Assistant Professor of Management Science and Engineering
I am a recipient of the NSF CAREER award and a Franz Edelman Laureate.
Research interests: market design, matching, mechanism design and game theory.
Huang Engineering Center, 262
475, Via Ortega
Stanford, CA, 94305
Students and Postdocs
Nima Haghpanah (Postdoc)
Ross Anderson (at Google)
I also worked with Vahideh Manshadi (at Yale SOM).
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof, with Yannai Gonczarowski.
- On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets, with Maximillien Burq and Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi (appears in EC 16).
- Min-cost bipartite perfect matching with delays, with Yossi Azar, Moses Charikar, Ashish Chiplunkar, Ofir Geri, Haim Kaplan, Rahul Makhijani, Yuyi Wang and Roger Wattenhofer.
- What matters in tie-breaking rules? How competition guides design, with Afshin Nikzad (appears in EC 16).
- Assigning more students to their top choices: A tiebreaking rule comparison, with Afshin Nikzad and Assaf Romm (appears in EC 15).
- Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogeneous pools, with Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi (abstract in EC 13), R&R at Management Science.
The Need for (Long) Chains in Eidney Exchange, with David Gamarnik, Michael
A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth, R&R at Operations Research.
- Ascending Unit Demand Auctions with Budget Limits, with Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim, Technical report.
Nead Chains in Transplantation, with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, December, 11, 2780-2781, 2011.
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests, with Flip Klijn, Social Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 23-33,2012.
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division, with Emin Karagozoglu and Bettina Klaus, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 63(3), 228-233, 2012.
Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rules by Anonymity, with Shigehiro, Social Choice and Welfare, 28(3),
Simultaneous Ad Auctions, with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(1),
Monotonicity and Implementability with Mark Braverman,
Hassidim and Dov Monderer, Econometrica,
78(5), 1749-1772, 2010.
Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness with Mark Braverman,
Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz, B.E.
journal of Theoretical Economics – Advances, forthcoming.
Mediators in Position Auctions, with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(1), 2009, (also in EC 07).
Routing Games with Unknown Active
Players , with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Artificial
Intelligence Journal, 173(15), 1441-1455, 2009.
On the Value of Correlation, with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Journal
of Artificial Intelligence, 33, 575-613, 2008, ( abstract in UAI 05).
- Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange, with Ross Anderson, David Gamarnik and Yash Kanoria, Operations Research, forthcoming (also in SODA 15).
- Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: the Stark Effect of Competition, with Yash Kanoria
and Jacob D. Leshno, Journal of Political Economy, 125(1), 69-98, 2017 (also in EC 13). Online appendix,Slides.
- This paper suggests that any matching market is likely to have a small core. See blog posts
- Finding Long Chains in Kidney Exchange Using the Traveling Salesman Problem, with Ross Anderson
David Gamarnik and Alvin Roth, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(3), 663-668, 2015.
- Optimal Allocation Without Money: an Engineering Approach, with Peng
Shi, Management Science, forthcoming (also in EC 14).
- First place: 2013 INFORMS Section on Public Programs, Services and Needs (SPPSN) best paper competition
- Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via
Correlated-Lottery Implementation, with Peng Shi. Operations Research, 62(6),1247-1264, 2014.
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities, with Mark Braverman and Avinatan
Hassidim, Operations Research, 62(4), 713-732, 2014 (also in EC 11).
- Previously called "Matching Markets with Couples - Revisited".
- Free Riding and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange, with Alvin
E. Roth, Theoretical Economics, 9, 817-865, 2014 (also in EC 11).
and Match, with Felix
A. Kash and Ariel D. Procaccia,
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming (also in EC 10).
New Challenges in Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange, with Alvin
E. Roth, American Economic Review (P&P), 102(3), 354-359, 2012
Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms, with Shahar Dobzinski and Ron Lavi, Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2),
- Winner of the outstanding paper award in EC 09.
Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation – Revisited, with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, 11(5), 984-994,
Covered in Nature
Papers in refereed conference proceedings (not appearing above)
Kidney exchange source code. Instructions for how to compile can be found here. An older version in c# can be found here (for both cycles and chains), which also generates
patient-donor pairs as well as compatibility matrices. The software finds an
allocation that maximizes the number of transplants using cycles and chains each of
a different bounded length. CPLEX is needed to use.