Bibliography of Learning in Games: Theory, Experiment, and Related Subjects

by Alvin E. Roth

(new additions always welcome:al_roth@harvard.edu )

Abbink, Klaus, Gary E. Bolton, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Fang-Fang Tang, "Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," mimeo, July 1996.

Andreoni, James (1988), "Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments," Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304.

Andreoni, James (1995), "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, CX, 1-21.

Andreoni, James (1995), "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?" American Economic Review, 85, September, 891-904.

Andreoni, James and John H. Miller, ``Auctions with Adaptive Artificial Agents,'' Journal of Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1995):39--64.

Aoyagi, Masaki [1992], "Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games," mimeo, Princeton F,B

Ariely, Dan, Axel Ockenfels, and Alvin E. Roth, "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions,"  Rand Journal of Economics, 36, 4, Winter 2005, 891-908.

Arthur, W. Brian [1991], "Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents: A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 81, May, 353-359.

Arthur, W. Brian [1993], "On Designing Economic Agents that Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 3, 1-22.

Atkinson, Richard C. and Patrick Suppes [1958], "An analysis of two-person game situations in terms of statistical learning theory," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55, 369-78.

Barron, G., "The effect of experience on decision making under uncertainty," Masters Thesis, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 2000.

Bereby-Meyer, Y., and I. Erev, "On learning to become a successful loser: A comparison of alternative abstraction of learning processes in the loss domain," Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42 (1998), 266-286.

Bereby-Meyer, Yoella and Alvin E. Roth, "Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation,"  American Economic Review, 1. 96, 4, September 2006, 1029-1042.

Binmore, Kenneth G. and Larry Samuelson [1992], "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, 57, 278-305.

Binmore, Kenneth G. and Larry Samuelson [1993], "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," mimeo. E

Binmore, Kenneth G., J. Gale, and Larry Samuelson [1995], "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior,

Binmore, K., J. Swierzbinski, S. Hsu, and C. Proulx (1993), "Focal Points and Bargaining," International Journal of Game theory, 22 (4), p. 381-409.

Blackburn, J. M. [1936], "Acquisition of skill: An analysis of learning curves," IHRB Report No. 73.

Bloomfield, R. (1995): "Learning a Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in the Laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 63, 1995.

Borgers, Tilman, Antonio Morales, and Rajiv Sarin [1997], "Simple Behaviour Rules Which Lead to Expected Payoff Macimising Choices," mimeo, University College, London.

Borgers, Tilman and Rajiv Sarin [1997], "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 1, November, 1-14.

Borgers, Tilman and Rajiv Sarin [1995], "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," mimeo, University College, London.

Bornstein, G., Erev, I., and Goren, H. (1994). Learning processes and reciprocality in intergroup conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 690-707.

Bornstein, Gary, Eyal Winter, and Harel Goren [1996], "Learning processes and reciprocity in intergroup conflicts," European Journal of Political Economy Volume 12, Issue 4, 17-December-1996. Abstract

Bornstein, Gary, Eyal Winter, and Harel Goren [1996], "Experimental Study of Repeated Team Games, " European Journal of Political Economy Volume 12, Issue 4, 17-December-1996.

Bosch, Antoni and Shyam Sunder, "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," working paper, 1995.

Boylan, R. T., and M. A. El-Gamal (1993): "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 205-222.

Brandts, Jordi and Charles A. Holt (1992), "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, 82, December, 1350-1365.

Brandts, J. and C. Holt (1993), "Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signalling Games," International Journal of Game theory, 22 (3), p. 279-302.

Brown, G. W. (1951): "Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play," in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, ed. by T. J. Koopmans. New York: Wiley.

Bush, Robert and Frederick Mosteller [1955], "Stochastic Models for Learning," New York, Wiley.

Cabrales, Antonio [1992], "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," mimeo, UCSD, F

Camerer, Colin and Teck-Hua Ho, "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in games: Estimates from Weak Link Games," in David Budescu, Ido Erev, and Rami Zwick, editors, "Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport," Erlbaum, 1999 31-51.

Camerer, C. F., and T. Ho, "Experience-Weighted Attraction in Games," Econometrica, 67 (1999), 827-874.

Chen, Shu-Heng, John Duffy, and Chia-Hsuan Yeh, "Equilibrium Selection via Adaptation: Using Genetic Programming to Model Learning in a Coordination Game," mimeo, University of Pittsburgh, May 1996.

Chen, Yan and Fang-Fang Tang, "Learning and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.

Cheung, Yin-Wong and Daniel Friedman [1994], "Learning in Evolutionary Games: Some Laboratory Results," mimeo, UC Santa Cruz.

Cheung, Yin-Wong and Daniel Friedman, "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, v 19, n 1, April 1997, p46-76.

Cheung, Yin-Wong and Daniel Friedman, "A Comparison of Learning and Replicator Dynamics Using Experimental Data," October 1996.

Cho, In-Koo [1995], "Perceptrons Play the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 67, 266-284.

Cho, In-Koo "Learning to Coordinate in Repeated Games," mimeo, May 1997, Brown University.

Cooper, David J. [1993], "Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting," mimeo.

Cooper, David and Nick Feltovich [1995], "Reinforcement-Based Learning vs. Bayesian Learning: A Comparison," draft mimeo.

Cooper, David J., Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, and Rami Zwick, "Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games," Experimental Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2003, 181-207.

Cooper, David J., Garvin, Susan and Kagel, John H., "Adaptive learning versus equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game, Economic Journal, Vol. 107 (1997), pp.553-575.

Cooper, David J., Garvin, Susan and Kagel, John H., "Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game" RAND Journal of Economics Vol.28, No.4, Winter 1997.

Cox, J. and M. Walker: Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies. U. of Arizona, October 1994.

Cox, J., J. Shachat, and M. Walker: An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning in normal form games. U. of Arizona, March 1995.

Cox, J., J. Shachat, and M. Walker: An experimental test of Bayesian vs. adaptive learning in normal form games. U. of Arizona, July 1995.

Crawford, Vincent (next 10 papers all by Crawford):
Learning Theory "Learning the Optimal Strategy in a Zero-Sum Game," Econometrica 1974, 885-891 "Learning Behavior and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1985, 69-78 "Learning and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games," Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 140 (23 October 1989), 537-550 "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," (with Hans Haller), Econometrica 1990, 571-595 "Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in Large- and Finite-Population 'Playing the Field' Models," Journal of Theoretical Biology , vol. 145 (9 July 1990), 83-94; reprinted in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique 1992, 299313 299-313

Learning in Experiments (still by Vince Crawford): "An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination," Games and Economic Behavior 1991, 25-59 "Introduction: Adaptive Dynamics, Parts I and II," Games and Economic Behavior 1993, 315-319 and 509-513 "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica 1995, 103-143 "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction," UCSD Discussion Paper 95-37, to appear in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 198 1996 Crawford, Vincent and Bruno Broseta, "What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play" American Economic Review, in press.

Cross, John G. [1983], "A Theory of Adaptive Economic Behavior," Cambridge University Press.

Dawid, Herbert and Alexander Mehlmann [1995], "Genetic Learning in Strategic Form Games," mimeo, Technische Universitat Wien, forthcoming in Complexity.

Duffy, John and Nick Feltovich (1999) "Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 131-152.

Duffy, John and Rosemarie Nagel (1996), "On the Robustness of Behavior in Experimental Guessing Games," mimeo.

Easley, D. and J. Ledyard (1986), "Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions, " Social Science Working Paper 611, Caltech.(book edited by Dan Friedman and John Rust)

El-Gamal, M., R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey (1993), "A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games, " Journal of the American Statistical Association, June, vol.88, No.422, p.428-435.

El-Gamal, M., R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey (1994), "Learning in Experimental Games," Economic Theory, p901-922.

Erev, Ido (1995), "A Cognitive Game Theoretical Model of Binary Categorization Decisions Under Uncertainty," mimeo, Technion.

Erev, I. (1998). Signal detection by human observers: A cutoff reinforcement learning model of categorization decisions under uncertainty. Psychological Review, 105, 280-298.

Erev, Ido, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Alvin E. Roth, "The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: Experimental investigation, and a reinforcement learning model with self-adjusting speed of learning," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39,1 May 1999, 111-128.

Erev, I., & Rapoport, A. (1998). Magic, reinforcement learning and coordination in a market entry game. Games and Economic Behavior,23, 146-175.

Erev, Ido and Alvin E. Roth (1995) "On the need for low rationality, cognitive game theory: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria," mimeo.

Erev, Ido and A.E. Roth "Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria," American Economic Review, 88,4, September 1998, 848-881.

Erev, Ido and Alvin E. Roth "On the role of reinforcement learning in experimental games: The cognitive game theory approach," In D. Budescu, I Erev & R. Zwick (eds.) Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, Erlbaum, 1999, 53-77.

Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim, and Greg Barron, "Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations:� accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games,'' Economic Theory, special issue: Behavioral Game Theory Symposium, 33, October 2007, 29-51.

 

Feltovich, Nick (1995), "Learning and Equilibrium in an Asymmetric Information Game: An Experimental Study," mimeo, University of Pittsburgh.

Feltovich, Nick (2000), "Reinforcement-Based vs. Beliefs-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information Games," Econometrica, 68,3, May, 605-642.

Foster, Dean and R. Vohra (1997) "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium,"Games and Economic Behavior, (Special Issue in Honor of Robert Aumann), 21, Nos 1/2, October/November, 40-55.

Foster, Dean and H. Peyton Young [1990], "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Theoretical Population Biology, 38, 219-232.

Foster, Dean and H. Peyton Young (1995) "The non-convergence of fictitious play for a coordination game," mimeo, IIASA.

Friedman, D. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1991), pp. 637-666. E

Friedman, D. (1995) "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," University of California, San Diego: Working paper.

Friedman, D., and Y. W. Cheung: (1994) "Learning in Evolutionary Games," University of California, San Diego: Working paper.

Friedman, J. W. and A. Shmida (1992). "Pollination, Gathering Nectar, and the Distribution of Flower Species." E

Fudenberg, D. and D. M. Kreps (1993). "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 320-367.

Fudenberg, D. and D. Kreps (1993), "Learning in Extensive Form Games, I: Selfconfirming Equilibria," Economic Theory Discussion paper #11, Harvard Institute of Economic Research.

Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1993a], "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61, 523-545.

Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1993b], "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61, 547-573.

Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1994), "How irrational are Subjects in Extensive Form Games," mimeographed.

Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1997], "Theory of Learning in Games" book mss., http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/Papers/CONTENTS.HTM

Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1998], "Learning in games," European Economic Review Volume 42, Issue 3-5, 31-May-1998. Abstract

Garvin, Susan and John H. Kagel [1994], "Learning in common value auctions: Some initial observations," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25, 351-372.

Gilat, Sharon, Joachim Meyer, Ido Erev, and Daniel Gopher [1995], "Beyond Bayes' Theorem: The Effect of Base Rate Information in Consensus Games," mimeo, Research Center for Work Safety and Human Engineering, Technion.

Gjerstad, Steven, and John Dickhaut. ``Price Formation in Double Auctions,'' forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

Gjerstad, Steven. ``The Rate of Convergence of Continuous Fictitious Play," Economic Theory, 7: 161-178 (1996).

Green, Leonard, Paul C. Price, and Merle E. Hamburger [1995], "PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND THE PIGEON: CONTROL BY IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES," Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 64, 1-17.

Gode, Dhananjay K. and Shyam Sunder (1993), Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, 101:119-137

Gode, Dhananjay K. and Shyam Sunder (1993), "Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions," Chapter 7 in Dan Friedman and John Rust, editors, The Double Auction Market, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings Vol. XIV, New York, Addison-Wesley,199-214.

Gode, Dhananjay K. and Shyam Sunder (1997)"What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, forthcoming.

Gode, Dhananjay K. and Shyam Sunder (1997), "Double Auction Dynamics: Structural Consequences of Non-Binding Price Controls," working paper, Carnegie Mellon University, February.

Harley, Calvin B. [1981], "Learning the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy," Journal of Theoretical Biology, 89, 611-633.

Hart, Sergiu and Andreu Mas Colell [1997], "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," Discussion paper #126, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Haruvy, Ernan, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku �nver, "The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 3, March 2006, Pages 457-486.

Herrnstein, Richard J. (1970), "On the Law of Effect," Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 243-266.

Herrnstein, R.J., George F. Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec, and William Vaughan, Jr. [1993], "Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual Choice," Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 6, 149-185.

Hertwig, Ralph, Greg Barron, Elke U. Weber, and Ido Erev. "Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choices." Psychological Science (forthcoming).

Holland, John H. [1975], Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.

Holland, John H. and John H. Miller (1991), "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 81, 365-370.

Hopkins, Ed "Learning, Matching and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, January, 1999.

Hopkins, Ed "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, October, 1999.

Hopkins, Ed "Two Competing Models of Learning in Games," working paper, University of Edinburgh, 1999.

Jackson, M. and E. Kalai, "Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning," Calif. Inst. of Tech. DP 1995.

Jackson, M. and E. Kalai, "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Northwestern Univ. DP 1995.

Jamal, Karim and Shyam Sunder [1996], "Bayesian Equilibrium in Double Auctions Populated by Biased Heuristic Traders," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.

Jordan, J.S. [1991], "Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 60-81.

Jordan, J. S. (1993): "Three Problems in Learning Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 368-386.

Kagel, John H. and Alvin E. Roth [1995], Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Kalai, E. and E. Lehrer (1993) "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61, 1019-1045

Kalai,E. and E. Lehrer "Subjective Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, 61, 1993, 1231-1240.

Kalai,E. and E. Lehrer "Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions," JME 23, 1994, 73-86.

Kalai,E. and E. Lehrer "Subjective Games and Equilibria," GEB 8, 1995, 123-163.

Kalai,E. and E. Lehrer "Merging Economic Forecasts" , Northwestern Univ. DP 1994.

Kahneman, Daniel "Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective," in R. Tietz, W. Albers, R. Selten (eds.) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, Proceedings, Bielefeld, West Germany, 1986. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 314, Springer-Verlag. [early mention of "market entry" experiments].

Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993). "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, 61, 29-56. E

Kandori, M. and R. Rob (1992). "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications." E

Kirman, Alan and Mark Salmon (editors), "Learning and Rationality in Economics," Blackwell, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA, 1995.

Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller, and Scott Page, ``Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections,'' American Political Science Review, 86 (December, 1992):929--37.

Koyanagi, J., M. Ohnishi, and T. Ibaraki (1991). "Learning Algorithms for 2x2 Stochastic Games with Incomplete Information," SSE Working Paper WP-91-8, Tottori University.

Krishna, V. (1992). "Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Working Paper No. 92-073, Harvard Business School. F

Lehrer, E. and R. Smorodinsky (1995). "Compatible Measures and Merging", to appear in Math. of Oper. Res.

Lehrer, E. and R. Smorodinsky (1995). "Large Games with Incomplete Information". Tel-Aviv Univ. manuscript.

Macy, Michael W. [1991], "Learning to cooperate: Stochastic and tacit collusion in social exchange," American Journal of Sociology, 97, 808-843.

Mailath, G. J. (1992). "JET Symposium on Evolutionary Game Theory: Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, 57, August, 259-277. E

Matsui, A. and R. Rob. (1991). "Evolution, Rationality, and Equilibrium Selection in Societal Games." E

Maynard Smith, John [1982], Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press.

Maynard Smith, J. (et al.) "Game theory and the evolution of behavior," [and following commentary] The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1984, 7, 95-125.

McCabe, K., A Mukherji and D. Runkle, "An Experimental Study Of Learning And Limited Information In Games," Working Paper, University of Minnesota, February 1995

McKelvey, R. D., and T. R. Palfrey (1992): "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, 60, 803-836.

McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey [1995], "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 1, July, 6-38.

Merlo, A. and A. Schotter (1992), Procedural Rationality and Learning in One-person Decision Problems and Two-Person Games. NYU Economics manuscript.

Miyasawa, K. (1961): "On the Convergence of the Learning Process in a 2 x 2 Nonzero Sum Two-Person Game," Manuscript, Princeton University.

Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts, "Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1255-78.

Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts, "Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, February 1991, 82-100.

Milgrom, Paul "Learning to Bid," working paper, Stanford University, 1993.

Miller, John H.``The Evolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' in Two Essays on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1988.

Miller, John H. (1991), "A Strategic Taxonomy of Repeated 2x2 Games Played by Adaptive Agents," mimeo.

Miller, John H., ``The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29:1 (January, 1996)87-112.

Miller, John H. and James Andreoni (1991), Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments?," Economics Letters, 36, 9-15.

Monderer, D. and L. S. Shapley (1992). "Potential Games." F

Mookherjee, D., and B. Sopher (1994): "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 62-91.

Mookherji, Dilip and Barry Sopher, "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, v 19, n 1, April 1997, p97-132.

Moreno, D. and M. Walker: Two problems in applying Ljung's "projection algorithms" to the analysis of decentralized learning. JET, 1994, 420-427. (Theory)

Nachbar, J.H. [1990], "'Evolutionary' Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, 19, 59-89. E

Nagel, R. (1995), "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study" American Economic Review, December, 85, 1313-1326.

Nagel, Rosemarie and Fang Fang Tang (1998), "Experimental Results on the Centipede Game in Normal Form: An Investigation on Learning," Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 356-384. R

Nyarko, Y. (1992). "Bayesian Learning Without Common Priors and Convergence to Nash Equilibria," Economic Research Report No. 92- 25, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics. B

Ochs, Jack (1995), "Simple games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium: an experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 1, July, 202-217.

Posch, Martin (1997), "Cycling in a Stochastic Learning Algorithm for Normal Form Games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Volume 7, p. 193-207

Posch, Martin (1999), "Win Stay - Lose Shift strategies for repeated Games" Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 198 (2), 183-195

Posch, Martin, Alexander Pichler, and Karl Sigmund (1999), "The Efficiency of Adapting Aspiration Levels," Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series B, Volume 266 (1427), 1427-1436

Rapoport, Amnon, Ido Erev, Elizabeth V. Abraham, and David E. Olson [1997], "Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol 69, no. 1, January, 31-49.

Rapoport, Amnon, Darryl A. Seale, Ido Erev, and James A. Sundali [1998], "Coordination Success in Market Entry Games: Tests of Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning Models," Management Science, 44, 119-141.

Robinson, J. (1951). "An Iterative Method of Solving a Game," Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 296-301. F

Rossi, Alesandro, Massimo Warglien, and Enrico Zaninotto [1997], "Cooperation as illusory hill-climbing: Co-adaptation and search in social dilemmas," mimeo, Department of Business Administration, University of Venice, Italy.

Roth, Alvin E. and Ido Erev (1995), "Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Model in the Intermediate Term" , Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue: Nobel Symposium, vol. 8, January 1995, 164-212.

Roth, A.E. and Schoumaker, F. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study", American Economic Review, Vol. 73, 1983, 362-372.

Roth, Alvin E. and Xiaolin Xing [1994], "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, .

Rust, John, John H. Miller, and Richard Palmer, ``Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market,'' in The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, D. Friedman and J. Rust (eds), Addison Wesley (1992):155--98.

Rust, John, John H. Miller, and Richard Palmer, ``Characterizing Effective Trading Strategies: Insights from a Computerized Double Auction Tournament,'' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 18 (1994):61--96.

Rustichini, Aldo [1997], "Optimal Properties of Stimulus-Response Learning Models," mimeo, CentER, Tilburgh University.

Sarin, Rajiv and Farshid Vahid, "Predicting how people play games: A simple dynamic model of choice," Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.

Selten, Reinhard [1991], "Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 3-24.

Selten, R. and J. Buchta (1994), "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auction with Directly Observed Bid Functions", discussion paper.

Shapley, L. S. (1964) "Some Topics in Two-Person Games," Advances in Game Theory, M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley, and A.W. Tucker, editors, Princeton University Press, pp. 1-28. F

Slonim, R. and A.E. Roth "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, 66, 3, May 1998, 569-596.

Sobel, Joel [1992], "Evolutionary Stability in Communication Games," mimeo, UCSD F

Sonsino, Doron "Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, v 18, n 2, February 1997, p286-331

Stahl, Dale O. (1992). "Evolution of Smartn Players." E

Stahl, Dale O. (1996) "Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game," Games and Economic Behavior, 16, 303-330.

Stahl, Dale O. (1997), "Evidence Based Rules and Learning in Symmetric Normal Form Games," International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.

Stahl, Dale O. (1997), "Local Rule Learning: Theory and Evidence," working paper, U. Texas at Austin. [stahl@eco.utexas.edu]

Suppes, P. and R. Atkinson (1960), "Marcov Learning Models for Multiperson Interaction", Stanford University Press.

Swinkels, Jeroen M. (1993), "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.

Tang, Fang-Fang [1995], "Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games: An Experimental Study," dissertation, University of Bonn, forthcoming.

Thorndike, Edward L. [1898], Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative processes in animals, Psychological Monographs, 2

Tsetlin, Mikhail L'vovich [1973], "Automaton Theory and Modeling of Biological Systems," (translated from the Russian), Academic Press, New York.

Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio, R.O. Beil (1990), "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure", American Economic Review, 80, 234-248. (and other papers by same authors...)

Van Huyck, J., R. Battalio, and R. Beil [1991], "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection Principles, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 885-910.

Van Huyck, J. R., R. Battalio, S. Mathur, A. Ortmann, and P. Van Huyck (1991): "On the Origins of Convention: Evidence From Symmetric Bargaining Games," Working Paper, Texas A&M University.

Van Huyck, John B, Joseph P. Cook, and Raymond C. Battalio [1994], "Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 102, 975-1005.

Van Huyck, John B, Raymond C. Battalio, and Frederick W. Rankin [1995], "Selection Dynamics and Adaptive Behavior without much Information," mimeo, TAMU Economics Laboratory.(http://econlab10.tamu.edu/JVH_gtee/os6_1_0.htm)

Vriend, Nicolaas J. [1996], "Does Reasoning Enhance Learning?" mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain.

Weibull, Jorgen W. [1995], Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press.

Yechiam, Eldad, and Greg Barron. "Learning to Ignore Online Help Requests." Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory (forthcoming).

Young, H. Peyton [1993], "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, 61, 57-84.

Young, H. Peyton (1991), "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," SFI working paper (Journal of Economic Theory, 59, February, 1993, 145- 168?)

Young, H. Peyton [1997], Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions," Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

Young, H. Peyton [1998], "Individual learning and social rationality," European Economic Review, Volume 42, Issue 3-5, 31-May-1998, Abstract

Young, H. Peyton, and Dean Foster (1991), "Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run," Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 145-156.