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Mohammad AkbarpourAssociate Professor of Economics |
About me
My research is on market design, redistributive mechanisms, and network theory. I frequently employ tools from computer science to tackle computationally complex economic problems. Here is a brief research statement.
Here is an older summary of my research in a 2018 interview.
Here is my C.V.
Papers (by subject)
Auction Market Design: Credibility and Computational Complexity
Credible Auctions: A Trilemma, [PDF], [SSRN] [Slides] [VideoPresentation]
with Shengwu Li
Econometrica, March 2020
Best Paper Award, EC’18.
In Quartz's list of 12 economics research that shaped our world in 2018
Non-technical Summary: Rigged Auctions?
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms, [PDF] [VideoPresentation]
with Scott Kominers, Kevin Li, Shengwu Li and Paul Milgrom
Forthcoming, Econometrica
At EC’21
Redistributive Market Design: Prices, Priorities, and Probabilistic Allocations
Comparison of Screening Devices, [PDF]
with Frank Yang and Piotr Dworczak
Working paper, 2023.
At EC’23
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization, [PDF]
with Eric Budish, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Kominers
Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics
At EC’22
Redistribution Through Markets, [PDF]
with Piotr Dworczak and Scott Kominers
At EC’18
Econometrica, July 2021
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms, [PDF] [VideoPresentation]
with Piotr Dworczak and Scott Kominers
Accepted, Journal of Political Economy
A Market-design Response to the European Energy Crisis, [PDF], with Filip Tokarski and Piotr Dworczak and Scott Kominers
Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms, [PDF], [Final RESTUD Version]
with Afshin Nikzad
Review of Economic Studies, January 2020
Centralized School Choice with Unequal Outside Options, [PDF]
with Adam Kapor, Christopher Neilson,Winnie van Dijk, and Seth Zimmerman
Journal of Public Economics, May 2022
Matching Market Design: Timing, Tokens, and Taboos
Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets, [PDF], [SSRN]
with Shengwu Li and Shayan Oveis Gharan
Journal of Political Economy, Lead Article, March 2020 (Also at EC’14)
A quick way to learn this paper is to watch the short videos:
Model (8mins)
Matching and Objective (6mins)
Designing algorithms (7mins)
Main theorems (5mins)
Proof ideas I (12mins)
Proof ideas II (6mins)
Value of information (9mins)
Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money, [PDF] NBER Working Paper
with Julien Combe, Yinghua He, Victor Hiller, Rob Shimer, and Olivier Tercieux.
Conditionally accepted, Review of Economic Studies
At EC’20
Global Kidney Chains, [LINK]
with Afshin Nikzad, Michael Rees, and Alvin Roth
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2022
The Iranian Market for Kidneys, [PDF]
with Farshad Fatemi and Negar Matoorian.
Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Political Economy
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets, [PDF] [Arxiv]
with Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li, and Amin Saberi.
At EC’22
Financing Transplant Costs of the Poor: A Dynamic Model of Global Kidney Exchange, [PDF]
with Afshin Nikzad, Michael Rees, and Alvin Roth.
Network Theory: Optimal Seeding and Optimal Lockdown
Diffusion in Networks and the Virtue of Burstiness
with Matthew Jackson
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, July 2018 (Also at EC’17)
[Link] [PDF] [Video of Talk]
Just a Few Seeds More: Value of Network Information for Diffusion, [PDF], [SSRN] [Video of Talk]
with Suraj Malladi and Amin Saberi.
Revise & Resubmit, American Economic Review
At EC’18
Socioeconomic Network Heterogeneity and Pandemic Policy Response, [PDF] NBER Working Paper
with Cody Cook, Aude Marzuoli, Simon Mongey, Abhishek Nagaraj, Matteo Saccarola, Pietro Tebaldi, Shoshana Vasserman, and Hanbin Yang
See the project website
Information Aggregation in Overlapping Generations, [SSRN]
with Amin Saberi and Ali Shameli.
A preliminary version of this paper won the Best Paper Award of WINE 2017
Revise & Resubmit, Operations Research