Appendix to “Military Alliances and Public Support for War”

Table of Contents

I. YouGov Survey: Questions and Sampling ................................................................. 3
   Randomized Treatments .......................................................................................... 3
   Text of the Experiment ......................................................................................... 4
   Attitudinal Controls .............................................................................................. 10
   Demographic Controls ......................................................................................... 12
   Political Interest and Activity .............................................................................. 13
   YouGov Sampling ................................................................................................. 14

II. YouGov Survey: Additional Analyses ................................................................. 15
   Figure 1: Effect of Alliances (As in the Article) ...................................................... 15
   Figure 2: Effect of Alliances, Weighted ................................................................. 15
   Figure 3: Effect of Alliances on a Five-Point Scale ................................................ 16
   Figure 4: Effect of Alliances on a Five-Point Scale, Weighted ............................... 16
   Figure 5: Effect of Alliances, By Region ............................................................... 17
   Figure 6: Effect of Alliances on People with High Political Interest ...................... 18
   Figure 7: Effect of Alliances on People with Low Political Interest ...................... 18
   Figure 8: Effect of Alliances on People Who Had High Political Activity .......... 19
   Figure 9: Effect of Alliances on People Who Did Not Have High Political Activity 19
   Figure 10: Effect of Alliances on Democrats ....................................................... 20
   Figure 11: Effect of Alliances on Independents .................................................... 20
   Figure 12: Effect of Alliances on Republicans ..................................................... 20
   Figure 13: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Linear Model) ............... 22
   Figure 14: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Probit Model) ............... 22

III. Lucid Survey: Questions and Sampling ............................................................... 23

IV. Lucid Survey: Additional Analyses .................................................................... 25
   Figure 15: Effect of Alliances on Support for War ............................................... 25
   Figure 16: Effect of Alliances on Support for War (Five-Point Scale) ................... 25
   Figure 17: Effect of Alliances, by Region .............................................................. 25
   Figure 18: Effects of All Treatments on Support for War ..................................... 26
   Figure 19: Support for War With and Without Alliances ..................................... 26
   Figure 20: Effect of Alliances, by Context ............................................................ 27
   Figure 21: Effect of Alliances, by Underlying Support for War ............................ 27
   Figure 22: Effects of Alliances on Mediators ....................................................... 28
   Figure 23: Effects of Mediators on Support for War ............................................. 28
   Figure 24: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms ....................................................... 28
   Figure 25: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Linear Model) ............. 29
   Figure 26: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Probit Model) ............... 29
   Figure 27: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (As in the Article) 30
   Figure 28: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Potential Outcomes) 30
Figure 29: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Democrats) ................................................. 31
Figure 30: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Democrats) .................................. 31
Figure 31: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Democrats) .......................... 31
Figure 32: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Independents) ........................................... 32
Figure 33: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Independents) ............................... 32
Figure 34: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Independents) ....................... 32
Figure 35: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Republicans) ........................................... 33
Figure 36: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Republicans) ............................... 33
Figure 37: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Republicans) ....................... 33
Figure 38: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Liberals) .................................................. 34
Figure 39: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Liberals) ....................................... 34
Figure 40: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Morality (Liberals) ............................................ 34
Figure 41: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Moderates) ............................................. 35
Figure 42: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Moderates) ................................. 35
Figure 43: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Morality (Moderates) ....................................... 35
Figure 44: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Conservatives) ........................................ 36
Figure 45: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Conservatives) ............................ 36
Figure 46: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Morality (Conservatives) ................................... 36
I. YouGov Survey: Questions and Sampling

Randomized Treatments

We randomized five features of the scenario.

Alliance:

- *alliance*: Does not have a military alliance with the U.S.
  *alliance_text*: blank

  — OR —

- *alliance*: Has a written military alliance agreement with the U.S.
  *alliance_text*: As noted, the country that was attacked has a written military alliance with the U.S. The agreement, which was signed and ratified three years ago, says: “If one member of the alliance is attacked, the other member will take all necessary actions, including the use of armed force, to defend its ally.”

Stakes:

- If the attacker succeeds in taking part of the other country, this would weaken U.S. military security and hurt the U.S. economy. — OR —
- If the attacker succeeds in taking part of the other country, this would neither weaken U.S. military security nor hurt the U.S. economy.

Costs:

- The U.S. military could stop the invasion, but the military operation would be very costly to the United States. — OR —
- The U.S. military could stop the invasion, and the military operation would not be very costly to the United States.

Regime: Democracy — OR — Not a democracy

Region: Africa — OR — Asia — OR — Eastern Europe — OR — South America
TEXT OF THE EXPERIMENT

There’s a lot of talk these days about U.S. relations with other countries in the world. We’d like to get your thoughts about a situation our country could face in the future. The situation is general, and is not about a specific country in the news today. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant. After describing the situation, we will ask your opinion about a policy option.

—new page—

The leader of a country in [region] wanted more power and resources, so he sent his military to attack another country in [region] and take part of that country’s territory. Here are some facts about the two countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The country that attacked</th>
<th>The country that was attacked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of government</strong></td>
<td>Not a democracy</td>
<td>[regime]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared interests?</strong></td>
<td>Does not share many interests with the U.S.</td>
<td>Shares many interests with the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance with the U.S.?</strong></td>
<td>Does not have a military alliance with the U.S.</td>
<td>[alliance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

❑ Click here after you have read this page carefully.

—new page—

[alliance_text] [stakes]

[costs]

❑ Click here after you have read this page carefully.

—new page—
Just to review...

The leader of a country in [region] wanted more power and resources, so he sent his military to attack another country in [region] and take part of that country’s territory. Here are some additional facts about the countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Shared interests?</strong></td>
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<td>Shares many interests with the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance with the U.S.?</strong></td>
<td>Does not have a military alliance with the U.S.</td>
<td>[alliance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[alliance_text] [stakes]

[costs]

**Do you favor or oppose sending the U.S. military to stop the invasion?**

- Favor strongly
- Favor somewhat
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Oppose somewhat
- Oppose strongly

——new page——
Here is the situation again, for your reference.

The leader of a country in [region] wanted more power and resources, so he sent his military to attack another country in [region] and take part of that country’s territory. Here are some additional facts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared interests?</strong></td>
<td>Does not share many interests with the U.S.</td>
<td>Shares many interests with the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance with the U.S.?</strong></td>
<td>Does not have a military alliance with the U.S.</td>
<td>[alliance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[alliance_text] [stakes]

[costs]

**We would like your opinions about what might happen if the U.S. does not send its military to stop the invasion. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.**

If the U.S. does not send its military, other countries will doubt America's willingness to honor military alliance agreements in the future.

- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

—new page—
Here is the situation again, for your reference.

The leader of a country in [region] wanted more power and resources, so he sent his military to attack another country in [region] and take part of that country’s territory. Here are some additional facts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared interests?</strong></td>
<td>Does not share many interests with the U.S.</td>
<td>Shares many interests with the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance with the U.S.?</strong></td>
<td>Does not have a military alliance with the U.S.</td>
<td>[alliance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[alliance_text] [stakes]

[costs]

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

If the U.S. does not send its military, other countries will doubt America’s willingness to honor non-military agreements in areas such as trade or the environment.

☐ Agree strongly
☐ Agree somewhat
☐ Neither agree nor disagree
☐ Disagree somewhat
☐ Disagree strongly

—new page—
Here is the situation one last time, for your reference.

The leader of a country in [region] wanted more power and resources, so he sent his military to attack another country in [region] and take part of that country’s territory. Here are some additional facts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The country that attacked</th>
<th>The country that was attacked</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of government</strong></td>
<td>Not a democracy</td>
<td>[regime]</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Shared interests?</strong></td>
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<td>Shares many interests with the U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance with the U.S.?</strong></td>
<td>Does not have a military alliance with the U.S.</td>
<td>[alliance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[alliance_text] [stakes]

[costs]

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

The U.S. has a moral obligation to send its military to defend the country that was attacked.

- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

—new page—
Which of the following statements best describes the situation we presented?

The situation took place in …
- Africa
- Asia
- Eastern Europe
- South America

The country that was attacked was …
- A democracy
- Not a democracy

The country that was attacked …
- Did not have a military alliance with the U.S
- Had a written military alliance with the U.S.

We said that, if the attacker succeeds in taking part of the other country …
- this would weaken U.S. military security and hurt the U.S. economy.
- this would neither weaken U.S. military security nor hurt the U.S. economy.

We said that the U.S. military could stop the invasion …
- but the military operation would be very costly to the United States.
- and the military operation would not be very costly to the United States.
ATTITUDINAL CONTROLS

To measure militarism, we coded responses to the following item to go from 0 to 1, such that larger values represented more militaristic attitudes.

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “The use of military force only makes problems worse.”
- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

To measure internationalism, we coded responses to the following item to go from 0 to 1, such that higher values indicated higher support for a U.S. role abroad.

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.”
- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

To measure nationalism, we coded answers to each of the following two questions from 0 to 1, such that larger values indicated greater nationalist sentiment. We then created an index by averaging the two items.

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with these statements:
"In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others."
- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

"I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world."
- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly
To measure affinity for the Republican Party, we used a branched set of questions about party identification to produce scale with seven levels, from 0 (Strong Democrat) to 7 (Strong Republican).

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a….
- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other (open textbox)
- Not sure

If Democrat:
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat

If Republican:
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
- Strong Republican
- Not very strong Republican

If Independent or Other:
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?
- The Democratic Party
- The Republican Party
- Neither
- Not sure
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS

We used the following question to generate a dummy variable for whether the subject was male.

Are you male or female?
- Male
- Female

We used the following question to generate a dummy variable for whether the subject was white.

What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
- White
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Asian or Asian-American
- Native American
- Middle Eastern
- Mixed Race
- Other [Type in race ________________]

We used the following question to compute the respondent’s age in years, and then (to facilitate presentation) rescaled the data to represent age in centuries.

In what year were you born?

We used the following question to measure education, which we coded such that 0 = High school or less; .33 = Some college; .67 = Four-year college degree; 1 = Post-graduate degree.

What is the highest level of school you have completed?
- Did not graduate from high school
- High school graduate
- Some college, but no degree (yet)
- 2-year college degree
- 4-year college degree
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)
POLITICAL INTEREST AND ACTIVITY

To measure political interest, we coded answers to the following question from 1 to 4, such that larger values indicated greater interest in politics. Respondents were classified as having a high level of political interest if they answered that they followed government and public affairs “most of the time.”

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?

- Most of the time
- Some of the time
- Only now and then
- Hardly at all
- Don't know

We used the following question to measure costly political activity. Respondents were classified as having a high level of political activity if they did any of the first four items on the list.

During the past year did you ... (Please check all that apply)
- Attend local political meetings (such as school board or city council)
- Put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or a bumper sticker)
- Work for a candidate or campaign
- Donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization
- Donate blood
- None of these
YOUGOV SAMPLING

The field period for the YouGov survey was April 7–29, 2017. YouGov interviewed 1,388 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 1,200 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). Data on voter registration status and turnout were matched to this frame using the November 2010 Current Population Survey. Data on interest in politics and party identification were then matched to this frame from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and ideology. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.
II. **YOUGov Survey: Additional Analyses**

**Figure 1: Effect of Alliances (As in the Article)**

![Graph showing the effect of alliances on support for war.]

**Figure 2: Effect of Alliances, Weighted**

![Graph showing the effect of alliances, weighted.]

*Note: Observations were weighted using sampling weights provided by YouGov.*
Figure 3: Effect of Alliances on a Five-Point Scale

Note: Respondents were asked: “Do you favor or oppose sending the U.S. military to stop the invasion?” For this figure, the dependent variable was 0 if oppose strongly, 1 if oppose somewhat, 2 if neither favor nor oppose, 3 if favor somewhat, and 4 if favor strongly.

Figure 4: Effect of Alliances on a Five-Point Scale, Weighted

Note: Same as Figure 3, but observations were weighted using sampling weights provided by YouGov.
Figure 5: Effect of Alliances, By Region

Note: Sample sizes were 335 for Africa, 302 for Asia, 273 for Eastern Europe, and 290 for South America.
Figure 6: Effect of Alliances on People with High Political Interest

Note: This figure pertains to the 624 respondents who said they follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time.

Figure 7: Effect of Alliances on People with Low Political Interest

Note: This figure pertains to the 567 respondents who did not say that they followed what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time.
Figure 8: Effect of Alliances on People Who Had High Political Activity

Note: This figure pertains to the 441 respondents who did at least one of the following in the past year: attended local political meetings (such as school board or city council); put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or a bumper sticker); work for a candidate or campaign; or donated money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization.

Figure 9: Effect of Alliances on People Who Did Not Have High Political Activity

Note: This figure pertains to the 759 respondents who did not report doing any of the activities mentioned in Figure 8.
Figure 10: Effect of Alliances on Democrats

Note: Pertains to 475 respondents who identified with the Democratic Party.

Figure 11: Effect of Alliances on Independents

Note: Pertains to 430 who did not identify as Democrat or Republican.

Figure 12: Effect of Alliances on Republicans

Note: Pertains to 295 respondents who identified with the Republican Party.
Causal Mediation

In the paper, we estimated the strength of each causal pathway by computing the product of regression coefficients (Baron and Kenny 1986). This method is easy to understand and useful for models with multiple mediators. Other methods have been gaining traction in political science, including work by Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011) that situates causal mediation within a potential-outcomes framework. To assess the robustness of our findings, we adapted the Imai et al. approach to our unique experimental design: a model with three mediators.

When all the models are linear, the potential outcomes approach should produce the same conclusions as the simpler product-of-coefficients method. When some models are nonlinear, however, the estimates could diverge. To assess the robustness of our findings, we first apply the potential outcomes framework in a purely linear setting, and then apply it to a nonlinear setting that uses probit regression to analyze a dichotomous version of our dependent variable.

As expected, the two approaches agreed when all models were linear (Figure 13), but differed slightly when we used a nonlinear probit regression (Figure 14). In the latter case, the estimated importance of the military reputation pathway decreased from 57 to 49 percent of the total effect, and the importance of the moral obligation pathway fell from 31 to 29 percent of the total effect. In general, though, our substantive conclusions remained the same.
Figure 13: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Linear Model)

Note: Estimated by adapting the methods in Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011) to accommodate an experimental design with three mediators. For this figure, all models were linear.

Figure 14: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Probit Model)

Note: Estimated by adapting the methods in Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011) to accommodate an experimental design with three mediators. For this figure, probit regression was used to model support for war.
III. LUCID SURVEY: QUESTIONS AND SAMPLING

Note: In addition to answering the same questions as in the YouGov study, respondents answered six questions about moral foundations.

CARE
If the U.S. does not send its military, the country that was invaded would suffer serious harm to its safety and security.
○ Agree strongly
○ Agree somewhat
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Disagree somewhat
○ Disagree strongly

FAIRNESS
If the U.S. does not send its military, this would be unfair to the country that was invaded.
○ Agree strongly
○ Agree somewhat
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Disagree somewhat
○ Disagree strongly

LOYALTY
If the U.S. does not send its military, this would be disloyal to the country that was invaded.
○ Agree strongly
○ Agree somewhat
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Disagree somewhat
○ Disagree strongly

AUTHORITY
If the U.S. does not send its military, this would show disobedience to higher authorities.
○ Agree strongly
○ Agree somewhat
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Disagree somewhat
○ Disagree strongly
LIBERTY
If the U.S. does not send its military, this would be a threat to the liberty of people in the invaded country.
- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

SANCTITY
If the U.S. does not send its military, this would increase the spread of germs and diseases.
- Agree strongly
- Agree somewhat
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Disagree strongly

SAMPLING
The Lucid survey was fielded in in December 2017 and June 2018. Lucid used quota sampling to ensure that the sample was diverse with respect to gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic region. Our final sample had 2,703 respondents.
IV. LUCID SURVEY: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Figure 15: Effect of Alliances on Support for War

Figure 16: Effect of Alliances on Support for War (Five-Point Scale)

Note: Respondents were asked: “Do you favor or oppose sending the U.S. military to stop the invasion?” For this figure, the dependent variable was 0 if oppose strongly, 1 if oppose somewhat, 2 if neither favor nor oppose, 3 if favor somewhat, and 4 if favor strongly.

Figure 17: Effect of Alliances, by Region
Figure 18: Effects of All Treatments on Support for War

Figure 19: Support for War With and Without Alliances
Figure 20: Effect of Alliances, by Context

Figure 21: Effect of Alliances, by Underlying Support for War
Figure 22: Effects of Alliances on Mediators

Figure 23: Effects of Mediators on Support for War

Figure 24: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms
Figure 25: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Linear Model)

Note: Estimated by adapting the methods in Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011) to accommodate an experimental design with three mediators. For this figure, all models were linear.

Figure 26: Causal Mechanisms via Potential Outcomes (Probit Model)

Note: Estimated by adapting the methods in Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011) to accommodate an experimental design with three mediators. For this figure, probit regression was used to model support for war.
Figure 27: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (As in the Article)

Figure 28: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Potential Outcomes)

Note: Estimated by adapting the methods in Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011) to accommodate an experimental design with three mediators. For this figure, the dependent variable (moral obligation) was scaled from 0 to 100 and all models were linear.
Figure 29: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Democrats)

Note: N=1,042 respondents who identified with the Democratic Party.

Figure 30: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Democrats)

Note: N=1,042 respondents who identified with the Democratic Party.

Figure 31: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Democrats)

Note: N=1,042 respondents who identified with the Democratic Party.
Figure 32: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Independents)

Note: N=875 respondents who did not identify as Democrat or Republican.

Figure 33: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Independents)

Note: N=875 respondents who did not identify as Democrat or Republican.

Figure 34: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Independents)

Note: N=875 respondents who did not identify as Democrat or Republican.
Figure 35: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Republicans)

Note: N=786 respondents who identified with the Republican Party.

Figure 36: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Republicans)

Note: N=786 respondents who identified with the Republican Party.

Figure 37: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Moral Obligation (Republicans)

Note: N=786 respondents who identified with the Republican Party.
Figure 38: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Liberals)

Note: N=894 extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal.

Figure 39: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Liberals)

Note: N=894 extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal.

Figure 40: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Morality (Liberals)

Note: N=894 extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal.
Figure 41: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Moderates)

Note: N=876 respondents who were moderate.

Figure 42: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Moderates)

Note: N=876 respondents who were moderate.

Figure 43: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Morality (Moderates)

Note: N=876 respondents who were moderate.
Figure 44: Effects of Alliances on Moral Foundations (Conservatives)

Note: N=933 extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative.

Figure 45: Effects of Moral Foundations on Moral Obligation (Conservatives)

Note: N=933 extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative.

Figure 46: Estimates of Causal Mechanisms for Morality (Conservatives)

Note: N=933 extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative.