) \right),
\]

(41)

where \( I_2(\tilde{\theta}) \) is given by (39). For simplicity, we normalize \( H(I_1) \) to 1. We can thus see that this problem corresponds to the general model with\(^{30}\)

\[
W \left( \hat{\theta}, \theta \right) = \alpha \frac{\bar{P}_2(\theta) - \theta}{\bar{P}_2(\theta)^3} H \left( I_2(\tilde{\theta}) \right),
\]

(42)

where \( W_{\hat{\theta}} < 0 \).

\(^{29}\)For simplicity, we assume that the skill parameter \( \theta \) of the venture capital firm is the same in both rounds. The model can be extended to the case of different, but correlated skill levels across rounds. In such a case, in equilibrium the timing of investment is an imperfect rather than perfect signal about the general partner’s talent. This extension does not alter the intuition or main results of the model.

\(^{30}\)Note that if the limited partners observe the proceeds from the first round, then they may also use this information to infer \( \theta \). However, this does not affect the model, because the proceeds is a noisier signal of the firm’s private information than the timing. Indeed, the proceeds reveal the value of \( \theta - \varepsilon_1 \), while the timing in a separating equilibrium reveals \( \theta \).
Thus, in the separating equilibrium the investment trigger $\bar{P}_1(\theta)$ satisfies

$$\frac{d\bar{P}_1(\theta)}{d\theta} = \frac{\bar{P}_1(\theta) I_2(\theta) / (1 - \alpha)}{(\beta - 1) \bar{P}_1(\theta) - \beta \theta + \beta \frac{P_2(\theta)}{P_2(\theta)} H(I_2(\theta))},$$ \hspace{1cm} (43)

solved subject to the boundary condition that type $\bar{\theta}$ invests at the full-information threshold:\hspace{1cm}31

$$\bar{P}_1(\bar{\theta}) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \left( \bar{\theta} - \frac{\bar{P}_2(\bar{\theta}) - \bar{\theta}}{\bar{P}_2(\bar{\theta})} H(I_2(\bar{\theta})) \right).$$ \hspace{1cm} (44)

### 4.2.3 Discussion

The timing of the IPO of the inexperienced firm, characterized by (43)-(44), has several intuitive properties. First, the inexperienced firm takes the portfolio public earlier than optimal. Because the inexperienced firm is better informed about its talent than the limited partners, the inexperienced firm has an incentive to manipulate the timing of the IPO in order to make the limited partners believe that its quality is better. Because an earlier IPO serves as a signal of higher quality, it will go public earlier than in the case of symmetric information. In equilibrium “signal-jamming” occurs: the limited partners correctly conjecture that the venture capital firm goes public earlier than optimal, so the type of the general partner is revealed. The degree of inefficient timing is illustrated in Fig. 2. The left graph plots the equilibrium exercise threshold of the inexperienced firm, $\bar{P}_1(\theta)$, and the efficient exercise threshold, $P_1^*(\theta)$, which would be the equilibrium if the limited partners were fully informed about the general partner’s talent.

Inefficient investment timing depends not only on the experience of the general partner, but also on its talent. Specifically, (44) implies that the least talented firm takes the portfolio public at the efficient time even if it is inexperienced. At the same time, all other types take the portfolio public earlier than efficient. The right graph of Fig. 2 illustrates the dependence

31To ensure that none of the types does an IPO immediately, we make an assumption that the initial value $P(0)$ is below $\bar{P}_1(\theta)$. Then, the unique separating equilibrium investment threshold is defined as an increasing function which solves (43) subject to (44).
of earlier than optimal exit on the general partner’s talent. The degree of inefficient investment increases in the general partner's talent from 0% for the least talented general partner ($\theta = 2$) to 19% for the most talented general partner ($\theta = 1$).

While the inexperienced firm takes the company public earlier than optimal, the experienced firm does so at the efficient threshold. Because the limited partners learn the true talent of the firm from observing its track record, it does not have any incentive to manipulate the beliefs of the limited partners.

5 Applications with Delay of Option Exercise

5.1 Cash flow diversion

We consider a cash flow diversion model where a manager (with a partial ownership interest) derives utility from diverting the owners’ cash flow from investment for personal consumption. Thus, in this case the manager would like shareholders to believe that the investment costs are higher than they truly are. We begin by providing a costly state verification model to endogenize the manager’s cash flow diversion utility. Then, conditional on the manager’s diversion incentives, we move on to modeling the manager’s optimal investment strategy.

The assumption that a portion of project value is observed only by the manager and not verifiable by the owners is common in the capital budgeting literature. This information asymmetry invites a host of agency issues. Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) posit that managers have incentives to understate project payoffs and to divert the free cash flow to themselves. In their model, such value diversion takes the form of managers reducing their level of effort. Stulz (1990), Harris and Raviv (1996), and Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) model managers as having preferences for perquisite consumption or empire-building. In these models, managers have incentives to divert free cash flows to inefficient investments or to excessive perquisites. Grenadier and Wang (2005) apply an optimal contracting approach to ensure against diversion and to provide an incentive for managers to exercise optimally.

32 We take the structure of the manager’s compensation contract as given. In a more general model, the manager’s ownership stake could itself be endogenous.
5.1.1 Costly state verification model

Suppose that the manager can divert any amount $d$ from the project value before the noise $\varepsilon$ is realized.\textsuperscript{33} As is standard in the literature (e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)), diversion is potentially wasteful, so that the manager receives only a fraction $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ of the diverted cash flows. After the project value of $P - \theta - d + \varepsilon$ is realized, the shareholders either verify whether the manager diverted or not. Verification costs are $c > 0$. If the shareholders verify that the manager diverted funds $d$ from the firm, the manager is required to return them to the firm.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, the timing of the interactions is the following. First, the manager decides when to exercise the investment option. Then, after the investment has been made but before the proceeds are realized, the shareholders decide on the verification strategy.\textsuperscript{35} As in traditional costly state verification models (Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)), the investors (shareholders in our case) can commit to the deterministic verification strategy. After that but before observing the noise $\varepsilon$, the manager decides how much to divert. Finally, the project value of $P - \theta - d + \varepsilon$ is realized, and the shareholders either verify the manager or not, according to the pre-specified verification strategy. Let $\Psi$ and $\psi$ denote the cumulative distribution and density functions of $\varepsilon$, respectively.

In Appendix B we demonstrate that any optimal verification strategy takes the form of verifying cash flows if and only if the difference between the expected and the realized cash flows is greater than a particular threshold. In other words, for some $v$, verification will occur if and only if $P - \theta - d + \varepsilon - \left(P - \tilde{\theta}\right) < v$, or, equivalently, $\varepsilon < v - \tilde{\theta} + \theta + d$. Let us initially choose any verification parameter $v$ and determine the manager’s optimal diversion strategy in response. Then, conditional on this managerial response, we determine the shareholders’ optimal choice of the parameter $v$.

Consider a manager of type $\theta$ that is inferred by the market as type $\tilde{\theta}$. If the manager diverts $d$, they expect to be verified with probability $\Psi \left(v - \tilde{\theta} + \theta + d\right)$, in which case there

\textsuperscript{33}We make an assumption that the manager is not allowed to inject their own funds into the firm. This assumption simplifies the solution but is not critical, as long as injection is not too profitable.

\textsuperscript{34}The model can be extended by allowing the shareholders to impose a non-pecuniary cost on the manager if diversion is verified.

\textsuperscript{35}While we assume that the proceeds from the project realize an instant after the investment has been made, the model can be extended to include the time to build feature (e.g., as in Majd and Pindyck (1987)).
is no impact on their payoff, as the diverted cash flow is returned to the firm. However, they are not verified with probability \(1 - \Psi(v - \bar{\theta} + \theta + d)\), in which case they gain a fraction \(\lambda\) of these diverted cash flows for their private benefit and lose a fraction \(\alpha\) due to their ownership position. Hence, the manager’s problem is

\[
\max_{d \geq 0} \left\{ d (\lambda - \alpha) \left(1 - \Psi(v - \bar{\theta} + \theta + d)\right) \right\}. \tag{45}
\]

Clearly, if \(\alpha \geq \lambda\), then the manager does not divert anything: \(d = 0\).\(^{36}\) Now, consider the case \(\alpha < \lambda\). Assuming that the hazard rate of the distribution of \(\varepsilon\), \(h_\psi(z) \equiv \psi(z) / (1 - \Psi(z))\), is non-decreasing, (45) has a unique solution \(d^*\) that satisfies

\[
d^* h_\psi \left( v - \bar{\theta} + \theta + d^* \right) = 1. \tag{46}
\]

The solution \(d^*\) is a decreasing function of \(v - \bar{\theta} + \theta\). Let us denote this functional dependence by \(D \left( v - \bar{\theta} + \theta \right)\).

Given the manager’s response to a verification rule \(v\), we now solve for the shareholders’ optimal choice of \(v\). Under the shareholders’ information set, they expect the manager to divert \(D(v)\) and estimate the probability of verification at \(\Psi(v + D(v))\). For any choice of \(v\), the shareholders will lose \((1 - \alpha)\) of diverted cash flows when verification does not occur, and will pay the verification cost \(c\) when verification does occur. Thus, the optimal verification parameter \(v^*\) is

\[
v^* = \arg \min \{ (1 - \alpha) (1 - \Psi(v + D(v))) D(v) + \Psi(v + D(v)) c \}. \tag{47}
\]

In summary, we have determined the manager’s diversion and shareholders’ verification strategies. If \(\alpha \geq \lambda\), then the manager does not divert cash flows and the shareholders do not verify the manager: \(d = 0, v = -\infty\). If \(\alpha < \lambda\), the manager diverts \(D\left( v^* - \bar{\theta} + \theta \right)\), and the shareholders verify the manager if and only if the project’s cash flows fall below \(v^* + P - \bar{\theta}\).

\(^{36}\)Technically, the manager is indifferent in their choice of \(d\) when \(\alpha = \lambda\). However, if there is any infinitesimal but positive fixed cost of diversion, a zero level will be chosen.
5.1.2 Equilibrium investment timing

From the above subsection, the manager’s cash flow diversion rule is 
\[ 1_{\lambda > \alpha} D \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta \right), \]
where \( 1_{\lambda > \alpha} \) is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if \( \lambda > \alpha \) and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the manager’s payoff from exercising the option at threshold \( \hat{P} \), when their type is \( \theta \) and the shareholders’ belief is \( \tilde{\theta} \), equals

\[ \alpha \left( \hat{P} - \theta \right) + \max (\lambda - \alpha, 0) D \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta \right) \left( 1 - \Psi \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta + D \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta \right) \right) \right). \quad (48) \]

Thus, this problem is a special case of the general model with

\[ W \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) = \max (\lambda - \alpha, 0) D \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta \right) \left( 1 - \Psi \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta + D \left( v^* - \tilde{\theta} + \theta \right) \right) \right). \quad (49) \]

Notice that for \( \lambda > \alpha \), \( W \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) > 0 \), meaning that the application corresponds to case 2 of the general model. Intuitively, as the shareholders become more pessimistic about the project’s cash flows, the manager will divert more and be verified less often.

Using the solution in (23), we can express \( \bar{P} (\theta) \) implicitly as the solution to the following equation:

\[
1 + \frac{\max (\lambda - \alpha, 0) D \left( v^* \right) \psi \left( v^* + D \left( v^* \right) \right)}{\alpha \beta} \left( \frac{\bar{P} (\theta)}{P^* (\theta)} \right)^{-\max (\lambda - \alpha, 0) D \left( v^* \right) \psi \left( v^* + D \left( v^* \right) \right) - 1} = \beta + \max \left( \frac{\lambda - 1}{\alpha}, 0 \right) D \left( v^* \right) \psi \left( v^* + D \left( v^* \right) \right) \theta \frac{\bar{P} (\theta)}{P^* (\theta)},
\]

where \( P^* (\theta) \) is the first-best investment threshold of type \( \theta \): \( P^* (\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \theta \). Note that for the case of \( \lambda \leq \alpha \), \( \bar{P} (\theta) = P^* (\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \theta \).

In the limit as \( \tilde{\theta} \rightarrow 0 \), we get the simplified expression of the equilibrium trigger function:

\[
\bar{P}(\theta) = \frac{\beta + \max \left( \frac{\lambda - 1}{\alpha}, 0 \right) D \left( v^* \right) \psi \left( v^* + d^* \left( v^* \right) \right)}{\beta - 1} \theta.
\]

Importantly, it is clear that, as long as \( \lambda > \alpha \), the managers exercise later than the first-best outcome, as they attempt (futilely) to fool investors into believing that the investment costs
are higher than they truly are.

5.1.3 Discussion

The effect of potential cash flow diversion on the timing of investment is illustrated in Fig. 3. If diversion is sufficiently costly ($\lambda \leq \alpha$), or, equivalently, managerial ownership is sufficiently high, then the interests of the manager and those of the outside shareholders are aligned. Because diversion is never optimal in this case, investment occurs at the full-information trigger. If diversion is not costly enough ($\lambda > \alpha$), then potential diversion leads to delay. The magnitude of this distortion is higher when diversion is less costly. The intuition behind this effect is straightforward. If diversion is less costly, then the manager has greater incentives to fool the market by investing later, since this will allow them to capture a higher fraction of the diverted value. In the rational expectations equilibrium the market correctly infers the type of the manager, but signal-jamming occurs: the investment threshold is at sufficiently high level so that the manager has no incentives to fool the market for any realization of $\theta$.

In the example on Fig. 3, distortion of the investment threshold is greater for projects of lower quality. This result contrasts with the results in the previous two applications. There the exercise trigger is altered in a way that the manager has no incentives to mimic a lower type. As a result, distortion in the exercise timing does not exist for the highest types (worst projects) and exists for lower types. In contrast, now the exercise trigger is altered in a way that the manager has no incentives to mimic a higher type. As a result, distortion in exercise timing does not exist for the lowest types (best projects) and exists for higher types.

5.2 Strategic product market competition

Another example of a real options signaling game in which asymmetric information delays option exercise, is the strategic entry into a product market. Specifically, consider the entry decisions of two firms that are asymmetrically informed about the value of a new product. Firm 1 knows the investment cost $\theta$, while firm 2 does not. For example, firm 1 may have greater experience in similar product introductions or may be the industry’s technology leader.
When there is only one firm in the industry, it receives a monopoly profit flow of $P(t)$. When there are two firms in the industry, each receives a duopoly profit flow of $\lambda P(t)$, where $\lambda \in \left(1 - \frac{1}{\beta}, 1\right)$.

We derive the Bayes-Nash separating equilibrium in two different versions of the game: when firm 1 is the designated leader (the “Stackelberg equilibrium”), and when the roles of the two firms are determined endogenously (the “Cournot equilibrium”). To obtain the closed-form solutions we focus on the limiting case $\theta \to 0$.

Product market competition in a real options framework has been frequently analyzed in the literature. Williams (1993), Leahy (1993), and Grenadier (2002) study simultaneous investment by symmetric firms in a competitive equilibrium. Novy-Marx (2007) looks at a similar problem with heterogeneous firms. Grenadier (1996), Weeds (2002), and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) study sequential investment in leader-follower games. We follow the simple duopoly framework outlined in Chapter 9 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The key distinction with the perfect information framework in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), is that one firm knows the investment cost, while the other attempts to infer it through the informed firm’s investment decision. The main insight is that the informed firm will delay its investment in order to signal to the uniformed firm that costs are higher than they truly are, thereby attempting to delay the uniformed firm’s entrance and enjoy monopoly profits for a longer period. In equilibrium this effort to deceive will fail, but the informed firm’s entry will still be delayed relative to the full-information entry time.

The investment decision for firm 1 depends on the degree of pressure it feels due to firm 2’s potential preemption. We will begin with the assumption of a Stackelberg equilibrium (where there is no potential preemption) and then show the extension to a Cournot equilibrium (where preemption by firm 2 is possible).

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37 Essentially, the assumption that $\lambda > 1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$ rules out any overwhelming influence of monopoly power. Under reasonable parameter values, this should typically hold.

38 Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Hsu and Lambrecht (2007) are also closely related to the model in this section. They study competition between two firms for an investment opportunity when the information structure is imperfect. In Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), each firm knows its own investment cost but not the cost of its competitor. In Hsu and Lambrecht (2007), the investment cost of one firm (the incumbent) is public knowledge, while the investment cost of the other firm is known only to itself.
5.2.1 The Stackelberg equilibrium

Let us work backwards and begin by considering the situation when firm 1 has already invested. Firm 2 has used firm 1’s entry time to make an inference about \( \theta \), denoted by \( \tilde{\theta} \). Given its inferred signal, firm 2 holds a standard real option whose expected payoff at exercise is \( \frac{\lambda P}{r-\mu} - \tilde{\theta} \). Firm 2 will thus enter at the first instant when \( P(t) \) equals or exceeds \( \tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta}) \), given by

\[
\tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta}) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \frac{r - \mu}{\lambda} \tilde{\theta}.
\]

(52)

Now, consider the entry of firm 1. Upon payment of \( \theta \) at exercise, firm 1 begins receiving the monopoly profit flow of \( P(t) \), which is then reduced to \( \lambda P(t) \) once firm 2 enters. Thus, for a given type \( \theta \), firm 2’s belief \( \tilde{\theta} \), and the entry trigger \( \tilde{P}_L \leq \tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta}) \), the payoff to firm 1 at the moment of entry is

\[
\frac{\tilde{P}_L}{r-\mu} - \theta - \left( \frac{\tilde{P}_L}{\tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta})} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{\beta - 1}} \frac{\tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta})(1-\lambda)}{r-\mu}, \quad \text{for } \tilde{P}_L \leq \tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta}),
\]

\[
\frac{\lambda \tilde{P}_L}{r-\mu} - \tilde{\theta}, \quad \text{for } \tilde{P}_L > \tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta}).
\]

(53)

Let \( \tilde{P}_L(\theta) \) denote the equilibrium entry threshold of firm 1 in the Stackelberg case. Conjecture that \( \tilde{P}_L(\theta) \leq \tilde{P}_F(\theta) \), which is verified in Appendix B. Then, from (53) we can see that the payoff from exercise can be written as

\[
\alpha \left( \tilde{P}_L - \theta \right) + W(\tilde{P}_L, \tilde{\theta}, \theta),
\]

(54)

where \( \alpha = \frac{1}{r-\mu} \), and

\[
W(\tilde{P}_L, \tilde{\theta}, \theta) = -\tilde{P}_L^\alpha (1-\lambda) \tilde{P}_F(\tilde{\theta})^{1-\beta} - (1-\alpha) \theta.
\]

(55)

Note that the belief component of this payoff is not a special case of the model outlined in Section 2, given that \( \tilde{P}_L \) is included as an argument. In Appendix B, we show that this slight difference in the functions can be easily handled, and that the separating equilibrium investment trigger satisfies differential equation (77). The resulting leader’s Stackelberg strategy
thus satisfies
\[
\frac{d\bar{P}_{L}(\theta)}{d\theta} = \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \frac{\beta \bar{P}_{L}(\theta)}{r - \mu} \left( \frac{\bar{P}_{L}(\theta)}{\beta - 1} \right)^{\beta}.
\] (56)

Since the leader’s payoff is decreasing in \(\bar{\theta}\), it is solved subject to the lower boundary condition:
\[
\bar{P}_{L}(0) = 0.
\] (57)

In Appendix B we show that the solution is
\[
\bar{P}_{L}(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \frac{r - \mu}{\lambda} \theta = \bar{P}_{F}(\theta).
\] (58)

Thus, firm 1’s Stackelberg strategy is to delay investment up to the point that firm 2’s response will be to invest immediately thereafter.

It is instructive to compare the equilibrium investment threshold of the leader (58) with the full-information case studied in Chapter 9 in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), in which both the leader and the follower know \(\theta\). In that case, the full-information Stackelberg equilibrium investment threshold for firm 1 is equal to
\[
P_{L}^{*}(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} (r - \mu) \theta.
\] (59)

Since \(\lambda < 1\), firm 1’s investment occurs later than in the full-information setting. Intuitively, firm 1 has an incentive to invest later than in the case of perfect information in order to fool firm 2 and thereby postpone its entry. As in the other applications, in equilibrium the informed player is unsuccessful in fooling the uninformed player: firm 2 learns the true type of the leader, and invests at the same investment threshold as in the case of perfect information. Information asymmetry not only leads to later entry of firm 1 but also shortens the period of time when firm 1 is a monopolist.

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39The intuition for this result is straightforward. The leader will never enter after \(\bar{P}_{F}(\theta)\), since in this region there will always be simultaneous entry, and \(\bar{P}_{F}(\theta)\) is the optimal trigger for simultaneous entry. Now, since the leader knows that the follower will enter at \(\bar{P}_{F}(\theta)\), and knows that at that point it will lose the difference between the monopoly value and the duopoly value, its entry time choice will be the one that maximizes its monopoly value: \(P_{L}^{*}(\theta)\).
5.2.2 The Cournot equilibrium

Now, consider how the Stackelberg equilibrium of the previous section is affected by the potential preemption of firm 2. Let \( \tilde{P}_L \) be the threshold at which firm 2 preempts firm 1 by entering first. In the event of being preempted, the optimal best response for firm 1 is to invest at the first time when \( P(t) \) equals or exceeds the optimal follower’s threshold \( P_F(\theta) \).

Given any preemption threshold, \( \tilde{P}_L \), we can compute the conditional expected value of firm 2 before either firm invests. Let \( P_M(t) \) denote the historical maximum of \( P(t) \) as of the current time \( t \). If firm 1 has not invested before the current time \( t \), firm 2 learns that \( \theta \) is such that \( \tilde{P}_L(\theta) > P_M(t) \), i.e., \( \theta > \frac{\beta-1}{\beta} \frac{\lambda}{r-\mu} P_M(t) \). There will be two ranges of \( \theta \): in the upper range firm 2 will enter first, and in the lower range both firms will enter simultaneously. For the case in which \( \theta > \frac{\beta-1}{\beta} \frac{\lambda}{r-\mu} \tilde{P}_L \), \( \tilde{P}_L < \tilde{P}_L(\theta) \) and thus firm 2 will preempt firm 1 by investing at \( \tilde{P}_L \). For the case in which \( \theta \leq \frac{\beta-1}{\beta} \frac{\lambda}{r-\mu} \tilde{P}_L \), \( \tilde{P}_L \geq \tilde{P}_L(\theta) \) and thus firm 1 will enter at the Stackelberg trigger \( \tilde{P}_L(\theta) \), where firm 2 will then infer \( \theta \) and immediately enter. Combining these cases, firm 2’s value, conditional on \( P \) and \( P_M \), is equal to

\[
\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ P^*_L(\theta) | \tilde{P}_L < \tilde{P}_F(\theta) \right] = \tilde{P}_L,
\]

The optimal preemption strategy is to invest at the \( \tilde{P}_L \) that maximizes (60). The corresponding first-order condition is\(^{40}\)

\[
\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ P^*_L(\theta) | \tilde{P}_L < \tilde{P}_F(\theta) \right] = \tilde{P}_L,
\]

In other words, the equilibrium preemption trigger equals the expected full-information Stackelberg trigger, conditional on preemption. In the appendix we show that the optimal preemption threshold, \( \tilde{P}_L \), is always between 0 and \( \tilde{P}_F(\theta) \). In particular, assuming that

\(^{40}\)Note that if \( \theta \) is such that \( \tilde{P}_L(\theta) > \tilde{P}_L \), it is not optimal for firm 1 to preempt firm 2 by investing at a threshold below \( \tilde{P}_L \). Indeed, if firm 1 invested at \( \tilde{P} < \tilde{P}_L \), firm 2 would respond by investing immediately after firm 1 as it would perceive that \( \theta \) is such that \( \tilde{P}_L(\theta) = \tilde{P}_F(\theta) = \tilde{P} \). As a result, firm 1 does not gain any monopoly power from investing below \( \tilde{P}_L \), so its best response to the preemptive strategy of firm 2 is to invest at \( \tilde{P}_F(\theta) \).
\( \theta \phi (\theta) / (1 - \Phi (\theta)) \) is increasing in \( \theta \), Eq. (61) has a unique solution, which determines \( \tilde{P}_L \).\(^{41}\)

We can now fully characterize the Cournot equilibrium outcome. Firm 2 will attempt to preempt firm 1 by investing at the trigger \( \tilde{P}_L \), which is implicitly given by (61). If \( \theta \) is such that \( \tilde{P}_L < P_L(\theta) \), then firm 2 will invest first at \( \tilde{P}_L \), and firm 1 will invest later at \( P_F(\theta) = P_L(\theta) \). Alternatively, if \( \theta \) is such that \( \tilde{P}_L \geq P_L(\theta) \), then both firms will simultaneously invest at the trigger \( P_L(\theta) \). Thus, in all cases the informed firm will invest later than it would in the case of full information. This delay is due to its strategic incentive to artificially inflate firm 1’s inferred estimate of \( \theta \).

The Cournot equilibrium is illustrated in Fig. 4, for the case in which \( \theta \) is distributed uniformly over \([0, 2]\). The preemption threshold, \( \tilde{P}_L \), is equal to 0.085. At the point designated \( A \) where \( \theta = 0.5 \), the Stackelberg trigger \( P_F(\theta) \) is equal to \( \tilde{P}_L \). Thus for all \( \theta > 0.5 \), the equilibrium outcome is for firm 2 to invest first at the trigger \( \tilde{P}_L \) and for firm 1 to invest later at the Stackelberg trigger \( P_F(\theta) \). Conversely, for all \( \theta \leq 0.5 \), there will be simultaneous entry at the Stackelberg trigger \( P_F(\theta) \).

## 6 Conclusion

This paper studies the class of real options signaling games - games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the payoff of the decision-maker. The decision-maker attempts to fool the outsiders by altering the timing of option exercise. In equilibrium, signal-jamming occurs: the outsiders infer private information of the decision-maker correctly, but the timing of the option exercise is significantly distorted. The direction of the distortion can go both ways. If the decision-maker’s payoff increases in the belief of the outsiders about the value of the asset, then signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise. Conversely, if the decision-maker’s payoff decreases in the belief of the outsiders about the value of the asset, then signaling incentives increase the value of the option to wait and

\(^{41}\)Intuitively, this assumption means that the density of distribution does not have abrupt kinks. It is satisfied for most standard distributions.
thereby delays option exercise.

We illustrate the findings of the general model using four corporate finance applications. The first two applications provide examples in which signaling erodes the value of the option to wait and speeds up investment. In the first application, managers care not only about the long-term performance of the company but also about the short-term stock price. In attempt to boost the short-term stock price, the managers invest too early attempting to fool the market into overestimating the project’s net present value. In the second application, we consider the decision when to take the company public by a venture capitalist, who is better informed about its value than are outside investors. Here, a venture capitalist with a short track record takes their portfolio companies public earlier in an attempt to establish reputation and raise more capital for new funds. The last two applications provide examples in which signaling incentives delay investment. First, signaling can significantly delay investment if the agent can divert cash flows from the project for their own private benefit without the shareholders’ noticing. In this case investment is delayed as the agent tries to signal that the net present value of the project is lower than it actually is and thereby divert more for their personal consumption. Second, we illustrate how signaling delays investment in a duopoly, where the firms are asymmetrically informed about the value of the new product. In this case, the informed firm’s decision when to launch the new product reveals information about its value to the uninformed firm and thereby affects future competition. The informed firm delays the decision to launch the product in attempt to fool the rival into underestimating the value of the product.

Irrespective of the application, the main message of the paper is the same: signaling incentives have an important role in distorting major timing decisions of firms such as investment in large projects, IPOs, and developing new products. These effects seem to be consistent with existing empirical evidence and significant both qualitatively and quantitatively. This gives rise to several interesting questions that are left outside of this paper. For example, to what extent do the existing contracts provide incentives to make the timing decisions optimally? As another example, in what applications do signaling incentives work for or against social welfare? While signaling incentives reduce the decision-maker’s utility due to an inefficient
timing of option exercise, their effect on the social welfare is unclear.
Appendix

Appendix A. Single-Crossing Condition

We list the single-crossing condition, which is used to obtain existence and uniqueness of the separating equilibrium.

**Assumption 5 (Single-crossing condition).** Function $W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta)$ satisfies

$$W_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta}, \theta) \times \frac{d}{d\theta} \left[ \frac{U_{\tilde{\varrho}}(\tilde{\varrho}, \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{P})}{U_{\varrho}(\tilde{\varrho}, \theta, P)} \right] > 0$$

in the graph of $\tilde{P}$, where $U(\tilde{\theta}, \theta, \tilde{P})$ is given by (13), $\beta$ is given by (7), and $\tilde{P}(\theta)$ is the unique increasing solution of the differential equation (16), subject to the boundary condition (17), if $W_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta}, \theta) < 0$, or (18), if $W_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta}, \theta) > 0$.

The single-crossing condition ensures that if the agent does not make extra gains by misrepresenting $\theta$ slightly, then they cannot make extra gains from a large misrepresentation. It is standard for games of asymmetric information, both signaling and screening. Importantly, it is enough that the single-crossing condition is satisfied for $(\tilde{\theta}, \tilde{P})$ in the graph of $\tilde{P}$. It holds in all applications that we consider.

To see what restrictions on $W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta)$ guarantee the single-crossing condition, differentiate $U(\tilde{\theta}, \theta, \tilde{P})$ to get

$$\frac{U_{\tilde{P}}(\tilde{\theta}, \theta, \tilde{P})}{U_{\tilde{\varrho}}(\tilde{\varrho}, \theta, \tilde{P})} = -\frac{\alpha ((\beta - 1) \tilde{P} - \beta \theta) + \beta W(\tilde{\theta}, \theta)}{\tilde{P} W_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\varrho}, \theta)}.$$  \hfill (62)
Differentiating this with respect to $\theta$, we get that the single-crossing condition holds if

$$\beta \left( \alpha - W_\theta \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) \right) + \frac{W_{\tilde{\theta} \theta} \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right)}{W_{\tilde{\theta}} \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right)} \left( \alpha \left( (\beta - 1) \hat{P} - \beta \theta \right) + \beta W \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) \right) > 0. \quad (63)$$

Notice that the first term of (63) is always positive. Hence, a sufficient condition for the single-crossing condition is that the cross-partial derivative of the “belief” component of the utility function, $W_{\tilde{\theta} \theta} \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right)$, is not too high.

**Appendix B. Proofs**

**Proof of Proposition 2.** To prove the proposition, we apply Theorems 1-3 from Mailath (1987). To do this, we need to show that function $U \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P} \right)$ satisfies Mailath’s (1987) regularity conditions:

- **Smoothness:** $U \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P} \right)$ is $C^2$ on $[\tilde{\theta}, \theta]^2 \times \mathbb{R}_+$;
- **Belief monotonicity:** $U_{\tilde{\theta}}$ never equals zero, and so is either positive or negative;
- **Type monotonicity:** $U_{\theta \hat{P}}$ never equals zero, and so is either positive or negative;
- **“Strict” quasiconcavity:** $U_{\hat{P}} \left( \theta, \theta, \hat{P} \right) = 0$ has a unique solution in $\hat{P}$, which maximizes $U \left( \theta, \theta, \hat{P} \right)$, and $U_{\hat{P} \hat{P}} \left( \theta, \theta, \hat{P} \right) < 0$ at this solution;
- **Boundedness:** there exists $\delta > 0$ such that for all $\left( \theta, \hat{P} \right) \in [\tilde{\theta}, \theta] \times \mathbb{R}_+$, $U_{\hat{P} \hat{P}} \left( \theta, \theta, \hat{P} \right) \geq 0 \Rightarrow \left| U_{\hat{P}} \left( \theta, \theta, \hat{P} \right) \right| > \delta$.

Let us check that these conditions are satisfied for our problem. The smoothness condition is satisfied, because $W \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right)$ is $C^2$ on $[\tilde{\theta}, \theta]^2$. The belief monotonicity condition is satisfied, because $W_{\tilde{\theta}}$ is either always positive or always negative. The type monotonicity condition is satisfied, because

$$U_{\theta \hat{P}} \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P} \right) = \frac{\beta \left( \alpha - W_\theta \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) \right)}{\hat{P}^{\beta + 1}} > 0, \quad (64)$$
as \( \alpha > W_\theta \left( \tilde{\theta}, \theta \right) \) by Assumption 4. As we show in Section 2.3, \( U_{\tilde{P}} \left( \theta, \theta, \tilde{P} \right) = 0 \) has a unique solution in \( \tilde{P} \), denoted by \( P^* (\theta) \), that maximizes \( U \left( \theta, \theta, \tilde{P} \right) \). Also,

\[
U_{\tilde{P}P} (\theta, \theta, P^* (\theta)) = \frac{\beta}{P^* (\theta)^{\beta+2}} \left[ \alpha (\beta - 1) P^* (\theta) - (\beta + 1) (\alpha \theta - W (\theta, \theta)) \right] \quad (65)
\]

\[
= -\frac{\beta (\alpha \theta - W (\theta, \theta))}{P^* (\theta)^{\beta+2}} < 0.
\]

Hence, the “strict” quasiconcavity condition is satisfied. Finally, to ensure that the boundedness condition is satisfied, we restrict the set of potential investment thresholds to be bounded by \( k \) from above, where \( k \) can be arbitrarily large. We will later show that extending the set of actions to \( \tilde{P} \in (0, \infty) \) neither destroys the separating equilibrium nor creates additional separating equilibria. Notice that \( U_{\tilde{P}P} \left( \theta, \theta, \tilde{P} \right) \geq 0 \) implies that \( \alpha \theta - W (\theta, \theta) \leq \tilde{P} \alpha (\beta - 1) / (\beta + 1) \). Hence, for any \( \left( \theta, \tilde{P} \right) \in \left[ \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\theta} \right] \times [0, k] \) such that \( U_{\tilde{P}P} \left( \theta, \theta, \tilde{P} \right) \geq 0 \):

\[
\left| U_{\tilde{P}} \left( \theta, \theta, \tilde{P} \right) \right| = \frac{\alpha (\beta - 1) \tilde{P} - \beta (\alpha \theta - W (\theta, \theta))}{\tilde{P}^{\beta+1}} \geq \frac{\alpha (\beta - 1) \tilde{P} - \beta (\alpha \theta - W (\theta, \theta))}{\tilde{P}^{\beta+1}} = \frac{\alpha (\beta - 1) \tilde{P}^{\beta+1}}{(\beta + 1)^{\beta+1}} \geq \frac{\alpha (\beta - 1) \tilde{P}^{\beta+1}}{(\beta + 1)^{\beta+1} k^\beta} > 0 \quad (66)
\]

for any arbitrarily large \( k \). Then, the boundedness condition is satisfied.

By Mailath’s (1987) Theorems 1 and 2, any separating equilibrium \( \tilde{P} (\theta) \) is continuous, differentiable, satisfies Eq. (16), and \( d\tilde{P} / d\theta \) has the same sign as \( U_{\theta \tilde{P}} \). Because \( U_{\theta \tilde{P}} > 0 \), \( \tilde{P} (\theta) \) is an increasing function of \( \theta \). Let \( \tilde{P} \) denote the solution to the following restricted initial value problem: Eq. (16), subject to (17), if \( W_\theta < 0 \), or (18), if \( W_\theta > 0 \). Because \( |W_\theta (\theta, \theta)| \) is bounded above by \( \max_{\theta \in [\tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\theta}]} |W_\theta (\theta, \theta)| \), \( \tilde{P} \) is unique by Mailath’s (1987) Proposition 5. Hence, if a separating equilibrium exists, it is unique and is given by \( \tilde{P} \). By Mailath’s (1987) Theorem 3, the single-crossing condition guarantees existence of the separating equilibrium.

This argument suggests that \( \tilde{P} \) is the unique separating equilibrium in a problem where the set of investment thresholds is \( \tilde{P} \in (0, k) \) for any sufficiently large finite \( k \). Finally, it remains to show that considering the space of investment thresholds bounded by \( k \) is not restrictive. First, we argue that \( \tilde{P} \) is a separating equilibrium in a problem where \( \tilde{P} \in (0, +\infty) \). To show this, note that the single-crossing condition holds for all \( \tilde{P} \in (0, +\infty) \). Therefore, local
incentive compatibility guarantees global incentive compatibility for all \( \hat{P} \in (0, +\infty) \), not only for \( \hat{P} \in (0, k) \). Hence, \( \hat{P} \) is a separating equilibrium in a problem where \( \hat{P} \in (0, +\infty) \). Second, we argue that there are no other separating equilibria in a problem where \( \hat{P} \in (0, +\infty) \). By contradiction, suppose that there is an additional separating equilibrium \( \hat{P}_2 \), other than \( \hat{P} \). It must be the case that for some \( \theta \), \( \hat{P}_2 (\theta) \) is infinite. Otherwise, it would be a separating equilibrium in the restricted problem for a sufficiently large \( k \). However, if \( \hat{P}_2 (\theta) \) is infinite for some \( \theta \), then the equilibrium expected payoff of type \( \theta \) is zero, so it would be optimal for type \( \theta \) to deviate to any finite \( \hat{P} \), as \( W(\hat{\theta}, \theta) < \alpha \theta \forall (\hat{\theta}, \theta) \in [\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]^2 \). ■

**Proof of Proposition 3.** Note that \( \bar{P} (\theta) \) is increasing in \( \theta \). We can rewrite Eq. (16) in the following form:

\[
\alpha (\beta - 1) \bar{P} (\theta) - \beta (\alpha \theta - W (\theta, \theta)) = \frac{\bar{P} (\theta) W_{\hat{\theta}} (\theta, \theta)}{P' (\theta)}
\]

From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that \( P' (\theta) > 0 \). Hence, if \( W_{\hat{\theta}} < 0 \), then the right-hand side of (67) is negative. Thus, (67) implies that \( \bar{P} (\theta) < P^* (\theta) \) except the point \( \theta = \hat{\theta} \) where the boundary condition holds. Analogously, if \( W_{\hat{\theta}} > 0 \), then the right-hand side of (67) is positive, so (67) implies that \( \bar{P} (\theta) > P^* (\theta) \) except the point \( \theta = \hat{\theta} \) where the boundary condition holds. ■

**Derivation of the semi-pooling equilibrium.** First, we show that for any \( \hat{\theta} \in (\theta, \bar{\theta}) \), Eq. (26) has the unique solution denoted \( P_{pool} (\hat{\theta}) \). Consider the function

\[
f(P; \hat{\theta}) = \left( \frac{P}{\bar{P} (\hat{\theta})} \right)^\beta \alpha \left( \bar{P} (\hat{\theta}) - \hat{\theta} \right) - \alpha \left( P - \hat{\theta} \right) + \lambda \frac{\hat{\theta} - \theta}{2},
\]

where
defined over $P \in [0, \bar{P}(\hat{\theta})]$, $\hat{\theta} \in (\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta})$. Note that

$$f\left(\bar{P}(\hat{\theta}); \hat{\theta}\right) = \frac{\hat{\theta} - \theta}{2} < 0,$$

$$f\left(0; \hat{\theta}\right) = \alpha \hat{\theta} + \frac{\hat{\theta} - \theta}{2} > 0,$$

(69)

(70)

where the first inequality holds by $\lambda < 0$ and the second inequality holds by Assumption 2.

Consider the derivative of $f\left(P; \hat{\theta}\right)$ with respect to $P$:

$$f'(P; \hat{\theta}) = \beta \left(\frac{P}{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta})}\right)^{\beta} \frac{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta}) - \hat{\theta}}{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta})} - \alpha$$

$$\leq \beta \alpha \frac{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta}) - \hat{\theta}}{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta})} - \alpha$$

$$< \alpha (\beta - 1) - \beta \alpha \frac{\hat{\theta}}{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta})} = 0.$$

(71)

The first inequality follows from $P \leq \bar{P}(\hat{\theta})$ and $f''\left(P; \hat{\theta}\right) > 0$. The second inequality follows from $\bar{P}(\hat{\theta}) < \bar{P}^*(\hat{\theta})$. By continuity of $f\left(P; \hat{\theta}\right)$, for any $\hat{\theta}$ there exists a unique point in $P_{pool}(\hat{\theta})$ at which $f\left(P_{pool}(\hat{\theta}); \hat{\theta}\right) = 0$.

Second, we demonstrate that types $\theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ indeed find it optimal to follow the strategy of pooling at $P_{pool}(\hat{\theta})$ and types $\theta \in [\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ find it optimal to follow the strategy of separating at $\bar{P}(\theta)$. Consider type $\theta \in [\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$. The difference of the utilities she obtains from separating at $\bar{P}(\theta)$ and pooling is equal to

$$\left(\frac{P_{pool}}{\bar{P}(\hat{\theta})}\right)^{\beta} \alpha (P(\theta) - \theta) - \alpha (P_{pool} - \theta) + \frac{\hat{\theta} - \theta}{2}$$

$$= P_{pool}^{\beta} \max_{Y \in \mathcal{Y}_{+}} \left\{ \frac{1}{Y^{\beta}} \left(\alpha (Y - \theta) + W\left(\bar{P}^{-1}(Y), \theta\right)\right) \right\} - \alpha (P_{pool} - \theta) + \frac{\hat{\theta} - \theta}{2}$$

(72)
By the envelope theorem, the derivative with respect to $\theta$ is

$$
\left( \frac{P_{pool}}{\bar{P}(\theta)} \right)^\beta (-\alpha - \lambda) + \alpha \geq 0,
$$

because $\lambda < 0$ and $P_{pool} \leq \bar{P}(\theta)$. Because type $\hat{\theta}$ is indifferent between separating and pooling, any type $\theta$ above $\hat{\theta}$ does not have an incentive to deviate to $P_{pool}$. By the single-crossing condition, any deviation to a threshold that is different from $P_{pool}$ is also not optimal for any type $\theta \in \left[ \hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta} \right]$. Consider type $\theta \in \left[ \bar{\theta}, \hat{\theta} \right]$. From (72), the payoff of type $\theta$ from pooling and investing at $P_{pool}$ is higher than $P_{pool}^\beta U(\hat{\theta}, \theta, \hat{P})$. By the single-crossing condition, $U(\theta, \theta, \bar{P}(\theta)) \geq U(\hat{\theta}, \theta, \bar{P}(\hat{\theta}))$. Therefore, if we impose the worst-possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs, then no type $\theta \in \left[ \bar{\theta}, \hat{\theta} \right]$ finds it optimal to deviate from $P_{pool}$. ■

**Proof that the form of the optimal verification threshold, $v(P, \hat{\theta})$, is $P - \hat{\theta} - v$ for some constant $v$.** Suppose that the manager’s type is $\theta$, and the shareholders’ belief is $\bar{\theta}$. Let $v(P, \hat{\theta})$ denote the more general verification threshold of the shareholders such that shareholders verify the manager if and only if the realized cash flows are below $v(P, \hat{\theta})$. Then, if the manager of type $\theta$ diverts $d$, they expect to be verified with probability $\Psi \left( v(P, \hat{\theta}) - P + \theta + d \right)$. Hence, the manager’s problem is

$$
\max_{d \geq 0} \left\{ (\lambda - \alpha) d \left( 1 - \Psi \left( v(P, \hat{\theta}) - P + \theta + d \right) \right) \right\}. \tag{73}
$$

The solution is a function of $P - \theta - v(P, \hat{\theta})$, denoted by $D(P - \theta - v(P, \hat{\theta}))$.

Given the manager’s response to a verification rule $v(P, \hat{\theta})$, we now derive the optimal $v(P, \hat{\theta})$. The shareholders expect the manager to divert $D(P - \hat{\theta} - v)$, so they estimate the probability of verification at $\Psi \left( v - P + \hat{\theta} + D(P - \hat{\theta} - v) \right)$. Hence, for each $P$ and $\bar{\theta}$, $v(P, \hat{\theta})$ must minimize

$$
(1 - \alpha) D(P - \hat{\theta} - v) \left( 1 - \Psi \left( v - P + \hat{\theta} + D(P - \hat{\theta} - v) \right) \right) + c \Psi \left( v - P + \hat{\theta} + D(P - \hat{\theta} - v) \right). \tag{74}
$$
Since the value function depends on $v$, $P$, and $\tilde{\theta}$ only through $v - P + \tilde{\theta}$, we conclude that any optimal verification threshold is of the form $v(P, \tilde{\theta}) = P - \tilde{\theta} - v$ for some constant $v$. ■

**Verification of $P_L (\theta) \leq P_F (\theta)$.** By contradiction, suppose that in equilibrium $P_L (\theta) > \hat{P}_F (\theta)$. If firm 1 invests at $\hat{P}_L \geq \hat{P}_F (\tilde{\theta})$, firm 2 will invest immediately after firm 1. Hence, in the range $\hat{P}_L \geq \hat{P}_F (\tilde{\theta})$, $P < \hat{P}_L$, $V_L (P, \theta, \tilde{\theta}; \hat{P}_L)$ is equal to

$$V_L (P, \theta, \tilde{\theta}; \hat{P}_L) = \left( \frac{P}{\hat{P}_L} \right)^{\beta} \left( \frac{\lambda \hat{P}_L}{r - \mu} - \theta \right). \quad (75)$$

Irrespective of $\tilde{\theta}$, this value function is maximized at $\hat{P}_L = \hat{P}_F (\tilde{\theta})$. Hence, any $\hat{P}_L (\theta) > \hat{P}_F (\theta)$ is inconsistent with equilibrium. ■

**Generalizing the payoff function to $W(P, \tilde{\theta}, \theta)$.** The equilibrium differential equation in (16) can be generalized to the case in which the belief function also includes $P$ as an argument. Provided that the function $W$ satisfies the regularity condition in Mailath (1987), as does the particular function in (55), the equilibrium derivation can proceed as follows. Analogous to (15), the agent’s first-order condition for their optimal selection of the trigger $\hat{P}$ is

$$\beta \left( \alpha \left( \frac{\hat{P} - \theta}{\hat{P}} \right) + W \left( \frac{\hat{P}}{\hat{P}^{-1} (\hat{P}), \theta} \right) \right)$$

$$= \alpha + W_P \left( \frac{\hat{P}}{\hat{P}^{-1} (\hat{P}), \theta} \right) + W_\theta \left( \frac{\hat{P}}{\hat{P}^{-1} (\hat{P}), \theta} \right) \frac{d \hat{P}^{-1} (\hat{P})}{d \hat{P}}. \quad (76)$$

In the separating equilibrium, we can set $\hat{P}^{-1} (\hat{P}) = \theta$ and obtain the equilibrium differential equation:

$$\frac{d \hat{P} (\theta)}{d \theta} = \frac{\hat{P} (\theta) W_\tilde{\theta} \left( \hat{P} (\theta), \theta \right)}{\alpha \left( (\beta - 1) \hat{P} (\theta) - \beta \theta \right) + \beta W \left( \hat{P} (\theta), \theta, \theta \right) - \hat{P} (\theta) W_P \left( \hat{P} (\theta), \theta, \theta \right)}. \quad (77)$$

■
Solution to differential equation (56) subject to boundary condition (57). Let us look for a solution in the form \( P_L(\theta) = A\theta \). Notice that this solution will satisfy the boundary condition (57) since \( P_L(0) = 0 \). Eq. (56) becomes
\[
A \frac{\beta - 1}{\beta(r - \mu)} - \left( A \frac{(\beta - 1)\lambda}{\beta(r - \mu)} \right) \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} = 1.
\]
Letting \( v = A \frac{(\beta - 1)\lambda}{\beta(r - \mu)} \), we get
\[
v - v^\beta - \lambda \left(1 - v^\beta\right) = 0.
\]
Let \( \psi(v) = v - v^\beta - \lambda \left(1 - v^\beta\right) \). It is clear that \( v = 1 \) is a root of \( \psi(v) \). Since \( \psi''(v) = \beta(\beta - 1)(\lambda - 1)v^{\beta - 2} < 0 \) and \( \psi(0) = -\lambda < 0 \), we know that \( \psi(v) \) has at most one other root. We have \( \lim_{v \to -\infty} \psi(v) = -\infty \), and since \( \lambda > 1 - \frac{1}{\beta} \), we know that \( \psi'(1) > 0 \). Thus, there exists a second root that is strictly greater than 1. The upper root cannot yield the separating equilibrium since it implies the investment threshold above \( P_F(\theta) \), which is inconsistent with the separating equilibrium, as shown above. Hence, the equilibrium investment threshold of the leader is given by
\[
X_L(\theta) = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \frac{r - \mu}{\lambda} \theta.
\]

Proof of properties of \( \tilde{P}_L \). The first derivative of (60) with respect to \( \tilde{P}_L \) equals
\[
-\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ \left( \frac{P}{\tilde{P}_L} \right)^\beta \frac{1}{\tilde{P}_L} \left( \frac{(\beta - 1)\tilde{P}_L}{r - \mu} - \beta \theta \right) \mathbb{P}[\theta > \eta\tilde{P}_L] \right] = \left( \frac{P}{\tilde{P}_L} \right)^\beta \frac{1}{\tilde{P}_L} \left( \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ \theta \mathbb{P}[\theta > \eta\tilde{P}_L] \right] - \frac{(\beta - 1)\tilde{P}_L}{r - \mu} \right)
\]
It is strictly positive for all \( \tilde{P}_L \) sufficiently close to 0 and strictly negative for all \( \tilde{P}_L \) sufficiently close to \( P_F(\bar{\theta}) \). Hence, (60) is maximized at \( \tilde{P}_L \in (0, P_F(\bar{\theta})) \). Therefore, the sets \( \left\{ \theta : P_F(\theta) > \tilde{P}_L \right\} \) and \( \left\{ \theta : P_F(\theta) < \tilde{P}_L \right\} \) are nonempty.

Consider the case when \( \theta(\theta) / (1 - \Phi(\theta)) \) is increasing in \( \theta \). First, we show that \( e(\theta^*) \equiv \)
$E_\theta \left[ \frac{\theta}{l} | \theta > \theta^* \right]$ is strictly decreasing in $\theta^*$. Taking the derivative:

$$
\theta^* e'(\theta^*) = e(\theta^*) \left( \frac{\phi(\theta^*) \theta^*}{1 - \Phi(\theta^*)} - 1 \right) - \frac{\phi(\theta^*) \theta^*}{1 - \Phi(\theta^*)}.
$$

(82)

Clearly, $e(\theta^*)$ is strictly decreasing in $\theta^*$ for all points below the point at which $\frac{\theta^* \phi(\theta^*)}{1 - \Phi(\theta^*)} = 1$. Consider the range above this point. If $e'(\theta^*) > 0$ for some $\theta^*$, then it must be the case that $e'(\theta^*) > 0$ for all $\theta^*$ above. This implies $1 = e(\tilde{\theta}) > e(\theta^*)$, which is a contradiction with $e(\theta^*)$ for all $\theta^* < \tilde{\theta}$. Hence, $e(\theta^*)$ is strictly decreasing in $\theta^*$. Now, consider (61). We can rewrite it as

$$
E_\theta \left[ \frac{\theta}{\eta \tilde{P}_L} | \theta > \eta \tilde{P}_L \right] = \frac{1}{\lambda},
$$

(83)

where $\eta \equiv \frac{\beta - 1}{\beta} \frac{\lambda}{r - \mu}$. Notice that the left-hand side approaches infinity when $\tilde{P}_L$ approaches zero and equals $1 = \frac{1}{\lambda}$ when $\tilde{P}_L = \theta/\eta = P_F(\tilde{\theta})$. Because $E_\theta \left[ \frac{\theta}{\eta \tilde{P}_L} | \theta \geq \eta \tilde{P}_L \right]$ is decreasing in $\tilde{P}_L$, there exists the unique $\tilde{P}_L \in (0, P_F(\tilde{\theta}))$ at which (61) is satisfied. ■
References


Figure 1. Equilibrium investment threshold of a myopic manager. The left graph shows the equilibrium investment trigger as a function of the investment costs $\theta$ for three different values of $\alpha_1 / (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$ as well as two benchmark cases. The top curve corresponds to the investment threshold $P^*(\theta)$ when there is no incentives for signaling. This happens either if there is symmetric information between the manager and the market or when $\alpha_1 = 0$. The other curves correspond (from top to bottom) to the cases when the manager can freely sell 25%, 50%, and 75% of their shares, respectively. The equilibrium investment threshold coincides with $P^*(\theta)$ for all types above $\theta$. The investment threshold is closer to the zero net present value threshold if the investment costs are lower or the manager can sell a higher fraction of their holdings. The right graph shows the option premium as a function of the investment costs $\theta$ for several values of $\alpha_1 / (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$ ranging from 0 to 0.75. The top curve corresponds both to the case of $\alpha_1 = 0$ and to the case of symmetric information. The graph shows that asymmetric information erodes the value of waiting to invest, and the effect is greater for better projects and managers who can freely sell a higher fraction of their shares. The parameter values of the project value process are $r = 0.04$, $\mu = 0.02$, $\sigma = 0.2$. The investment costs are distributed uniformly over $[1, 2]$. 
Figure 2. Exit strategies of the inexperienced general partner. The left graph shows the equilibrium trigger, $P_1(\theta)$ (the bold line), and the efficient trigger, $P_1^*(\theta)$ (the thin line) as functions of the general partner’s talent $\theta$ (lower $\theta$ correspond to higher talent). The right graph shows the ratio of the two triggers, $P_1(\theta)/P_1^*(\theta)$. The production function is the power function: $H(I) = AI^\gamma$. The parameter values of the price process are $r = 0.04$, $\mu = 0.02$, $\sigma = 0.2$. The interval of possible types is $[\underline{\theta}, \overline{\theta}] = [1, 2]$. The share of the IPO proceeds which goes to the general partner is $\alpha = 0.2$, which is consistent with a typical carry level observed in the venture capital industry (Metrick and Yasuda (2009)). The curvature of the production function is $\gamma = 0.67$. The value of $A$ is calibrated at $A = 3.015$ so that for the middle type $\theta = 1.5$ the equilibrium investment into the second project equals the investment into the first project, i.e., $F(I_2(\theta)) = 1$. 
Figure 3. Equilibrium investment threshold when the manager can divert cash flows from the project. The figure shows the equilibrium investment trigger as a function of the investment costs $\theta$ for different levels of the diversion parameter $\lambda$: 0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75. The bottom curve corresponds to the investment threshold $P^*(\theta)$ when the manager has no incentives to divert cash flows from the project. This happens either if there is symmetric information between the manager and the market, or when $\lambda \leq \alpha$, in particular, $\lambda = 0$. The middle curves correspond (from bottom to top) to the cases when the diversion rate is equal to 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. The parameter values of the project value process are $r = 0.04$, $\mu = 0.02$, $\sigma = 0.2$. The managerial ownership is $\alpha = 0.2$. The interval of possible investment costs is $[1, 2]$. The distribution of noise $\varepsilon$ is $N(0, 1)$. Verification costs are $c = 1$. In equilibrium, the manager divers $d^* = 0.83$, and the shareholders verify the manager if and only if the realized cash flows are below $P - \theta - 0.24$. 
Figure 4. Equilibrium investment thresholds in the Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria. The figure shows the equilibrium investment triggers of firm 1 and firm 2 in the Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria. The lower (thin) line corresponds to the investment threshold of the leader (firm 1) in the Stackelberg equilibrium when both the leader and the follower know $\theta$. The upper (bold) line corresponds to the investment thresholds of both firm 1 and firm 2 in the Stackelberg equilibrium when only the leader knows $\theta$. While firm 2 does not know $\theta$, it infers $\theta$ from observing when firm 1 invests. Point A corresponds to the preemption threshold in the Cournot equilibrium. Its coordinates are (0.5, 0.085). If $\theta \leq 0.5$, then the outcome in the Cournot equilibrium is the same as in the Stackelberg equilibrium. If $\theta > 0.5$, then in the Cournot equilibrium firm 2 invests first, even though it does not know the investment costs, and firm 1 invests later at $\bar{P}_F(\theta)$. The parameter values of the project value process are $r = 0.04$, $\mu = 0.02$, $\sigma = 0.2$. The competition parameter is $\lambda = 0.4$, which implies that duopoly generates 80% of monopolistic profits. The investment costs, $\theta$, are distributed uniformly over $[0, 2]$. 