THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS

Stephen John Stedman

A New Foreign Policy Doctrine

NOT SO LONG AGO we could confuse the end of the Cold War with the end of history and entertain the possibility that we had survived the famous Chinese curse of living in interesting times. A new era of international security seemed about to dawn, where even the most protracted conflicts appeared solvable. International mediation in Angola, Cambodia and El Salvador led to negotiated settlements of long civil wars and revived the hope that ballots, not bullets, would finally determine the fate of peoples around the globe.

But as Ralph Ellison cautioned in his masterpiece, Invisible Man, history is not an arrow but a boomerang. Just when the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry held out the promise that rationality and reason would triumph over ideology, the world witnessed the bloody dissolution of states in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia and Ethiopia. So, too, came the revival of virulent nationalism throughout the former Soviet empire and genocidal campaigns on the fringes of western Europe. Even those successful cases of mediated civil war now hover on the brink of renewed bloodshed. The fortunes of history, it seems, have as much to do with the persistence of hatred and memory as with the vicissitudes of grand ideologies.

Yet the end of superpower rivalry continues to entrance America with the chimera of a new world order. That illusion, alongside often violent disorder in many states, has produced a kind of “new interventionism.” This outlook combines an awareness that civil war is a legitimate issue of international security with a sentiment for crusading liberal internationalism. The new interventionists wed great emphasis on the moral obligations of the international community to an eager-

ness for a newly available United Nations to intervene in domestic conflicts throughout the world.

Thus future historians may compare 1991 and 1992 to the years just after World War II, when the doctrine of containment evolved. Like that time, the last two years have seen a series of events, precedents, incremental decisions and policy rationales give birth to a new doctrine of American foreign policy. While that new doctrine remains inchoate, a few important facets are visible and suggest that the United States, far from turning inward, may be taking upon itself a more crusading, interventionist role in world affairs.

Many eager advocates of this new doctrine lack a sufficient sense of the dilemmas, risks and costs of intervention. They often fail to take account of the special dynamics of civil war or the realistic limitations of the United Nations as the chosen vehicle for action. The precepts of this new doctrine chafe at traditional notions of sovereignty, remain contradictory and are leading international actors toward largely uncharted domain. Followed unthinkingly, the new interventionism could become increasingly expansive, until the United States and the United Nations ultimately take on tasks for which they are ill-prepared, leaving themselves embroiled in numerous internal conflicts without the will or resources to bring peace to any.

A Doctrine of Dubious Presumptions

THE UNPRECEDENTED U.N. DECISION on December 4, 1992, authorizing the deployment of military force to provide humanitarian relief to starving Somalis was the culmination of year-long pressures. Well before the deployment of 21,000 U.S. troops, congressional leaders from both parties and many in the media had for months urged massive intervention, including establishing a U.N. trusteeship if need be.

But Somalia did not stand alone as a cause worthy of international intervention. Many of the same chorus of congressional leaders, political pundits, television commentators and print journalists also clamored for U.S. military action to stop Serbian aggression in the former Yugoslavia. They endorsed war crime tribunals against Serbs, demanded firmer action to protect and feed afflicted Bosnians and castigated U.N. peacekeepers for their unwillingness to engage armed partisans attempting to thwart humanitarian relief. In turn, U.S. and
U.N. intervention was urged for Liberia, East Timor, Sudan, Zaire and Haiti as well.

The new interventionists seek to end civil wars and stop governments from abusing the assume that civil war today is threatening to international security than in previous eras. They believe that active international intervention is necessary to bring a semblance of order to the post-Cold War world, based on the dubious presumption that the Cold War's end makes internal violence somehow more tractable. But their often contradictory demands for intervention—either mediation, an active combat role on behalf of a warring side, or simply shielding civilians caught in the middle—belies a lack of coherent understanding of peacemaking in internal conflicts.

The new interventionists advocate “a new humanitarian order in which governments are held—by force, if necessary—to higher standards of respect for human life.” They contend that “the protection of ethnic, religious and other minorities endangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile government is now increasingly a recognized obligation of the international community.” To adherents of this approach, sovereignty is no longer a tool for creating international order, but a “political constraint” on international action.¹ In the words of former U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, “We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.”²

The new interventionists seek to establish guidelines to ensure that the United Nations polices any regime failing to meet the broadly and often ill-defined “humanitarian needs” of its people. Such a rule is possible, they believe, because the

end of the Cold War has vanquished the ideological constraints on intervention in the domestic affairs of U.N. member states. Guidelines for intervention would mark a significant shift in the long-standing meaning of the terms of international relations. Sovereignty would no longer reside with states but with the people within them; self-determination would no longer refer to peoples, but to individuals. Precedent, rhetoric, faulty generalization and expectations: such is the stuff of doctrine.

**Doctrine Reunites American Liberalism**

The new interventionism has its roots in long-standing tendencies of American foreign policy—missionary zeal, bewilderment when the world refuses to conform to American expectations and a belief that for every problem there is a quick and easy solution. It reunites divided strains of American foreign policy liberalism: traditional Wilsonian liberalism, defined by support for international organizations and self-determination of peoples; and its Cold War cousin, defined by anticommunism.

The challenge of explaining the new interventionism lies in providing an account of how two camps at odds for most of the last 25 years can today find common ground. The key to resolving the mystery is found in the insight of former Harvard professor of government Louis Hartz: that all Americans are liberals, united in their commitment to freedom and the belief that the future of their freedom depends on freedom flourishing everywhere.³

Over the last forty years, however, Cold War liberals tended to a Manichaean view of world politics. They believed that America had to engage actively in mortal combat with an evil and implacable Soviet foe. The perceived dangers of international communism prompted Cold War liberals to advocate intervention globally in an attempt to prevent regimes even vaguely sympathetic with communist ideals from coming to power.

The reaction to Cold War liberalism was an alternative steeped in the Wilsonian tradition. Issues like the Vietnam War, nuclear strategy and U.S. support for authoritarian regimes split America’s liberal consensus. The generation of

the 1960s saw Vietnam as immoral and a betrayal of the American belief in self-determination. The U.S.-Soviet arms race, too, was judged as a threat to international security, prompting Wilsonian liberals toward international organizations and negotiation as a way out of the nuclear dilemma. Wilsonian liberals railed against American support for authoritarian regimes as a policy that compromised American values respecting human rights and self-determination.

The end of the Cold War finally allowed these competing liberalisms to recombine. The two groups slowly found common ground on respect for human rights, their belief that the internal character of regimes has implications for international peace, and on their support for international organizations to reform, and even sometimes to remove, rogue regimes. Right and left have thus come to agree on the broad outlines of America’s future foreign policy.

The reunion was also made possible by changes in each liberal strain. The horror and revulsion over Vietnam had led the Wilsonian liberals to an almost categorical opposition to American intervention abroad. In 1978, for example, when Senator George McGovern called for international intervention in Cambodia to stop the Khmer Rouge genocide of its own people—anticipating in some ways the thrust of the new interventionism—his former anti-Vietnam allies dismissed him out of hand. The Vietnam analogy was frequently invoked when the question of American military intervention was raised.

Wilsonian liberals had couched much of their opposition to American intervention abroad in terms of respect for national self-determination and support for individual human rights. Yet a contradiction exists between these two goods—respect for national sovereignty may preclude intervention in the face of a government’s horrific violations of the individual and minority rights of its own citizens.

Mounting evidence of the corruption and brutality of many Third World regimes (and rising claims to self-determination in the aftermath of the Cold War) eventually led many

"The new interventionism has its roots in long-standing tendencies of American foreign policy...."
Wilsonian liberals to abandon their commitment to self-determination. By the late 1980s international opinion, which had often served as a brake on the crusading tendencies of American foreign policy, began to concur. A consensus emerged among international lenders that economic and political conditions on aid were necessary for Third World development and government reform. Wilsonian liberals had finally resolved the contradiction between self-determination of peoples and human rights, opting in favor of the latter.

For Cold War liberals, meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union released them from the need to support authoritarian regimes as bulwarks against global communism. They also came to appreciate the potential of international organizations and international law, a shift best explained by apprehensions about the costs of providing order in the post-Cold War era.

As consensus emerged in the 1980s that economic power was the dominant currency of international relations and an important component of national security, Cold War liberals opened to the possibility of a larger U.N. role in security affairs. Collective security, they hoped, could help alleviate America’s crushing defense burden and massive public debt. This new-found courtship, however, has its limits. Former Cold War liberals do not wish to relinquish America’s international leadership. Rather, they see the end of the Cold War as making international organizations more ideologically predisposed to follow the American lead.

The Gulf War’s Errant Example

For the new interventionists the Gulf War is a watershed of international cooperation and consensus. It should, they believe, serve as a model for a new system of global collective security. International order is seen as flowing from the credibility and capability of a unified community of nations, unshackled from ideological polarization, to deter any act of interstate and internal aggression.

Actions taken by the United Nations in response to Iraqi attacks on its Kurdish population are now renowned as setting important precedents. In particular U.N. Security Council resolution 688, which allowed that an act of internal aggression may be deemed a threat to international order, is interpreted as establishing humanitarian intervention in a state’s affairs as a legitimate response of the international community.
Overlooked, however, are the many special circumstances that make the Gulf War an unlikely model for future collective responses. While the war was sanctioned by the United Nations, the military action remained firmly under American command and control. While international forces drove the Iraqi army from Kuwait, the costs of the operation ran upwards of $70 billion. And while U.N. resolution 688 established legal precedent, its practical relevance may be moot: U.N. protective forces entered Iraq only after Operation Desert Storm demolished what was the world’s fourth largest army, thus destroying Iraq’s capacity to resist. In short, humanitarian intervention could work in Iraq because it followed, not preceded, the most successful U.N. peace-enforcement mission ever.

The Gulf War and the subsequent protection of Iraqi Kurds nonetheless provided the basis for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia as well as the legal rationale for the 22,000 U.N. troops providing humanitarian relief in Bosnia. Many new interventionists claim that precedent has been set for peace-enforcement—that is, war—against Serbia and for humanitarian intervention in Liberia and Sudan as well.

But the model of the Gulf War—a limited mandate to fight a conventional war in the vast openness of a desert—may be relevant only to wars involving secession of relatively homogeneous populations in readily defined territories. Rarely does such a situation occur.

**Toward Selective Intervention**

BILL CLINTON comes to the presidency sympathetic to the new interventionism. His election marks the accession to power of a generation intent on making America live up to its professed ideals. But to avoid an increasingly expansive doctrine that risks extending American intervention to all areas of the globe, Clinton must scrutinize the underlying assumptions of the new interventionism.

Foremost, a more realistic perspective of internal state violence would avoid much of the new interventionist hysteria surrounding civil war in the post-Cold War era. Such wars are no more frequent than before. At present there are 18 civil wars; in 1985 there were 19. Civil wars today are no more bloody than those past. The U.S. civil war cost upwards of 600,000 lives; the Spanish civil war of the 1930s and the
Nigerian civil war of the late 1960s killed on similar scales. Today's civil wars should not be expected to be more amenable to negotiation; they will remain among the most difficult conflicts to settle politically. In the twentieth century about 18 percent of civil wars ended with the elimination or unconditional surrender of one party. Moreover, the same percentage of civil wars was settled in the period before the Cold War as during it, suggesting that it is the dynamics of internal conflicts that account for their intractability.

The end of the Cold War peels away but one layer of conflict from civil wars, only to reveal a host of others beneath. While there was a short window where the ending of the Cold War provided the superpowers leverage to settle various disputes such as Angola and El Salvador, the actual end of the Cold War significantly reduces their ability to influence former internal allies.

Nor will outside intervention aimed at defeating recalcitrant warring groups—even if undertaken by the United Nations—prove any more likely to succeed in the post-Cold War era. For example, some new interventionists have insisted that the United Nations use military force to compel the Khmer Rouge to abide by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. But why should the United Nations be expected to succeed where the Vietnamese army, one of world's most disciplined, could not? Likewise, what would enable the United Nations to defeat Angola's UNITA when the Cuban army had failed to do so?

U.N. troops may carry international legitimacy, but internal parties will still command the asymmetries of civil war: parties win by not losing; the will of those who intervene will wane over the long term if resource and human costs run high; and intervention will be one of many commitments for outsiders, whereas internal actors will be singleminded in their dedication. The primary advantage this new era affords for enforcing peace in places like Cambodia or Angola is that the superpowers will no longer equip rival factions. But such factions have already proven adept at maintaining access to weaponry, as
bordering states often have incentive for continuing to arm warring sides.

The guiding principle of the new interventionism—the international community’s obligation to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its people—cannot be enforced consistently. To do so would dictate intervention in every civil war as well as in states with regimes so repressive as to destroy even its incipient threat. Potential cases for intervention far outstrip available resources. Intervention will have to be selective, and a moral principle applied unevenly will leave even well-intended international actors variously open to charges of hypocrisy, cowardice, neglect or self-interest.

Some internal wars are also more threatening to international security than others. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Balkan war place heavy burdens on newly independent east European states undergoing transitions to democracy. Left unchecked, Serbian aggression could advance to Kosovo and Macedonia, raising the specter of broader interstate conflagration. The war in the Balkans is a greater danger to international security than civil wars in Somalia, Liberia or Sudan because it may overwhelm Europe’s political stability and economic productivity, prerequisites for Third World development. Even in Africa, Mozambique’s civil war bears the greater stakes, threatening to flood southern Africa with refugees or to overwhelm South Africa’s tenuous transition to majority rule and economic renewal, which would wreck a boon for the entire continent.

While there may be cause for the United States and United Nations to step into civil war for reasons of international security, the goal of intervention must be clearly defined. Only a combination of coherent strategy, sufficient leverage and a keen sense of timing will allow a third party to bring peace. Most civil wars become amenable to settlement only after they have played themselves out with ferocity. A short-term emphasis on ceasefires may only prolong conflicts and mitigate against parties perceiving that their survival depends on political settlement. While attempting mediation or urging negotiation, third parties may inadvertently prolong conflicts. A decision to try combatants for war crimes, say, may assuage our sense of justice but work against a negotiated end.

Many civil wars may have to be allowed to run an ugly course. Herein lies an irony that clouds the clear morality of
many new interventionists: the possibility that humanitarian assistance may extend war and anarchy rather than end it. Aid to besieged populations, if it assists prolonged resistance, may only end up costing more lives. Likewise, arming a weaker party in the belief that justice calls for a "fair fight" may simply produce a permanent state of war. Fewer lives may be lost if one side wins outright. Moreover, a decisive victory is sometimes the best result, followed by a forward-looking conciliatory peace.

There are no panaceas for internal conflicts. The hope that international intervention in one war will prove a deterrent elsewhere is simply that—a hope, with little evidence to justify it as a proposition and plenty to suggest that domestic tyrants do not learn from other cases. Civil wars and ethnic rivalries have histories and dynamics all their own that diminish the effects of precedents set elsewhere.

Finally preventive diplomacy, while a reasonable expectation for avoiding interstate war, is more difficult for internal conflicts. In the 1980s some analysts predicted that Yugoslavia would collapse into civil war; today one would be hard pressed to find an expert who does not believe Zaire will soon collapse into war as well. Yet such predictions are different from knowing exactly when internal violence will begin. Predicting civil war is akin to predicting earthquakes: analysts know the fault lines running beneath the surface and can provide probabilities and estimate time periods, but they cannot say with any confidence when the big one will strike.

**Recognizing U.N. Costs and Limits**

President Clinton will need a realistic sense of what the United Nations can and cannot do. The United Nations is simply incapable of playing the role that the new interventionists demand of it. Only if used with a prudent sense of its costs and capabilities can the organization play a limited role in bringing peace in the world.

The organization is currently overextended and underfunded. During the last three years it has been involved in 14 peace missions, the same number of missions as undertaken in all its preceding 43 years. The estimated cost of peacekeeping has grown from $750 million in 1991 to $2.9 billion in 1992, of which member nations have contributed only $2 billion, leaving a shortfall of almost $900 million for this year alone.
These figures do not include U.N. commitments to Somalia and Mozambique, which could double U.N. expenses.

The scope of U.N. involvement in civil wars has expanded dramatically. In addition to peacekeeping the United Nations is now expected to extend protection to noncombatants and food convoys, to supervise, monitor and sometimes run elections, to oversee land reform, to document war crimes and, if need be, to provide order when societies and governments break down. The United Nations has somehow taken on a mythic status as the cure for all ills. Yet it has not received the resources necessary to carry out even the tasks it has embarked on already, let alone to meet the open-ended commitments of humanitarian protection called for in Yugoslavia and Somalia.

Despite its expanded role, the United Nations remains wedded to previous doctrines sharply delineating peacekeeping and peace-enforcement on the basis of enemies. In peacekeeping there is no enemy, and success depends on keeping it that way. In peace-enforcement the United Nations determines an aggressor and sets out to defeat or deter it militarily. There is a clear enemy and mission, and the rules of engagement are broader than merely returning fire in self-defense.

Yet recent demands for U.N. intervention in civil wars present dilemmas for U.N. troops, revealing a yawning gap between tried doctrines and newly appointed tasks. In the case of Bosnia, U.N. troops "providing protection" face enemies but lack a mandate to defeat them. In cases of peace-building—acting as referee in certifying elections and monitoring demobilization—U.N. troops may make enemies and eventually need to engage in peace-enforcement. Such is the case in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge refuses to meet treaty commitments and attempts to undermine the peace process. Finally, in Somalia the task of "providing order" could lead to the worst case: enemies on all sides and an open-ended commitment to administering the country.

The United Nations has built-in flaws that cannot be remedied simply by increasing its resources, capabilities and organi-
zation. By its very nature the United Nations is prone to deliberation; that is the essence of a large bureaucracy that purports to represent all peoples of the world. Its strength—the ability to grant international legitimacy to an endeavor—at the same time forms its weaknesses: slowness, inefficiency and the possibility that the national interests of its members will block constructive collective action. A confusion of demands, the need for consensus in decision-making and the tendency toward incremental action rob the United Nations of coherent strategy when approaching intervention.

A review of past operations, however, shows that when a situation calls for classic peacekeeping—agreement between warring parties who have reasonable command and control over those with weapons—the United Nations can do the job. Although U.N. peace-building operations in Cambodia and Angola are at various stages of unraveling, U.N. experience in Namibia and El Salvador shows that the organization can indeed play a key role in ending civil war. Where parties to civil war have reached public agreement on ending hostilities, prompt and decisive action alongside commitment of adequate resources can make the difference. Strengthening U.N. capability to place peacekeeping troops on the ground quickly after settlements are reached would be a major contribution to peace.

The Lessons of Yugoslavia

FROM A STRATEGIC standpoint U.N. intervention in Yugoslavia has been a disaster. No overriding goal or cohesive plan exists. Steps resembling peace-enforcement—no-fly zones and sanctions—are implemented with no mandate to enforce them. Investigation and the threat of war crimes prosecution, which only make sense if the international community deems the war in Bosnia a total war, could work against a mediated settlement. Actions that resemble peacekeeping, such as repeated attempts to create and monitor ceasefires, assist the provision of humanitarian aid but work at cross purposes to the search for a permanent solution, as combatants merely use the pauses to regroup and gain tactical advantage. Measures to protect food and people—including a request to use Belgrade as a shipping depot for deliveries to Bosnia—weaken potential peace-enforcement operations. And provisions for the self-defense of troops protecting convoys and
refugees may lead to de facto peace-enforcement, without the necessary commitment, planning and resources to ensure success.

The new interventionists argue that the lesson of Yugoslavia is that the time for international action is before crises become wars: the United Nations, they say, must improve its tools of preventive diplomacy. They contend that improving U.N. intelligence gathering and establishing a rapid deployment force of 10,000 to 60,000 troops will enable the United Nations to intervene rapidly in crises and to avoid future Bosnias and Somalias.

Yet such proposals skirt the crucial issue. Preventive diplomacy depends on quick, decisive action. Information and tools to respond to crises are necessary but insufficient without a firm decision and the demonstrated will to use them. The ability of the United Nations to respond decisively will always be inferior to the ability of individual states or small groups of states to do so.

The Balkan crisis is telling in this regard. Deterring acts of aggression within states is much more difficult than deterring acts of aggression between states. It should be remembered that at the beginning of the Balkan war there was no Slovenia and no Serbia, but a state called Yugoslavia. Knowing what the world knows now, injecting 30,000 troops between Croatia and Slovenia may have been a good idea. But at that time many in the United Nations desired that Yugoslavia stay Yugoslavia. A decision to inject troops into the conflict would have been seen by many as prejudicing the internal conflict toward a secessionist outcome.

The crises over Slovenia and Croatia made apparent the different strategies among Western powers for avoiding war. Germany argued that quick recognition of those states might prevent war; U.N. special representative Cyrus Vance believed that recognition would increase the possibility. Germany's strategy might have worked if Europe had closed ranks behind it. But coming on the heels of German unification, a united European response was stymied by fears that Germany would dominate European decision-making and that Croatia’s authoritarian past would revive the unseemly prospect of a new German-Croat alliance. There also existed genuine confusion over whether Yugoslavia should be one or many. If Europe could not reach consensus on quick action, how could the United Nations?
Peace-enforcement in the Balkans?

THE UNITED NATIONS has set the stage for peace-enforcement against Serbia, warning that Serbian actions in Kosovo could constitute a threat to international peace. Former Secretary of State George Shultz has urged the use of military force on humanitarian grounds to stop Serbian aggression in Bosnia. Ronald Reagan has called for forming “an army of conscience.” And Western diplomats have discussed a host of specific measures—enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, establishing war crimes tribunals for Serbian leaders, recognizing Macedonia and placing U.N. troops there to act as a trip wire in case of Serbian attack.

Yet peace-enforcement in civil wars requires a clear, compelling case for reasons of international security; humanitarian concerns are not enough. Indeed if humanitarian concerns—measured by deaths and genocidal campaigns—were the justification for military intervention, Bosnia would rank below Sudan, Liberia and East Timor. Serbian thugs are certainly rank amateurs compared to Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge and Mozambique’s RENAMO, both of whom have been accorded international legitimacy in the search for peace.

Peace-enforcement in civil wars is more difficult than peace-enforcement in interstate wars and often requires a long-term presence as an army of occupation. There are no clean civil wars: enemies are rarely concentrated, visible and vulnerable; it is often difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers or enemies and allies, and if one inadvertently confuses the two, soon there are no allies at all.

The war in Bosnia combines a war of secession with an internal war fought among a diverse population. Bosnians are nearly divided in thirds among Croats, Muslims and Serbs. Bosnian Serbs have fought because they do not want to be a minority in a state outside Serbia; Croats and Muslims have fought because they do not want to be minorities within a greater Serbia. It is unclear whether there is unified command and control among Bosnian Serbian militias. According to one count, no less than 19 separate armed groups are engaged.

Peace-enforcement in the Balkans should address the relationship between the conflict and its effects on international security. Action against Serbia should only be to deter aggression against Kosovo and Macedonia, to prevent escalation to interstate war and to weaken Serbia’s capability to carry out
further attacks. U.N. military intervention should not aim to end the war in Bosnia. U.N. troops would find themselves fighting a protracted guerrilla war. The war in Bosnia should be ended politically or militarily by the territory’s various warring groups.

The Pitfalls for President Clinton

The CLINTON foreign policy will likely be marked by competing instincts. A presumption of moral certitude and search for global social redemption may vie with a realistic sense of the limits of American power to bring peace and justice to a world marked by violence, brutality and political disintegration.

The new president inherits from his predecessor few clear guidelines about when and where to intervene militarily. George Bush’s last major speech before leaving office reveals that the former president never resolved whether he was a realist or a liberal. Addressing the cadets at West Point, Bush spoke of America’s moral and spiritual leadership and the threat of tyrants who “ignore the welfare of their own men, women and children.” But he also warned against “universalism” and a perceived need for the United States to react to every “outrage of violence.” The speech could provide grist for those who seek to curtail America’s policing of the world or those who seek to broaden humanitarian intervention by the United States. It did little to quell demands for more forceful action in the Balkans.

If the United States joins in peace-enforcement against Serbia, President Clinton should seek to avoid an “elastic doctrine syndrome.” Foremost, the new president must explain that military intervention is in America’s own interests, that it is necessary to prevent a possibly larger interstate war that may involve NATO allies. Clinton should avoid the temptation of rhetoric that speaks of upholding the rights of peoples everywhere, of supporting the dictates of international morality or of doing, in President Bush’s phrase, “God’s work.”

It will take courage. The American people prefer more lofty reasons to use military force than the unadorned truth that national interests are at stake. If Clinton chooses the rhetoric of the new interventionism, he should be prepared for the next case for intervention that the most vivid television images—depicting a world sharpened, simplified and devoid of
context—thrust to the top of his foreign policy agenda, whether it be Tibet or Tajikistan, Myanmar or Malawi.

It may be, as the new interventionists insist, that the international community has begun to accept the proposition that interests of people come before the interests of states. Such a principle could be a valuable tool for creating a more just and secure world. But carried out absent a sense of limits and of political and economic realism, and if applied according to the dictates of television, rather than the national interests of the United States, not only will this new American foreign policy be unsustainable but the post-Cold War era will likely be more confrontational, conflict-ridden and violent than the one that preceded it.
STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN

World Order
Alchemy for a New
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A defining characteristic of the

Alchemy: Preventive Diplomacy

Outsizing Prevention...
Effective Response

The world of conflict is not just a conflict of the complex structures. It is also a conflict of the complex processes. The outcomes of these processes are the results of the complex interactions of the complex structures. The world of conflict is not just a conflict of the complex structures, it is also a conflict of the complex processes. The outcomes of these processes are the results of the complex interactions of the complex structures.

Signer John Shimkin
[19]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. 1

Alcohol for a New World Order

Steven J. Rubin

[20]
Understanding Preventive Diplomacy

Response

- The challenge is that the understanding of preventive diplomacy is often limited, and its effectiveness is not always clear.

- Preventive diplomacy involves steps such as:
  - Early warning and conflict prevention through early detection of potential conflicts
  - Conflict resolution and peacebuilding
  - Post-conflict reconstruction and development

- The effectiveness of preventive diplomacy depends on:
  - Early detection and response
  - Involvement of multiple stakeholders
  - Adequate resources and funding

- Preventive diplomacy can be strengthened through:
  - International cooperation and dialogue
  - Conflict-sensitive policies and strategies
  - Empowerment of local communities

- The future of preventive diplomacy lies in:
  - Increased awareness and understanding
  - Improved tools and methods for conflict prevention
  - Stronger international commitment
Zimmermann believes, in nationalism but in the national socialism and totalitarianism expressed by racist and militarist Serbs and in their “ethnic cleansing.” The region’s recent conflicts are over the political and constitutional principles on which the post-communist Yugoslavia was to be based. Slovenia and Croatia sought federalism, human rights, multiple parties, and market economies. Simultaneously, however, Serbia and the leadership of the Yugoslav army (JNA) sought to negate these principles.

Contrary to Zimmermann’s analysis, the nationalist and secessionist movements in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia were not the cause but the inevitable consequence of pan-Serbian national socialism. That movement threatened to undermine federal and democratic institutions, prevent multiparty elections, block private ownership, and oppress all non-Serbs.

The causes and motives of these wars are to be found in Serbia, the Serbs, and the JNA. Slobodan Milošević’s national socialist movement, which came to power in 1986, wanted neither federalism nor democracy for Yugoslavia. Its goal was total Serbian domination. For the JNA, Croatian and Slovenian demands for democracy, a market economy, and federalism were the immediate reason for war or a coup. When the new political parties came to power in Slovenia and Croatia, Milošević and his national socialist movement were already prepared for their wars of aggression. As Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulić put it, “The war is not difficult to understand at all. There existed a Serbian political elite determined to start a war; it controlled the army; it controlled the media; and it had four years of systematic nationalist propaganda behind it. This is all it takes to start a war.”

Given the implacably aggressive attitude of the “Greater Serbia” imperialists, the Croatian government tried to prevent aggression first by reducing the potential for ethnic conflict and then by proposing a confederation designed to transform the former Yugoslavia into a commonwealth of sovereign Slavic states. For various reasons, this proposal did not obtain the support of the former Yugoslav republics. The commonwealth proposal was also submitted to representatives of the Bush administration in September 1991, which instead favored unity for communist Yugoslavia, then led by the reformist government of Prime Minister Ante Marković. Unfortunately Marković was, like Zimmermann, less a tragic hero than a loser. As Yugoslavia crumbled, Marković sat quietly on in Belgrade until the last moment, when nobody even noticed his protest resignation.

SLAVEN LETICA
Former Principal Adviser to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman

A THOUSAND RWANDAS
To the Editor:

Stephen John Stedman rightly points out that there are no easy solutions to prevent or stop the internal and regional conflicts that have broken out since the end of the Cold War, and that the resources available for foreign aid and conflict prevention are declining (“Alchemy for a New World Order,” May/June 1995). But despite the lack of simple solutions and scarcity of resources, something can be done. The human and financial costs of man-made disasters are neither acceptable nor inevitable.

Most of the conflicts besetting countries today are internal, but they both
affect and are affected by conditions in neighboring countries. As a result of recent conflicts, 3.2 million refugees have fled Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia. An additional 4 million people are displaced within these countries. During 1994 and the first half of 1995, the United States spent more than $500 million on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

The relief costs of man-made emergencies now vastly outstrip those of natural disasters. But unlike natural disasters, conflicts seldom occur without warning. Economic and social conditions—widespread, deep, and inequitable poverty, rapid population growth, limited resources, growing numbers of youth with inadequate economic prospects, and environmental destruction—render countries vulnerable to breakdown and violence. In addition, arms left over from the Cold War make conflict more likely. In such societies a major shock can provoke an outburst of violence or be used as an excuse for premeditated conflict.

Building economically strong and equitable societies in which all citizens have a stake provides an important hedge against societal breakdown. Among the ingredients for stability are a balance between population growth and resources, healthy and educated citizens, economic opportunity, and resilient and responsive political systems. These are the fundamental elements of the sustainable development program of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Prevention works. Local conflict resolution in South Africa helped avert widespread violence during its transition to a fully democratic government last year.

Collective action by nations in the Sahel since the late 1970s prevented recurring droughts from becoming famines. When the worst drought in 100 years struck southern Africa in 1991 and 1992, preemptive action and regional cooperation averted widespread death by starvation.

Stedman is correct that the declining resources available for foreign assistance—which now amount to less than one percent of the U.S. federal budget—cannot fix the problems of the world. However, development assistance addresses many of the key factors underlying potential conflict. USAID has reduced the number of objectives in its programs and now focuses on five mutually reinforcing strategic areas of development: population, health and nutrition; democracy and governance; economic growth; the environment; and humanitarian assistance. We have also reduced the number of countries that receive foreign assistance.

With the end of the Cold War, we are no longer compelled to prop up corrupt governments for strategic reasons. Hand in hand with efforts to foster sustainable development, we must condemn the abuse of human rights and the self-serving activities of authoritarian leaders or those who incite ethnic hatred.

In the transition phase following conflict, countries may begin to recover or descend into crisis again. That we have seen war and genocide in only a small number of nations in the post–Cold War era is not cause for complacency. One of the problems with preventive diplomacy is that one does not hear or see the results of those efforts as easily as one does the chaos so dramatically portrayed in the media. Nor have the true costs of conflict been analyzed until recently. To turn away
from efforts to prevent future conflict in the world because our resources are limited, because the root causes of conflict are deep, or because the results of prevention do not make headlines is to abdicate U.S. leadership and risk international disorder.

J. BRIAN ATWOOD
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

WEIRD SCIENCE

To the Editor:

In his vituperative defense of preventive diplomacy, Michael S. Lund argues that social science is “pinning down the probable precipitants” of “ethnic warfare, genocide, and the breakdown of states” (“Underrating ‘Preventive Diplomacy,’” July/August 1995). Lund suggests the following indicators: demonstrations, repressive measures, hate rhetoric, arms builds, and separatist communities forming parallel institutions. He accuses me of “knee-jerk negativism” in my critical appraisal of preventive diplomacy (“Alchemy for a New World Order,” May/June 1995).

His argument is wobbly. First, while the outcomes of ethnic warfare and state collapse may often have these precipitants, it is crucial to know how likely the precipitants are to trigger the outcomes. Since many countries score high without experiencing ethnic warfare or state collapse, social science is unfortunately a poor forecaster. Statistical indicators for violence are no substitute for human judgment. Social science will not provide clear prescriptions for policymakers during crises.

Second, assuming Lund’s overall point is correct (that intervention is more effective at early stages when “disputes tend to be simple and singular rather than complex and multiple” and “disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized”), he still needs better indicators. The ones he cites are evidence of full-blown complex disputes and rigidly polarized and politically mobilized groups. According to Lund’s own logic, these indicators do not provide warning early enough for preventive intervention to succeed.

My negativism about this new intellectual fad, hardly knee-jerk, is grounded in realism, which throughout the twentieth century has debunked utopians who ignore the importance of power, offer simplistic prescriptions, endorse social engineering, and privilege themselves from scrutiny by invoking morality and science.

STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN
Associate Professor of African Studies,
School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University
The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda

The need for intervention in Rwanda

The Arusha Accords were signed in 1995 between the government of Rwanda and the various rebel factions. The accords called for an end to the civil war and the establishment of a transitional government. However, the accords were not implemented, and peace was not achieved. This failure has been attributed to a number of factors, including the lack of international support and the failure of the peace process.

The potential for international intervention

International intervention in Rwanda could have played a crucial role in bringing about peace. The international community had the opportunity to prevent the genocide by providing military support to the Rwandan government and by negotiating with the rebel factions. However, the international community failed to take these opportunities, and the result was a devastating civil war.

The failure of the peace process

The peace process in Rwanda was plagued by a number of problems. The government of Rwanda was not willing to negotiate with the rebel factions, and the rebel factions were not willing to accept the terms of the accords. This led to a lack of trust and a lack of willingness to cooperate.

The need for intervention in the future

International intervention in Rwanda has important lessons for the future. It is clear that the international community must be prepared to intervene when there is a risk of genocide or other atrocities. The United Nations must be willing to use its peacekeeping forces to prevent such atrocities from occurring. The international community must also be willing to provide financial and technical support to countries that are struggling to achieve peace.

Overall, the failure of the peace process in Rwanda is a reminder of the importance of international intervention. It is clear that the international community must be prepared to act when there is a risk of genocide or other atrocities. The United Nations must be willing to use its peacekeeping forces to prevent such atrocities from occurring. The international community must also be willing to provide financial and technical support to countries that are struggling to achieve peace.
The pressure on land and resources are extreme. A country of only 23,000 square miles is crowded by over 2.5 million people. Agricultural growth is often poor; food prices are high. The government's efforts to increase food production have been ineffective. The majority of the population is subsistence farmers, with limited access to modern technology and markets. The country suffers from chronic food shortages and malnutrition. The government has implemented policies to increase food production, but progress has been slow.

Background

The Highland Coffee Estate is a major employer in the area. In 1989, the company was founded by a group of local farmers who wanted to improve the quality of their coffee. The estate covers 1,000 acres and produces coffee beans that are sold worldwide. The company has been successful in increasing the quality of its coffee, but the high cost of production has made it difficult to compete with other coffee producers. The estate has faced challenges in recent years, including a decrease in demand for coffee and changes in the global market. The company is currently working on new strategies to improve its profitability and sustainability.

The coffee estate has a long history in the region. It was established in 1912 by a group of Dutch farmers who were looking for a new agricultural venture. The estate was originally used to grow tobacco, but in the 1950s, coffee production became more profitable. The estate has since expanded and diversified its product line, including chocolate and tea. The company is committed to sustainable practices and has implemented programs to reduce its carbon footprint and support local communities.
without further ado...

C. The Determination of the System's素质

The determination of the system's素质 involves a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches. The theoretical framework is grounded in the principles of information theory, particularly the concept of entropy. The empirical component involves the collection and analysis of data through various experimental designs.

1. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for determining the system's素质 is based on the information-theoretic approach, which quantifies the amount of information contained in a system. This approach is particularly useful in understanding complex systems where the relationships between components are not immediately obvious.

2. Empirical Approach

The empirical approach involves the design of experiments to measure the system's behavior under different conditions. These experiments are often guided by hypotheses derived from theoretical models, and the data collected are used to refine these models.

3. Integration of Theoretical and Empirical Components

The integration of theoretical and empirical components is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the system's素质. Theoretical models provide a framework for interpreting the data collected through experiments, while the empirical data help refine these models.

4. Applications

The determination of the system's素质 has applications in various fields, including biology, economics, and engineering. For example, in biology, it can be used to understand the behavior of ecosystems, and in economics, it can help in modeling market dynamics.

5. Challenges

The determination of the system's素质 faces several challenges, including the complexity of systems, the scarcity of data, and the need for advanced computational tools.

6. Future Directions

Future research in this area should focus on developing more robust theoretical frameworks and improving data collection techniques. Additionally, there is a need for interdisciplinary collaboration to address the challenges associated with determining the system's素质.

The determination of the system's素质 is a crucial step in understanding complex systems. It involves a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches and has applications in various fields. However, it also presents several challenges that need to be addressed to advance our understanding further.
Because of its desperate economic situation, Rwanda was unable to participate in the 1981 International Monetary Fund (IMF) conference on redefining the monetary structure of the world. In addition, the impact of the IMF’s conditionality on economic policies in many developing countries, such as South Africa and Argentina, was significant. Rwanda’s failure to participate in the IMF conference reinforced the belief that it was not ready to adopt the international standards of economic management.

The Huwawa Movement, which was led by Paul Kagame, played a crucial role in overthrowing the Rwandan government. The movement was composed of students and other dissidents who had grown disillusioned with the government’s policies. They organized protests and eventually launched a successful coup in 1994, leading to the fall of the government.

The independence of Rwanda was a significant milestone in the country’s history. It marked the end of a period of conflict and the beginning of a new era of peace and stability. However, the challenges of rebuilding the country were enormous, and it took many years of hard work and dedication to achieve this goal.
position, the resistance of the floodplain along the river's edge, and the impact of increased runoff from upstream developments. These factors have combined to exacerbate flooding and erosion along the river in recent years, leading to increased property damage and public safety concerns.

In my opinion, the solution lies in a comprehensive approach that includes both structural and non-structural measures. Structural solutions, such as the construction of levees and other flood control structures, can provide immediate relief. However, they may not be sustainable in the long term due to maintenance costs and potential environmental impacts.

On the other hand, non-structural measures, such as floodplain management policies and public education programs, can help mitigate the effects of flooding and reduce the risk associated with it. These measures can be implemented at a lower cost than structural solutions and can be more effective in the long term.

In conclusion, a multi-faceted approach that integrates both structural and non-structural measures is necessary to address the flooding issue along the river. This approach should be backed by a strong commitment from all stakeholders, including local governments, residents, and the private sector, to ensure its successful implementation and long-term sustainability.
The premise that the coal depletion discovered at the Mathura landing was essential for the RPM's
monitoring of the different levels of the coal seams was not valid. As depleted and monitored, the RPM was
meant to track the coal depletion and be a monitoring tool to help the mine.

The RPM was designed to provide background information and not to be used for monitoring the coal depletion. It was
intended to assist the mine in understanding the depletion pattern on the coal seams in the mine. The RPM was not
designed to provide a detailed monitoring tool for the mine.

The RPM's role was to provide a general overview of the coal depletion, not to be a detailed monitoring tool. It was
meant to give the mine an idea of the coal depletion pattern, not to be a detailed monitoring tool.

The RPM was not designed to be a detailed monitoring tool. It was meant to provide a general overview of the coal
deployment pattern to help the mine understand the depletion pattern on the coal seams in the mine.
The environment included the most controversial issue, the armed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Administration were heavily involved. The process had gained sufficient momentum, especially in the wake of the events.
The procedural documentation from U.S. participation were primarily a few paragraphs. The discussion followed up on the events described in the preceding paragraphs. The discussion also outlined the next steps in the process. The final paragraph emphasized the importance of understanding the implications of the actions taken.

Analysis

Modern history, the largest and most complete decision document, was...
more resources, the U.S. team would have been able to allocate more personnel to the talks; for example, someone could have been present during the December and January power-sharing talks. While discussing the above points, U.S. participants also noted that the United States purposefully took a less active role so as not to undermine the Tanzanian and OAU mediators.

Crucial to any mediation is good intelligence. Members of the observer community and the academic literature have suggested that those who mediated and implemented the Arusha Accords needed better information. In hindsight the warning signs appear clear, but for many participants at that time the magnitude of the impending crisis was not apparent. Participants and members of the RPF remember dismissing RTLMC precisely because it was so literal and extreme. For some, the January massacres were interpreted as a negotiating tactic. In addition, there was a belief that some killings were the inevitable result of transition. Part of the problem may also have arisen because of the dramatically different atmospheres that existed in Arusha and Kigali. For example, when the Accords were signed, no celebration occurred in the Rwandan capital. Instead the city was dominated by a state of fear, especially acute among the Tutsi population.

The human rights community had been documenting the efforts of the extremists and the disturbing trend they represented. Tragically, what almost no one anticipated before early 1994 were the brutally inhumane lengths to which the extremists were willing to go in their desperate bid to retain power. There are strong arguments that a robust response by the international community could have stopped the killings before they spread throughout the country. What happened instead was that the United Nations, after having insisted on unilateral control, simply withdrew. The civilians, who were being killed by the thousands each day, were abandoned to their fate. Although UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was perhaps trying to spread the blame, his outrage about the world’s inaction was shared by many:

We are all to be held accountable for this failure, all of us, the great powers, African countries, the NGOs, the international community. It is a genocide. . . . I have failed. . . . It is a scandal.

Conclusion

The Arusha Accords stand as a testament to the strength of and the implicit danger represented by third-party intervention. They indicate that even the most carefully crafted resolution is not complete until implemented. They underscore the deep responsibility of third parties to maintain their full commitment once having accepted the burden of involvement. Especially for small countries, the international community has the power to dramatically alter the course of events. International powers must remain fully cognizant that partial efforts are likely worse than no efforts at all.

South Africa: The Negotiated Transition from Apartheid to Nonracial Democracy

Peter Bouckaert

Overview

The South African case is exceptional in that the parties completely renegotiated their political system with only a minimum of outside intervention and no formal external mediation process. Even though the international community had acted for years against apartheid in South Africa, there was no externally led mediation effort in South Africa during the 1990–94 negotiation period, and the international community remained interested but largely unentangled observers in the negotiation process. The decision of the international community to remain on the sidelines, while offering logistical support and occasional focused intervention (such as Cyrus Vance’s mission under the auspices of the United Nations and the UN observer group that followed), was a conscious and appropriate decision, and one that actually aided the parties in reaching their own solution.

In addition to the heroic stature of Mandela and de Klerk, the keys to the success of this remarkable transition were a strong civil society (fostered with help from the international community); a public peace process in which a myriad of public meetings helped generate support for political change; strategic use of help offered by the United Nations and others at key points in the talks; and the establishment of independent, objective structures like the Goldstone Commission to ensure successful implementation of the negotiated agreements. This chapter also highlights how a spoiler group, in this case the Inkatha Freedom
Overview

Mediation, Emergency and Humanitarian Interventions

Mediation and the Bosnia Crisis

From Lisbon to Dayton: International Negotiations

2
Time

The French Revolution had a significant impact on the political landscape of Europe. The ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity spread across the continent, inspiring revolutions in other countries.

In December 1791, the National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which laid out the fundamental principles of the French Revolution. These principles were later incorporated into the Constitution of 1793.

The revolution's influence extended beyond France, influencing the political systems of other countries. The revolution's ideals of liberty and equality continue to shape modern democratic societies.
mediation occurs through the mediator’s role in facilitating communication between the conflicting parties. The mediator helps the parties to express their views, understand each other’s perspectives, and find common ground. Through active listening and questioning, the mediator encourages the parties to engage in a constructive dialogue. The mediator acts as a neutral facilitator, ensuring that the process remains fair and impartial. This role involves maintaining confidentiality and ensuring that the process respects the dignity and rights of all participants. The mediator’s goal is to facilitate a genuine and meaningful dialogue, leading to a resolution that is agreed upon by both parties.

In summary, mediation is a powerful tool for resolving disputes while preserving relationships. It allows parties to have a voice and be heard, fostering a collaborative environment. By working together under the guidance of an impartial mediator, parties can achieve a mutually acceptable solution that addresses their concerns.

References:

Further Reading:

Appendix:
- Case Study: Mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East Peace Process (2019).
- Principles of Mediation, Mediation Network (2020).

Note: This information is based on public domain sources and is provided for educational purposes only.
The efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society in providing humanitarian assistance and relief in times of conflict and natural disasters.

In addition to seeking policy and humanitarian assistance and the manipulation of forces and resources in conflict zones, the ICRC is also committed to advocating for and implementing measures that promote international law and human rights in situations of armed conflict. This includes providing legal aid and representation to individuals affected by conflict, as well as working to ensure that the principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality are upheld in all operations.

Under these principles, the ICRC is able to provide assistance to victims of armed conflict, including medical aid, food, shelter, and water. The organization also works to prevent the use of child soldiers and to ensure that those who have been conscripted or forced into military service are released and provided with the necessary assistance to reintegrate into society.

The ICRC places a strong emphasis on the protection of civilians, particularly women and children, in times of conflict. This includes providing information and training to military personnel on the laws of war and the rights of individuals affected by armed conflict.

In conclusion, the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society are crucial in providing humanitarian assistance and relief in times of conflict and natural disasters. Through their commitment to advocating for international law and human rights, the ICRC works to ensure that those affected by conflict are able to live in dignity and safety.
From this viewpoint, the government's role in the economy is crucial. By adopting an economic strategy that promotes growth and stability, the government can ensure that the economy remains robust and prosperous. This involves setting policies that encourage investment and trade, while also regulating to prevent excessive market manipulation. Additionally, the government must be transparent and accountable in its decision-making processes, ensuring that the public trust is maintained. In this way, the government can foster an environment that is conducive to economic success, ultimately benefiting all citizens.

Another important aspect of economic policy is the management of fiscal and monetary policy. The government must balance the budget to prevent inflation and ensure economic stability. It is also essential to maintain a strong currency and implement policies that promote international trade. By doing so, the government can ensure that the economy remains competitive and attractive to investors.

In conclusion, economic policies are vital to the success of the government. They must be carefully crafted and implemented to ensure that the economy remains healthy and prosperous. By focusing on growth, stability, transparency, and accountability, the government can create an environment that fosters economic success and benefits all citizens.

In summary, the government's role in the economy is crucial for its success. By adopting an economic strategy that promotes growth, stability, and transparency, the government can ensure that the economy remains robust and prosperous. This involves setting policies that encourage investment and trade, while also regulating to prevent excessive market manipulation. Additionally, the government must be transparent and accountable in its decision-making processes, ensuring that the public trust is maintained. In this way, the government can foster an environment that is conducive to economic success, ultimately benefiting all citizens.
The Commission-Culture Mediation, March 1992

realization efforts seemed to have been made for peaceful resolution by the government's own Peace Talks Panel. However, these efforts have been undermined by the government's own policies, which continue to fuel the conflict. The government's failure to address the root causes of the conflict and its continued violation of human rights have only served to exacerbate the situation.

In the case of Bosnia, the conflict has been fueled by a combination of external factors, including political and ethnic divisions, as well as economic and social inequalities. The government's own policies have only served to deepen these divisions, further complicating the situation.

In conclusion, the government's failure to address the root causes of the conflict and its continued violation of human rights have only served to exacerbate the situation. The government must take immediate action to address these issues and work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Under the Joint Security Area, there were a few key players. The United Nations Command, primarily the ROK and ROK forces, had a strong role. The Korean government had a consistent policy and stance on the peace process.

The proposed resolution, Resolution 781, had three key points:

1. The presence of the United Nations Command in the DMZ to provide security guarantees.
2. The establishment of a joint military commission to monitor the peace process.
3. The withdrawal of all foreign military forces from the DMZ.

Despite these points, the situation on the Korean peninsula remained tense. The presence of foreign military forces continued to be a source of concern, especially for the ROK. The South Korean government was particularly concerned about the presence of American forces in the DMZ, which it perceived as a threat to its sovereignty.

In response, the United Nations Command agreed to begin a phased withdrawal of its forces from the DMZ. This withdrawal would be monitored by a joint military commission, which would report to the Security Council of the UN. The withdrawal was scheduled to be completed by the end of September 1993.

The Venetian Peace Plan was seen as a significant step towards peace on the Korean peninsula. It was also seen as a test of the United Nations’ ability to mediate and bring about a peaceful resolution to the Korean conflict.
The issue in Bosnia...

The Dayton Agreement...
The United States faced a critical role in the failure of the Vare-Wagner Public Works Administration (PWA) program during the Great Depression. This program aimed to create jobs and stimulate the economy by providing public works projects. However, the program faced several challenges.

Firstly, the program encountered difficulties in the allocation of funds. The initial $3.3 billion was not sufficient to meet the demand for work-relief projects from various parts of the country.

Secondly, the program faced delays in the execution of projects. The process of selecting and implementing projects was slow, which hampered the job creation efforts.

Thirdly, the program encountered scrutiny over its spending and accountability. Critics argued that the program was inefficient and that funds were being mishandled.

Despite these challenges, the Vare-Wagner PWA program played a crucial role in providing employment and economic relief during the Great Depression. Its failure highlights the complexities of implementing large-scale public works programs.
The military situation in Bosnia continued to worsen by mid-1999, the United Nations mission was slow to produce meaningful results. There was increasing frustration that the UN was not able to achieve its goals.

Key Factors in Shaping the Result

The UN peacekeeping mission was a reaction to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was established to provide a safe environment for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to live in peace and security. However, the mission was not able to achieve its goals.

The mission was hampered by a number of factors. First, the mission lacked the necessary resources to carry out its mandate. Second, the mission was often forced to operate in environments that were not conducive to peacekeeping. Third, the mission was often criticized for its lack of effectiveness.

Overall, the mission was not able to achieve its goals. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to worsen, and the UN peacekeeping mission was ultimately unable to bring an end to the war.
The Washington Framework Agreement and the Mission-Corridor Concept

The Washington Framework Agreement was signed in May 1990, and it provided a basis for the establishment of the Mission-Corridor Concept. This concept was designed to facilitate the deployment of U.S. military forces into Europe and to establish a framework for the eventual withdrawal of such forces. The agreement was based on a series of principles, including the commitment of the United States to provide military assistance to NATO allies, the willingness of NATO allies to accept U.S. forces on their territory, and the establishment of a joint planning and coordination process.

The Mission-Corridor Concept involved the creation of corridors or pathways for the movement of military forces through the United States and NATO allies. These corridors were designed to provide a rapid and flexible means for the deployment of forces in response to potential threats. The concept also included provisions for the coordination of military exercises and training activities, as well as the establishment of joint command and control arrangements.

The Washington Framework Agreement and the Mission-Corridor Concept were significant milestones in the process of adapting the U.S. military posture to the challenges of the post-Cold War era. They represented a shift away from the traditional reliance on large-scale, conventional military forces and towards a more flexible and adaptive approach to military strategy. The concepts were designed to provide a framework for the deployment of forces in a more rapid and efficient manner, while also facilitating the development of closer military and strategic cooperation among NATO allies.

The Washington Framework Agreement and the Mission-Corridor Concept continue to be important elements of U.S. defense policy and military strategy. They have played a crucial role in shaping the evolution of NATO and the U.S. military posture in the 21st century.
The Contact Group Plan: The 31 Percent-Foccer Situation

Wealth Lessons, Experiences, and Mechanisms

The Contact Group Plan: The 31 Percent-Foccer Situation

Wealth Lessons, Experiences, and Mechanisms

The Contact Group Plan: The 31 Percent-Foccer Situation

Wealth Lessons, Experiences, and Mechanisms
In the first stage, the President would receive a detailed briefing and then make a decision on whether to approve or reject the proposed declaration. If approved, the President would then present it to Congress, which would have to ratify it. The process is subject to strict legal and procedural requirements, ensuring that it is transparent and accountable. The ultimate goal is to create a stable and predictable framework for managing the relationship between the two countries.
On October 4, President Clinton appeared holding the conference in his hands. Citing President Clinton's efforts, the agreement was signed. However, the agreement was not without controversy, as the United States' demands were not fully met.

### From and Specific Mechanisms of Interrogation

- **Cabinet of the Federal Council**
  - The cabinet of the Federal Council was formed on December 28, 1995, with the re-election of President Clinton.
  - The new cabinet included a number of important figures, including the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.
  - The cabinet was tasked with implementing the provisions of the agreement.

### Conclusion

The agreement was signed on October 4, 1995, and was seen as a major step forward in the conflict. However, the implementation of the agreement was slow, and tensions between the United States and the coalition remained high.

---

Joseph Kravitz, a peace expert, has stated that the United States will need to be careful in its approach to the conflict. "The United States must be cautious in its approach, as it is not in the best interests of the United States to rush into a new conflict."
The selection of information is the initial step in developing a strategy to address the issues.

A critical component of the strategy must be a comprehensive, well-defined plan for the implementation of the selected information.

This plan should include:

1. Identification of the key stakeholders and their roles.
2. Development of a timeline for the implementation.
3. Definition of the resources required for the implementation.
4. Development of a communication strategy for the stakeholders.
5. Establishment of metrics for measuring the success of the implementation.

The plan should be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure its effectiveness.

In addition to the implementation plan, the strategy should also include:

1. A risk management plan to identify potential risks and develop mitigation strategies.
2. A contingency plan to address unexpected events.
3. A feedback mechanism for ongoing evaluation and improvement.

By integrating these components into the strategy, the organization can ensure a successful implementation of the selected information.
Form of Information flows from the perspective of the United Nations, the World Bank, and experts in international law.

**Getting in Agreement**

As Hoehnkle says, "We need a clear agreement on what the principles are, what the objectives are, and how we will measure success.

The conference examined the principles agreed upon, the agend of the conference and the objectives agreed upon.

---

27 November 1974, Hoehnkle described the process from his perspective in a press conference:

"Hoehnkle says the conference was a failure. He feels it failed on all fronts. The conference ended without agreement on a single issue. The conference failed because of lack of participation from the UN and other agencies."
The role of international law and nongovernmental organizations

Trends in which the international legal space was redefined to
shape not only the peculiarities of the international landscape
but also to push the boundaries of international law and
governance. The emergence of new institutions and processes,
along with the expansion of the legal framework of the
UN, has led to the development of new forms of legal
mediation and cooperation, including in the fields of
democracy promotion, human rights protection, and
cultural diversity. This development has been accompanied
by the proliferation of international organizations and
groups, which have become increasingly involved in
the regulation of various aspects of international law.

War Crimes, Genocide, and the War Crimes Tribunal

Reflections on the impact of the war crimes
tribunal on the protection of human rights
and the promotion of international law.

From Lebanon to the Bosnian War

The evolution of the international legal
framework in the context of conflict in
the Middle East and the Balkans.

World Café: Dialogue and the World Coffee Club

Suggestions for the future of international
law and the role of cutting-edge
thinking in the field.

Ad hoc Criminal Tribunals: An Experiment in
International Justice

The creation and functioning of the
International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

International Criminal Tribunal

The establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

International Criminal Tribunal

The establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

International Criminal Tribunal

The establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
The true story was never intended to stay hidden when the
secret service released the original document.

"Truthful under the rule, the record is erroneous. The
commission must also be equally accurate. In
contradictory circumstances, the position of the
secret service is clear. This case is pressing and
pressing because the questions raised are
fundamental."

From: John Doe, Commissioner of the Secret Service

"Proposed: Could the War Have Been Stopped Earlier?"

"This is the true story of the war, and the
questions must be asked."

From: John Doe, Commissioner of the Secret Service

The announcement of the Interdepartmental
Provisional Council, as a part of the
Interdepartmental Council's declaration of war,
was met with immediate opposition from some
of the Interdepartmental Council's members.

The Interdepartmental Council's members
opposed the Interdepartmental Council's
opposition to the war, and the Interdepartmental
Council's opposition to the war was met with
immediate opposition from some of the
Interdepartmental Council's members.

The Interdepartmental Council's members
opposed the Interdepartmental Council's
opposition to the war, and the Interdepartmental
Council's opposition to the war was met with
immediate opposition from some of the
Interdepartmental Council's members.

The Interdepartmental Council's members
opposed the Interdepartmental Council's
opposition to the war, and the Interdepartmental
Council's opposition to the war was met with
immediate opposition from some of the
Interdepartmental Council's members.
The new generation of entrepreneurs is challenging the traditional business models and creating a more dynamic and innovative economy. The rapid growth of technology and the emergence of new industries are creating opportunities for positive change.

Innovation is key to driving economic growth. Companies that are able to adapt and evolve quickly are more likely to succeed in today's fast-paced business environment. This requires a culture of continuous learning and a willingness to take risks.

Furthermore, fostering a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation within educational institutions is crucial. By providing students with the tools and resources they need to succeed, we can help ensure a steady stream of talented and innovative individuals to fill the workforce.

Governments and stakeholders should work together to create an environment that is conducive to innovation and entrepreneurship. This includes investing in infrastructure, education, and research, as well as providing support for small businesses and start-ups.

In conclusion, the future of the economy is bright if we continue to prioritize innovation and entrepreneurship. By fostering a culture of continuous learning and collaboration, we can ensure a bright and prosperous future for all.

References:
Conclusion

The successful implementation of the European Union's (EU) Ifor (Integrated Military Operation) and the NATO-led Operation Atalanta have been crucial in reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia. The success of these operations has shown the importance of international cooperation and the effectiveness of military interventions.

Recommendations:

1. Increase diplomatic efforts to address the root causes of piracy.
2. Strengthen international coordination and sharing of intelligence.
3. Enhance capacity-building and training for local authorities.
4. Explore economic development programs in affected regions.
5. Continue to monitor and adjust strategies as necessary.

In conclusion, the collaboration between the EU and NATO demonstrates the power of joint military operations in tackling complex security challenges.

From https://www.history.nato.int/.../summary-of-the-mission