Peter J. Hammond

Articles, Book Chapters, and Research Papers

List of Topics

  1. Growth and Exhaustible Resources
  2. Rational Individual Choice and Consequentialism
  3. Game Theory and Consequentialism
  4. Consequentialist Social Choice and Utilitarian Ethical Theory
  5. Social Choice: General
  6. Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparisons
  7. Social Choice with Individual and Group Rights
  8. Distributional Objectives in Welfare Economics
  9. General Equilibrium Theory and Market Efficiency
  10. Gains from Trade and Migration
  11. Widespread Externalities and the f-Core
  12. Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets
  13. Private Information and Incentive Constraints
  14. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Policy Reform, and Welfare Measurement
  15. Welfare, Information and Uncertainty
  16. Miscellaneous Work in Welfare Economics and Ethics
  17. Continuum of Random Variables
  18. Empirics, Statistics, Experiments, and Other Topics

Growth and Exhaustible Resources

(with James A. Mirrlees) “Agreeable Plans,” in J.A. Mirrlees and N.H. Stern (eds.) Models of Economic Growth (Proceedings of a Conference of the International Economic Association, Jerusalem, 1970) (London: Macmillan, 1973), ch. 13, pp. 283–299.
Reprinted in James A. Mirrlees Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation (Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 19.
Chapter Summary; Oxford Scholarship Online link to chapter

“Agreeable Plans with Many Capital Goods,” Review of Economic Studies 42 (1975), 1–14.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

(with Edwin Burmeister) “Maximin Paths of Heterogeneous Capital Accumulation and the Instability of Paradoxical Steady States,” Econometrica 45 (1977), 853–870.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

(with John F. Kennan) “Uniformly Optimal Infinite Horizon Plans,” International Economic Review 20 (1979), 283–296.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

(with Avinash K. Dixit and Michael Hoel) “On Hartwick's Rule for Constant Utility and Regular Maximin Paths of Capital Accumulation and Resource Depletion,” Review of Economic Studies 47 (1980), 551–6.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

(with Andrés Rodríguez-Clare) “On Endogenizing Long-Run Growth,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95 (1993), 391–425; also in T.M. Andersen and K.O. Moene (eds.) Endogenous Growth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 1–35.
Abstract; PDF version of preprint; JSTOR link for paper

- “Overture Plans of Accumulation for an Infinite Horizon,” University of Essex, Economics Discussion Paper No. 52 (1974).

Discussion of A.K. Dixit, “Comparative Dynamics from the Point of View of the Dual” in J.M. Parkin (ed.), Modern Economics (Proceedings of the Conference of the Association of University Teachers of Economics, Aberystwyth, 1972), pp. 47–49.

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Rational Individual Choice and Consequentialism

“Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice,” Review of Economic Studies 43 (1976), 159–173; reprinted in K.J. Lancaster (ed.) Consumer Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999) ch. 23, pp. 367–381.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“Total Discounted Demands and Long-Period Preferences,” Economic Record 52 (1976), 26–35.
Abstract; Wiley Online Library link for paper

“Endogenous Tastes and Stable Long-Run Choice,” Journal of Economic Theory 13 (1976), 329–340.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link for paper

“Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice,” Economica 44 (1977), 337–350.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“Consequentialism and the Independence Axiom,” in B.R. Munier (ed.) Risk, Decision and Rationality (Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theories) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), pp. 503–516.
PDF copy; Springer link for paper

“Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility,” Theory and Decision 25 (1988), 25–78.
Abstract; PDF version of preprint

“Orderly Decision Theory: A Comment on Professor Seidenfeld,” Economics and Philosophy 4 (1988), 292–297.
Online version

“Consistent Plans, Consequentialism, and Expected Utility,” Econometrica 57 (1989), 1445–1449.
JSTOR link for paper

“Consequentialism, Structural Rationality and Game Theory,” in K.J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt (eds.) The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour (IEA Conference Volume No. 114) (London: Macmillan, 1996) ch. 2, pp. 25–42.
Abstract; PDF version of preprint

“Subjectively Expected State-Independent Utility on State-Dependent Consequence Domains,” in M.J. Machina and B. Munier (eds.) Beliefs, Interactions, and Preferences in Decision Making (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1999), pp. 7–21.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

Two chapters for the Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1: Principles (edited with Salvador Barberà and Christian Seidl; Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) on:

“Objective Expected Utility: A Consequentialist Perspective,” ch. 5, pp. 145–211;
PDF file of preprint
“Subjective Expected Utility,” ch. 6, pp. 213–271.
PDF file of preprint

“Rationality in Economics,” Rivista internazionale di Scienze sociali Anno CV (1997), 247–288.
PDF file of preprint; JSTOR link for paper

“Schumpeterian Innovation in Modelling Decisions, Games, and Economic Behaviour,” History of Economic Ideas XV (2007), 179–195.
Abstract; PDF file of reprint

(with Horst Zank) “Rationality and Dynamic Consistency under Risk and Uncertainty,” in Mark J. Machina and W. Kip Viscusi (eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol 1 (Oxford: North Holland, 2014) ch.. 2, pp.. 41–97.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

- “Subjective Probabilities with State Independent Utilities on State Dependent Consequence Domains,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 520 (1987).

- “How Restrictive Are Information Partitions?”
Abstract; PDF file

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Game Theory and Consequentialism

“Charity: Altruism or Cooperative Egoism?” in E.S. Phelps (ed.), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), pp. 115–131.
PDF copy (to be read onscreen or printed in LANDSCAPE mode); JSTOR access to book

“The Core and Equilibrium through the Looking-Glass,” Australian Economic Papers 16 (1977), 211–218.
Abstract; PDF file, including following item; Wiley Online Library link

“Voluntary Contracts and Jam in the Far Future,” Australian Economic Papers 17 (1978), 363–364.
Wiley Online Library link

“Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior,” in K. Binmore, A.P. Kirman, and P. Tani (eds.) Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T Press, 1993), ch. 14, pp. 277–305.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Elementary Non-Archimedean Representations of Probability for Decision Theory and Games,” in P. Humphreys (ed.) Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. I: Probability and Probabilistic Causality (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), ch. 2, pp. 25–59.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

“Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games,” in W. Leinfellner and E. Köhler (eds.) Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics. In Honor of John C. Harsanyi. (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5) (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997) pp. 187–196.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

“Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility,” in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms (eds.) The Logic of Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) ch. 2, pp. 39–66; also in A. Bachem, U. Derigs, M. Jünger and R. Schrader (eds.) Operations Research '93 (Extended Abstracts of the 18th Symposium on Operations Research held at the University of Cologne, September 1–3, 1993) (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1994), pp. 219-250.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

“Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games,” Stanford University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 97-038; abbreviated version published in Mathematical Social Sciences 38 (1999), 139–156.
Abstract; PDF file of working paper ; Science Direct link to published version

“Expected Utility in Non-Cooperative Game Theory,” in S. Barberà, P.J. Hammond, and C. Seidl (eds.) Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 2: Extensions (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), ch. 18, pp. 982–1063.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Utility Invariance in Non-Cooperative Games,” in Ulrich Schmidt and Stefan Traub (eds.) Advances in Public Economics: Utility, Choice, and Welfare: A Festschrift for Christian Seidl (Springer Verlag, 2005), pp. 31–50.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk” in Prasanta Pattanaik, Koichi Tadenuma, Yongsheng Xu, and Naoki Yoshihara (eds.) Rational Choice and Social Welfare: Theory and Applications (Essays in Honor of Kotaro Suzumura) (Berlin: Springer, 2008), pp. 215–233.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Isolation, Assurance and Rules: Can Rational Folly Supplant Foolish Rationality?” in Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (eds.) Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I, Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 28, pp. 523–534.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

- “Time, the Surprise Examination, and Prisoner's Dilemma,” University of Essex, Economics Discussion Paper No. 45 (1972).

- “Sophisticated Dynamic Equilibria for Extensive Games” (1982, to be revised).

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Consequentialist Social Choice and Utilitarian Ethical Theory

“Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty,” in P.K. Pattanaik and M. Salles (eds.) Social Choice and Welfare (North-Holland, 1983), ch. 10, pp. 175–205.
Science Direct link

“Consequentialist Social Norms for Public Decisions,” in W.P. Heller, R.M. Starr and D.A. Starrett (eds.), Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 1, pp. 3–27;
PDF copy
Italian translation published in L. Sacconi (ed.) La decisione: Razionalità collettiva e strategie nell'amministrazione e nelle organizzazioni (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1986), ch. 2, pp. 60–88.

“Consequentialist Demographic Norms and Parenting Rights,” Social Choice and Welfare 5 (1988), 127–145; also in W. Gaertner and P.K. Pattanaik (eds.) Distributive Justice and Inequality (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988), pp. 39–57.
Abstract; PDF file of reprint; Springer Link

“Consequentialist Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,” in F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci (eds.) Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 92–118.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Well-Being from One Economist's Perspective,” discussion of T.M. Scanlon's Tanner Lecture on Human Values at the University of Michigan, October 1996 (later included as ch. 3 of his book What We Owe to Each Other).
PDF file of preprint

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Social Choice: General

“Social Choice: The Science of the Impossible?” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy (Macmillan and New York University Press, 1987), ch. 1B, pp. 116–131. Springer Link

(with Georges Bordes and Michel Le Breton) “Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 7 (2005), 1–25.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Wiley Online Library link

- “Consistent Dynamic Social Choice Procedures,” preprint, Australian National University, 1975.

- “Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction,” Stanford University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 99-021; revised in October 2020 as CRETA Working Paper No. 66, University of Warwick.
Abstract; PDF file

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Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparisons

“Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle,” Econometrica 44 (1976), 793–804; reprinted in K.J. Arrow and G. Debreu (eds.), Landmark Papers in General Equilibrium Theory, Social Choice and Welfare (Edward Elgar, 2002), ch. 35, pp. 679–690; and (without appendix) in F.H. Hahn and M. Hollis (eds.), Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. X, pp. 155–163.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“Why Ethical Measures of Inequality Need Interpersonal Comparisons,” Theory and Decision 7 (1976), 263–274.
Abstract; PDF file of reprint; Springer link

“Equity in Two-Person Situations: Some Consequences,” Econometrica 47 (1979), 1127–1135.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“On Reconciling Arrow's Theory of Social Choice with Harsanyi's Fundamental Utilitarianism,” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy (Macmillan and New York University Press, 1987), ch. 4, pp. 179–221.
PDF copy; Springer Link

“Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons,” Social Choice and Welfare 8 (1991), 1–19.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer Link

“Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and how they are and should be made,” in J. Elster and J.E. Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 7, pp. 200–254; reprinted in A.P. Hamlin (ed.) Ethics and Economics, Vol. I (Edward Elgar, 1996), ch. 22, pp. 410–464.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Link to published chapter

“Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations,” in R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pp. 305–319.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

(with Marc Fleurbaey) “Interpersonally Comparable Utility,” in S. Barberà, P.J. Hammond, and C. Seidl (eds.) Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 2: Extensions (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) ch. 21, pp. 1181–1285.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

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Social Choice with Individual and Group Rights

“Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle,” in L.J. Cohen, J. Łoś, H. Pfeiffer and K.-P. Podewski (eds.), Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science VI, (North-Holland, 1982), pp. 607–620.
Publisher’s Summary

“Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights,” in W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N. Schofield (eds.), Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 3, pp. 55–77.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights,” in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.) Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. II (IEA Conference Volume No. 117) (London: Macmillan, 1997) ch. 11, pp. 82–95.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

“Rights, Free Exchange, and Widespread Externalities,” in J.-F. Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel and A. Trannoy (eds.) Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), ch. 11, pp. 139–157.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Difficulties with the Social Choice Approach to Rights: Some comments on Brunel and Salles,” in J.-F. Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel and A. Trannoy (eds.) Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), ch. 8, pp. 112–5.
PDF file of preprint

“Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate,” Social Choice and Welfare (Special issue on “The axiomatic theory of resource allocation - In honour of Louis Gevers” edited by C. d'Aspremont and F. Maniquet) 21 (2003), 181–193.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint ; Springer link

- “On Dynamic Liberalism,” preprint, Australian National University, 1974.

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Distributional Objectives in Welfare Economics

“A Note on Extreme Inequality Aversion,” Journal of Economic Theory 11 (1975), 465–467.
ScienceDirect link.

“Dual Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Welfare Economics of Income Distribution,” Journal of Public Economics 7 (1977), 51–71.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link.
“ ... : A Corrigendum,” Journal of Public Economics 14 (1980), 105–6
ScienceDirect link.

“Economic Welfare with Rank Order Price Weighting,” Review of Economic Studies 45 (1978), 381–384.
JSTOR link for paper

“The Economics of Justice and the Criterion of Wealth Maximization,” Yale Law Journal 91 (1982), 1493–1507.
JSTOR link for paper

“Progress in the Theory of Social Choice and Distributive Justice,” in S. Zandvakili (ed.) Research in Economic Inequality, Vol. 7: Inequality and Taxation pp. 87–106; revised version of English original whose Italian translation was published in L. Sacconi (ed.) La decisione: Razionalità collettiva e strategie nell' amministrazione e nelle organizzazioni (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1986), ch. 3, pp. 89–106.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

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General Equilibrium Theory and Market Efficiency

“Irreducibility, Resource Relatedness, and Survival in Equilibrium with Individual Non-Convexities,” in R. Becker, M. Boldrin, R. Jones, and W. Thomson (eds.) General Equilibrium, Growth, and Trade II: The Legacy of Lionel W. McKenzie (San Diego: Academic Press, 1993), ch. 4, pp. 73–115.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Science Direct link to chapter

(with Jeffrey L. Coles) “Walrasian Equilibrium without Survival: Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Remedial Policy,” in K. Basu, P.K. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura (eds.) Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 3, pp. 32–64.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“The Efficiency Theorems and Market Failure,” in A.P. Kirman (ed.) Elements of General Equilibrium Analysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998) ch. 6, pp. 211–260.
PDF file of preprint

(with Antonio Villar) “Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the 'Scandinavian Consensus' Approaches,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 100 (1998), 11–32; also in T.M. Andersen and K.O. Moene (eds.) Public Policy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 11–32.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Wiley Online Library link to paper

(with Antonio Villar) “Valuation Equilibrium Revisited,” in A. Alkan, C.D. Aliprantis, and N.C. Yannelis (eds.) Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications: Proceedings of the Third International Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (Berlin: Springer, 1999), pp. 201–214.
Abstract; Springer Link to paper

(with Antonio Villar) “Efficiency and Core Properties of Valuation Equilibrium with Increasing Returns,” Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, WP-AD 2001-24.
Abstract;
PDF file; REPEC Link to working paper

“Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures,” in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. II (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2011), ch. 15, pp. 47–151.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Science Direct link to chapter

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Gains from Trade and Migration

“Credible Liberalization: Beyond the three theorems of neoclassical welfare economics,” in D. Bös (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, Vol. 3: Public Policy and Economic Organization (IEA Conference Volume No. 109) (London: Macmillan, 1993), ch. 3, pp. 21–39.
PDF file of preprint; Springer Link

(with Jaume Sempere) “Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies,” Economic Journal 105 (1995), 1180–1204.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“The International Allocation of Labour,” in Europa, migrazione e lavoro [Europe, Migration and Labour] (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2000), pp. 153–161.
PDF file of preprint

(with Jaume Sempere) “Gains from Trade versus Gains from Migration: What Makes Them So Different?” Journal of Public Economic Theory 8 (2006), 145–170.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Wiley Online Library

(with Jaume Sempere) “Migration with Local Public Goods and the Gains from Changing Places,” Economic Theory 41 (2009), 359–377.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

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Widespread Externalities and the f-Core

(with Mamoru Kaneko and Myrna Holtz Wooders) “Continuum Economies with Finite Coalitions: Core, Equilibrium and Widespread Externalities,” Journal of Economic Theory 49 (1989), 113–134.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link

“Four Characterizations of Constrained Pareto Efficiency in Continuum Economies with Widespread Externalities,” Japanese Economic Review 46 (1995), 103–124.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Wiley Online Library

“History as a Widespread Externality in Some Arrow-Debreu Market Games,” in G. Chichilnisky (ed.), Markets, Information and Uncertainty: Essays in Economic Theory in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) ch. 16, pp. 328–361.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“On f-Core Equivalence in a Continuum Economy with General Widespread Externalities,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 32 (1999), 177–184.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Science Direct link to journal issue

“History: Sunk Cost or Widespread Externality?” Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali (2007), n. 2, 161–185.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; JSTOR link

“The Power of Small Coalitions in Large Economies,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 501; in M.O.L. Bacharach, M.A.H. Dempster and J.L. Enos (eds.) Mathematical Models in Economics: Oxford University Mathematical Economic Seminar 25th Anniversary Volume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007) chapter 3.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint.

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Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets

“Overlapping Expectations and Hart's Conditions for Equilibrium in a Securities Model,” Journal of Economic Theory 31 (1983), 170-175; reprinted in J.-M. Grandmont (ed.), Temporary Equilibrium: Selected Readings (New York: Academic Press, 1988), pp. 156–161.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link

“General Asset Markets, Private Capital Formation, and the Existence of Temporary Walrasian Equilibrium,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 394 (1982).
PDF copy

- “On the Irrelevance of Share Contracts,” (1977) revised as “On the Irrelevance of Stock Markets under Constant Returns to Scale and Free Access,” (1979).

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Private Information and Incentive Constraints

“Symposium on Incentive Compatibility: Introduction,” Review of Economic Studies 46 (1979), 181–184.
JSTOR link

(with Partha S. Dasgupta and Eric S. Maskin) “The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility,” Review of Economic Studies (Symposium on Incentive Compatibility), 46 (1979), 185–216.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies,” Review of Economic Studies (Symposium on Incentive Compatibility), 46 (1979), 263–282.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

(with Partha S. Dasgupta and Eric S. Maskin) “On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control,” Review of Economic Studies 47 (1980), 857–860.
JSTOR link for paper

(with Partha S. Dasgupta) “Fully Progressive Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics 13 (1980), 141–154.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link

Discussion of E.S. Maskin, “First-Best Taxation,” in D. Collard, R. Lecomber and M. Slater (eds.) Income Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution (Bristol: Scientechnica, 1980), pp. 22–28.

“Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies,” Review of Economic Studies 54 (1987), 399–412; extended abstract in P. Kleinschmidt and F.J. Radermacher (eds.), Proceedings of the SOR Conference, Passau, 1987 pp. 57–8.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

Discussion of P. Champsaur, “Information, Incentives, and General Equilibrium,” in B. Cornet and H. Tulkens (eds.) Contributions to Operations Research and Economics: The Twentieth Anniversary of CORE (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1989), ch. 2, pp. 50–58.

“Incentives and Allocation Mechanisms,” in R. van der Ploeg (ed.) Advanced Lectures in Quantitative Economics (New York: Academic Press, 1990), ch. 6, pp. 213–248.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link

“On the Impossibility of Perfect Capital Markets,” in P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart, and E. Maskin (eds.), Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1992), pp. 527–560.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian Rationalizable Strategies,” in R.P. Gilles and P.H.M. Ruys (eds.), Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994) ch. 3, pp. 39–70.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer Link to book

(with José Córdoba) “Asymptotically Walrasian Strategy-Proof Exchange,” Mathematical Social Sciences 36 (1998), 185–212.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Science Direct Link

“Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann–Hildenbrand Macroeconomies,” in M. Wooders (ed.) Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann Fields Institute Communications Volume 23 (Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 1999), pp. 171–187.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Designing a Strategy-Proof Spot Market Mechanism with Many Traders: Twenty-Two Steps to Walrasian Equilibrium,” Economic Theory 63 (2017) Special Issue in Honor of Bernard Cornet: Part 2, pp. 1--50.
Abstract; Open Access

- “Incomplete Resource Allocation Mechanisms,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 361 (1981).

“Perfected Option Markets in Economies with Adverse Selection,” European University Institute, Working Paper 89/426; presented at the Econometric Society European Meeting, Munich, 1989.
Abstract; PDF file

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Cost-Benefit Analysis, Policy Reform, and Welfare Measurement

“Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Planning Procedure,” in D.A. Currie and W. Peters (eds.), Contemporary Economic Analysis, Vol. 2 (Proceedings of the Conference of the Association of University Teachers of Economics, 1978) (London: Croom-Helm, 1980), ch. 8, pp. 221–250.
PDF file of scanned copy with pages in the right order (!) and discussion by Partha Dasgupta.

“Approximate Measures of Social Welfare and the Size of Tax Reform,” in D. Bös, M. Rose, and C. Seidl (eds.), Beiträge zur neueren Steuertheorie (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1984), pp. 95–115.
Abstract; PDF copy; Springer Link

“Project Evaluation by Potential Tax Reform,” Journal of Public Economics 30 (1986), 1–36.
Abstract; ScienceDirect link

“Principles for Evaluating Public Sector Projects,” in P. Hare (ed.) Surveys in Public Sector Economics (Oxford: Basil Backwell, 1988), ch. 2, pp. 15–44.
PDF file of reprint

“Approximate Measures of the Social Welfare Benefits of Large Projects,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 410 (1983); in S. Dahiya (ed.) Theoretical Foundations of Development Planning, Vol. V: Project Evaluation (New Delhi: Concept Pub. Co., 1991).
PDF copy

“Money Metric Measures of Individual and Social Welfare Allowing for Environmental Externalities,” in W. Eichhorn (ed.) Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994), pp. 694–724.
Abstract; Springer Link; PDF file of minor revision

“Reassessing the Diamond–Mirrlees Efficiency Theorem,” in P.J. Hammond and G.D. Myles (eds.) Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics: Papers in Honour of Sir James Mirrlees (Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 12, pp. 193–216.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

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Welfare, Information and Uncertainty

“Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty,” Economica 48 (1981), 235–250.
Abstract; JSTOR link for paper

“Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information,” in A.K. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 1982), ch. 4, pp. 85–102.
Online access to book

“Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty,” in P.K. Pattanaik and M. Salles (eds.) Social Choice and Welfare (North-Holland, 1983), ch. 10, pp. 175–205.

- “On Welfare Economics with Incomplete Information and the Social Value of Public Information,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 332 (1981).

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Miscellaneous Work in Welfare Economics and Ethics

“Welfare Economics,” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1985), ch. 13, pp. 405–434.
Springer link

“Some Assumptions of Contemporary Neoclassical Economic Theology,” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) Joan Robinson and Modern Economic Theory (Macmillan, and New York University Press, 1989), ch. 4, pp. 186–257.
Abstract; PDF copy
Spanish translation published as “Algunos supuestos de la teología de la teoría económica neoclásica contemporánea” in Estudios Económicos de el Colegio de México 5 (1990), 3–81.

“Theoretical Progress in Public Economics: A Provocative Assessment,” Oxford Economic Papers 42 (1990), 6–33; also in P.J.N. Sinclair and M.D.E. Slater (eds.) Taxation, Private Information and Capital (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
Abstract; PDF copy; JSTOR link

“The Moral Status of Profits and Other Rewards: A Perspective from Modern Welfare Economics,” in R. Cowan and M.J. Rizzo (eds.) Profits and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), ch. 4, pp. 88–123.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

(with Giovanni Facchini and Hiroyuki Nakata) “Spurious Deadweight Gains,” Economics Letters 72 (2001), 33–37.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Science Direct link

“How to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Some Lessons from Public Economic Theory,” in H. Abele, T.C. Heller and S.P. Schleicher (eds.) Designing Climate Policy: The Challenge of the Kyoto Protocol (Vienna: Service Fachverlag, 2001), pp. 89–107.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint

“Catastrophic Risk, Rare Events, and Black Swans: Could There Be a Countably Additive Synthesis?” Warwick Economic Research Paper, no. 1060 (2015); Working Paper
in Graciela Chichilnisky and Armon Rezai (eds.) The Economics of the Global Environment: Catastrophic Risk in Theory and Policy (Springer International 2016) pp. 17–38.
Abstract; Springer Link

(with Graciela Chichilnisky) “The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Pareto Improvements to Policies that Mitigate Climate Change”
University of Warwick, CAGE Online Working Paper Series 287, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE); Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 16-009; in Maurizio Baussola, Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, and Marco Vivarelli (eds.) Essays in Honor of Luigi Campiglio (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2018) pp. 3–23.
Abstract; CAGE Working Paper; SIEPR Working Paper

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Continuum of Random Variables

All the following articles are co-authored with Yeneng Sun.

“Monte Carlo Simulation of Macroeconomic Risk with a Continuum of Agents: The Symmetric Case,” Economic Theory 21 (2003), 743–766; also in C.D. Aliprantis et al. (eds.) Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics: Essays in Honor of Mordecai Kurz (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003), pp. 709–732.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

“Joint Measurability and the One-way Fubini Property for a Continuum of Independent Random Variables,” Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 134 (2006), 737–747.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; AMS link

“The Essential Equivalence of Pairwise and Mutual Conditional Independence,” Probability Theory and Related Fields 135 (2006), 415–427.
Abstract; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

“Monte Carlo Simulation of Macroeconomic Risk with a Continuum of Agents: The General Case,” Economic Theory 36 (2008), 303–325.
Abstract; PDF file of Warwick Economics Research Paper; PDF file of preprint; Springer link

(with Lei Qiao as third co-author) “Monte Carlo Sampling Processes and Incentive Compatible Allocations in Large Economies,” University of Warwick CRETA Discussion Paper no. 54 (2019), forthcoming in Economic Theory.
Abstract; Springer access to online article

“The One-way Fubini Property and Conditional Independence: An Equivalence Result,” University of Warwick, CRETA (Centre for Research in Economic Theory and Applications), Working Paper no. 22, revised October 2020; to appear in Advances in Mathematics.
Abstract; Link to working paper

“Characterization of Risk: A Sharp Law of Large Numbers,” Warwick Economic Research Paper, no. 806 (2007); published as part of the above Economic Theory paper with Lei Qiao and Yeneng Sun.
Abstract; PDF file

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Empirics, Statistics, Experiments, and Other Topics

(with Bing Anderson and Cyrus A. Ramezani) “Affine Models of the Joint Dynamics of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45 (2010), 1341–1365.
Abstract; Cambridge Journals link

(with Federica Liberini and Eugenio Proto) “Individual Welfare and Subjective Well-Being: Comments on ‘Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth’ by Daniel W. Sacks, Betsey Stevenson, and Justin Wolfers,” in Claudia Sepúlveda, Ann Harrison, and Justin Yifu Lin (eds.) ABCDE 2011: Development Challenges in a Postcrisis World (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013) pp. 339–353.
Abstract; PDF file

(with Federica Liberini and Eugenio Proto) “Do Happier Britons Have More Income? First-Order Stochastic Dominance Relations” CAGE Online Working Paper 165, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, University of Warwick, 2013.
Abstract; PDF file

- (with Stefan Traub) “A Three-Stage Experimental Test of Revealed Preference,” CAGE Online Working Paper 71, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, University of Warwick, 2012.
Abstract; PDF file

- “Laboratory Games and Quantum Behaviour: The Normal Form with a Separable State Space,” Warwick Economics Research Paper, no. 969 (2011); presented at Quantum Physics Meets TARK, University of Groningen.
Abstract; PDF file

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Lectures and Other Items

Four Lectures on “Schumpeterian Themes in the Modern Welfare Economics of Production,”
all published in Christian Seidl (ed.), Lectures on Schumpeterian Economics (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1984).

“Schumpeter and the Economic Problems of Today” (ch. 1, pp. 3–13). Springer Link
“Is Entrepreneurship Obsolescent?” (ch. 3, pp. 31–43). Springer Link
“Must Monopoly Power Accompany Innovation?” (ch. 4, pp. 45–56). Springer Link
“What To Do About Business Cycles?” (ch. 5, pp. 59–75). Springer Link

Entries for “The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics” (London: Macmillan, 1987)

“Uncertainty”; reprinted in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) The New Palgrave: Utility and Probability (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 280–294; slightly revised for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance (London: Macmillan, 1992).

“Altruism”; reprinted in S. Zamagni (ed.) The Economics of Altruism (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995).
Springer Link

“Envy”; reprinted in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) The New Palgrave: Social Economics (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 45–48.
Springer Link

“The Role of Information in Economics,” in L'informazione nell'economia e nel diritto [Information in Economics and Law] (Milan: CARIPLO, 1990), pp. 177–193.
PDF file of preprint

“Ethics, Distribution, Incentives, Efficiency and Markets,” in I. Musu and S. Zamagni (eds.) Social and Ethical Aspects of Economics: A Colloquium in the Vatican (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 1992), pp. 51–63.
PDF file of preprint; PDF file of second edition (2011)

“Is There Anything New in the Concept of Sustainable Development?” in L. Campiglio, L. Pineschi, D. Siniscalco, and T. Treves (eds.), The Environment after Rio: International Law and Economics (London: Graham & Trotman, 1994), ch. 13, pp. 185–194.
PDF file of preprint

“Financial Distortions to the Incentives of Managers, Owners, and Workers,” in Le strutture del capitalismo e l'impresa nella società contemporanea [The Structures of Capitalism and the Firm in Contemporary Society] (Milan: CARIPLO, 1994), pp. 308–325.
PDF file of preprint

(with Luigi Campiglio) “Innovation and the World Economy: How will our (Grand) Children Earn a Living?” in Scienza, tecnologia, società alle soglie del XXI secolo [Science, Technology, and Society at the Threshold of the 21st Century] (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 1997), pp. 105–120.
PDF file of preprint

(with Claude d'Aspremont) “An Interview with John C. Harsanyi,” Social Choice and Welfare 18 (2001), 389–401.
Springer link

“Reassessing the Role of Public Institutions in a Private Economy”, Lecture to the 12th National Congress of Economics Students, Veracruz, Mexico, October 1999; Italian translation of revised version published as “Istituzione publiche ed economia privata” in L. Ornaghi (ed.) Globalizzazione: nuove richezze e nuove povertà, (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2001), pp. 65–84.
PDF file of preprint in English

“A Theorist's Reflections on Making Policy for an Intergenerational Global Economy”, first Arcelli Lecture at the University of Piacenza, April 2007.
PDF file of preprint

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Book Reviews of:

E. Malinvaud, Lectures in Microeconomic Theory (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972); in the Economic Journal 83 (1973), 543–5.
JSTOR link

J.R. Green and J.-J. Laffont, Incentives in Public Decision-Making (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979); in the Economic Journal 90 (1980), 407–8.
JSTOR link

H.I. Greenfield, A.M. Levenson, W. Hamovitch, and E. Rotwein (eds.), Theory for Economic Efficiency: Essays in Honor of Abba P. Lerner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979); in the Economic Journal 90 (1980), 667–9.
JSTOR link

J. Tinbergen, Production, Income and Welfare: The Search for an Optimal Social Order (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985); in the Journal of Economic Literature 25 (1987), 1316–7.
JSTOR link

K. Binmore and P.S. Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games and The Economics of Bargaining (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986 and 1987); in The Manchester School (1987), 319–21.

J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); in Ethics 100 (1989), 190–1.
JSTOR link

T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter (eds.), Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); in the Journal of Economic Literature 28 (1990), 1197–8.
JSTOR link

R. Hardin, Morality within the Limits of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); in Economics and Philosophy 7 (1991), 300–8.
PDF file of preprint

J. Broome, Counting the Cost of Global Warming (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1992); in Social Choice and Welfare 14 (1997), 465–7.
Springer link

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Based on file translated from TEX by TTH, version 2.21, on 10 Sep 1999, 11:21. Latest revision 25 October 2020.